Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, were severely injured after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in an apartment building in Lodi, California, where they lived with their mother. The accident occurred shortly after the property owner replaced the apartment’s windows during a renovation that did not include installing fall prevention devices on the upper-floor windows. The children’s guardian ad litem sued the property owner and its manager, alleging negligence based on both general negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the absence of fall prevention devices violated the California Building Standards Code and proximately caused the injuries.The case was heard in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Prior to trial, the defendants sought to defeat the negligence per se claim, arguing the building was exempt from current code requirements because it complied with the code at the time of its original construction in 1980. The trial court denied their motion, allowing both negligence theories to proceed to trial. After plaintiffs presented their case, the court granted a nonsuit for the entire complaint, ruling there was no duty owed under general negligence given lack of foreseeability, and that the window replacement qualified for a code exemption, negating negligence per se.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court affirmed the nonsuit on the general negligence claim, finding the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty. However, it reversed the nonsuit as to negligence per se, holding that replacing the window did not qualify for the “original materials” exemption in the Building Code, and thus the defendants were required to comply with current safety standards. The case was remanded for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes" on Justia Law

A city in California owned a downtown parking garage known as Garage 5, which was in poor condition and underutilized according to studies conducted in 2019 and 2022. The city had previously adopted a housing plan to identify public land suitable for housing development. In public meetings and study sessions throughout 2021 and 2022, city staff and consultants presented data showing declining demand for public parking and the high cost of necessary repairs to Garage 5. After further study and public comment, the city’s council passed a resolution in December 2022 declaring Garage 5 to be surplus land under the Surplus Land Act, provided that any future development retain at least 75 public parking spaces.The owner of nearby properties, Airport Business Center, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in Sonoma County Superior Court. The petitioner argued the city had violated the Surplus Land Act by declaring the garage surplus while there was still an ongoing need for public parking and contended that the city’s findings were not supported by the evidence. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding the city’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, and that there was substantial evidentiary support for the resolution. A temporary stay was granted pending appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied a request for further stay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the Surplus Land Act’s requirement that property be “not necessary for the agency’s use” allows a city to designate property as surplus if it is not indispensable for agency operations, even if the property serves a public purpose like parking. The evidence supported the city’s determination, and the findings in the resolution satisfied statutory requirements. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the city. View "Airport Business Center v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

A property owner in Los Angeles obtained a density bonus from the city in 2005, allowing him to build one additional housing unit beyond what zoning would otherwise permit, in exchange for agreeing to rent one of the units to low-income households for at least 30 years. This agreement was formalized and recorded against the property in 2006. The owner had previously taken out a mortgage, and the lender recorded its deed of trust against the property in 2005. After the owner defaulted, the lender foreclosed on the property in 2013. Several years later, new owners purchased the property, allegedly unaware of the recorded agreement requiring the low-income rental restriction.Following a notice from the City demanding compliance with the affordable housing agreement, the new owners filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking quiet title and declaratory relief. They argued that the affordable housing agreement, recorded after the original deed of trust, was a junior encumbrance extinguished by the foreclosure. The City countered that the agreement was a condition of a building permit and survived foreclosure. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the agreement was a covenant running with the land and survived foreclosure.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the affordable housing agreement was equivalent to a “condition attached to a permit” under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), and thus survived foreclosure. Permit conditions that have not been timely challenged run with the land and remain enforceable against successor owners, even those who acquire the property through foreclosure. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim and were not entitled to amend their complaint. View "Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to groundwater replenishment charges imposed by a water district in a desert region where groundwater is the main source of potable water. The water district operates three areas of benefit (AOBs) and levies replenishment charges on customers who pump significant groundwater. Domestic customers do not pay these charges directly, but their payments for drinking water are allocated to the replenishment funds through the district’s enterprise fund system. Plaintiffs, including a taxpayer association, alleged that the replenishment charges were unconstitutionally structured, resulting in higher rates for certain AOBs and unfair subsidies for others, benefitting large agricultural businesses.The litigation began with a combined petition and class action in the Superior Court of Riverside County, which was dismissed because the court found the validation statutes applied and the statute of limitations had expired. Subsequent reverse validation actions for later fiscal years were timely filed and consolidated. The Superior Court, in rulings by two judges, found the replenishment charges to be unconstitutional taxes because they did not satisfy the requirements of California Constitution Article XIII C, Section 1, subdivision (e)(2). Specifically, the court found that the district failed to show the allocation of replenishment costs bore a fair or reasonable relationship to the burdens or benefits received by each AOB, and thus the charges were not exempt from being classified as taxes. The court awarded substantial refunds to affected ratepayers and enjoined the district from imposing similar unconstitutional charges in the future.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed both the district’s appeal of the remedies and liability findings and the taxpayer association’s cross-appeal on procedural grounds. The appellate court affirmed in full, holding that the replenishment charges were unconstitutional, the remedies were proper, and that the validation statutes applied to these charges, thus barring untimely claims for earlier years. The appellate court also found no error in the trial court’s grant of refund and injunctive relief. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The case centers on a long-standing dispute involving three churches over ownership and sale of real property in Los Angeles. Attorney Steven C. Kim represented one of the churches, Central Korean Evangelical Church, which granted him a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of attorney fees. Central Korean had contracted to sell the property to New Life Oasis Church but later reneged, leading to litigation. The trial court ordered Central Korean to honor the sale and expunged Kim’s deed of trust, which was obstructing the transaction. Kim’s client appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, and Kim did not pursue his own appeal. The judgment became final in 2018.Following the final judgment, Kim filed a new lawsuit against New Life Oasis Church and Bank of Hope, seeking a declaration that his deed of trust was still valid and challenging the prior expungement order. New Life and Bank of Hope moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that issue preclusion barred Kim from relitigating the validity of his lien. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed and entered judgment against Kim. Additionally, New Life filed a cross-complaint alleging that Kim’s recording of a lis pendens constituted slander of title and abuse of process. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of New Life, awarding damages and not addressing Kim’s defense based on the litigation privilege.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s application of issue preclusion, holding that Kim could not relitigate the validity of his deed of trust. However, it reversed the judgment on the cross-complaint, holding that the litigation privilege protected Kim’s recording of the lis pendens from claims of slander of title and abuse of process. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs leased a 2,400-acre parcel of undeveloped land in San Luis Obispo County, California, from the predecessor of the defendant, Eureka Energy Company. The lease, originally executed in 1968 and later novated, provided for a 99-year term with an option to renew for another 99 years. The property, known as Wild Cherry Canyon, was historically used for cattle grazing, but the lease itself stated that the premises could be used for “any lawful purpose.” The parties understood that cattle grazing would continue, primarily to reduce wildfire risk rather than for commercial livestock production. In 2018, the plaintiffs exercised their option to renew the lease, but Eureka asserted that the lease was limited to 51 years under California Civil Code section 717, which restricts leases for agricultural purposes.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a court trial and issued a detailed statement of decision. It found that the lease was for agricultural purposes, specifically cattle grazing, and concluded that section 717 applied, limiting the lease to 51 years. The court entered judgment for Eureka, declaring that the lease expired in 2019 and that the plaintiffs had no further interest in the property. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the lease was not for agricultural purposes within the meaning of section 717, given the fire prevention intent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that, although cattle grazing generally constitutes an agricultural purpose under section 717, the particular circumstances here—where grazing was intended for fire prevention and not for commercial agriculture—meant the lease was not for agricultural purposes as defined by the statute. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the lease was valid beyond the 51-year limit and that the plaintiffs’ leasehold interest should not be forfeited. View "Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy Co." on Justia Law

The case concerns the City of San Diego’s approval of a 2022 ballot measure to remove the longstanding 30-foot building height limit in the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Planning area. This height restriction, established by a 1972 voter initiative, was intended to preserve coastal views, community character, and mitigate issues such as congestion and pollution. In 2018, the City updated the community plan and prepared a program environmental impact report (PEIR) under the assumption that the height limit remained in effect. In 2020, the City attempted to remove the height limit via a ballot measure, but the measure was invalidated for failing to adequately consider environmental impacts as required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).Following the invalidation, the City prepared a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) and approved a second ballot measure in 2022. Save Our Access, a nonprofit, challenged this new measure, arguing that the City’s environmental review remained inadequate. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Save Our Access’s petition for writ of mandate, finding that the City’s SEIR sufficiently addressed the environmental impacts by focusing on visual effects and neighborhood character, and by relying on the 2018 PEIR for other impact categories.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found that the City’s SEIR was inadequate under CEQA. The court held that the City failed to meaningfully analyze the environmental impacts of allowing buildings above 30 feet, such as effects on noise, air quality, biological resources, and geological conditions. The court concluded that relying on the prior PEIR and deferring analysis to future site-specific projects did not satisfy CEQA’s requirements. The judgment was reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant Save Our Access’s petition and direct the City to comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law