Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Chaim Woolf and Steven Camhi were attorneys who represented plaintiffs in a prior civil action. They appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal of a legal malpractice action. The court dismissed the case after plaintiffs Michael Younessi and Alea Investments, LLC failed to timely file an amended complaint in response to an order sustaining demurrers to the original complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the appeal, for relief from default in failing to file a respondents' brief, and for judicial notice. The Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motions. But the Court "reluctantly" affirmed the trial court's order vacating the dismissal: while the evidence did not support granting relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, since the dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint, plaintiffs were entitled to relief under Code Civ. Proc. section 473, subdivision (b)'s attorney-fault provision. View "Younessi v. Woolf" on Justia Law

Sheppard Mullin, J-M's former attorneys, sought recovery of attorney fees relating to litigation in which Sheppard Mullin represented J-M. Sheppard Mullin was disqualified from that litigation because, without obtaining informed consent from either client, Sheppard Mullin represented J-M, the defendant in the litigation, while simultaneously representing a plaintiff in that case, South Tahoe. The trial court ordered the case to arbitration based on the parties’ written engagement agreement, and a panel of arbitrators found that the agreement was not illegal, denied J-M’s request for disgorgement of fees paid, and ordered J-M to pay Sheppard Mullin’s outstanding fees. The trial court confirmed the award. The court concluded that, under California law, because J-M challenged the legality of the entire agreement, the issue of illegality was for the trial court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide. The court further concluded that the undisputed facts establish that Sheppard Mullin violated the requirements of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-310 by simultaneously representing J-M and South Tahoe. Sheppard Mullin failed to disclose the conflict to either J-M or South Tahoe, and it failed to obtain the informed written consent of either client to the conflict. The representation of both parties without informed written consent is contrary to California law and contravenes the public policy embodied in Rule 3-310. Therefore, the trial court erred by enforcing the contract between the parties and entering judgment on the arbitration award based on that contract. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court remanded for factual findings on the issue of disgorgement of all fees paid to Sheppard Mullin. View "Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

James Kelly, as trustee of the Beverly Snodgrass Clark Inter Vivos 1999 Separate Property Trust, sued Barbara J. Orr, Joseph Holland, Gretchen Shaffer, and DLA Piper LLP (US) (Defendants) for professional negligence in relation to legal advice they provided to his predecessor trustee of the Trust. Defendants demurred on statute of limitations grounds, arguing his action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, and Kelly filed a timely notice of appeal. On review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the statute of limitations was tolled under section 340.6, subdivision (a)(2), until March 22, 2013, the date Kelly alleged Defendants ceased representation of Kelly's predecessor trustee. Because Kelly filed suit on February 27, 2014, less than one year after Defendants ceased representation of the predecessor trustee, the Court of Appeal concluded Kelly's action was not time-barred. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Orr" on Justia Law

In a previous decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment terminating Johneisha Kemper's parental rights to her daughter, rejecting Kemper's contention that she received ineffective assistance of her appointed juvenile dependency counsel. Kemper then brought a legal malpractice action against the same appointed juvenile dependency attorneys, their supervising attorney, and the County of San Diego.2 She alleged defendants' legal representation breached the applicable standard of care and caused the termination of her parental rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor. Kemper appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed: "Causation is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, and Kemper is barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine from relitigating the issue of whether her juvenile dependency attorneys caused the termination of her parental rights. We decline Kemper's request that we create a new exception to the collateral estoppel rule based on an analogy to the writ of habeas corpus procedure applicable in juvenile dependency cases." View "Kemper v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jill Shelton, Mobile Medical Services for Physicians and Advanced Practice Nurses, Inc. (NPS), and Mobile Medical Services for Physicians and Advanced Practice Nurses, Inc., a Nursing Corporation (MMS) filed a complaint against defendant Chalat Rajaram. The complaint was based on defendant’s statements to the California Nursing Board (Board) that led to the investigation of Shelton. The trial court granted defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint (anti-SLAPP motion), granting leave to amend one cause of action for breach of contract. After NPS filed an amended complaint for breach of contract, defendant filed another anti-SLAPP motion, which the court denied. Defendant appealed, contending the amended breach of contract cause of action was a sham because NPS merely eliminated the offending allegations from the original complaint. Defendant argued the amended breach of contract cause of action seeks to impose liability on him based solely on his statements to the Board. Thus, he argued the court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was no authority for the court to grant leave to amend the original complaint. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to the court to grant defendant’s original motion to strike without leave to amend. View "Mobile Medical Services etc. v. Rajaram" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of a petition for a writ of administrative mandate, seeking to reverse a decision by the California State Board of Pharmacy subjecting his pharmacist’s license to discipline following the discovery of an employee’s widespread theft of a dangerous drug from the pharmacy plaintiff supervised as the pharmacist-in-charge. The court concluded that the Board properly interpreted Business and Professions Code section 4081 to hold plaintiff strictly liable for violations leading to licensing discipline. Further, had plaintiff restricted access to the passcode or put in place measures to ensure employees placed orders only through the pharmacy’s phone system, he could have averted the employee’s theft. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to properly oversee the operations of the pharmacy and the Board could have concluded that theft would have been averted if he supervised and randomly audited drug deliveries, conducted checks of his staff’s work, and actively participated in the inventory and delivery process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sternberg v. Cal. State Bd. of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Lattimore brought a wrongful death action against two doctors and Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare arising from their care and treatment of Yvonne’s father, who had gone to the hospital for a blood transfusion, experienced gastrointestinal bleeding, and died. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the declaration of Lattimore’s medical expert was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on whether treatment of her father violated the applicable standards of care applicable to physicians and surgeons. However, the medical expert declaration did not raise a triable issue of fact on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals in general. View "Lattimore v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and legal malpractice, and defendants moved to strike the entire complaint as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz because defendants had no independent legal duty to plaintiffs nor did they act for their personal financial gain. Plaintiffs alleged that a former business associate of theirs, Stephen Bruce, who was a client of defendants, conspired with defendants to unlawfully withdraw from plaintiff SageMill and to usurp a nascent business opportunity of SageMill. The trial court denied the motion. The court reversed the trial court‘s order on plaintiffs‘ second cause of action for conspiracy as to the individual plaintiffs Klotz and Spitz, finding that any advice defendants gave Bruce arose from an attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and thus was within the ambit of section 1714.10. The court affirmed as to the remaining claims. View "Klotz v. Milbank,Tweed, Hadley & McCloy" on Justia Law

Smith, a California partnership, hired attorney Moncrief to perform due diligence for its purchase of equipment from Texas Hill in Arizona. Texas Hill was represented by Clark, an Arizona attorney. Moncrief performed a UCC search, called Clark, and left a voicemail. Clark called Moncrief in response and represented that Texas Hill was the sole owner of the equipment. Afterwards Clark sent Moncrief an e-mail, stating: “I have been the attorney for Texas Hill . . . and can state unequivocally that the cooling equipment you are buying is free and clear and is owned by Texas Hill.” Based on Clark’s representations, Moncrief advised Smith to go forward with the purchase. Smith later learned that Texas Hill did not own the equipment when they completed the transaction; New York Community Bank had acquired an interest in the equipment. Smith sued Moncrief for legal malpractice. Moncrief cross-complained against Clark. Clark moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court granted the motion. Clark’s conduct and his intentional misrepresentations were required to close the sale. Clark personally availed himself of the benefits of California when he reached into California to induce Moncrief’s client to complete the purchase. Moncrief’s claims arise out of Clark’s contacts with California. lark has not demonstrated that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. View "Moncrief v. Clark" on Justia Law

"This is a case of egregious attorney misconduct." Because of the cumulative effect of the attorney's misconduct, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reverse the judgment she obtained on behalf of her client, Caltrans. "While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed [the attorney] to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff's character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage." View "Martinez v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law