Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010-2011, the San Francisco Unified School District employed 11 substitute teachers who worked on an as-needed basis and 15 paraprofessional classified employees. Each of the 26 employees received a letter during the spring of the 2010-2011 school year advising that they had a reasonable assurance of employment for the following 2011-2012 school year. The 26 sought unemployment benefits for the period between the last date of the regular session of the 2010-2011 school year, May 27, 2011, and the first day of instruction for the 2011-2012 school year, August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the District: “in effect what the claimants ... are requesting is … a full year‘s income … they have agreed to work and be paid for only 41 weeks of each year. … school employees can plan for those periods of unemployment and thus are not experiencing the suffering from unanticipated layoffs that the employment-security law was intended to alleviate.” View "United Educators of San Francisco. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The single mother of five children, 8 to 15 years old, struggled with abusive relationships, homelessness and unemployment. They lived primarily in Marin County from 2000 until they moved to Richmond in 2009. In 2015, Mother asked Contra Costa Children & Family Services to place the four youngest children in foster care. CFS did so and filed petitions alleging Mother’s failure to protect and inability to provide support. The court ordered supervised visitation and that CFS refer Mother to substance abuse treatment and parenting education. CFS's disposition report recommended that the court order family reunification services and transfer the case to Marin County. Mother was participating 12- step meetings and alcohol abuse education in Marin and expected to secure a Marin apartment. Marin County court accepted the transfer and continued the case. Later, Marin’s Health and Human Services Department asked the court to transfer the cases back to Contra Costa because it had discovered that a county employee had a familial relationship to the parties, rendering the Department unable to continue services. Mother opposed the transfer; there was no evidence that the proposed transfer served the children’s best interests. The court of appeal remanded the cases to Marin, noting that all of the parties conceded error. View "In re Nia A." on Justia Law

Dreher had been a maintenance supervisor at an Alliance apartment complex for 74 days when he slipped and fell on concrete walkway in the complex in the rain. Dreher sustained a fractured pelvis and injuries to his neck, shoulder, leg, and knee. He suffered gait derangement, a sleep disorder, and headaches. Dreher required surgery to repair pelvic fractures, another surgery to repair a torn meniscus, and another surgery to address issues with his foot and ankle. Dreher sought compensation for a psychiatric injury. An evaluation concluded that Dreher suffered a psychiatric disability as a result of the accident, including depression, difficulty sleeping, and panic attacks. The ALJ found that Dreher sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment but denied his claim as barred by section 3208.3(d) because Dreher was employed by Alliance for less than six months and his psychiatric injury did not result from a sudden and extraordinary employment condition. On reconsideration, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board found that the injury was not barred. The court of appeal annulled the decision. Dreher’s testimony that he was surprised by the slick surface because the other walkways had a rough surface, and that the walkway was later resurfaced, did not demonstrate that his injury was caused by an uncommon, unusual, or totally unexpected event. View "Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the trial court's denial of her petition for a writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that the Board correctly calculated plaintiff's effective date of disability retirement. Plaintiff raised two questions on appeal: (1) whether donated sick leave or vacation time from co-workers is considered "regular compensation" of the disabled employee under Government Code section 31724, and (2) whether the incremental payments of sick leave, vacation and holiday pay should be "compressed" to achieve an earlier date of retirement. The court concluded that the first question is not properly before it. In regards to the second question, the court concluded that Katosh v. Sonoma County Employees' Retirement Assn. confirmed the bright line rule that disability retirement benefits are not available until the day following the day paid leave was last received. Therefore, the trial court properly denied her petition for writ of mandate challenging that date. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Astorga v. Retirement Board" on Justia Law

In 2011, the California Legislature adopted legislation which dissolved the redevelopment agencies (RA's) that had been formed by municipalities throughout the state under the provisions of the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL). Before their dissolution, the operations of RA's were funded by way of so-called "tax increment" financing. Shortly before the Legislature dissolved RA's, plaintiffs-appellants Virginia Macy, a low-income resident of the city; Libreria Del Pueblo, Inc.; and California Partnership filed a petition for a writ of mandate against the Fontana Redevelopment Agency alleging the agency failed to provide the low- and moderate-income housing required under the CRL. Plaintiffs asked for relief in the form of the payment of $27 million into the agency's low- and moderate-income housing fund (LMIHF). AB 26 created successor agencies that were given responsibility over certain obligations of each dissolved RA. Importantly, under the dissolution legislation, the liability of successor agencies was limited to the value of the assets those agencies received from their respective predecessor RA's. After enactment of AB 26, plaintiffs amended their petition and added defendant and respondent City of Fontana (the city), initially in its role as the successor agency provided by AB 26, and later also in its separate capacity as a municipal corporation. In its capacity as a municipal corporation, the city filed a demurrer to the petition, arguing that under AB 26 only a successor agency may be held liable for the preexisting obligations of an RA. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed, but the Court of Appeal affirmed: the low- and moderate-income housing were never the liabilities of municipalities and their general funds. "An extension of RA statutory liabilities to municipalities and their general funds would require a very clear expression of the Legislature's intention to depart from the historical treatment of low- and moderate-income housing obligations; no such expression appears in AB 26 or later amendments to the dissolution legislation." View "Macy v. City of Fontana" on Justia Law

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14) was sustained against A.A., a juvenile court dependent from 2007-2015. A.A. was committed to a period of confinement with the DJJ. A.A. subsequently turned 18 years old and the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over him. In this appeal, the court rejected A.A.'s contention that the juvenile court should have maintained dependency jurisdiction over him and provided him with services under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill No. 12. In this case, A.A. is not eligible for A.B. 12 benefits where A.A. is not a nonminor dependent; the juvenile court reasonably concluded that A.A. did not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction; and the juvenile court did not err in concluding that A.A. was not participating in a transition to living independently case plan where he was committed to a juvenile detention facility. Further, DCFS has complied with the requirements of section 391, subdivision (b), and the juvenile court's order did not violate section 303, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. A.A." on Justia Law

Legislation, effective in 2004 requires that injured workers’ requests for medical treatment be evaluated through a process called utilization review (UR). Under the UR process, a request for treatment cannot be denied by a claims adjustor and must be approved unless a clinician determines that the treatment is medically unnecessary. Workers can challenge decisions denying requested treatment, but employers cannot challenge decisions approving it. The 2004 legislation called for administrative adoption of uniform standards for physicians to use in evaluating treatment. In 2013, additional reforms went into effect, establishing a new procedure, independent medical review (IMR), to resolve workers’ challenges to UR decisions. Stevens challenged the constitutionality of the IMR process, arguing that it violated the state Constitution’s separation of powers clause, its requirements that workers’ compensation decisions be subject to review and the system “accomplish substantial justice,” and principles of due process. The court of appeal rejected those claims, but remanded Stevens’s request for a home health aid. The Legislature has plenary powers over the workers’ compensation system under article XIV, section 4 of the state Constitution. California’s scheme for evaluating workers’ treatment requests is fundamentally fair and affords workers sufficient opportunities to present evidence and be heard. View "Stevens v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd," on Justia Law

A single mother of five children subject to dependency proceedings sought to reverse a court order denying her further reunification services with respect to her three oldest children and to stay a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26 that had been set for September 16, 2015. She claims the court erred in denying her further reunification services because she has made and continues to make reasonable efforts to address the problems that led to the removal of her children, so denial of additional services is not in the children’s best interests. The court of appeal stayed the hearing, but ultimately denied the petition and lifted the stay. Mother has received extensive child welfare services and has taken advantage of them only sporadically. The children have been involved with the dependency system for 11 years, and have spent six years in out-of-home placement with multiple caregivers, not always in healthful circumstances. Mother’s drug abuse, mental instability, and abusive relationships with men, have exposed the children to a continuing risk of harm, delayed their educational development, and left them without a stable home. The court’s factual findings in determining to withhold further services were supported by substantial evidence. View "D.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Juvenile Court found R.G., a nonminor dependent within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 450), ineligible for extended foster care support payments between January 13 and March 13, 2015, because he was neither employed at least 20 hours per week nor participating in a program or activity that promoted or removed barriers to employment, as is required to receive financial support pursuant to section subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(3) of section 11403 of the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which certain youth in foster care may continue receiving financial assistance after turning 18. The court of appeal agreed and reversed. The undisputed evidence indicated that R.G.’s activities, which were primarily self-directed, included formulating a specific job search plan; applying online and in person to numerous jobs; following up with prospective employers; receiving feedback from an independent living skills program specialist on how to improve his resume and job applications; and maintaining contact with the social worker on his progress. This evidence showed that he was working toward his goals during the period in question as contemplated by the statute. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

Pursuant to federal law, California’s Medi-Cal program requires beneficiaries to use other health coverage (OHC) they may have before accessing Medi-Cal benefits. The state Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) maintains a database with codes that indicate whether a Medi-Cal beneficiary has OHC and, to some extent, the scope of that coverage. The codes are available to providers when a beneficiary seeks services. Medi-Cal beneficiaries filed suit. Because DHCS allegedly permits Medi-Cal providers to refuse nonemergency services to beneficiaries with OHC, and because the codes are not always correct and the information is limited, beneficiaries may be improperly denied service and referred to other providers even when there is no OHC available for the requested service; beneficiaries may experience delays in receiving nonemergency care and may be subject to a higher copayment than permitted under Medi-Cal. Plaintiffs argued that the assignment of an OHC code should trigger notice and a hearing. The trial and appeals courts rejected their arguments. Neither Welfare and Institutions Code 10950 nor regulation 50951 nor the California Constitution requires DHCS to provide a hearing or notice when it assigns an OHC code. Plaintiffs did not establish any violation of a ministerial duty subject to enforcement by a writ of mandate. View "Marquez v. Dept. of Health Care Servs." on Justia Law