Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs SLPR, L.L.C. (SLPR), Ann Goodfellow, trustee of the survivor's trust of the Goodfellow Family Trust (Goodfellow), and Jerry Cannon and Michael Morris, trustees of the Sewall Family Trust (Sewall) (together Plaintiffs) appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant State of California (State) in their action against State and the San Diego Unified Port District (Port) (together Defendants) arising out of damage to their bayside properties in the City of Coronado (City) allegedly caused by dredging of the San Diego Bay (Bay). The United States Navy dredged an area of the Bay within the Naval Air Station North Island Turning Basin in 1998 and 2002 and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army) dredged the central navigation channel of the Bay from 2004 to 2005. In a previous decision relating to this matter, the Court of Appeal concluded, inter alia, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' quiet title action because there were triable issues of material fact on the meaning of a facially ambiguous 1931 judgment in favor of City and against J.D. and A.B. Spreckels Investment Company (Spreckels), owner of real property along the Bay's shoreline and Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, and other defendants regarding whether that judgment fixed the bayside boundaries of Plaintiffs' properties or whether it located only the current position of the mean high tide line (MHTL) at that time and retained the ambulatory MHTL as the legal boundaries of their properties. On remand, Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, alleging causes of action for quiet title, inverse condemnation related to the quiet title cause of action (by SLPR and Arendsee), inverse condemnation (by Plaintiffs), nuisance, and removal of lateral support. The trial court sustained State's demurrer to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. The court subsequently conducted a bench trial on the first and second causes of action and, after admitting and considering extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of the Spreckels judgment, found that the judgment had fixed the boundaries between Plaintiffs' properties and the public tidelands. The court then entered judgment in favor of State and against Plaintiffs. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law

The owner of the unencumbered 25 percent interest in the real property is entitled to a proportionate share of surplus proceeds. The Court of Appeal's conclusion is based on Caito v. United California Bank (1978) 20 Cal.3d 694. The court held that the 1990 enactment of Civil Code section 2924k did not change the principles set forth in Caito.Applying this principle about the rights of junior lienors to the undisputed facts of this case, the court held that the creditor holding the second deed of trust encumbering an undivided 75 percent interest in the real property was entitled only to a 75 percent share of the surplus funds. The court held that the remaining 25 percent must be distributed to the person who owned the interest that was not encumbered by the second deed of trust. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP v. Dhindsa" on Justia Law

Appellant Heather Robinson Tanaka’s great-grandfather purchased a subdivided parcel that had been part of a larger riparian tract but was no longer contiguous to water. Riparian rights can persist in land sold under such circumstances, though the grantee cannot acquire riparian rights any greater than those held by the grantor. The question presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the parties intended the grantee to receive riparian rights in such a transfer. "The clearest expression of intent is when a deed expressly conveys the riparian rights to the noncontiguous parcel, in which case the parcel retains its riparian status. However, where the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible on the question." Here, the trial court, after considering the language of the deed at issue and extrinsic evidence, concluded the conveyance to Tanaka’s great-grandfather did not convey riparian rights. As a consequence, Tanaka had no rights to divert water from Middle River onto her small, approximately 106-acre parcel that has been used for farmland for 130 years. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion and reversed. View "Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Tanaka" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family court's division of marital property and rejected father's four claims of error. The court deferred to the family court's credibility call in rejecting two of father's witnesses as unreliable, and held that substantial evidence supported the family court's conclusion that a $171,099 obligation remained on the Hacienda Heights home, which sum it subtracted from the home's value. The court upheld the family court's sanction against father for his omission of another property in his preliminary and final declarations of disclosure. The court held that the family court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting a 2008 order directing father to sell a third property. Finally, the court held that substantial evidence supported the family court's judgment regarding father's Jeep, tools, all-terrain vehicle, and watch. View "Gutierrez v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In 2018, Landlord served Tenants with a Notice of Termination of Tenancy “in furtherance of [Landlord’s] withdrawal of the Property from residential rental use.” After the withdrawal date, Landlord filed unlawful detainer (UD) actions against Tenants under the Ellis Act. (Gov. Code, 7060) as unlimited civil cases. Landlord brought summary judgment motions for restitution of the premises based on Tenants’ holdover under the Ellis Act and the San Francisco rent ordinance. Landlord waived damages, estimated at $92-105 per day. After those motions were granted, Tenants moved to reclassify the actions as limited civil cases, arguing Landlord waived all unlawful detainer damages and that it was impossible for Landlord to meet the $25,000 minimum judgment amount for an unlimited civil matter.The trial court denied the motions for reclassification and entered judgments for possession in favor of Landlord. The court of appeal denied Tenants’ petition for a writ of mandate. Under the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040(e), a UD action, filed as an unlimited civil case, need not be reclassified as a limited civil case if the landlord waives its claim to damages for the purpose of obtaining a judgment for possession by way of a motion for summary judgment. View "Hiona v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Carmel provided design and construction work for a luxury subdivision, Monterra, in Monterey County for more than 10 years under an oral contract with property owner Mills, the principal of Monterra LLC. Carmel recorded a mechanic’s lien and a site improvement lien against certain lots in Monterra after being informed that Monterra LLC would be unable to continue paying for the work. Carmel sued several of Monterra LLC’s investors with property interests in unsold lots in the development and Monterra LLC, alleging breach of contract and foreclosure of the mechanic’s and site improvement liens. Monterra stipulated to liability before trial; the investor defendants contested liability in a lengthy bench trial.The court of appeal reversed. Carmel applied the payments it received from Monterra LLC to debt that was not subject to liens, in effect increasing the amounts of the Water Lien and Site Improvement Lien. It was improper to allocate a water infrastructure lien only to certain benefited lots; the liens could not accrue contractual interest greater than the reasonable value of the improvements. The trial court applied an incorrect rate to calculate prejudgment interest. The court remanded with instructions to remove contractual interest from both liens, reapportion the water infrastructure lien, and recalculate prejudgment interest. View "Carmel Development Co., Inc. v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Fasslers obtained a Wells Fargo (WF) home equity line of credit (HELOC), secured by a deed of trust (DOT). In 2003, they secured a $530,000 World Savings home loan, then obtained another WF HELOC. In 2004, they refinanced, using a $682,500 Countrywide Loan (secured by a DOT) to pay off World Savings and eliminate the HELOC balances. WF never issued any reconveyance of its DOTs. In 2005-2008, the Fasslers drew upon both HELOCs; as of 2016, the outstanding balances totaled over $224,000. In 2007, they refinanced the Countrywide Loan with a $1 million WaMu loan They defaulted. WaMu foreclosed. In 2008, LaSalle obtained title at a nonjudicial foreclosure auction. The following month, WF recorded a notice of default and election to sell under its DOT. The Huangs purchased the property from LaSalle in February 2009. In August 2009, WF recorded its notice of trustee’s sale. The Huangs received the notice when it was posted on their door.The Huangs' suit to quiet title was rejected as time-barred because, more than three years before they filed suit, they were aware of a recorded notice of trustee’s sale. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the notice of sale did not disturb or otherwise interfere with the Huangs’ possession sufficiently to start the running of the limitations period. After receiving the notice of sale, the Huangs provided it to their title insurer. The trustee’s sale did not take place as scheduled; the Huangs heard nothing substantive about the matter for years, while they continuously lived in the home. View "Huang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Teed promoted himself online as a real estate agent with “over 25 years of experience as a building contractor” with “an extensive background in historic restorations.” Moore believed that Teed was a general contractor. Moore toured homes that Teed had renovated and retained Teed as his agent. Moore bought a large San Francisco fixer-upper house for $4.8 million. The home was built in 1912 and was last updated in the 1950s. Moore borrowed significantly. Teed received a commission from the sale. Teed was not a licensed contractor; his team of contractors gutted large parts of the house and excavated the lot but the foundation was defective. After Moore became aware of the defects, he halted all work and engaged consultants, who concluded, despite Teed's strong resistance, that the foundation had to be torn out and replaced. Teed’s structural engineer agreed and privately apologized to Moore. Moore had paid about $265,000 of the $900,000 promised cost for Teed’s renovations. A jury awarded Moore his out-of-pocket expenses for replacing the foundation and benefit-of-the-bargain damages for the additional cost he incurred in obtaining the promised renovations. Conceding liability, Teed challenged the award. The court of appeal affirmed that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are available to fully compensate a plaintiff for all the detriment proximately caused by a fraudulent fiduciary’s actions and the award of statutory attorney fees and costs based on the jury’s special verdict finding that Teed violated the Contractors’ State License Law. View "Moore v. Teed" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment denying El Rovia's first amended petition for administrative mandamus. At issue is the City's 2015 rent control Ordinance No. 2860, which at least for some purposes states that in the calculation of rents, the base year is the "2012 calendar" year. El Rovia argued that 2015, not 2012, is the lawful base year for the determination of base rent adjustments and that the ALJ's contrary decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The court found no error in the City's selection of 2012 as the base year, and there was no error in using comparable 2012 rental rates to determine base year rent. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the base rent determination of $525. View "El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of El Monte" on Justia Law

Schreiber resided in her apartment since the building was built in 1980. She was seriously injured when she fell through a skylight built into the apartment's deck. Lee built and previously owned the three-unit building. At the time of the accident, Lee’s adult children owned the property, which was managed by Golden. Before trial, Schreiber settled with the Lee children for $2.5 million. The trial court denied Lee’s motion for nonsuit on the ground Schreiber’s claims were based on a patent construction defect and barred by the statute of repose.The jury awarded Schreiber damages of over $2.6 million, allocating 12 percent of fault to Schreiber, 54 percent to Lee, 16 percent to Golden, and 18 percent collectively to the Lee children. After reducing the verdict to reflect Schreiber’s percentage of fault, the court offset the entirety of the economic damages by the amount of the settlement attributable to such damages; it denied any credit to Lee and Golden for the noneconomic damages and entered judgment against Lee for $756,000 and against Golden for $224,000. The court of appeal affirmed in all respects except as to the settlement credit, Golden, but not Lee, is entitled to a credit against both economic and noneconomic damages. The court noted the "unusual circumstances," that the Lee children were not only found independently negligent but also bore imputed liability for Golden's negligence. View "Schreiber v. Lee" on Justia Law