Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Christopher J. Warner served as a municipal and then superior court judge from July 1996 until his retirement in October 2010. In November 2010, he applied for a disability retirement benefit under the Judges' Retirement System II Law (JRS II). Defendant-respondent California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) granted his application, and he was awarded a monthly retirement allowance, paying him an amount equal to 65 percent of his retirement-level salary. In May 2011, Judge Warner applied to CalPERS to receive a distribution of his monetary credits in the JRS II system, which totaled $572,407. CalPERS staff denied the request. Judge Warner appealed that decision to the CalPERS Board of Administration. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision recommending the staff decision be affirmed. The Board adopted the ALJ's recommendation. In January 2013, Judge Warner filed a petition for writ of mandate in San Bernardino County Superior Court challenging the Board's decision. The Judicial Council assigned the case to Los Angeles County Superior Court, which later an order denying the petition. This appeal presented a matter of first impression for the Court of Appeal: a question of statutory interpretation regarding the JRS II. Judge Warner contended that under JRS II, he was entitled to receive both a disability retirement allowance and payment of the monetary credits he accrued during his service. CalPERS ruled JRS II entitles Judge Warner only to the disability retirement allowance. The trial court denied Judge Warner's petition for writ of mandate, which sought to reverse the agency's ruling. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Warner v. CalPERS" on Justia Law

Robles worked collecting food grease from restaurants until his 2010 termination. Robles’s supervisor cited Robles’s attempt to buy shoes at the Red Wing store, where employees can use an annual $150 shoe allowance. Robles asked the clerk to measure his friend’s foot because he “intended to give it to my friend.” Robles reasoned that he had shoes and his friend needed them. The clerk told Robles “that was not possible.” Robles believes there was a misunderstanding of policy but no misconduct. Robles sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Development Department’s record contained no employer information about the incident. The EDD’notice stated that Robles’s claim was denied because he “broke a reasonable employer rule.” Robles appealed, stating his employer did not cite any specific rule, that he was not aware of any such rule, and that he did not obtain an improper benefit or cause his employer any harm. Despite being twice ordered to do by the trial court, EED continued to refuse to award benefits. The court of appeal affirmed the court’s most recent response to Robles’s motion to enforce writ of administrative mandate,ordering EDD “to pay withheld federal extension benefits, costs and interest in the amount of $45,560.39, within 30 days.” View "Robles v. Emp't Dev. Dept." on Justia Law

Since 1996, retired employees of the City and County of San Francisco) have been eligible for a supplemental cost of living allowance (COLA) as part of their pension benefits when the retirement fund’s earnings from the previous year exceeded projected earnings. In 2011, voters passed Proposition C, an initiative measure that conditioned payment of the supplemental COLA on the retirement fund being “fully funded” based on the market value of the assets for the previous year. POB, a political action committee representing the interests of retired city employees, challenged the amendment as an impairment of a vested contractual pension right under the contract clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The court of appeal held that, with respect to current employees and employees who retired after the supplemental COLA went into effect, the full funding requirement cannot stand. Employees who retired before November 6, 1996 had no vested contractual right in the supplemental COLA; the 2011 amendment may be applied to their pensions. The court rejected POB’s claim that the full funding requirement must be set aside because the Board of Supervisors failed to obtain an adequate actuarial report before placing Proposition C on the ballot. View "Protect Our Benefits v. City & Co. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Pomianowski was 19 years old when she was in an automobile accident which left her a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic. She required total care in all aspects of daily living. A lawsuit filed against the County of Santa Cruz and Ford Motor Company, resulted in a settlement for $3,175,000.00. The court directed that the funds be deposited in a special needs trust (Probate Code sections 3600-3605). At age 23, Pomianowski died, with $1,294,453.23 left in the trust, which was ordered to reimburse the Department of Health Care Services for medical expenses paid on her behalf before her death. The trustee argued that the assets were exempt from reimbursement rights because the beneficiary was under 55 years of age when the services were provided. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the Department was entitled to reimbursement under both the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396a, and the statutes and regulations implementing Medicaid through California’s Medi-Cal program. The statutes and regulations do not exempt beneficiaries under age 55, nor is there a public policy reason to shield the trust assets from recovery so that $417, 812.43 spent by the public can pass to the beneficiary’s parents along with the rest of the trust assets. View "Herting v. Cal. Dep;t of Health Care Servs." on Justia Law

Nealy was hired by Santa Monica in 1996 and became a recycling worker. Nealy injured his knee on the job in 2003. A doctor declared him temporarily totally disabled until 2005, when he was released to “light duty” with the restriction that he could not push large trash bins. Nealy requested a clerical or refuse collection vehicle operator position, but began working as a groundskeeper. Nealy met with the accommodations committee again in 2006 because of difficulty climbing or descending stairs. The city did not have any office work available; Nealy never returned to work after a 2006 emergency room visit. After additional accommodation meetings, in 2010, the city indicated that it was unable to provide reasonable accommodation into an alternative position because Nealy was not minimally qualified for the only available position that was not a promotion. The city filed a disability retirement application but, in 2011, CalPERS canceled the application for failure to submit necessary information. Nealy obtained a right-to-sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court entered judgment for the city on disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Meanwhile, an ALJ awarded Nealy $36,260 on his workers’ compensation claim. The court of appeal affirmed, in favor of the city. View "Nealy v. City of Santa Monica" on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Following the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Terence and Paula Kilker against defendant Frank Stillman, the trial court ordered Stillman to produce documents regarding his assets to the Kilkers. After Stillman failed to comply with that order, the trial court found Stillman in contempt and ordered that Stillman pay the Kilkers reasonable attorney fees and costs, plus interest. The underlying judgment was eventually satisfied. To collect on the attorney fees and costs award, the Kilkers served a writ of execution on Preferred Bank to levy funds in Stillman’s bank account. Stillman submitted a claim of exemption to the writ. He asserted the funds in the account were Social Security payments exempt from levy. The Kilkers opposed Stillman’s claim of exemption, arguing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.080, only Social Security funds directly deposited into a bank account by the government are protected by the exemption. The trial court found Stillman’s bank account at Preferred Bank solely contained Social Security payments, but, nevertheless, denied Stillman’s exemption claim. The court did so because those funds were not directly deposited into the bank account by the government. On review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s conclusion was legally erroneous because Stillman’s Social Security payments were protected by federal law from levy. View "Kilker v. Stillman" on Justia Law

David and Melinda’s two children lived with Melinda, and David paid child support. The Napa County Department of Child Support Services moved to modify David’s child support obligation. (Fam. Code, 17400). After a hearing, the court found that David’s income, for purposes of calculating child support, was the monthly Social Security disability payment he received, ordered him to pay a portion of that to Melinda as child support, and found Melinda received $796 per month in derivative Social Security disability benefits as the representative payee of the children based on David’s disability, 42 U.S.C. 402(d). Melinda argued these benefits should be treated as part of David’s income when calculating his monthly income for purposes of his support obligation. The court concluded the derivative benefits were the income of the children, not of David, so that the $796 in derivative disability benefits would partially satisfy David’s support obligation. The monthly benefits would be credited first toward his current child support, and any excess would be credited to pay off arrears. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Daugherty v. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Duarte joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) in 1993. He earned 2.023 years of service. He took unpaid personal leave for Duarte for the 1995-1996 school year and unpaid educational leave for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Duarte worked one season as a forest firefighter, attended law school, and worked as a paralegal. In 2003, Duarte returned to teaching in Oakland. On his second day he was assaulted and threatened by students. Duarte has not returned to teaching. In 2004, Duarte filed a worker’s compensation claim. After four evaluations, he entered into a stipulated settlement that indicated a “serious dispute” regarding the scope of Duarte’s disability. In 2006, Duarte sought social security disability benefits; it was determined that he was disabled from the date of the 2003 incident and became eligible for monthly disability benefits in 2005. Duarte’s student loans were forgiven. In 2008, Duarte sought CalSTRS disability retirement benefits. CalSTRS repeatedly asked Duarte to submit medical records and other documents. An ALJ upheld denial of Duarte’s application because he refused to complete the independent medical evaluation ordered under Education Code 24103 (b),. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars CalSTRS from relitigating his disability because several other state agencies have found him to be disabled. View "Duarte v. CA. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Serban worked as a massage therapist at Voda Spa. Serban and Voda Spa disagree as to why he left that work, but the trial court found Serban had good cause to leave and that finding was not challenged. They also disputed whether Serban was an employee or independent contractor. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, and the trial court agreed with the Board that its decision was not subject to judicial review because both the California Constitution and the Unemployment Insurance Code bar actions whose purpose is to prevent the collection of state taxes. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the case does not challenge the imposition of a tax.View "W. Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CA Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law