Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In February 2014, a jury found defendant Kenneth Davis guilty of two 2010 misdemeanors, diverting the natural course of a stream and petty theft (of water). It also found him guilty of a trespass injuring wood or timber in 2010 in another case (which was consolidated solely for purposes of trial) that involved a road he had bulldozed across neighboring property to his own. The court placed him on a three-year period of informal probation, conditioned on a 90-day jail term. Defendant appealed his conviction of petty theft of water, arguing there could not be a theft in this case as a matter of law because the natural stream at issue was nuisance groundwater that the owner was diverting from its property, and the State of California had only a regulatory interest in use of these public waters that otherwise were not personalty that can be the subject of a larceny. The Court of Appeal agreed that there could not be a simple larceny of uncaptured flowing water. The Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of that count. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The case arose out of a dispute over the reasonableness of the level of noise generated during outdoor festivities held at the Rancho Valencia Resort (the Resort). Plaintiffs, who shared a property line with the Resort, became frustrated with the noise emanating from the Resort when it hosted outdoor events on a lawn created for that purpose. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Resort's outdoor events constituted a private nuisance, and sought to enjoin the Resort from continuing to create noise that would travel onto plaintiffs' property and disturb them there. The trial court appreciated the difficulties inherent in this situation, but after a trial on the merits, concluded that the Resort's outdoor events did not amount to a private nuisance. Despite plaintiffs' contentions that the trial court failed to properly address purported violations of various San Diego County ordinances, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated no reversible error in the trial court's decision. View "Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a borrower of a home loan, filed suit against lending banks, seeking an injunction to prevent a foreclosure. The trial court sustained the lenders’ demurrers and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court held that the availability of injunctive relief under the 2013 Homeowner's Bill of Rights (HBOR) is governed exclusively by its two provisions - Civil Code, sections 2924.12, subdivision (a)(1) and 2924.19, subdivision (a)(1) - in which the Legislature authorized the courts to interpose such relief into the nonjudicial foreclosure scheme. Neither provision authorizes a court to enjoin a violation of section 2924(a)(6). Thus, no injunctive relief is available for a violation of that section. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show a reasonable possibility of amending his complaint to plead any of the grounds for injunctive relief that the HBOR authorizes. The court also affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to a separate breach of contract cause of action. View "Lucioni v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In 1975, TNMC purchased property in Cazadero, for use as a monastery and retreat center, including the printing of sacred Buddhist texts in the Tibetan language for shipment to Asia and free distribution to Buddhist practitioners whose libraries have been destroyed by Chinese authorities. In 1983, the county approved a conditional use permit for Timberhill, a Cazadero resort within an area designated as Resources and Rural Development in the county’s general plan. Timberhill’s permit allowed construction of a lodge, a dining room, and 15 guest cabins. In 2000, the county adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND), allowing five additional cabins, a new dining room and other guest facilities, and 10 staff dwelling units. In 2004, TNMC purchased Timberhill and designated it as the Ratna Ling Retreat Center. The county adopted an MND in lieu of a formal environmental impact report, approving a third master use permit for expansion of the Center. Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act, maintaining that an EIR was required because the proposed project greatly expands an existing printing operation and that the approval violated the general plan and zoning provisions. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the arguments, finding that the approvals did not constitute spot zoning and that the county imposed adequate mitigation measures. View "Coastal Hills Rural Pres. v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

The Permanente Quarry is a 3,510-acre surface mining operation, producing limestone and aggregate for the manufacture of cement, in unincorporated Santa Clara County. The Quarry has been in existence since 1903. The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors conducted a review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code section 21000, certified an environmental impact report, and, in 2012, approved a reclamation plan amendment for closing and reclaiming the Quarry’s mining operations over a 20-year period. Opponents challenged the approval, asserting claims under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA), Pub. Resources Code section 2710, and CEQA. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed the approval, upholding a determination that the reclamation plan amendment satisfied SMARA’s regulatory standards for water quality and wildlife habitat. Statements by the Office of Mining Reclamation were properly considered by the county and provided substantial evidence to support the county’s findings. The county’s findings regarding the direct and indirect environmental impacts from the reclamation plan amendment were sufficient under CEQA. View "Bay Area Clean Env't, Inc. v. Santa Clara Co" on Justia Law

Schellinger planned commercial development of a large Sebastopol tract that it had agreed to purchase from Cotter. Certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) was stalled for five years. In the first lawsuit, the court of appeal rejected Schellinger’s contention that CEQA section 21151.1 imposed a mandatory deadline of one year for EIR approval of an EIR and noted that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to Schellinger’s changes to its proposal. Cotter then sued Schellinger for breach of the contract, arguing that the prior litigation established that Schellinger took an unreasonably long time to secure approval. The trial court rejected that argument, but fixed a date by which Schellinger must secure final approval. The court of appeal affirmed. Schellinger then sued Cotter for breaching the contract and obtained a $2,855,431.77 judgment, plus costs and attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that Cotter committed a breach of contract “animated by egregious bad faith” after failing to obtain relief in prior litigation, by undermining Schellinger’s efforts to obtain approval and by Cotter’s management of the property and efforts to transfer the property to others. View "Schellinger Bros. v. Cotter" on Justia Law

Appellant Danilo Sese sought to challenge an order denying his motion for interim attorney fees under Civil Code section 2924.12 after he secured a preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his residential real property. The trial court denied the motion on grounds section 2924.12, subdivision (i) did not provide for interim attorney fees. Sese argued on appeal that the order should have been reversed because section 2924.12 provided attorney fees to a borrower immediately after successfully obtaining a preliminary injunction. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo) argued the appeal should have been dismissed because the trial court’s order was interlocutory in nature and nonappealable under the one final judgment rule. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s order was nonappealable because it was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was a dispute over the ownership of certain real property between appellant Scott Walters, as the administrator of his father Randy Walters' estate and Randy's former girlfriend, respondent Valerie Boosinger. A 2003 deed named Randy and Boosinger as owners in joint tenancy of the Property. Upon Randy's death in 2013, Boosinger claimed sole ownership of the Property as the surviving joint tenant. Scott brought a quiet title claim premised on the theory that the grant deed was void ab initio. The Court of Appeal rejected Scott's claim on appeal that such a claim could be brought "at any time." Instead, the Court concluded that the claim was subject to a statute of limitation and that Scott failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that his quiet title cause of action was time barred. Scott also contended that he properly stated a claim for quiet title premised on the alternative theory that Randy and Boosinger severed their joint tenancy in the Property prior to Randy's death. As to this contention, the Court of Appeal concluded that Scott failed to sufficiently allege facts demonstrating such severance and that he did not demonstrate that he could amend his complaint to properly allege a severance of the joint tenancy. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Scott did not properly state a quiet title claim pursuant to this alternative theory either. View "Walters v. Boosinger" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Thomas and Lynn Hazelbaker owned a condominium in the Rancho Mirage Country Club development. Defendants made improvements to an exterior patio, which plaintiff-respondent Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association contended were in violation of the applicable covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The parties mediated the dispute pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, the results of which were memorialized in a written agreement. Subsequently, the Association filed this suit alleging that defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the mediation agreement to modify the property in certain ways. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants made modifications to the patio to the satisfaction of the Association. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach agreement regarding attorney fees, which the Association asserted it was entitled to receive as the prevailing party. The Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, seeking an award of $31,970 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, awarding the Association $18,991 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court’s award, as well as its subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider the issue, was erroneous in various respects. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award. View "Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker" on Justia Law