Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over possession and damages related to a residential property in Malibu. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against several defendants, including the defendant, seeking possession of the property and damages. The defendant responded with an answer denying several key allegations, including the plaintiff’s ownership of the property and the claimed fair rental value. The plaintiff later obtained leave to file a first amended complaint, which reclassified the action and asserted new causes of action but relied on the same underlying facts as the original complaint. The defendant did not file a new answer to this amended complaint.The Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a default against the defendant after he failed to answer the amended complaint and subsequently entered a default judgment awarding significant damages. The defendant moved multiple times to set aside the default judgment. The court eventually denied his postjudgment motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which allows courts to set aside void judgments. The defendant timely appealed these orders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the original answer sufficed to controvert the first amended complaint’s allegations and precluded entry of default. The appellate court held that because the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations that remained central to the amended complaint—including ownership and valuation—the default judgment was improper. The court found that a defendant’s original answer stands as a response to reasserted facts in an amended complaint, and default cannot be entered on allegations previously denied. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the trial court’s order denying the motion to set aside default, remanding with instructions to vacate the default and default judgment. View "Ammari v. Ammari" on Justia Law

Craig and Michelle Opperman sought approval from their homeowners association to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) by converting their garage and building a new garage on their property within a planned development managed by Portola Ranch Association. The Design Review Committee, lacking expertise on ADUs, referred the application to the Board of Directors. After retaining an independent consultant and reviewing the application, the Board denied the proposal, citing concerns about traffic and fire safety. During this period, adjacent property owners, Martin and Anna Eng, filed a quiet title action against the Oppermans regarding a non-exclusive easement affecting the area in front of the Oppermans’ garage.In response to the Engs’ action, the Oppermans filed a cross-complaint against the Association, asserting claims including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectancy, and declaratory relief. The Portola Ranch Association moved for summary judgment, arguing its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was within its authority under the governing documents. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted summary judgment for the Association, finding that the Board acted properly and that the business judgment rule applied. The court later awarded attorney fees to the Association.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the consolidated appeals. It applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Board had authority under the Association’s governing documents to review and deny the ADU application based on safety concerns and that its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and the doctrine of judicial deference articulated in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. The court further affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Association. View "Eng v. Opperman" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the owner of a restaurant, alleging violations of accessibility laws and seeking damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The defendant requested an early evaluation conference under the Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act, which allows certain defendants to obtain a stay of proceedings and mandates that the plaintiff provide a statement disclosing, among other things, the amount of claimed attorney fees and costs. The plaintiff objected to disclosing this information, arguing that it was protected by attorney-client privilege, and did not include it in the required statement.The Superior Court of Santa Clara County ordered the plaintiff to comply with the statutory disclosure and, after the plaintiff’s continued refusal, imposed sanctions. The court offered the plaintiff a choice between a ruling that would bar recovery of attorney fees or dismissal of the case with prejudice; the plaintiff chose dismissal. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the requested disclosure was privileged and that the trial court’s process violated due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory requirement to disclose claimed attorney fees and costs for the purposes of an early evaluation conference does not violate the attorney-client privilege. The court found that the statutory scheme does not provide for a privilege exception, and that requiring disclosure does not frustrate the legislative purpose of promoting early settlement. The appellate court also found no due process violation in the trial court’s sanction process, noting that the plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard on the privilege issue. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s case with prejudice. View "Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, voters in a California city approved an initiative known as Measure H, which amended the city charter to establish rent control, just cause eviction protections, and an independent Rental Housing Board with significant regulatory authority over rental housing, rent increases, and evictions. The measure limited annual rent increases for certain multifamily units, prohibited evictions without just cause, and required the city council to appoint a supermajority of tenants to the Rental Housing Board. It also contained provisions for mandatory landlord-paid relocation assistance in certain circumstances and additional notice requirements prior to eviction for nonpayment of rent.After certification of the election results, a group of landlords and a rental housing trade association challenged the validity of Measure H in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. They alleged the measure constituted an impermissible revision of the city charter under the California Constitution, imposed unconstitutional property qualifications for public office, violated equal protection, and was preempted by various state laws. The superior court rejected most of these claims, holding that Measure H was a lawful charter amendment, did not violate constitutional protections regarding property qualifications or equal protection, and did not conflict with state law except in one respect: it partially severed language in the measure that imposed greater notice requirements than those mandated by state statutes for termination of tenancy.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reversed in part. The court held that Measure H was a permissible charter amendment, not an impermissible revision; that restricting certain board seats to tenants with a leasehold interest did not violate the constitutional prohibition on property qualifications for office; and that the tenant-majority requirement did not violate equal protection under rational basis review. However, the court found that the relocation assistance provision for tenants displaced by lawful rent increases was preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, and that the additional notice requirement for evictions due to nonpayment of rent was preempted by the Unlawful Detainer Act. The preempted provisions were declared void, and the matter was remanded for the superior court to enter judgment consistent with these findings. View "California Apartment Assn. v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Two neighbors own adjacent properties in a subdivision, with one property benefiting from a road easement across the other’s land. The easement includes both a paved portion and a 244.5-foot gravel or dirt driveway segment. The defendant uses this gravel road for access. In an earlier lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had entered the property to clear trees, perform excavation, and build a rock wall without permission. That suit was resolved by partial settlement and judgment. While the first case was still pending, the plaintiff filed a second suit seeking to stop the defendant from paving the gravel portion of the easement, arguing that paving was not necessary for reasonable use.The Superior Court of El Dorado County first denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting arguments that the second complaint improperly split causes of action and was legally insufficient. The court found the new suit did not overlap with the first, as the threat to pave the easement arose after the initial complaint and involved distinct allegations. After a bench trial, the court determined that paving the driveway was not reasonably necessary for safe and convenient vehicular access, and issued an injunction prohibiting the defendant from paving.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the second suit was not barred as an improper splitting of actions because it addressed a different episode and new factual circumstances. The court further held that the scope of an easement does not automatically include the right to pave; such improvements must be reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the easement, as determined by the facts. The appellate court found no error with the trial court’s application of the legal standard or its factual findings, and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. View "Berstein v. Sebring" on Justia Law

Two neighbors in a residential community disagreed about a tree branch that obstructed one neighbor’s view. Jinshu Zhang, the owner seeking the view, used his homeowners association’s dispute resolution process, which included mediation and arbitration services provided by Charles Peterson, an independent mediator. When the association dismissed Zhang’s application, Zhang sued Peterson for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Peterson was a director or officer of the association and thus owed him such a duty. However, Peterson was neither a director nor an officer, but an independent contractor. Zhang lost his lawsuit against Peterson following a nonsuit at trial, and did not appeal.After that case concluded, Peterson filed a malicious prosecution action against Zhang, alleging Zhang’s earlier suit was baseless and continued without probable cause once Zhang had evidence Peterson was not an officer or director. In response, Zhang filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), seeking to dismiss Peterson’s malicious prosecution claim. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, finding Peterson’s case had at least minimal merit based on evidence showing Zhang lacked probable cause and may have acted with malice in pursuing the prior suit.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed Zhang’s appeal. The court affirmed the denial of Zhang’s anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the denial of a discretionary sanctions motion in the underlying suit did not establish probable cause under the “interim adverse judgment rule,” and did not bar the malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that Peterson’s evidence on lack of probable cause and malice was sufficient to allow his case to proceed, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Zhang" on Justia Law

In 2016, the City of Los Angeles established new tiered water rates for residential customers of its Department of Water and Power (LADWP). These rates included a charge that funded a low-income subsidy, which was paid by customers who did not qualify for the subsidy, and utilized progressively increasing charges based on water usage tiers. Stephen and Melinda Dreher, LADWP customers, challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of these rates under article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution: (1) the inclusion of a low-income subsidy charge in the rates of non-subsidized customers, and (2) the structure of the tiered rates themselves, arguing they exceeded the proportional cost of water service to each parcel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the Drehers regarding the low-income subsidy charge, finding it unconstitutional and issuing a writ to prevent the City from including this charge in future rates. However, the court denied the Drehers’ request for a refund of previously paid charges, concluding that such a claim was barred because the Drehers had not paid under protest, as required by Health and Safety Code section 5472. The court also found that, aside from the invalid low-income subsidy, the City’s tiered rates complied with constitutional proportionality requirements.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the payment under protest requirement of Health and Safety Code section 5472 applies to claims seeking refunds of water delivery charges fixed by city ordinance, and that the Drehers’ failure to comply with this requirement barred their retrospective refund claim. The court further held that the City met its burden to demonstrate that its tiered water rates (excluding the invalid subsidy) did not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to each parcel, as required by article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "Dreher v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Villa Zinfandel, LLC purchased real property in Napa County from a party that acquired it at a foreclosure sale. Christopher Bearman was occupying the property at the time. Villa Zinfandel filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Bearman as a limited civil action, seeking possession and holdover damages, as required by law after purchasing foreclosed property. Meanwhile, a third party, Edward Sanchez, filed a separate unlimited civil action to set aside the trustee’s deed upon sale, alleging violations in the foreclosure process. Bearman moved to consolidate the two actions, arguing that the issues overlapped. The trial court ultimately consolidated both cases for all purposes.Following consolidation, the trial court granted summary adjudication against Sanchez on his claim to unwind the foreclosure, while Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer claim proceeded to trial. At trial, Villa Zinfandel introduced recorded foreclosure documents and the trustee’s deed upon sale. Bearman objected to the admission of these documents, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay, and contended that Villa Zinfandel needed to prove the truth of the recorded statements, not just their existence. The trial court overruled these objections, took judicial notice of the documents’ existence (but not their truth), and found in favor of Villa Zinfandel, awarding damages exceeding the then-applicable $35,000 cap for limited civil actions.On appeal, Bearman argued to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, that the trial court erred by admitting the recorded documents and by awarding damages above the jurisdictional limit. The appellate court held that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the existence and facial contents of the recorded foreclosure documents and correctly applied legal presumptions regarding the regularity of the trustee’s sale. The court also held that, after consolidation for all purposes with an unlimited civil action, the case was no longer subject to the damages cap for limited civil actions. The judgment in favor of Villa Zinfandel was affirmed. View "Villa Zinfandel v. Bearman" on Justia Law

Several tenants of a subdivided property in Los Angeles, each with separate oral lease agreements for individual units, were forced out of their homes after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the tenant of a different unit. The landlord did not inform these tenants of the proceedings or provide proper notice. Although only the tenant of unit seven was behind on rent, the landlord sought and obtained possession of the entire property. The sheriff’s deputies, acting on the writ of possession, evicted all the tenants, leaving them homeless and unable to retrieve most of their belongings.The tenants filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asserting claims such as wrongful eviction, breach of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of statutory and local ordinances. The landlord responded by filing a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the tenants’ claims arose from protected petitioning activity—the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action. The Superior Court granted the motion for ten of the eleven causes of action, concluding that the tenants’ claims were premised on the landlord’s protected activity in pursuing the unlawful detainer case.Upon review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, held that the tenants’ claims did not arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The appellate court found that the gravamen of the tenants’ complaint was the landlord’s improper termination of their tenancies without judicial process or notice—not the act of filing or prosecuting the unlawful detainer action against another tenant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to deny the motion. View "Noon v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

A homeowners association in San Diego, governed by the Davis-Stirling Act and its own bylaws, held a recall election to remove a board director. The association distributed recall ballot materials, including a candidate statement from the sole candidate seeking to replace the director if the recall succeeded. The sitting director sought to include her own statement in these materials to advocate against her removal but was denied by the elections inspector, who reasoned that only candidate statements were included. The association’s election rules defined “association media” to exclude candidate forms or statements attached to ballots.Previously, the Superior Court of San Diego County, in a separate action brought by the same director, found no violation of the statutory equal-access requirement for association media, concluding that all candidates had equal opportunity to submit statements using the association’s forms for regular board elections. Following the recall, the director filed a new petition and complaint challenging the association’s refusal to distribute her statement, alleging violations of Civil Code section 5105, various Corporations Code provisions, and negligence. After a bench trial, the Superior Court again ruled for the association and the inspector, finding the candidate statement was not “association media” under the relevant statute and that the recall vote met statutory requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that “association media” as used in Civil Code section 5105 does encompass ballot materials containing candidate statements distributed by the association during an election. The court concluded the director was entitled to equal access to these materials to advocate her position. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Civil Code section 5145, whether the association’s failure to provide equal access affected the election outcome. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions. View "Arroyo v. Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law