Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The land underlying the 100-unit condominium project was owned and used by Shell as a fuel distribution terminal from 1925-1980, then owned by others. Petroleum products were delivered to the property and stored in aboveground and underground storage tanks. The Estuary Owners Association (EOA) and individual unit owners sued, alleging contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site and improper construction of the condominiums. After the plaintiffs settled with developers and other defendants, the court granted Shell summary judgment, reasoning that the causes of action for negligence and nuisance were barred by a 10-year statute of repose; the negligence claims also were barred by a three-year statute of limitations; and Shell did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court of appeal affirmed as to negligence and reversed as to nuisance. The trial court erred in finding the statute of repose applicable but was correct with respect to the statute of limitations. Any claim of negligence causing damage to real property accrued in favor of prior landowners and cannot be pursued by plaintiffs now. Rejecting Shell’s assertion that the plaintiffs were only claiming construction defects as the basis of nuisance, the court noted a possible argument that Shell‘s negligent mishandling of petroleum products and subsequent failure to remediate created a continuing nuisance. View "Estuary Owners Association. v. Shell Oil Co." on Justia Law

A 72-foot diseased tree fell on a sleeping child’s tent, in a campground within a 499-acre public wilderness park, owned by San Mateo County. The county claimed immunity as a matter of law for the allegedly dangerous condition of its property under Government Code section 831.2, “natural condition immunity,” which states: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.” The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of the county’s motion for summary judgment. There are triable issues of fact as to whether the property was “unimproved.” The heavily wooded park has trails. Its campsites are cleared of trees. The campground area has amenities including paved roads, telephones, restrooms (with electricity, sinks and flush toilets), showers, dedicated parking areas, a dumping station and a store. Plaintiffs’ campsite had two picnic tables, a fire pit, and a metal food locker. A professional land surveyor determined there were 34 man-made improvements within 126 feet of where the tree stood. View "County of San Mateo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2009, Dessel, Dessel’s daughter (Seal), and Cummings purchased land in Fieldbrook containing a small and dilapidated residence with a carport, planning to remodel the residence, converting it to a vacation rental. Cummings made a downpayment of $80,000, and the seller agreed to carry a note for the balance of $120,000, to be due in full in June 2015. The parties committed to make monthly interest-only payments to the seller of about $700 and to pay all insurance and property taxes. After disputes arose, Cummings sought partition of the property. The court ordered partition by the appraisal method: each half-owner could bid to purchase the other half-owner‟s interest, with the minimum bid set by appraisal. The court of appeal affirmed. While the trial court erred when it ordered partition of the property by appraisal because the parties had not agreed to that method, as is required by the statute, the defendants have not shown the error was prejudicial. View "Cummings v. Dessel" on Justia Law

In 2004 Denise Saluto recorded a grant deed to real property. In early 2007 Saluto defaulted on the loan encumbering the Property. Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company acquired the Property at a trustee's sale. Before the purchase was complete, Saluto recorded a number of documents purporting to convey an interest in the Property. In August 2007 Deutsche Bank recorded its trustee's deed upon sale. Saluto again recorded a number of documents. Deutsche Bank sought to gain possession of the Property through an unlawful detainer action, but Saluto filed for bankruptcy protection. Saluto sued Deutsche Bank (and other parties) to cancel, set aside and vacate the trustee's deed and cancel the DOT; Saluto did not allege a quiet title claim. Saluto also recorded more documents purporting to convey an interest in the Property, then sold the Property to defendants Cora Broadhurst and her husband, Alan Pyle. Deutsche Bank successfully moved the trial court to set aside the default judgment. A grant deed was ultimately recorded, and title in the Property was conveyed to Broadhurst and Pyle. Deutsche Bank filed suit against defendants for quiet title, cancellation of instruments, declaratory and injunctive relief, slander of title, and forcible entry and detainer. Defendants filed a cross-complaint seeking to quiet title to the Property in their favor. Deutsche Bank argued that defendants' claim for quiet title and affirmative defense of bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer failed as a matter of law. The trial court denied defendants' motion and granted Deutsche Bank's, concluding that defendants did not qualify as bona fide purchasers as a matter of law based on the void default judgment in the chain of title. The Court of Appeal found a void judgment does not pass title free of the lien purportedly cancelled by the void judgment; rather, "a void judgment in the chain of title has the effect of nullifying a subsequent transfer, including a transfer to a purported bona fide purchaser." The Court of Appeal concluded the void default judgment did not quiet title to the property. View "Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust v. Pyle" on Justia Law

In 2004, Hesperia began acquiring vacant property in its downtown for development of a Civic Plaza, with a city hall, public library, other government buildings and “complimentary retail, restaurant, and entertainment establishments.” Cinema West articulated a plan to develop a cinema immediately west of the Civic Plaza Park: the city would convey 54,000 square feet of real property to Cinema for $102,529, the property‘s fair market value; Cinema would construct a 38,000-square foot, 12-screen digital theatre; the city would construct the necessary parking lot, develop a water retention system for the theater and the parking lot, and install off-site improvements including curb, gutter and sidewalks. Cinema would execute a 10-year operating agreement with the city. The city later made a $250,000 forgivable loan to Cinema to aid with a $700,000 anticipated shortfall. As development of the theater and parking lot was nearing completion, the Electrical Workers Union requested a public works coverage determination under California‘s prevailing wage law (Lab. Code, 1720–18611 ) The State Department of Industrial Relations concluded that the project was subject to the prevailing wage requirement. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Cinema received the benefit of a new, publicly-funded parking lot adjacent to the theater, which, though owned by the city, is Cinema‘s to use for as long as it operates the theater. View "Cinema West v. Baker" on Justia Law

A trustee's acts in recording a notice of default, a notice of sale, and a trustee's deed upon sale in the course of a nonjudicial foreclosure are privileged under Civil Code section 47. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiff did not state a cause of action for slander of title based on the recording of those documents. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's slander of title claim without leave to amend. View "Schep v. Capital One" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aristea Hupp (Aristea) appealed after the trial court granted defendants Solera Oak Valley Greens Association and City of Beaumont Animal Control Officer Jack Huntsman’s ex parte application to dismiss Aristea’s first amended complaint (FAC) as a vexatious litigant. Aristea argued: (1) the trial court’s order granting Solera’s ex parte application to dismiss deprived her of her due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) Solera waived its vexatious litigant defense by not raising it in its first responsive pleading; and (3) under the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act), she was authorized to seek recovery of damages sustained by her son, Paul Hupp (Paul), from violations of Solera’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). In 2014, Paul was declared a vexatious litigant. In 2015, Aristea and Paul filed a complaint against Solera over enforcing a community rule regarding muzzling of Pit Bulls on properties within the Solera community. The Hupps walked their dogs through the community without a muzzle. The Hupps argued the rule was only applied to the Hupps, and that Solera could not single out any one breed. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal as to all claims alleged in the FAC which were brought by or for the benefit of Paul, on the ground he has been declared a vexatious litigant. Because Aristea had not been declared a vexatious litigant, the judgment of dismissal was reversed as to all claims in the FAC that were solely personal to Aristea. View "Hupp v. Solera Oak Valley Greens Assn." on Justia Law

The Cobbs borrowed $10,229,250 from Citizens Business Bank. The note was secured by a deed of trust on a parcel of commercial real property in Rancho Cucamonga. Years later, the Cobbs obtained a second loan from Citizens Business Bank, which was secured by a second deed of trust on the same property. Black Sky Capital purchased both notes from Citizens Business Bank. After the Cobbs defaulted on the senior loan, Black Sky opted to conduct a trustee’s sale under the senior deed of trust. It acquired the property after the Cobbs defaulted on the junior loan. Black Sky filed the suit seeking to recover the amount still owed on the junior note. The Cobbs moved for summary judgment, pertinent here, relying on section 580d. They contended that the monetary judgment would be a deficiency judgment, which is prohibited by section 580d. The trial court granted the Cobbs’ motion and entered judgment for them. Black Sky appealed, contending that the caselaw used as grounds for the Cobbs' motion and trial court's judgment erroneously expanded section 580d, based on an incorrect reading of Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35 (Roseleaf). Black Sky contended that section 580d, by its express terms, did not apply here. It maintained that it was a “sold-out junior” lienholder within the meaning of Roseleaf, and that it had the right to seek a judgment for the balance owed on the junior note. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 580d did not apply under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Black Sky Capital v. Cobb" on Justia Law

Garnes’s Richmond home was damaged by a kitchen fire. She had a fire insurance policy, with a limit of $425,000 from FAIR Plan Association, California’s insurer of last resort. Gaines claimed she should receive the amount it will cost her to repair the house, less an amount for depreciation, the net amount of which was agreed to be $320,549. FAIR argued the Policy and the Insurance Code allowed it to pay the lesser of that amount or the fair market value of the house, which at the time of the fire was $75,000. After examining Insurance Code, the court of appeals agreed with Garnes. Section 2051 provides that under an open fire insurance policy that pays “actual cash value,” as does the Gaines Policy, the actual cash value recovery is determined in one of two ways. For a “partial loss to the structure,” the measure is “the amount it would cost the insured to repair, rebuild, or replace the thing lost or injured less a fair and reasonable deduction for physical depreciation” or “the policy limit, whichever is less.” Construed in accord with its plain meaning, this provision, coupled with sections 2070 and 2071, sets a minimum standard of coverage that requires FAIR to indemnify Garnes for the actual cost of the repair to her home, minus depreciation, even if that amount exceeds the home's fair market value. View "California FAIR Plan Association v. Garnes" on Justia Law

The property was sold at a 1998 foreclosure sale. The Santa Cruz Superior Court ordered that United take possession from Michael Ioane. Michael’s wife, Shelly, filed for bankruptcy. The two filed an adversary proceeding against United, alleging that the foreclosure sale was invalid. The bankruptcy court granted United summary judgment. The Ioanes's subsequent separate federal suit against United, alleging “paramount interest” in the property, was dismissed as “frivolous.” The court imposed the sanction of pre-filing review. The property was deeded to Thompson. The Ioanes filed a quiet title action in Superior Court, which granted Thompson judgment on the pleadings and awarded Thompson costs, but did not purport to quiet title in Thompson’s favor. The court of appeals affirmed. The Ioanes subsequently recorded several documents regarding the property, including purporting to transfer title from the Ioanes children to Tavake. Thompson sued all of the Ioanes, seeking quiet title, cancellation of written instruments, and declaratory relief. Daughter Briana filed a cross-complaint asserting conversion and malicious prosecution; on summary judgment, the court rejected her claims, entered a vexatious litigant prefiling order against Michael and Shelly, quieted title in Thompson, and ordered cancellation of recorded documents. The court of appeal reversed summary judgment and the vexatious litigants order, affirming as to Briana’s cross-complaint. Thompson did not establish his right to title through United. View "Thompson v. Ioane" on Justia Law