Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nealy was hired by Santa Monica in 1996 and became a recycling worker. Nealy injured his knee on the job in 2003. A doctor declared him temporarily totally disabled until 2005, when he was released to “light duty” with the restriction that he could not push large trash bins. Nealy requested a clerical or refuse collection vehicle operator position, but began working as a groundskeeper. Nealy met with the accommodations committee again in 2006 because of difficulty climbing or descending stairs. The city did not have any office work available; Nealy never returned to work after a 2006 emergency room visit. After additional accommodation meetings, in 2010, the city indicated that it was unable to provide reasonable accommodation into an alternative position because Nealy was not minimally qualified for the only available position that was not a promotion. The city filed a disability retirement application but, in 2011, CalPERS canceled the application for failure to submit necessary information. Nealy obtained a right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court entered judgment for the city on disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Meanwhile, an ALJ awarded Nealy $36,260 on his workers’ compensation claim. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the city. View "Nealy v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Following the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Terence and Paula Kilker against defendant Frank Stillman, the trial court ordered Stillman to produce documents regarding his assets to the Kilkers. After Stillman failed to comply with that order, the trial court found Stillman in contempt and ordered that Stillman pay the Kilkers reasonable attorney fees and costs, plus interest. The underlying judgment was eventually satisfied. To collect on the attorney fees and costs award, the Kilkers served a writ of execution on Preferred Bank to levy funds in Stillman’s bank account. Stillman submitted a claim of exemption to the writ. He asserted the funds in the account were Social Security payments exempt from levy. The Kilkers opposed Stillman’s claim of exemption, arguing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.080, only Social Security funds directly deposited into a bank account by the government are protected by the exemption. The trial court found Stillman’s bank account at Preferred Bank solely contained Social Security payments, but, nevertheless, denied Stillman’s exemption claim. The court did so because those funds were not directly deposited into the bank account by the government. On review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s conclusion was legally erroneous because Stillman’s Social Security payments were protected by federal law from levy. View "Kilker v. Stillman" on Justia Law

David and Melinda’s two children lived with Melinda, and David paid child support. The Napa County Department of Child Support Services moved to modify David’s child support obligation. (Fam. Code, 17400). After a hearing, the court found that David’s income, for purposes of calculating child support, was the monthly Social Security disability payment he received, ordered him to pay a portion of that to Melinda as child support, and found Melinda received $796 per month in derivative Social Security disability benefits as the representative payee of the children based on David’s disability, 42 U.S.C. 402(d). Melinda argued these benefits should be treated as part of David’s income when calculating his monthly income for purposes of his support obligation. The court concluded the derivative benefits were the income of the children, not of David, so that the $796 in derivative disability benefits would partially satisfy David’s support obligation. The monthly benefits would be credited first toward his current child support, and any excess would be credited to pay off arrears. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Daugherty v. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Duarte joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) in 1993. He earned 2.023 years of service. He took unpaid personal leave for Duarte for the 1995-1996 school year and unpaid educational leave for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Duarte worked one season as a forest firefighter, attended law school, and worked as a paralegal. In 2003, Duarte returned to teaching in Oakland. On his second day he was assaulted and threatened by students. Duarte has not returned to teaching. In 2004, Duarte filed a worker’s compensation claim. After four evaluations, he entered into a stipulated settlement that indicated a “serious dispute” regarding the scope of Duarte’s disability. In 2006, Duarte sought social security disability benefits; it was determined that he was disabled from the date of the 2003 incident and became eligible for monthly disability benefits in 2005. Duarte’s student loans were forgiven. In 2008, Duarte sought CalSTRS disability retirement benefits. CalSTRS repeatedly asked Duarte to submit medical records and other documents. An ALJ upheld denial of Duarte’s application because he refused to complete the independent medical evaluation ordered under Education Code 24103 (b),. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars CalSTRS from relitigating his disability because several other state agencies have found him to be disabled. View "Duarte v. CA. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Serban worked as a massage therapist at Voda Spa. Serban and Voda Spa disagree as to why he left that work, but the trial court found Serban had good cause to leave and that finding was not challenged. They also disputed whether Serban was an employee or independent contractor. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, and the trial court agreed with the Board that its decision was not subject to judicial review because both the California Constitution and the Unemployment Insurance Code bar actions whose purpose is to prevent the collection of state taxes. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the case does not challenge the imposition of a tax.View "W. Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CA Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a mandate petition challenging the board's decision denying his request for unemployment compensation benefits. The trial court subsequently issued a writ of mandate directing that plaintiff receive the requested benefits. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff's actions in exceeding his break times on four separate occasions and then falsifying his time sheets constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256. Plaintiff may not receive unemployment compensation benefits because he committed misconduct within the meaning of section 1256.View "Irving v. California Uninsurance Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Norasingh, a woman in her twenties, suffers from medical and mental health problems, including congenital brain malformation, mental retardation, diabetes, asthma, and epileptic seizures. Norasingh lives with her parents and younger sister. In 2009, her parents became her limited conservators, entitled to determine her residence and make her medical and educational decisions. The conservatorship limits Norasingh’s rights to marry, enter into contracts, and control her social and sexual relationships. In 2004, she began to receive benefits from the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) Program administered by the California Department of Social Services. She was determined to be eligible for 32.90 IHSS hours, with no benefit for protective supervision. Norasingh’s mother is her paid IHSS provider and requested protective supervision hours because Norasingh was having seizures five times a day. In 2005, Contra Costa County Human Services determined that Norasingh was eligible for protective supervision, based on the opinion of one of Norasingh’s treating physicians, who stated that she had a history of wandering and poor judgment. Based on a report by a social worker, in 2011 an administrative law judge concluded that Norasingh was no longer eligible for protective supervision. The trial court affirmed. The appeals court reversed, finding that a persistent misconception regarding the scope of Norasingh’s mental impairment undermined the eligibility determination.View "Norasingh v. Lightbourne" on Justia Law