Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-homeowners alleged the copper piping in their homes was damaged by a chemical the defendant water districts added to tap water. Adding the chemical was authorized by regulation, however, and it was undisputed that the water districts complied with all statutory and regulatory standards. After a bifurcated bench trial on certain legal issues, the trial court entered judgment for the water districts, finding plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance and inverse condemnation were preempted by federal and state laws, and otherwise insufficient on the merits. The plaintiff homeowners appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs’ causes of action failed on the merits, and thus affirmed. View "Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist." on Justia Law

An interest in land that is functionally equivalent to ownership may be acquired by adverse possession, but not as a prescriptive easement. This appeal concerned a dispute between Erik Hansen and his relatives and Sandridge Partners over 10 acres of land. The Court of Appeal held that the Hansens were not entitled to an equitable easement over the disputed lands because the Hansens' encroachment on Sandridge's land was negligent as a matter of law. In this case, the Hansens negligently encroached on the disputed land when they planted pistachio trees and installed an irrigation system; Sandridge was not contributorily negligent in causing the encroachment; and the Hansens were not entitled to the prescriptive easement they seek. Therefore, the elements of adverse possession were not satisfied in this case and the trial court properly rejected the Hansens' claim. View "Hansen v. Sandridge Partners" on Justia Law

Before San Francisco Ordinance 286-13 was adopted in 2013, the Planning Code generally prohibited the enlargement, alteration or reconstruction of “nonconforming units,” which are legal residential housing units that exceed the currently-permitted density for the zoning district in which they are located. The 2013 amendment permits the enlargement, alteration or reconstruction of nonconforming residential units in zoning districts where residential use is principally permitted, if the changes do not extend beyond the “building envelope” as it existed on January 1, 2013. A waiting period of five to 10 years applies for changes to units where a tenant has been evicted employing Administrative Code grounds for evicting a non-faulting tenant, including section 37.9(a)(13), which allows an owner to evict tenants to remove residential units from the rental market in accordance with the Ellis Act. The Ellis Act prohibits local governments from “compel[ling] the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer accommodations in the property for rent or lease.” Gov. Code 7060(a). The trial court upheld the amendment. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the ordinance is preempted by the Ellis Act because it requires an owner who exercises Ellis Act rights to wait years before being eligible for a permit to make alterations. View "Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Before San Francisco Ordinance 286-13 was adopted in 2013, the Planning Code generally prohibited the enlargement, alteration or reconstruction of “nonconforming units,” which are legal residential housing units that exceed the currently-permitted density for the zoning district in which they are located. The 2013 amendment permits the enlargement, alteration or reconstruction of nonconforming residential units in zoning districts where residential use is principally permitted, if the changes do not extend beyond the “building envelope” as it existed on January 1, 2013. A waiting period of five to 10 years applies for changes to units where a tenant has been evicted employing Administrative Code grounds for evicting a non-faulting tenant, including section 37.9(a)(13), which allows an owner to evict tenants to remove residential units from the rental market in accordance with the Ellis Act. The Ellis Act prohibits local governments from “compel[ling] the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer accommodations in the property for rent or lease.” Gov. Code 7060(a). The trial court upheld the amendment. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the ordinance is preempted by the Ellis Act because it requires an owner who exercises Ellis Act rights to wait years before being eligible for a permit to make alterations. View "Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff 1901 First Street Owner, LLC (First Street), appealed a judgment which interpreted the meaning and application of Government Code section 65995 (b)(1), in a manner favorable to defendant Tustin Unified School District (the District). First Street developed an apartment complex. The underlying dispute arose after the City of Santa Ana (the City) had calculated the square footage of the development for purposes of assessing a school impact fee. The District disputed the City’s method of calculating the assessable space and filed an administrative appeal. Before that appeal was resolved, the City revised its calculation in the District’s favor, prompting First Street to file an administrative appeal. First Street prevailed in its administrative appeal and subsequently filed the present lawsuit against the District, alleging various tort causes of action and seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate ordering the District to refund the excess school fees. The court dismissed the tort claims pursuant to an anti-SLAPP motion, which the Court of Appeal affirmed in a separate appeal. The case proceeded on the declaratory relief claim and writ petition, as well as a cross-complaint by the District for an administrative writ of mandate. The court found in favor of the District, and First Street appealed. At issue was whether the square footage of interior space outside the individual apartment units should have been included in the calculation of school impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the District. View "1901 First Street Owner v. Tustin Unified School District" on Justia Law

The City filed a nuisance abatement action against several businesses and individuals related to medical marijuana dispensaries, which were prohibited by the Pasadena Municipal Code (PMC). Defendants in that action then filed suit against the City, and these two cases were deemed related. The trial court granted the City's request for injunctions, prohibiting defendants from operating their medical marijuana dispensaries in the City. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the PMC states that medical marijuana dispensaries were not permitted, and that non-permitted uses were a nuisance; because defendants operated medical marijuana dispensaries, which was prohibited, and the PMC stated that the operation of a prohibited use was a nuisance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the dispensaries were nuisances per se under the PMC; because defendants did not challenge ordinance 7018 within the 90-day period allowed by Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), their procedural challenge was time-barred; and defendants have not set forth any persuasive arguments that the legal actions here were not authorized by the City Council. View "Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

The City filed a nuisance abatement action against several businesses and individuals related to medical marijuana dispensaries, which were prohibited by the Pasadena Municipal Code (PMC). Defendants in that action then filed suit against the City, and these two cases were deemed related. The trial court granted the City's request for injunctions, prohibiting defendants from operating their medical marijuana dispensaries in the City. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the PMC states that medical marijuana dispensaries were not permitted, and that non-permitted uses were a nuisance; because defendants operated medical marijuana dispensaries, which was prohibited, and the PMC stated that the operation of a prohibited use was a nuisance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the dispensaries were nuisances per se under the PMC; because defendants did not challenge ordinance 7018 within the 90-day period allowed by Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), their procedural challenge was time-barred; and defendants have not set forth any persuasive arguments that the legal actions here were not authorized by the City Council. View "Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the enforcement of a homeowner's association resolution banning short term rentals (STR ban) in Oxnard Shores. Plaintiffs alleged that the STR ban violates the California Coastal Act, which requires a coastal development permit for any "development" that results in a change in the intensity of use of or access to land in a coastal zone. The Act provides that any person may maintain an action for declaratory and equitable relief to restrain any violation of this division. The Act further states that, on a prima facie showing of a violation of this division, preliminary equitable relief shall be issued to restrain any further violation of this division. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a prima facie showing has been made to issue a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the STR ban until trial. The court explained that the decision to ban or regulate STRs must be made by the City and Coastal Commission, not a homeowner's association. View "Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Community Assn." on Justia Law

SV Care has operated a medical marijuana collective in a San Jose commercial zoning district since 2010. The municipal code did not then list marijuana-specific uses in its table of permitted uses. That table stated that all uses not listed were not permitted, but listed “medical offices” as permitted. After the collective opened, voters passed a local measure adding a marijuana business tax, which is described as “solely for the purpose of obtaining revenue.” The tax certificate specifies that it does not indicate zoning compliance. In 2014, the city determined that a medical marijuana collective was not an authorized use and ordered the collective to close. SV appealed the denial of its petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the collective was a legal nonconforming use and that the city should be equitably estopped from forcing it to close. The court of appeal affirmed. Giving due deference to the city’s interpretation of its code, the medical office category does not include medical marijuana collectives. Because plaintiffs’ collective was not permitted when it opened, it cannot be a legal nonconforming use. In light of the express disclaimers, reliance on paying required business taxes as authorization to operate a medical marijuana collective is unreasonable as a matter of law. View "J. Arthur Properties, II, LLC v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Petrolink, Inc. sought the modification of a judgment entered in its favor on its cause of action for specific performance. Petrolink leased a parcel of undeveloped property from defendant Lantel Enterprises pursuant to a lease agreement that included a provision allowing the lessee to purchase the property. Petrolink notified Lantel of its desire to exercise the option, but the parties obtained appraisals that were far apart in their valuation of the property. The parties ultimately could not agree on the value. They sued one another, each asserting various causes of action (including specific performance), claiming that the other party had refused to complete the sale and purchase transaction, and essentially seeking a judicial determination as to the fair market value of the property. During the pendency of the litigation, Petrolink continued to pay Lantel monthly rent on the property. The case went to trial before a judge. At trial, Lantel did not dispute that Petrolink had exercised the purchase option. The main factual issue at trial concerned what the fair market value of the property was at the time Petrolink notified Lantel of its desire to purchase the property. The judge appointed an expert and obtained an independent appraisal of the property, which was between the values in the appraisals that the parties had obtained. The trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Petrolink on its specific performance cause of action and found the date on which Petrolink exercised the purchase option was August 25, 2011, the date of its letter notifying Lantel of its desire to exercise the option. Although Petrolink had requested it, the court did not grant Petrolink an offset for any of the rent that it had paid to Lantel during the pendency of the litigation. On appeal, Petrolink contended the trial court erred in failing to offset the rents it paid to Lantel through the pendency of this litigation against the purchase price. The Court of Appeal agreed with Petrolink that once it exercised the purchase option, the lease was terminated and a contract for purchase and sale came into existence. To the extent that the trial court denied Petrolink an offset for the rents that it paid during the pendency of the litigation, the court failed to account for the delayed performance of the contract for purchase and sale. Specifically, the court failed to place the parties in the positions in which they would have been at the time the sale and purchase contract should have been performed. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed judgment to permit the trial court to undertake an accounting between the parties that takes into account the delay in performance of the contract, and places both parties in the positions in which they would have been if the contract had been timely performed. View "Petrolink, Inc. v. Lantel Enterprises" on Justia Law