Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District was asked to determine two key issues. The first issue pertained to whether K&S Staffing Solutions, Inc., a staffing company, could be considered a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law. The second issue was whether the payment bonds issued for two state projects were subject to the mechanics’ lien law’s requirements. The staffing company had been contracted by a subcontractor, Titan DVBE Inc., to fulfill its staffing needs for two road maintenance projects awarded by California’s Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to VSS International, Inc. (VSSI). When Titan failed to pay K&S all the amounts owed for the projects, K&S sued VSSI and the Western Surety Company, which had issued payment bonds for the projects. K&S argued that it was a “laborer” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law and was therefore entitled to recover against the payment bonds. The trial court disagreed, finding that K&S was not a “laborer” as it failed to show it was the employer of the laborers. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, interpreting the term “laborer” as defined in the mechanics’ lien law to mean “a person who, acting as an employee, performs labor upon, or bestows skill or other necessary services on, a work of improvement.” The court concluded that K&S was not a “laborer” as it was not acting as an employee in any capacity. The court also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the defendants under a provision in the mechanics’ lien law. Although K&S argued that this provision was inapplicable because the payment bonds for the projects were not “payment bonds” within the meaning of the mechanics’ lien law, the court rejected this argument. The court concluded that the general requirements of the mechanics’ lien law for payment bonds applied both to state projects that required a bond under the Public Contract Code and other “public entity” projects that required a bond under the mechanics’ lien law. View "K & S Staffing Solutions v. The Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant, a homeowner, for defamation after the homeowner posted critical comments about the company online. The homeowner had hired the construction company to repair her home after it was damaged by a fallen tree. Dissatisfied with the work, the homeowner reported the company to the Contractors State License Board and began posting negative reviews of the company on her blog and Yelp. In response to the defamation lawsuit, the homeowner filed a special motion to strike, arguing that her comments were protected by the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the motion, and the homeowner appealed.The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the homeowner's online posts were not covered by the litigation privilege. The court explained that the litigation privilege applies only to communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings that have some connection to the litigation. The homeowner's posts were public criticisms of the construction company, some of which did not even mention the Contractors State License Board. Therefore, the court found that the posts were akin to press releases and lacked the necessary connection to the proceedings before the board. The court also rejected the homeowner's arguments that the construction company failed to plead that her statements were unprivileged, that her statements were true, and that her statements were merely her opinions. View "Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, the Greenspan family bought a home in Long Beach, California, for $900,000 in 2014. The land was valued at $540,000 and the improvements (the home itself) at $360,000. Two years later, the Greenspans demolished the original residence, except for the garage, and built a new home on the property. The County of Los Angeles then reappraised the property, reducing the value of the improvements to $40,000 and increasing the value of the land to $860,000. The County then added the appraised value of the new construction to the newly allocated land and improvement values. The Greenspans contested this reappraisal, arguing that the County's reallocation of their base-year land and improvement value was contrary to law. The trial court found in favor of the County, and the Greenspans appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The court found that the County's automatic reallocation of the base-year value for the entire structure removed, leaving only a "credit" for the remaining garage, was contrary to Revenue and Taxation Code sections 51 and 75.10, which require that a property owner receive a reduction in previously assessed base values for portions of any property removed. The court held that the County's automatic reappraisal policy, based on the assumption that a property owner bought the property for the land value alone if substantial renovation occurred within two years, was inconsistent with Proposition 13 and statutory valuation standards. The court remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment vacating the decision of the Board and remanding the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Greenspan v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In the 1950s and 1960s, landowners in southwest San Bernardino County, California, transferred 19 parcels of land to various individuals by grant deed, reserving a partial interest in all minerals beneath the surface. The current owners of the surface estate are mining companies that wish to extract sand and gravel from the combined 196-acre tract through open-pit excavation. Mineral rights holders, descendants of the original grantors, claim a one-half interest in the mining proceeds. The question in this appeal was whether “minerals” in the original reservations include rights to mine sand and gravel. Concluding they do, the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the mineral rights holders, and the mining companies appealed.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the plain language of the deed was ambiguous as to the term "minerals," and therefore turned to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. The court found that sand and gravel had been mined in the region for decades before the grant deeds, and that these substances possess commercial value. Although open-pit mining will affect the usability of the surface estate, the surface estate retains a 50 percent interest in the extracted minerals. The court concluded that the deeds' ambiguity as to whether sand and gravel were included in the mineral reservation was resolved by California Civil Code section 1069, which requires that deed reservations be construed in favor of the grantor. Thus, the court held that under these deeds, the term "minerals" included sand and gravel. View "Vulcan Lands, Inc. v. Currier" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Castaic Studios, LLC (Castaic) and Wonderland Studios, LLC (Wonderland) entered an agreement under which Castaic granted Wonderland the “exclusive right to use” certain areas of its commercial property. The agreement specified that it was a “license agreement,” as opposed to a lease, with Castaic “retaining legal possession and control” of the premises. The agreement was to be “governed by the contract laws and not by the landlord tenant laws.” When Wonderland defaulted, Castaic nonetheless filed an unlawful detainer action seeking possession of the property. The trial court sustained Wonderland’s demurrer without leave to amend, reasoning that Castaic had waived its right to pursue the remedy of unlawful detainer   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the trial court correctly sustained Wonderland’s demurrer without leave to amend. Whether an agreement constitutes a lease or a license is “a subtle pursuit.” Although Castaic argued at length that the agreement was in fact a lease despite its express designation to the contrary, we need not decide this issue to resolve the appeal. Even assuming the agreement contains some elements of a lease, its express terms show the parties’ intent to waive any rights afforded by the landlord-tenant laws, including a landlord’s remedy of unlawful detainer. View "Castaic Studios v. Wonderland Studios" on Justia Law

Snowball West Investments, LP applied to build a housing project consisting of 215 homes in the Sunland/Tujunga area of the City of Los Angeles. The current zoning for the site is RA and A1; the project must be rezoned to RD5 and R1 for the project to move forward. The City denied Snowball’s zone change request, stating that more information was needed before building homes in a high wildfire hazard area. Snowball petitioned for a writ of mandate, which was denied. Snowball appealed. Snowball argues that under the rezoning exemption in the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (j)(4)1 (section 65589.5(j)(4)), its project is exempt from the need for a zone change.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the superior court’s denial of Snowball’s writ petition. The court explained that the current RA and A1 zoning is consistent with the community plan through the language of that plan. Because the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) only applies when “the zoning for the project site is inconsistent” with the applicable plan, the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not apply here, and Snowball’s project was not exempt from zone change requirements.  Further, the court wrote that the HAA does not apply, and the City’s findings were sufficient under the LAMC and supported by substantial evidence. View "Snowball West Investments v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2008-2010, Shah engaged in fraudulent transactions involving three luxury condominiums owned by Hwang, ultimately using the property to obtain over $2 million in loans. Shah was convicted of multiple crimes. Enhancement allegations, including taking a property valued over $3.2 million and special findings, including a pattern of white-collar crime. were found true. A 2015 restitution order remains unpaid. Hwang filed a civil action against Shah and, in 2018, secured a civil judgment—over $3.8 million.In 2021, the trial court levied property under Penal Code 186.11, the “Freeze and Seize” law, which is intended to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets pending trial, and then use the assets to pay restitution after conviction. Shah argued that a trial court must seize any properties under section 186.11 no later than the sentencing hearing.The court of appeal affirmed. Shah sought to import time limitations into the statute and ignored the legislative purpose of section 186.11 and California’s over-arching statutory framework for restitution in criminal cases. California recognizes restitution for crime victims as a constitutional right. The court’s authority does not change even after the Courts of Appeal decide a criminal case. The lack of a disposition formally remanding Shah’s original appeal for further proceedings was no bar to the trial court’s levying order. View "People v. Shah" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Breanne Martin alleged she was injured when a large metal gate fell on her while she was on a residential rental property located in Alpine, California. Martin initially filed claims for negligence and premises liability against the owners of the property. But upon learning that the owners had previously filed a bankruptcy petition, Martin amended her complaint to add the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, Leslie Gladstone, as a defendant. Gladstone demurred to Martin’s complaint, asserting that application of federal statutory and common law demonstrated that Martin could not state a cause of action against her. The trial court rejected Gladstone’s argument regarding application of the "Barton" doctrine, but accepted her argument regarding the abandonment of the property at issue; the court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer on this ground and entered judgment in favor of Gladstone. On appeal, Martin contended the trial court erred in concluding that Gladstone’s abandonment of the relevant property after the accident prevented Gladstone from being held liable for Martin’s injuries. Martin further argued the trial court correctly determined it could not conclude as a matter of law that the Barton doctrine applied to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over Martin’s claims. The Court of Appeal agreed with Martin’s appellate contentions and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Martin v. Gladstone" on Justia Law