Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A developer sought to build a 30-unit condominium project, including six affordable units, within the coastal zone of the City of Redondo Beach. The proposed site was located in a zone designated under the City’s Local Coastal Program (LCP) for public access uses, commercial-recreational facilities, and services supporting boating and fishing; residential uses were not permitted. Despite knowing this, the developer submitted its application, asserting that the project qualified for approval under the Housing Accountability Act’s “builder’s remedy” provisions, which can override local zoning restrictions if a city lacks a compliant housing element.At the time of the application, the City did not have a certified compliant housing element, triggering the builder’s remedy provisions. However, after the application, the City informed the developer that residential uses were not permitted in the relevant zone under the certified LCP and suggested that the developer apply for an amendment to the LCP. The developer did not pursue this amendment process. After the City declined to process the application, and an administrative appeal failed, the developer filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel approval under the Housing Accountability Act. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the builder’s remedy provisions did not override the Coastal Act or the City’s LCP.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s denial was required under the Coastal Act because the proposed residential use was not permitted by the certified LCP, and no feasible method existed to comply without an LCP amendment, which the developer did not seek. The court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, finding no abuse of discretion and concluding that the Housing Accountability Act does not displace the requirements of the Coastal Act or Commission-certified LCPs regarding permitted uses. View "New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord leased a property to an individual, Sina, who stopped paying rent soon after the lease began, causing significant unpaid rent and property damage. The landlord regained possession of the property and found it had been gutted. The landlord sued Sina for breach of contract and prevailed at trial, but the initial judgment was reversed on appeal due to a change in parol evidence law. On retrial before a referee, the landlord again prevailed, with the referee finding substantial damages and the trial court adopting the referee’s decision, entering judgment for the landlord. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.After the second judgment, Sina and his wife filed for bankruptcy. During related bankruptcy proceedings, the landlord discovered new evidence revealing that Sina, his brothers, their wives, and a family-owned corporation, Amey, were all part of a longstanding “one-for-all” family partnership. The landlord moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to amend the judgment to add these family members and Amey as judgment debtors, arguing that they were the true parties in interest and had been virtually represented in the litigation by Sina.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the trial court's decision to amend the judgment. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the family members and Amey were part of a partnership that controlled the litigation and benefited from it. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, a court may amend a judgment to add parties who had sufficient control of the litigation and unity of interest with the original judgment debtor, even if traditional alter ego requirements are not strictly met. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the addition of the individual partners and Amey as judgment debtors. View "8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad" on Justia Law

A group of affiliated real estate companies entered into an agreement with a city to develop and manage an affordable senior housing community. The agreement included a promissory note, requiring the companies to provide annual audited financial statements and payments based on residual receipts. The city’s finance director later raised concerns about compliance, and the city issued a breach notice, which was subsequently cured and rescinded. The companies also pursued a similar housing project in a neighboring city, but after city officials discussed the prior project with the original city’s staff, the negotiations ended and the exclusive agreement expired. The companies alleged that false statements made by the original city’s staff about their financial compliance and loan status caused the neighboring city to terminate the project and harmed their reputation.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the companies’ complaint for interference, breach of covenant, and defamation. The city filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims arose from protected activity and were barred by the Government Claims Act due to lack of proper claim presentation. The trial court found the city’s activities were protected but determined the companies were likely to prevail, holding that delivering a letter outlining their claims to a city council member was sufficient compliance with the Act.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the city’s communications and actions regarding municipal contracts and development projects were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. It further held that the companies failed to comply with the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement, as delivery to a single council member at a private meeting did not constitute proper service to the governing body or authorized recipient. The court reversed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, remanded with instructions to grant the motion, and directed further proceedings to determine attorney fees. View "Eagle Colton 55, LP v. City of Colton" on Justia Law

Following an unusually severe rainstorm in San Francisco, a retaining wall separating the backyards of two uphill and two downhill residential properties collapsed, sending soil and debris from the uphill properties into the downhill properties. This resulted in significant damage to all four properties, prompting the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection to issue notices of violation to all owners, requiring reconstruction of the wall. The uphill neighbors sued the downhill neighbors, including claims for nuisance, negligence, and loss of lateral support, and the downhill neighbors countersued for nuisance, negligence, and trespass. Before trial, some parties settled, leaving Mary Coulton as the sole remaining downhill neighbor defendant and cross-complainant.The San Francisco County Superior Court ruled on various motions. It denied Coulton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the loss of lateral support claim, finding at least a cause of action for negligence. Before trial, the court granted Coulton’s motion in limine to exclude strict liability and negligence per se claims based on Civil Code section 832, concluding that strict liability does not apply absent excavation. The uphill neighbors then voluntarily dismissed their nuisance and negligence claims, and the court entered judgment in favor of Coulton. Coulton later sought expert fees as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, based on joint settlement offers made to the uphill neighbors, which the trial court upheld.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that California law does not recognize a strict liability claim for loss of lateral support absent excavation, thus affirming the trial court’s exclusion of that claim. However, the appellate court found Coulton’s joint section 998 offers invalid because they were unapportioned among multiple plaintiffs with separate claims, and no unity of interest exception applied. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for Coulton but reversed the award of expert fees, directing the trial court to strike those costs. View "Quinn v. Coulton" on Justia Law

A local government entity, which owns and operates Ventura Harbor, entered into a master lease for commercial property and a sublease with the appellant, who operates a restaurant and bar on the premises. Both the master lease and sublease required the lessee or sublessee to pay not only a fixed monthly rent but also a percentage of gross income from all sales, including food and alcoholic beverages. The appellant had been paying three percent of its income from food and alcohol sales as percentage rent.The appellant sued the government entity in the Ventura County Superior Court, alleging that the percentage rent clause violated two provisions of the California Constitution: article XIII C, which restricts local governments from imposing taxes without voter approval, and article XX, section 22, which gives the state exclusive authority to regulate the sale and purchase of alcoholic beverages. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the government entity, finding that the percentage rent was not an unconstitutional tax nor an unlawful regulation of alcoholic beverage sales. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the government entity as the prevailing party.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the consolidated appeals challenging both the summary judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney’s fees. The appellate court held that the percentage rent clause falls within the constitutional exception for charges imposed for the rental or lease of government property, and thus is not a tax requiring voter approval. The court further found no reasonableness requirement applies to this exception. Additionally, it determined that the clause does not violate the state’s exclusive authority over alcoholic beverage regulation because the rent is not intended to regulate alcohol sales. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment and attorney’s fee award. View "Ventura Harbor Restaurant Associates v. Ventura Port Dist." on Justia Law

A city owned shares in a mutual water company that were appurtenant to land it held. After a dispute regarding the city’s right to inspect corporate records, the water company cancelled the city’s shares, citing Corporations Code section 14300, which requires mutual water companies to cancel appurtenant shares held by public entities. The city argued that this statute violated its rights under article XVI, section 17 of the California Constitution, which allows public entities to acquire and hold shares in mutual water companies for furnishing water for public, municipal, or governmental purposes.The Superior Court of Lake County initially issued a temporary restraining order invalidating a board election and later granted the city’s request for a preliminary injunction. The injunction required the water company to re-issue the cancelled shares to the city, concluding that Corporations Code section 14300 was unconstitutional because it conflicted with section 17 of the state constitution. The trial court found that the city’s operation of a public facility, such as a splash pad, constituted a valid public purpose under section 17 and determined that the city was likely to suffer harm without the injunction.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the constitutionality of Corporations Code section 14300 de novo, applying a presumption in favor of the statute’s validity. The appellate court interpreted section 17 as permitting public entities to hold shares only when acting as a water purveyor for their territory, not merely as a landowner receiving water for its own parcels. The court held that section 14300 does not violate section 17, as the statute can reasonably be construed to exclude appurtenant shares from the constitutional exception. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Clearlake v. Highlands Mutual Water Co." on Justia Law

The case centers on a charge imposed by a local water district in Tehama County, California. In 2022, the district adopted a resolution requiring all landowners in the county to pay an annual “well registration charge” of $0.29 per acre for three years, regardless of whether their property used groundwater or had a well. The stated purpose was to fund the administrative costs of a groundwater well registration program. The district later adopted additional resolutions to implement waivers for certain parcels and continued collecting the charge for noncompliant parcels. David Garst, trustee of a trust owning 40 parcels in the county, paid the charge and subsequently challenged its validity, arguing it violated California constitutional provisions adopted by Propositions 218 and 26.The Superior Court of Tehama County reviewed the case and conducted a bench trial. The court found that the district acted in good faith and imposed the charge for a legitimate purpose, but concluded the charge was not related to any specific government service or benefit provided to the landowners. The court determined the well registration charge amounted to a tax rather than a regulatory fee. The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the district to rescind the charge, refund all collected sums, and cease further collection.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the district’s appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified, holding that the well registration charge was an unconstitutional tax under Article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was imposed broadly without a nexus to regulated activity or specific government service. The court struck the provision requiring the district to refund the charge, finding Garst had not complied with the procedural requirements of the Government Claims Act. The remainder of the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Garst v. Tehama County Flood Control & Wat. Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

After her property experienced water intrusion, a homeowner sued her neighbor, whose property was the source of the problem. The neighbor, in defending the lawsuit, hired a construction consulting firm to inspect both properties and to create an expert report recommending repairs. The recommendations from this report formed the basis of a settlement between the homeowner and her neighbor, and repairs were performed accordingly. After the settlement and repairs, the water intrusion problem recurred, leading the homeowner to file a new lawsuit against the consulting firm, alleging that its recommendations were negligent and defective.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the consulting firm filed an anti-SLAPP motion, asserting that its actions were protected as statements made in the course of litigation. The trial court granted the motion concerning certain claims, but denied it for claims of negligence and breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, reasoning these arose from conduct rather than protected statements. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously affirmed the trial court’s partial denial, finding that the remaining claims were not based on protected activity, and remanded for further proceedings on those claims.Upon remand, the consulting firm moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the litigation privilege under California Civil Code section 47(b) barred the remaining claims. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the consulting firm. The court held that the litigation privilege applied because the firm’s formulation of repair recommendations was necessarily related to a communicative act (the expert report) prepared in the course of litigation, and thus barred the homeowner’s negligence and third-party beneficiary claims. The judgment in favor of the consulting firm was affirmed. View "Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services" on Justia Law

Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company acquired the Las Flores Pipelines, which run through the coastal zone in Santa Barbara County, California. After the 2015 Refugio Beach oil spill, the pipelines were inactive until Sable purchased them in 2024 and began repair and maintenance work at numerous sites. The California Coastal Commission sent Sable a Notice of Violation, then issued Executive Director Cease and Desist Orders, directing Sable to seek permits for both prospective and already completed work. Sable submitted zoning clearance applications to the County, which declared the repair work authorized by existing permits and declined to act on the applications. The Commission subsequently issued further cease and desist orders and filed a cross-complaint seeking injunctive relief. After observing ongoing construction, the Commission requested a preliminary injunction.The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held hearings and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction enforcing the Commission’s cease and desist order. Sable appealed, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the County had determined no new permits were necessary and had declined enforcement action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that under Public Resources Code section 30810, the Commission was authorized to issue a cease and desist order when the County declined to act regarding an alleged violation, regardless of the County’s reasons for its decision. The court found that the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of a Coastal Act violation, and no balancing of equities was required under section 30803. The court also rejected Sable’s due process and federal preemption arguments and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

A woman married a man who was, unbeknownst to her, still legally married to his first wife. After learning of the bigamy, she obtained an annulment of the marriage. Meanwhile, the man's first wife obtained a court judgment against him for unpaid spousal support and an equalization payment, totaling over $1.4 million. To enforce this judgment, the first wife secured a writ of execution and served notices of levy on the man's bank accounts. Relying on a statutory provision allowing a judgment creditor to levy accounts in the name of a judgment debtor’s spouse without a court order if accompanied by an affidavit of spousal status, the first wife provided an affidavit stating that the second woman was the man's spouse. As a result, more than $380,000 was levied from accounts held in the second woman's name, either individually or with her son.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the second woman’s motion to quash the levies, concluding that the annulment of her marriage did not undermine the validity of the levies. The court found the levies valid, except for a small exemption, and awarded nearly all the seized funds to the first wife. The second woman appealed, arguing that her marriage to the judgment debtor was void from the outset and thus could not form the basis for levying her separate accounts without a court order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that, under California law, a void marriage is invalid from its inception and its invalidity can be shown in collateral proceedings. Therefore, the affidavit of spousal status was ineffective, and the levies on the second woman's accounts were invalid. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, directed that the levies be quashed, and ordered the return of the funds improperly seized. View "Greely v. Greely" on Justia Law