Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and legal malpractice, and defendants moved to strike the entire complaint as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz because defendants had no independent legal duty to plaintiffs nor did they act for their personal financial gain. Plaintiffs alleged that a former business associate of theirs, Stephen Bruce, who was a client of defendants, conspired with defendants to unlawfully withdraw from plaintiff SageMill and to usurp a nascent business opportunity of SageMill. The trial court denied the motion. The court reversed the trial court‘s order on plaintiffs‘ second cause of action for conspiracy as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz, finding that any advice defendants gave Bruce arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and thus was within the ambit of section 1714.10. The court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "Klotz v. Milbank,Tweed, Hadley & McCloy" on Justia Law

Smith, a California partnership, hired attorney Moncrief to perform due diligence for its purchase of equipment from Texas Hill in Arizona. Texas Hill was represented by Clark, an Arizona attorney. Moncrief performed a UCC search, called Clark, and left a voicemail. Clark called Moncrief in response and represented that Texas Hill was the sole owner of the equipment. Afterwards Clark sent Moncrief an e-mail, stating: “I have been the attorney for Texas Hill . . . and can state unequivocally that the cooling equipment you are buying is free and clear and is owned by Texas Hill.” Based on Clark’s representations, Moncrief advised Smith to go forward with the purchase. Smith later learned that Texas Hill did not own the equipment when they completed the transaction; New York Community Bank had acquired an interest in the equipment. Smith sued Moncrief for legal malpractice. Moncrief cross-complained against Clark. Clark moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court granted the motion. Clark’s conduct and his intentional misrepresentations were required to close the sale. Clark personally availed himself of the benefits of California when he reached into California to induce Moncrief’s client to complete the purchase. Moncrief’s claims arise out of Clark’s contacts with California. lark has not demonstrated that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. View "Moncrief v. Clark" on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the Board's decision rejecting petitioner's request for early termination of the probationary restrictions on his medical license. The Board revoked petitioner’s medical license, finding that he had engaged in sexual abuse and sexual misconduct during gynecological pelvic examinations. The court concluded that because the Board decision operated to restrict petitioner’s medical license, Bus. & Prof. Code 2337 applies to and controls the method of appellate review of the trial court’s ruling upholding the Board’s decision. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment denying petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate is not appealable. The court declined to exercise its discretion to treat petitioner's unauthorized appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Sela v. Medical Board of Cal." on Justia Law

In 2010, Debra Hackett was seriously injured in an accident in Sacramento County in which a tractor and trailer owned by Silva Trucking, Inc. and driven by Elaine McDonold jackknifed and collided with the vehicle being driven by Hackett. In 2012, the Hacketts filed a personal injury action in Sacramento County against Silva Trucking and McDonold. The jury awarded the Hacketts $34.9 million in damages. Silva Trucking was insured by Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (CCIC), who retained the law firm Cholakian & Associates to provide a defense. Silva Trucking had an excess liability insurance policy with Lexington Insurance Company (LIC), who retained the law firm Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP (Lewis Brisbois) as counsel. In 2014, Silva Trucking and McDonold brought suit in Sacramento County against LIC, CCIC, Cholakian & Associates and individual attorneys Kevin Cholakian and Jennifer Kung (collectively Cholakian), and Lewis Brisbois and individual attorney Ralph Zappala (collectively Lewis Brisbois). As to LIC and CCIC, the complaint alleged bad faith and breach of contract. As to the law firms and attorneys, the complaint alleged legal malpractice. The gravamen of the complaint was that the insurers unreasonably refused to accept the policy limit demand when the insured’s liability was clear and damages were known to be in excess of the policy limit. The attorneys failed to advise their insurer clients to accept the demand and the consequences of failing to do so, and failed to advise Silva Trucking and McDonold of their need for personal counsel. LIC and CCIC responded with demurrers. Lewis Brisbois answered with a general denial and asserted 22 affirmative defenses. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), where an action has been filed in the “wrong venue,” a defendant may move to transfer the case to the “proper court for the trial thereof.” In such a case, “if an answer is filed,” the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer and may retain the action in the county where filed to promote the convenience of witnesses or the ends of justice. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether, in a multi-defendant case, an answer must be filed by all defendants before the court may consider opposition to the motion to transfer venue. The Court concluded the answer was yes. In this case, the trial court considered opposition to the motion before all defendants had answered the complaint. Accordingly, the Court issued a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to transfer and to issue a new order granting the motion. View "Cholakian & Assoc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Paul retained attorney Patton to draft an amendment to his revocable living trust. Paul signed the “Trust Amendment,” which, as drafted by Patton, named his wife, Helen, and his children, Stephen, David, Alan, and Nancy, as beneficiaries. Stephen and David also are the successor trustees. Following Paul’s death, they petitioned the probate court to modify the Trust Amendment, alleging it failed to conform to Paul’s intentions by erroneously granting Helen an interest in brokerage accounts and personal and real property. In that probate court action, Patton admitted the Trust Amendment did not reflect Paul’s intention that his brokerage accounts and personal and real property be divided among his children. Stephen and David settled the probate court action with Helen. The children filed the legal malpractice action, alleging that Patton failed to exercise reasonable care in performing legal services by failing to draft the Trust Amendment in a manner consistent with the decedent’s intentions. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the children could not establish Patton owed them a duty as beneficiaries; they should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege such a duty. View "Paul v. Patton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were represented by defendant attorneys in an action against State Farm arising out of the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Court-appointed retired judges presided over a 1997 aggregate settlement. In 2012, one of the plaintiffs conducted a random sampling of other plaintiffs’ awards in the action, which, they claimed, revealed that the defendants had not properly disbursed or accounted for the settlement funds and had concealed this conduct from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought damages for failure to obtain their informed consent to an aggregate settlement and misappropriation of and failure to account for the settlement funds. The trial court dismissed, finding the claims based on speculation and barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the statute of limitations had not run under Probate Code section 16460 because they had no notice of wrongdoing and that actions for violations of Business and Professions Code section 6091 in failing to provide an accounting are not barred because their action was filed within one year of failure to comply with the statute. Where there are facts sufficient to put one on inquiry notice, the fraud statute of limitations starts running even when the defendant is a fiduciary. View "Britton v. Girardi" on Justia Law

Utrecht represented Loanvest in a lawsuit arising out of a loan that was secured by an interest in Oakland property. Utrecht successfully opposed Madow’s motion for a preliminary injunction that would have prevented Loanvest from paying out of the proceeds of the property’s sale. In 2013, Madow became manager of Loanvest, which then sued Utrecht, claiming breach of the duty of loyalty and “looting” Loanvest to pay other obligations. The trial court dismissed under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16), finding that the claim was based on an act in furtherance of the right of petition and that Loanvest failed to make a prima facie showing of its ability to prevail in the action. The court of appeal reversed. Loanvest is not a third party allegedly harmed by Utrecht’s representation of another client, but Utrecht’s former client that allegedly was harmed as the result of his “egregiously breaching the duty of loyalty.” That the complaint refers to another as Utrecht’s “true client” and Loanvest as his “purported client” does not alter that admitted fact. A lawsuit that concerns a breach of duty does not depend on the exercise of a constitutional right. View "Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht" on Justia Law

In 2008 Knox, the mother of Keys and the sister of Smith underwent surgery on her thyroid. When Knox was transferred from a post-anesthesia care unit to a medical-surgical unit, a nurse noticed Knox’s breathing was “noisy,” and called the hospital’s rapid assessment team to evaluate her. During the medical team’s efforts Knox was without a pulse for a number of minutes and as a result of her blocked airway, she suffered a permanent brain injury. She died after life support was withdrawn. A jury awarded Keys and Smith damages on their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs meaningfully comprehended the medical negligence that led to the death of their family member at the time the negligence was occurring. View "Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Amis alleged that his former attorneys committed malpractice by “caus[ing]” him to execute a settlement agreement that converted his company’s corporate obligations into Amis’s personal obligations without advising Amis that he had little to no risk of personal liability in the underlying litigation. All advice he received from the attorneys regarding the settlement agreement was given during mediation. The attorneys argued that Amis could not obtain evidence to support his claims, and that the law firm could not produce evidence to defend itself, because the disclosure of such evidence was barred by the mediation confidentiality statutes, Evidence Code section 1115. The trial court agreed on both counts and entered summary judgment for the firm. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court has broadly applied the mediation confidentiality statutes and all but categorically prohibited judicially crafted exceptions, even in situations where justice seems to call for a different result. View "Amis v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP" on Justia Law