Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prior to this action, PCF Acquisitionco, LLC owned a former gas station at the corner of 4th and Folsom Streets in San Francisco. The site was marked as the future site of the Central Subway's Moscone station. Following several years of negotiations and the exchange of proposed valuations for the property, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury determined the total compensation to be awarded for the property was approximately $7.3 million, which reflected a fair market value minus costs for environmental remediation. PCF then moved to recover its litigation expenses. The City opposed the motion on the grounds that its final offer was reasonable and, alternatively, that PCF's claimed litigation expenses were excessive. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether the City's final pre-trial settlement offer, made 20 days before trial and contingent on obtaining approvals from other governmental entities, could have been reasonable under Code of Civil Procedure 1250.410, and thus bar PCF (who rejected the offer) from later recovering litigation costs. PCF argued that such a contingent offer was unreasonable as a matter of law because it was conditioned on the approval of three different governmental bodies, thus providing no assurance that OCF's acceptance would result in a pre-trial settlement. The Court of Appeal agreed: the City's contingent settlement offer did not serve section 1250.410's aims of encouraging the pre-trial settlement of eminent domain actions and making property owners whole, and thus was not reasonable within the statute's meaning. The Court therefore reversed the order denying PCF's motion for litigation expenses and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City & County of San Francisco v. PCF Acquisitionco, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an insurance coverage dispute arising from underlying construction defect litigation in which Corona homeowners sued the developer, plaintiff-appellant Centex Homes for work performed by Centex’s subcontractors. One of the subcontractors, Oak Leaf Landscape, Inc., was insured by defendants-respondents, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (Travelers). Centex was named as an additional insured on the Travelers’s policy. Centex appealed an order and judgment sustaining without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to the seventh and eighth causes of action of the original complaint filed by Centex. The seventh and eight causes of action for declaratory relief centered on coverage and Centex’s right to independent counsel pursuant to Civil Code section 2860. Upon review of the dispute, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the claims were neither “ripe” nor “actual”, and affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over a patch of land. When plaintiff purchased her property, she thought the patch was on her property and put outdoor furniture on it. Later, the prior owner of defendant's land discovered that the patch belonged to him. Years after defendant purchased the property, she demanded that plaintiff remove the outdoor furniture. Plaintiff then filed suit for damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. A trial court has the power to issue an equitable easement authorizing a trespasser to continue her trespass in exchange for paying damages, but only if, among other things, the hardship on the trespasser in ceasing the trespass is “greatly disproportionate” to the hardship on the land’s owner in losing use of the trespassed-upon portion of her land. At issue was what constitutes a “greatly disproportionate” hardship. The court concluded that a trespasser’s hardship in having to remove her portable patio furniture does not qualify. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's issuance of an equitable easement and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shoen v. Zacarias" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute over control of certain church property. Appellants and other members of the Cho/Shin faction, with the WCP as a co-plaintiff, filed suit seeking declaratory relief, an injunction, and an audit and accounting from Rev. Bang and respondents. Bang and respondents filed a cross-complaint claiming trespass and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and seeking declaratory relief against appellants and the WCP as cross-defendants. On appeal, appellants contend that, contrary to the trial court's ruling: (1) there was no internal dispute permitting the WCP to intervene and assert control in 2013; (2) because any remaining dispute did not involve Church Property, court intervention into matters of Church membership was improper; (3) the WCP’s actions were a legal nullity because appellants’ secession vote complied with applicable procedures; and (4) the WCP lacked authority to excommunicate appellants because it violated its own procedures by acting in the absence of a petition. The court concluded that none of these contentions meet appellants' burden of demonstrating reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of respondents. View "Kim v. True Church Members etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who purported to have a remainder fee interest in the real property at issue, filed suit to quiet title to the property, claiming that the surviving spouse only had a life estate in the real property and no power to encumber it. After the surviving spouse was distributed the property from the probate court, she executed and recorded a deed of trust on the property in favor of a lender to secure a loan. The surviving spouse subsequently died and the lender recorded a notice of default and election to sell the real property. The court concluded that, even if the surviving spouse had a right to sell the property, that right did not convert her life estate into a fee simple estate. Therefore, the lender had no rights to the property upon the death of the surviving spouse and affirmed the judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County adopted a mitigated negative declaration and granted a use permit allowing Wozniak to host up to 28 weddings and other events annually, with up to 100 attendees, on 14.46 acres on Highway 35 in the Santa Cruz Mountains. The property houses vineyards for the Redwood Ridge Estates Winery, llama and alpaca grazing land, barns, and a residence where Wozniak lives. It is adjacent to the Bear Creek Redwoods Open Space Preserve, which currently is open to the public by permit only. The remainder of the surrounding area is characterized by single-family residences on heavily wooded lots that are over two acres in size. Before obtaining the permit, Wozniak had hosted unpermitted events. Neighbors had complained. An association of neighboring owners successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate on the ground that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000, in adopting the mitigated negative declaration instead of requiring an environmental impact report. The court of appeal affirmed, noting evidence of likely significant traffic and noise impacts. View "Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. Cnty. of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Salazar was born in Mexico in 1945. He speaks little English and cannot write English. His wife attended school through the second grade. She does not speak, read or write English. They operate a food truck. In 1992, they purchased commercial property on Brundage Lane in Bakersfield. Most of the businesses occupying the property were run by their children, who did not pay rent. They also had rent-paying tenants. In 2005, a deed of trust and assignment of rents was recorded, listing as collateral the Brundage Property and another parcel. The debt was a promissory note for $350,000. The proceeds bought the other property. Both purport to have been made by the Salazars, who claim that the signatures were forged (presumably by their son) and not made at their direction. Notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust were recorded in 2005. Their daughter, Marina, negotiated with the lender. When the son disappeared in 2009, Salazar started making payments. Marina signed her parents’ names to a forbearance agreement that identified the Salazars as “borrower” and released all claims. In 2012, the Salazars sought quiet title. The trial court granted summary judgment on the three-year limitations period, but did not address affirmative defenses, holding that the 2005 notices triggered the statute of limitations. The court of appeal reversed. Notices of default under a void deed of trust provided notice of a cloud on title, but did not dispute or disturb the possession of the property; the statute of limitations does not bar their action. View "Salazar v. Thomas" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were allegations of a wrongful foreclosure and related causes of action. Plaintiff John Miles appealed a judgment dismissing his breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation causes of action pursuant to a sustained demurrer, and a summary judgment in favor of defendants banks on the wrongful foreclosure cause of action. With respect to the demurred causes of action, the Court of Appeal reversed: after review of the record, the Court found no explanation for the trial court's ruling. Based on its independent review of the complaint, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff adequately stated his claims. With respect to the wrongful foreclosure cause of action, the Court also reversed: the trial court granted summary judgment on the sole basis that plaintiff could not prove damages because he did not have any equity in the home when it was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. "Wrongful foreclosure is a tort, however, and thus plaintiff may recover any damages proximately caused by defendants’ wrongdoing. Plaintiff offered evidence that he lost rental income and suffered emotional distress as a result of the foreclosure. This is disputed, of course, but it is sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion." View "Miles v. Deutsche Bank" on Justia Law

The complaint alleged that in May 2010, a notice of default was recorded against plaintiffs’ Pasadena residence. In August 2011, a notice of trustee sale was recorded. Plaintiffs retained Rex Law to negotiate a loan modification with Wells Fargo, which agreed to continue the trustee sale scheduled to October 17, 2011. On October 17, 2011, a paralegal from the Rex Law firm spoke with Wells Fargo representative Munoz, who stated that plaintiffs were “under active review for a modification and, therefore, there no longer was a trustee [sale] date scheduled.” In fact, a sale date of December 16, 2011 was scheduled. The house was sold at that sale. On December 10, 2011, the same paralegal spoke with Munoz and told her that plaintiffs’ tax returns were available. Munoz instructed him to submit the returns, but said nothing about the upcoming sale. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of promissory estoppel. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that no promise was made and that plaintiffs had no equity in the property and, therefore, no detrimental reliance. View "Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law