Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

John Carr filed a prior quiet title action against Earnest Ortiz and Anna Colón. In connection with that action, he recorded a lis pendens. However, he did not mail the lis pendens to either Ortiz or Colón; instead, he filed a declaration that their addresses were unknown. He also did not examine the county assessor's roll, which would have shown that Ortiz and Colón had a mailing address in Oceanside. While the prior action was pending, a deed was recorded transferring Colón's half of the property to Michael Lopez; a deed of trust was recorded encumbering what was now Lopez's half of the property to secure a loan from Rondo Resources, Inc. (Rondo). Thereafter, Carr won a judgment in the prior action, quieting title in him as against Ortiz and Colón. Carr then brought this new quiet title action against Lopez and Rondo (plus Rondo). Ortiz and Colón were not parties; under the judgment in the prior action, they no longer had any interest in the property. Moreover, there was no dispute over Ortiz's former half of the property; under the judgment in the prior action, Carr owned that half. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the dispute over Colón's former half of the property. Lopez and Rondo both argued that the lis pendens was void because it was not mailed to Colón's address, as shown on the assessor's roll. Carr argued that he did not have to mail the lis pendens to the address on the assessor's roll because that address was not valid and the lis pendens would not actually have reached Colón. The Court concluded that, under the applicable statutes, the lis pendens had to be mailed to Colón's address as shown on the assessor's roll, regardless of whether that address was actually valid; because this was not done, the lis pendens was void, not only as against Colón, but also as against Lopez and Rondo. View "Carr v. Rosien" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchaser of a nine-unit building in San Francisco, filed a landlord's petition with the Rent Board seeking a determination that the unit was not subject to rent control pursuant to the Rent Board Rules and Regulations and the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50 et seq. At issue was whether Civil Code section 1954.53,1 subdivision (d)(2) authorizes a San Francisco landlord to raise the rent without limit on an apartment otherwise subject to rent control when an occupant, who moved into the apartment as a child when his parents took possession, remained in possession of the unit after his parents vacated it. In Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board, the panel addressed the identical issue and concluded that “the son, although a minor when the rental agreement was entered and not a signatory to the rental agreement, is nonetheless an ‘original occupant’ entitled to the continued protection of the rent control provision.” Because the current law does not permit vacancy decontrol until all lawful occupants residing in a dwelling at the start of the tenancy vacate the premises, the court affirmed the denial of the petition and the claim for declaratory relief. View "T & A Drolapas & Sons, LP v. SF Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd." on Justia Law

This appeal presents issues of statutory construction involving Code of Civil Procedure section 729.0601 and the calculation of the redemption price for real property sold by judicial foreclosure. At issue was when the property subject to redemption contains multiple parcels, some vacant and unimproved and some improved with offices occupied by rent paying tenants, is the sole measure of the offset “the value of the use and occupation of the property to the purchaser” for the entire property? The court concluded that it is not the sole measure because the statute allows the trial court to calculate the offset by adding (1) the amount of rents paid for the improved portion of the property with tenants and (2) the value (i.e., monetary worth) to the purchaser of the use and occupation of the unimproved and unleased portion of the property, if any such value was realized. In this case, the trial court’s finding that the purchaser’s use and occupation of the unleased portion had no value is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in reducing the redemption price only by the rents paid. Also at issue was whether the the offset to the redemption price for “rents … paid to the purchaser” refer to gross rents or net rents? The court concluded that subdivision (c) of section 729.060 refers to net rents. Consequently, the redemptioner suffered no prejudice when the trial court subtracted the management fees and operating expenses related to the business of the renting units of the property from the redemption price as “reasonable amounts for … maintenance, upkeep, and repair of improvements on the property” because, if not treated as costs of maintenance and repair, those fees and expenses should have been deducted from the gross rents added to the redemption price. Thus, the final redemption price would have been the same if the management fees and operating expenses had been accounted for in calculating the net rents, rather than in calculating the maintenance and repairs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order determining the redemption price. View "Wells Fargo v. 6354 Figarden General P'ship" on Justia Law

The Wongs bought a hillside home in San Carlos for $2.35 million from the Stolers. Several months after they moved in, the Wongs discovered that they and 12 of their neighbors were connected to a private sewer system and were not directly serviced by the city’s public system. Believing they had been deceived, they sued the Stolers and the real estate agents who brokered the sale alleging various claims, including rescission. After the Wongs settled their dispute with the real estate agents for $200,000, a trial was held on the rescission claim only. Although the court found that the Stolers, with reckless disregard, made negligent misrepresentations to the Wongs, it declined to effectuate a rescission , but ordered the Stolers to be, for a limited time, indemnifiers to the Wongs for sewer maintenance and repair costs exceeding the $200,000 they obtained in their settlement with the agents. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court declined to effectuate a rescission of the contract based on incorrect justifications and that its alternative remedy failed to provide the Wongs with the complete relief to which they were entitled. View "Wong v. Stoler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Ocwen after their lender's purchase of their residence at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, alleging that Ocwen violated Civil Code section 2923.6, the prohibition on "dual tracking" contained in the Homeowners Bill of Rights, when it conducted a foreclosure sale of plaintiffs' property while their loan modification application was pending. The trial court sustained Ocwen’s demurrer. However, the court concluded that by alleging the submission of the loan modification application three days after receipt of the Offer Letter, and the transmittal of the additional documents requested by Ocwen on the date of request, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that a complete loan modification application was pending at the time Ocwen foreclosed on their home in violation of section 2923.6. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing" on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the real estate partnership interest that husband and wife own. Husband had owned the interest before marrying wife. The court held that when a spouse places separate property in joint title form, the transmutation requirements of Family Code section 852 must be satisfied before the joint title presumption of Family Code section 2581 applies. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband's separate property interest in the partnership, and therefore, it remained husband's separate property. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court asked the parties for additional briefing on the character of loan proceeds received by the partnership after the modification. The court remanded for the trial court to determine whether the lenders intended to rely on the parties' community property to satisfy the loans. View "In re: Marriage of Lafkas" on Justia Law

In 2012, new legislation imposed specific limitations regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure of owner-occupied residential real property. Among other things, the statutory scheme provided that a court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the "prevailing borrower:" "A borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section." Petitioners Michael Monterossa and Cheranne Nobis filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and request for issuance of an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the trustee's sale of their residence, then scheduled for April 21, 2014. The superior court issued an order on May 8, 2014, granting petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the trustee’s sale of petitioners' home, with conditions. Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. After a hearing, the superior court denied the motion, reasoning the language of the applicable statute was consistent with the award of attorney fees at the conclusion of the action; statutory attorney fees were awardable only at the end of the case; and the statute did not specifically provide for an interim award of attorney fees upon the granting of provisional relief such as a preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order to direct the superior court to grant their motion for attorney fees and costs. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the superior court erred in concluding that petitioners were not prevailing borrowers because they obtained only a preliminary rather than permanent injunction. "[A] borrower who obtains a preliminary injunction enjoining, pursuant to section 2924.12, the trustee’s sale of his or her home is a 'prevailing borrower' within the meaning of the statute." The case was remanded for consideration on the merits, and costs were awarded on this writ proceeding. View "Monterossa v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's application of the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 66499.37 to his inverse condemnation action and conclusion that the action was untimely. While the court agreed with plaintiff that a land owner may elect to pursue a damage claim for an unconstitutional taking after a mandamus proceeding results in a final judgment, the initial mandamus action must result in “a final judgment establishing that there has been a compensable taking of the plaintiff’s land.” In this case, plaintiff’s mandamus action did not seek or establish that an unconstitutional taking occurred when the county denied his subdivision application. Therefore, plaintiff does not qualify for the two-step procedure identified in Hensler v. City of Glendale. As a result, the unconstitutional taking claim in plaintiff's inverse condemnation action is time barred under section 66499.37. In regards to the cross-appeal involving the denial of sanctions against plaintiff, the court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff's complaint was not frivolous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Honchariw v. Co. of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

Mira filed suit against defendants, seeking a declaration that its judgment lien was superior and senior to any lien that might be obtained by the Muse Parties with respect to the property at issue. The Muse Parties filed a cross-complaint, seeking a declaration that their anticipated judgment lien related back to the recording of their lis pendens and was therefore superior. The court found that the Muse Parties’ judgment did not relate back to the lis pendens and that the Mira judgment was not void due to extrinsic fraud. The court concluded that because the Muse Parties indisputably had the right to record a lis pendens with respect to their fraudulent transfer claim, their rights and interest in the property (i.e., the avoidance of transfers of the property to satisfy their claims) relate back to the date they recorded their lis pendens. Because this date was earlier than the date plaintiff recorded its abstract of judgment, the Muse Parties’ judgment lien has priority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Mira Overseas Consulting v. Muse Family Enter." on Justia Law