Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Husband appealed the trial court's finding of a family home as community property and award of reimbursement of husband's separate property contributions under Family Code section 2640. The trial court also charged husband for the fair market rental value of the home from the time wife moved out to the date of judgment. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that if property is acquired during marriage with both separate and community funds, the transmutation requirements of section 852 must be satisfied before the reimbursement provisions of section 2640 apply. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband’s separate property, and therefore, husband’s separate property contributions remained husband’s separate property. Husband held a separate property interest in the property proportionate to the separate property funds that he contributed. View "Bonvino v. Bonvino" on Justia Law

The Lakes Water System (LWS), created in the late 1800s-early 1900s, provides Vallejo with potable water. After completing a diversion dam and the Green Line for transmission, the city created two reservoirs, Lake Frey and Lake Madigan, which were soon insufficient to meet demand. The city began storing water in hills above Napa County’s Gordon Valley and constructed the Gordon transmission line. The city acquired easements from some property owners by agreeing to provide “free water.” The city also agreed to provide potable water to other nonresident customers. In the 1950s, the city obtained water rights from the Sacramento River Delta and contracted for water from the Solano Project. In 1992, water quality from Lake Curry ceased to meet standards and the city closed the Gordon Line. In 1992 the city passed an ordinance shifting the entire cost of LWS to 809 nonresident customers, so that their rates increased by 230 percent. The city passed additional rate increases in 1995 and 2009. Plaintiff, representing a purported class of nonresident LWS customers, alleges the city has grossly mismanaged and neglected LWS, placing the burden on the Class to fund a deteriorating, inefficient, and costly system, spread over an “incoherent service area” and plaintiff did not become aware of unfunded liabilities until 2013 The court of appeal affirmed dismissal; plaintiff cannot state any viable claims alleging misconduct by the city. View "Green Valley Landowners Ass'n v. City of Vallejo" on Justia Law

Real-Parties-in-Interest Plaza Camino Real, LP and CMF PCR, LLC (collectively, "Westfield") proposed to renovate a shopping center originally built in the City of Carlsbad over 40 years ago. The City approved Westfield's request to renovate a former Robinsons-May store and other small portions of the shopping center. North County Advocates challenged the City's approval under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), arguing the project's environmental impact report (EIR) used an improper baseline in its traffic analysis because it treated the Robinsons-May store as fully occupied, even though it was vacated in 2006 and had been only periodically occupied since. Advocates also argued the City violated CEQA by failing to consider as a mitigation measure that it require Westfield to make a fair share contribution to the future widening of the El Camino Real bridge over State Route 78 and by failing to respond adequately to public comments regarding traffic mitigation. The trial court rejected Advocates' CEQA challenges and awarded the City costs for staff time spent reviewing and certifying the administrative record Advocates prepared. Advocates appeals the trial court's CEQA and costs determinations. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's CEQA determinations. View "North County Advocates v. City of Carlsbad" on Justia Law

The Contra Costa Water District oversaw construction of a dam, requiring acquisition of 20,000 acres from about 40 owners, relocating 13 miles of road, and installing 20 miles of water pipeline and 12 miles of gas line. A 586-acre tract acquired by the Nunns in 2006 is crossed by two strips of land, acquired by the District by condemnation in 1997. One was acquired to relocate Vasco Road. The other intersects Vasco Road at a right angle and contains an underground pipeline. Previous owners were awarded $964,000 in compensation. The property is partially planted with wine grapes and is subject to a Williamson Act contract restricting it to agricultural uses. The Nunns sought approval to subdivide the property into four lots and one remainder parcel.. Before completing the process, they abandoned their application, but asked the county to issue a certificate of compliance for each of the parts under Subdivision Map Act 66499.35(a), arguing that the condemnation had the effect of subdividing the property for purposes of the Act. Planning staff denied the request, but the Planning Commission reversed. The Board of Supervisors rejected appeals and issued the certificates. The trial court and court of appeal concluded that no legal authority supported the Nunns’ theory and vacated the approvals. View "Save Mount Diablo v. Contra Costa Cnty." on Justia Law

The controversial “8 Washington Street Project,” a plan to develop waterfront land near the San Francisco Ferry Building, includes “Seawall Lot 351,” which is currently owned by the City and County of San Francisco through its Port Commission, subject to the public trust for uses benefiting the people of California. The public trust restriction on the use of Seawall Lot 351 is inconsistent with the 8 Washington Street Project as conceived by the project developers. To remove this inconsistency, the Developers and the City devised a plan to transfer Seawall Lot 351 out of the public trust and replace it with a different parcel in a land exchange agreement with the State Lands Commission (SLC). SLC approved land exchange agreement, finding that the agreement was a statutorily exempt activity under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000. Opponents challenged SLC’s reliance on a CEQA exemption for “settlements of title and boundary problems by the State Lands Commission and to exchanges or leases in connection with those settlements.” The trial court held and the court of appeal affirmed that the proposed land exchange agreement is not statutorily exempt from CEQA review. View "Defend Our Waterfront v. Cal State Lands Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendants, owners of land along the two roads south of plaintiffs’ property, appealed from the portion of the trial court's judgment burdening their land and enjoining them from obstructing vehicular access. The trial court also found that plaintiffs had not established their right to an express, prescriptive, or equitable easement for access along the roads and across defendants’ properties. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that Civil Code section 1009 bars all use of non-coastal private real property, not simply recreational use of such property, from ever ripening into an implied dedication to the public after the effective date of that statute. In this case, the trial court erred in considering evidence about use of the subject roads after March 4, 1972 to support its finding that the roads were impliedly dedicated to public use. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Scher v. Burke" on Justia Law

This suit stemmed from a failed multimillion dollar investment in commercial real estate. Plaintiffs were seven investors in Southwest Corporate Center (the Property), a three-story office building in Tempe, Arizona. The 30 defendants played various roles in acquiring the Property and marketing ownership shares therein to plaintiffs. This appeal did not involve the parties from whom plaintiffs actually purchased their investments, including defendant WA Southwest Acquisitions, LLC (Acquisitions). Instead, this appeal centered on three judgments of dismissal entered on May 15, 2014, in favor of four defendants (the respondents to this appeal) on the periphery of the transaction: (1) First American Title Insurance Company, which provided escrow and closing services in connection with the acquisition of the Property; (2) Hirschler Fleischer, a law firm that worked on the investment offering and prepared a tax opinion in connection therewith; (3) Trammell Crow Company (Trammell Crow), which acted as real estate broker for the original seller of the Property and then entered into a property management and leasing agreement with plaintiffs; and (4) CBRE, Inc. (CBRE), which acquired Trammell Crow and became its successor in interest. The Court of Appeal affirmed the three judgments of dismissal at issue here because the applicable statutes of limitation foreclosed recovery. View "WA Southwest 2 v. First Amer. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mak owns a Berkeley rental property with four apartments. In 2012 Mak served on Burns, a tenant for 28 years, a 60-day eviction notice, asserting that Mak intended to occupy the apartment. Two months later, Mak and Burns entered a written agreement under which Burns agreed to vacate the apartment, stating that Burns was not doing so pursuant to the 60-day notice, and that such notice “shall upon occupant vacating, be conclusively deemed withdrawn.” Burns vacated the apartment and months later the Maks rented the unit to new tenants (Ziems), at more than double the rent that Burns had paid. In response to Ziems’s application to the Rent Stabilization Board to lower the permissible rent to that paid by Burns, Mak contended that Burns had voluntarily vacated, so that under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code 1954.50, the Board was prohibited from limiting the rent at the commencement of the new tenancy. The Board and the trial and appeals courts rejected the “landlord’s transparent attempt to circumvent” rent control. The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a tenant who moves out within one year of service of an owner move-in eviction notice has moved out pursuant to that notice. Mak failed to present evidence overcoming the presumption. View "Mak v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd." on Justia Law

The prior owners subdivided their land into two parcels, dedicating narrow lots “A,” “B,” and “C,” to defendant County of Riverside (County) for public road and utility purposes. The County accepted the dedication in 1980, with the proviso that Lots B and C would not immediately become part of the county-maintained road system. In 1984, plaintiffs Joseph and Connie Coppinger purchased one parcel. Defendants Rogelio and Maria Rawlins purchased the other parcel, and used Lot C to access their land. Plaintiffs erected a gate to prevent the Rawlinses from using Lot C, and eventually filed a lawsuit against the Rawlins and the County for quiet title, trespass, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The Rawlinses and the County demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that: (1) the dedication of the public right of way constituted a "taking" from the prior owners ; and (2) the County’s acceptance of the dedicated lots did not constitute an unconditional acceptance within the meaning of the Subdivision Map Act, constituting rejection of the dedication, and reverting title to Lot “C” to plaintiffs. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Coppinger v. Rawlins" on Justia Law

Defendants Spanish Inn, Inc. (Spanish Inn), Hormoz Ramy, and Nejat Kohan owned or otherwise held an interest in the Spanish Inn Hotel property in Palm Springs. In order to renovate and rehabilitate the property, Spanish Inn borrowed $6 million from Nara Bank under a written construction loan agreement. To secure the loan, Nara Bank recorded a construction deed of trust against the property. To protect its construction deed of trust, Nara Bank required that Spanish Inn procure a lender's title insurance policy to protect against loss resulting from mechanic's liens. First American Title Insurance Company (First American) issued the policy. Before it would do so, however, First American required that defendants agree to indemnify it if any mechanic's liens were recorded against the property due to the contractor's or the owners' failure to pay for work furnished to the project. In this appeal, the project's developers challenged the trial court's grant of summary adjudication in favor of the title insurer, which sought contractual indemnity from the developers for legal expenses incurred in defending the project's construction lender against mechanic's lien foreclosure actions. The developers argued the trial court erred because triable issues of fact existed regarding whether the mechanic's lien claims were covered by the title policy and regarding the amount of the title insurer's damages. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "First American Title Ins. Co. v. Spanish Inn" on Justia Law