Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI) leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and sought to purchase it under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which mandates that Caltrans offer to sell commercial real property deemed excess to the current occupant at fair market value. ADI used the property commercially and applied to purchase it after Caltrans designated it as excess. However, Caltrans denied the application, arguing that the property was not commercial when initially acquired. The trial court agreed with Caltrans and denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that ADI met the conditions of section 118.1, including leasing, occupying, and improving the property. However, it ruled that the statute applied only to property that was commercial when acquired by Caltrans, interpreting "acquired" as a past-tense verb.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the plain and contextual reading of section 118.1 requires the property to be commercial at the time it is deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court found that the statute's language, legislative history, and Caltrans' own manuals support this interpretation. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer to sell the property to ADI at fair market value. The court held that ADI is entitled to its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over two adjacent properties, each containing a multi-unit apartment complex with on-site parking. The plaintiffs, Eli and Maha Batta, sought to establish easement rights for additional parking and trash dumpsters on a disputed area of the adjacent property owned by the defendant, Therese Hunt. The Battas purchased their property from Hunt in 1994 and claimed that their tenants had used the disputed area for parking and dumpsters since then.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Battas, finding they had established easement rights by oral grant, prescription, and implication. The court granted the easement but ordered it to expire upon a bona fide sale of either property. Both parties appealed the decision. Hunt argued that the trial court erred in granting the easement on procedural and evidentiary grounds, while the Battas contended that the court abused its discretion by ruling that the easement would expire upon a sale.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court's findings were inconsistent and irreconcilable. The trial court had found both that Hunt had granted an easement and that the Battas' use of the property was without permission, which are contradictory. The appellate court concluded that these inconsistent findings required reversal. Additionally, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Battas to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for an easement by implication without giving Hunt the opportunity to rebut the evidence.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Batta v. Hunt" on Justia Law

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The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Condominium owners Gregory and Kathleen Haidet filed a lawsuit against their homeowners association (HOA), Del Mar Woods Homeowners Association, alleging that their upstairs neighbors' improperly installed floors constituted a nuisance. The HOA demurred to the Haidets' initial complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing one cause of action without leave to amend and two with leave to amend. The Haidets chose not to amend their claims against the HOA and instead filed an amended complaint naming only other defendants. Subsequently, the Haidets filed a motion to dismiss the HOA without prejudice, while the HOA filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court granted the HOA's request for dismissal with prejudice and awarded the HOA attorney fees.The trial court found that the Haidets' breach of contract claim failed because the governing documents did not require HOA consent for installing hardwood flooring. Additionally, the claims were time-barred as the Haidets had notice of their claims starting in 2016 but did not file until 2022. The court also found that the HOA had no fiduciary duty regarding the structural violation of the governing documents and that the business judgment rule applied to the HOA's decisions. The court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court was permitted to dismiss the HOA with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), as the Haidets failed to amend their claims against the HOA within the allowed time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the HOA was the prevailing party for purposes of Civil Code section 5975 and its award of $48,229.08 in attorney fees. The judgment was affirmed. View "Haidet v. Del Mar Woods Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

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Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

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In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

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Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

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Lucy Mancini Newell was designated as the trustee and sole beneficiary of her parents' trust. After her father, Arthur Mancini, passed away, Newell discovered that he had amended the trust to name his caregiver, Neneth Rollins, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. Newell challenged the validity of these amendments and, upon learning that Rollins used trust assets to purchase real property, recorded a lis pendens against the property and sought to impose a constructive trust on it.The probate court granted Rollins' motion to expunge the lis pendens, ruling that Newell's petition did not contain a "real property claim" as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court concluded that Newell's petition sought to invalidate the trust amendments and change the trustee, but did not directly affect the title or possession of the real property.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Newell's petition did indeed contain a real property claim because it would affect the title to the property if successful. The court noted that the trustee holds legal title to the trust's property, and a change in trustee would change the name on the title. Therefore, the petition would affect the title to the Van Nuys property.The Court of Appeal granted Newell's petition for writ of mandate, directing the probate court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens and to enter a new order denying Rollins' motion to expunge. The court also awarded Newell her costs in the proceeding. View "Newell v. Superior Court" on Justia Law