Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs and appellants Antonio and Imelda Aranda and their son-in-law, Heriberto Ponce, (together, Ponce and Aranda) appeal from the trial court’s entry of a judgment of dismissal following an order imposing both terminating and monetary sanctions against them and their attorneys under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 1 The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Ponce and Aranda received a permanent loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Ultimately they defaulted on the loan when the error-filled modification agreement called for higher payments they could not afford. Wells Fargo transferred the note and deed of trust to Consumer Solutions 3, LLC in November 2010. Defendant and respondent Specialized Loan Services, LLC (Specialized) serviced the loan on behalf of Consumer Solutions. In the meantime, Ponce and Aranda were still trying to work things out with Wells Fargo. One Wells Fargo representative told Ponce’s wife, Alma, that they should not make further payments until the mistakes were corrected. Other representatives called Ponce demanding payment. Wells Fargo refused to accept any reduced payment, and ultimately invited Ponce and Aranda to apply for another loan modification. Specialized recorded a notice of trustee’s sale in December 2010, while Ponce and Aranda’s second application was pending. A Wells Fargo representative told Ponce “not to worry about the notice because the trustee sale was scheduled by mistake.” Over the next several weeks, other Wells Fargo representatives reassured Ponce and Aranda that the property would not be sold because they had been approved for a loan modification. Despite these assurances, a trustee’s sale was held on January 18, 2011, at which Residential Investments LLC acquired title to the property. Residential Investments filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against plaintiffs. The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint responding to Residential Investments’ was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. On appeal, Ponce and Aranda argued the claims asserted in their complaint were not frivolous and therefore, could not have been asserted for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment based on terminating sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and entry of monetary sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and their attorneys. View "Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Parcel 27 (22 acres) was proposed for development with 44 single-family homes, 7.9 acres of public parkland, a bike path, and dog park. The planning commission recommended and the city council adopted an amendment to Parcel 27's general plan designation from Administrative Professional Office (APO) to Low-Density Single Family Residential, R-20. After the amendment could no longer be challenged, the council changed Parcel 27's zoning designation from APO to R-20. Opponents filed a referendum challenging the rezoning. The city clerk notified them that the referendum met the requirements of the Elections Code. The city attorney prepared a staff report, indicating that once a referendum petition is certified, the ordinance is suspended and the city council must reconsider the ordinance, but advised that “a referendum seeking to repeal a zoning amendment which would result in a zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with a general plan is a legally invalid referendum.” The council voted to refuse to repeal the ordinance or to place the issue on the ballot because repeal would result in reversion to APO zoning and create an inconsistency between the zoning and the general plan. The court of appeal held that the referendum was not invalid and the issue must be placed on the ballot. View "Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

Parcel 27 (22 acres) was proposed for development with 44 single-family homes, 7.9 acres of public parkland, a bike path, and dog park. The planning commission recommended and the city council adopted an amendment to Parcel 27's general plan designation from Administrative Professional Office (APO) to Low-Density Single Family Residential, R-20. After the amendment could no longer be challenged, the council changed Parcel 27's zoning designation from APO to R-20. Opponents filed a referendum challenging the rezoning. The city clerk notified them that the referendum met the requirements of the Elections Code. The city attorney prepared a staff report, indicating that once a referendum petition is certified, the ordinance is suspended and the city council must reconsider the ordinance, but advised that “a referendum seeking to repeal a zoning amendment which would result in a zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with a general plan is a legally invalid referendum.” The council voted to refuse to repeal the ordinance or to place the issue on the ballot because repeal would result in reversion to APO zoning and create an inconsistency between the zoning and the general plan. The court of appeal held that the referendum was not invalid and the issue must be placed on the ballot. View "Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco barred no-fault evictions (for owner move-in, condominium conversion, permanent removal of the unit from housing use, capital improvements, or substantial rehabilitation) of families with children and educators during the school year. The trial court concluded state law preempted this ordinance. The court of appeal reversed. The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural; they implement the landlord’s property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant’s occupancy ends. The ordinance is a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. The ordinance does not specify an amount of notice required to terminate a tenancy but only establishes a permissible substantive defense to eviction that (like some other substantive defenses to eviction) impacts when landlords may evict. It regulates in an area within the municipality’s police powers and does not conflict with a state statute, its incidental impact on the timing of landlord-tenant relations does not alone render it preempted. View "San Francisco Apartment Association. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco barred no-fault evictions (for owner move-in, condominium conversion, permanent removal of the unit from housing use, capital improvements, or substantial rehabilitation) of families with children and educators during the school year. The trial court concluded state law preempted this ordinance. The court of appeal reversed. The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural; they implement the landlord’s property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant’s occupancy ends. The ordinance is a limitation upon the landlord’s property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. The ordinance does not specify an amount of notice required to terminate a tenancy but only establishes a permissible substantive defense to eviction that (like some other substantive defenses to eviction) impacts when landlords may evict. It regulates in an area within the municipality’s police powers and does not conflict with a state statute, its incidental impact on the timing of landlord-tenant relations does not alone render it preempted. View "San Francisco Apartment Association. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Tenant leased a two-unit San Francisco commercial building and sublet one unit to Peng. Peng later secured a $46.545 judgment against Tenant with an award of attorney fees of $47,800. Peng collected $46,500 in partial satisfaction. While trying to collect the judgment, Peng learned that the owner and Tenant had terminated the master lease. In 2009, a new tenant continued the same business that had been conducted by Tenant. Peng claimed the change was a fraudulent conveyance to prevent her from collecting the judgment through a setoff of rent. Peng remained in possession of the premises without paying rent and, by operation of law, became a tenant at the rental rate of $4,725 per month. The owner served Peng with a notice of change in terms of tenancy. Peng paid rent in March and April 2011 then became delinquent. The owner was awarded summary judgment, directing Peng to pay $4,725 in back-due rent plus attorney fees. The owner then filed a breach of contract suit, seeking back-due rent for 2009-2011. Peng filed a cross-complaint and counterclaim. The court of appeal held the owner was not precluded from pursuing a separate civil action for back-due rent that accrued in months other than the month for which damages were awarded in the unlawful detainer action and modified the attorney fee award. View "Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng" on Justia Law

John and Denise Lane jointly owned a piece of rural property together with Denise's mother, Joan Bell. In 2011, the Lanes filed a lawsuit (the property action) against Bell arising out of disputes over the property. Bell cross-complained, seeking among other things a declaration of the extent of her interest in the property and an order for partition. The Lanes prevailed on most of Bell's claims, but a judgment was ultimately entered in Bell's favor valuing her interest in the property and granting her claim for partition. Because Bell prevailed on at least one of her claims was that the Lanes cannot demonstrate a "favorable termination" of the underlying action, which is fatal to their malicious prosecution action. In its most recent discussion of the issue, the California Supreme Court emphasized that "lack of probable cause" and "favorable termination" were distinct requirements in a malicious prosecution action: "'[T]hat a malicious prosecution suit may be maintained where only one of several claims in the prior action lacked probable cause [citation] does not alter the rule there must first be a favorable termination of the entire action.'" (Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (1994). Thus, if the defendant in the underlying action prevails on all of the plaintiff's claims, he or she may successfully sue for malicious prosecution if any one of those claims was subjectively malicious and objectively unreasonable. But if the underlying plaintiff succeeds on any of his or her claims, the favorable termination requirement is unsatisfied and the malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained. The Lanes suggested in their appeal that the Court of Appeal decline to apply the dicta of Crowley in favor of their reading of Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d 375 (1956), which held that, at least in certain cases, a malicious prosecution plaintiff could satisfy the "favorable termination" element by succeeding on some causes of action in the underlying case, even though a partial judgment was entered against him or her on a different claim. In the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal believed Crowley correctly addressed the issue presented by the facts of this case, and the trial court properly relied on Crowley in granting summary judgment. View "Lane v. Bell" on Justia Law

Payment in the amount of the judgment to plaintiff by a third party for something collaterally related to the judgment did not constitute satisfaction of the judgment. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that CTIC's payment to Jacob Tikosky was not payment on Tikosky's judgment against Yoram Yehuda, but rather was payment for Tikosky refraining from having Yehuda's property sold. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of Yehuda's motion to compel acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the judgment. View "Tikosky v. Yehuda" on Justia Law

Payment in the amount of the judgment to plaintiff by a third party for something collaterally related to the judgment did not constitute satisfaction of the judgment. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that CTIC's payment to Jacob Tikosky was not payment on Tikosky's judgment against Yoram Yehuda, but rather was payment for Tikosky refraining from having Yehuda's property sold. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of Yehuda's motion to compel acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the judgment. View "Tikosky v. Yehuda" on Justia Law

The Association filed suit against Metro and Foothill Transit for inverse condemnation and other torts arising from the construction and maintenance of part of the Metro Gold Line railway that runs adjacent to the condominium complex Sierra Palms manages. The trial court sustained Metro and Foothill Transit's demurrers and granted Metro and Foothill Transit's motions to strike the remainder of the second amended complaint. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to Metro, holding that Sierra Palms has demonstrated on appeal that it can amend its complaint to allege facts sufficient to support standing for an inverse condemnation claim against Metro. However, Sierra Palms has failed to make such a showing in regards to Foothill Transit. View "Sierra Palms Homeowners Association v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority" on Justia Law