Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rowe, age 12, suffered catastrophic injuries during a family camping trip at San Mateo County Memorial Park, when a tree fell on his tent as he lay sleeping. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) owns and maintains an electricity distribution line that serviced a nearby restroom, and has a license permitting it to enter the park to inspect and maintain its equipment and vegetation near its power lines, including near Rowe's campsite. Rowe’s family paid an entrance fee to the county, but paid nothing to PG&E. The county paid PG&E for electricity. Civil Code section 846 confers property owners with immunity from liability arising from the recreational use of their property, with an exception applicable when permission to enter the premises for a recreational purpose “was granted for a consideration.” The court of appeal concluded that the consideration exception applies to PG&E even though Rowe’s fee was not paid to PG&E. Payment of consideration for permission to enter premises for a recreational purpose abrogates section 846 immunity of any nonpossessory interest holder who is potentially responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, including a licensee or easement holder who possesses only a limited right to enter and use a premises on specified terms but no right to control third-party access. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellants Arthur Young and John Young, as Trustees and on behalf of the J.S. Abbott Trust, sought a permit to demolish a small cottage on a parcel of land located in Coronado, California (the City). Because the cottage was more than 75 years old, the Coronado Historic Resource Commission (Commission) reviewed the property for potential historical significance. The Commission ultimately concluded that the dwelling should be designated as a historic resource under the Coronado Municipal Code (the CMC). Appellants appealed the determination to the Coronado City Council, which agreed with the Commission's assessment and affirmed the property's designation as a Coronado historic resource. The effect of this designation placed additional limits on a property owner's ability to alter or demolish the property without taking certain ameliorative steps and/or demonstrating a heightened need for the action pursuant to Chapter 84.20 of the CMC. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking review of the City's designation of the property as a historic resource. The trial court denied appellants' petition. Appellants sought review of the trial court's denial of their petition for mandate. Appellants contended that the City abused its discretion in denying them a demolition permit because the City Council's resolution failed to contain sufficient findings to support the conclusion, the City failed to apply its own mandatory guidelines in holding the hearing and making its findings, and the findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded appellants have not established that the City abused its discretion in designating the dwelling subject property as a historic resource and denying a demolition permit. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Young v. City of Coronado" on Justia Law

The patriarch-settlor appointed defendant Melissa Reynoso (a granddaughter of the settlor) as trustee of his estate. In this proceeding, the trial court determined Reynoso was the most reliable and credible of the family members. The trial court found that other family members were not credible. Reynoso sold real property of the trust to Karen Bartholomew (a daughter of the settlor). Plaintiff Anthony Pizarro (a grandson of the settlor) filed a petition for relief against Reynoso concerning the sale of the real property. The court denied the petition and ordered Pizarro and others to pay the trust’s attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Pizarro contended the trial court erred in finding that Reynoso acted properly as trustee. However, the Court of Appeal found he failed to make a focused, organized, and coherent argument for why the Court should have reversed the order. The Court therefore concluded he forfeited the argument. Pizarro and Bartholomew contended that the award of attorney fees and costs against them was improper. The Court concluded that the attorney fees and costs were properly and lawfully imposed under the trial court’s equitable power over the trust, except to the extent the trial court made Pizarro and Bartholomew personally liable for attorney fees and costs, rather than liable solely from their shares of the trust assets. The award of attorney fees and costs to the extent it imposed personal liability was reversed; in all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Pizarro v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the HOA, requested inspection of the HOA's membership list and other records. After the HOA largely denied the request, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the HOA to allow him to inspect and copy the requested records. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that plaintiff sought the information for an improper purpose; and the HOA's challenge to disclosing the membership list was not barred by statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment requiring disclosure of the membership list, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Tract No. 7260 Assn. v. Parker" on Justia Law

Two trial courts invalidated San Francisco ordinances increasing the relocation assistance payments property owners owe their tenants under the Ellis Act, Gov. Code 7060, finding the ordinances facially preempted by the Act. The Ellis Act prohibits a city or county from “compel[ling] the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease.” The ordinances, intended to mitigate the impact of evictions on low-income tenants, required the greater of either an inflation-adjusted base relocation payout per tenant of $5,555.21 to $16,665.59 per unit, with an additional payment of $3,703.46 to each elderly or disabled evicted tenant or “the difference between the tenant’s current rent and the prevailing rent for a comparable apartment in San Francisco over a two-year period.” In a consolidated appeal, the court of appeal affirmed, stating that “a locality may not impose additional burdensome requirements upon the exercise of state statutory remedies that undermine the very purpose of the state statute.” View "Coyne v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In three related actions, three separate plaintiffs sought the return of seized property based on the ground that government agencies failed to comply with the statutory requirements for nonjudicial forfeiture. Defendants filed general demurrers in response to plaintiffs' petitions for writ of mandate. The demurrers were sustained based on the one-year statute of limitations. The court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations under section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to plaintiffs' petitions filed in the trial court. Rather, the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 338, subdivision (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable, and plaintiffs' petitions were timely filed under that latter statute. Because the district court erred in sustaining the demurrer on statue of limitations grounds, the court reversed the judgment. View "Ramirez v. Tulare County District Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

The Townhouse Motel in Crescent City first became a subject of code enforcement efforts in 2006. Until 2013, the city repeatedly ordered Reddy to abate dangerous conditions. In 2013, following an inspection, the city issued a Notice and Order to Repair or Abate listing 76 building code violations and other illegal conditions and ordering Reddy to rehabilitate the property within 30 days. A subsequent inspection found that Reddy had not made the required repairs. The city filed suit. The court entered a stipulated judgment requiring Reddy to upgrade the property within six months and to cease renting rooms to the same occupant for more than 30 days. Nearly a year later, the city inspected and found little or no improvement. The inspectors concluded that “conditions on the [property] pose a substantial danger to the life, limb, health, and safety of the occupants of the motel, the residents of the surrounding community, and the public in general.” In October 2014, the city successfully moved for the appointment of a receiver to oversee the property’s rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in overruling Reddy’s objections to the city’s evidentiary submissions and in failing to take live testimony. View "City of Crescent City v. Reddy" on Justia Law

After Westlake Health failed to vacate Westlake Village, plaintiff filed suit for unlawful detainer. Westlake Health argued that its lease was senior to the deed of trust and that the notice to quit was invalid because it was served before title was recorded. The trial court found that the lease was subordinate to the deed of trust and was extinguished by the trustee's sale, and that the notice to quit was valid. Westlake Health was evicted and plaintiff leased the facility to another business. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Westlake Health's appeal as moot. While this case was under submission, the state Supreme Court ordered publication of U.S. Financial, L.P. v. McLitus (2016). In McLitus, the Appellate Division of the San Diego County Superior Court held that a property owner's service of a notice to quit before it perfects title to the property renders invalid any subsequent unlawful detainer proceeding. The court explained that none of the cases cited in McLitus support the requirement that title be perfected before service of the notice to quit. In this case, the court rejected Westlake Health's claim that the notice to quit was premature, and held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a does not require that title be recorded before the notice to quit was served. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss and affirmed the judgment, awarding plaintiff costs on appeal. View "Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center" on Justia Law

Defendant, a homeowner in Rancho Palos Verdes, submitted an application to his HOA, seeking to invoke the HOA's dispute resolution process against a neighbor who refused to trim trees blocking defendant's views. Plaintiff, another neighbor and HOA member, filed suit against defendant and the HOA, alleging that two of the offending trees were actually on his property, that the relevant tree-trimming covenant did not encumber his property, and therefore that defendant and the HOA were wrongfully clouding his title by seeking to apply such an encumbrance. The trial court granted defendant's special motion to strike the claims alleged against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The court concluded that defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's complaint arose from defendant's statements made in connection with an issue of public interest. Therefore, defendant's statements were protected under section 425.16. The court also concluded that plaintiff could not show a probability of success on the merits of his claims against defendant, particularly because defendant dismissed his application shortly after the lawsuit was filed and has never sought to invoke the HOA's tree-trimming process against plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Association" on Justia Law

In 1996 Brown Field Aviation Ventures leased space at Brown Field Airport from the City of San Diego under a long-term, master lease agreement. Brown Field Aviation Ventures subleased the space to Bearden Aviation, Inc. (Bearden), and Bearden subleased it to Finch Aerospace Corporation (Finch). Finch occupied the space with three airplane hangars. Lancair Corporation (Lancair) later purchased Bearden's leasehold. In 2005 the City amended and restated the master lease. Finch attempted to enter a new lease directly with the City and remove its hangars from Lancair's leasehold; however, Lancair claimed to own and control the hangars. Finch subsequently filed a complaint against Lancair alleging causes of action for quiet title, declaratory relief, intentional interference with economic advantage, conversion, and retaliatory eviction. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal’s review was whether the immunities in Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2 applied to a slander of title cause of action and, if not, whether Finch otherwise adequately alleged a slander of title cause of action against the City. The Court concluded the immunities in sections 818.8 and 822.2 did not apply to a slander of title cause of action. Furthermore, the Court concluded Finch did not otherwise adequately allege a slander of title cause of action nor did Finch demonstrate it could cure the pleading deficiencies by amendment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the City's demurrer to Finch's complaint without leave to amend. View "Finch Aerospace Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law