Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The complaint alleged that in May 2010, a notice of default was recorded against plaintiffs’ Pasadena residence. In August 2011, a notice of trustee sale was recorded. Plaintiffs retained Rex Law to negotiate a loan modification with Wells Fargo, which agreed to continue the trustee sale scheduled to October 17, 2011. On October 17, 2011, a paralegal from the Rex Law firm spoke with Wells Fargo representative Munoz, who stated that plaintiffs were “under active review for a modification and, therefore, there no longer was a trustee [sale] date scheduled.” In fact, a sale date of December 16, 2011 was scheduled. The house was sold at that sale. On December 10, 2011, the same paralegal spoke with Munoz and told her that plaintiffs’ tax returns were available. Munoz instructed him to submit the returns, but said nothing about the upcoming sale. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of promissory estoppel. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that no promise was made and that plaintiffs had no equity in the property and, therefore, no detrimental reliance. View "Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2007, the California Department of Transportation sought to condemn part of the Hansen parcel for a highway interchange. The Hansens operated a truck stop and sought additional compensation for impairment of highway access and the loss of goodwill. A jury awarded $525,122 for land and improvements, $300,000 for loss of goodwill, $8,000 for vegetation easement, and $1.7 million in damages to the remainder of the property: $2,533,122. The Hansens sought to recover $345,306 in litigation expenses, arguing that their final demand of $2.99 million was reasonable and the state’s final offer, $784,000, was unreasonable. The state argued that only the Hansens’ first demand, $5 million, could be considered because the second demand was filed after trial began. The court concluded that precedent required it to use the first demand when evaluating reasonableness, although it believed the “better result” would be that any final offers or demands made 20 days prior to a trial on issues of compensation (the trial had been bifurcated) should be considered. The court found the first demand to be unreasonable, and denied litigation expenses. The court of appeal vacated, finding that the statute does not restrict the court to considering only the offer and demand made prior to the first date set for trial. View "Cal. Dep;t of Transp. v . Hansen's Truck Stop, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the enactment of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 14.3.1, developers of eldercare facilities had to obtain several zoning permits or variances. To “expedite the review process for these much-needed Eldercare Facilities,” section 14.3.1 provides that approval of an eldercare facility is warranted if the zoning administrator finds “that the strict application of the land use regulations on the subject property would result in practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships inconsistent with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations.” The developer sought a permit for a Woodland Hills eldercare facility on a 1-1/2-acre lot zoned for residential uses. The proposed building would face Fallbrook, a major highway. Zoning regulations would limit a structure to 12,600 square feet; the proposed facility would contain 50,289 square feet, with 60 rooms and 76 beds. Most owners of neighboring single family residences strongly opposed the proposal. The city’s report did not consider whether limiting the facility to 16 rooms would pose an unnecessary hardship. The zoning administrator approved the project. The trial court found no substantial evidence supported the finding of “unnecessary hardship.” The court of appeal affirmed. Although the developer argued the unnecessary hardship was based on its purported lost “economy of scale,” no evidence supported that claim. View "Walnut Acres Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Earl and Marina Rideau entered into an agreement with condominium developer, Inmobiliaria BGJB de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (BGJB; not a party to this appeal), to purchase a unit to be constructed in Mexico. The Rideaus deposited funds toward the purchase price with an escrow company, defendant-respondent Stewart Title of California. In the "Sale Escrow Instructions," Stewart Title agreed to receive funds from the Rideaus, to be released at the seller's direction to a fund control company, as specified in the Instructions. The project failed and the Rideaus lost their deposit. In the Rideaus' prior appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed a defense judgment on the basis that the trial court erred in denying their contract claim that Stewart Title had breached the Instructions, when it released their $239,700 deposited funds to entities other than the one specified in the Instructions. On remand, the trial court entered judgment in their favor. This appeal arose from the trial court's denial of the Rideaus' motion for an award of contractual attorney fees and costs, based upon "hold harmless" language found in section IV of the Instructions, "Release of Funds," regarding defense of claims arising from the Instructions. The Rideaus argued a portion of that language should be interpreted as a reciprocal attorney fees clause, and not as an item of recovery specified in an indemnity agreement. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly denied the motion and affirmed the order and judgment. View "Rideau v. Stewart Title of California" on Justia Law

Tam’s Burgers, at the Los Angeles intersection of Figueroa and 101st Streets, has a parking lot and drive-through and walk-up windows, adjacent to residential homes. The Police Department (LAPD) initiated a nuisance investigation, based on reported: “pimping-prostitution, narcotics use-sales, loitering, transients and intoxicated groups, drinking in public, graffiti and associated trash and debris that encourage loitering.” LAPD informed the Planning Department that the owner was uncooperative, citing extensive calls for service and crime reports at the location, including two homicides in the last two years and a narcotics arrest involving an employee. A Planning Department investigator visited Tam’s and reported that the site was not maintained. The city determined that the operation constituted a nuisance and imposed conditions that required it to: not allow patrons to “linger over a … soft drink for more than 30 minutes”; not allow prostitutes, pimps, drug users or dealers, or homeless individuals to loiter; not allow alcoholic beverage consumption on the property; paint over graffiti with a matching color within 24 hours; have a licensed, uniformed security guard; install fencing; implement a 24-hour “hot line” for complaints; and limit hours of operation. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence. View "Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Ram’s Gate bought Sonoma County property from the Roches, intending to build a winery. The sellers agreed in the Purchase Agreement to disclose facts having a “material effect on the value of the ownership or use,” including geological hazards. After escrow closed, Ram’s Gate discovered an active fault trace on the property that substantially increased the cost of development, and sued the Roches for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary adjudication, finding the Purchase Agreement warranties merged with the recording of the deed and did not survive the closing. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court relied on the wrong legal standard in determining that merger extinguished the contractual duty to disclose geotechnical reports allegedly known by the Roches; evidence from Ram’s Gate’s representative raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties intended to have this duty of disclosure merge with the deed. Ram’s Gate’s claim for breach of contract accrued at the time of the breach; the Roches’ liability for breach was fixed before escrow closed, even though Ram’s Gate was unaware of its right to sue. Even if merger applied, the collateral obligations exception prevented it from extinguishing the disclosure duty. View "Ram's Gate Winery, LLC v. Roche" on Justia Law

Contra Costa County owns and operates a drainage system on Lettia Road that connects to a drainage channel on adjacent property owned by Pinole Point. When the drainage channel is functioning, its water flows into the San Pablo Bay. After experiencing storm-related flooding, homeowners on Lettia Road sued the County, which cross-complained against Pinole Point for nuisance and negligence, claiming that Pinole Point allowed the drainage channel to be blocked with debris and vegetation. Pinole cross-claimed negligence and inverse condemnation. The County and Pinole Point settled with the homeowners. The court ruled in favor of the County. finding that the drainage channel is a natural watercourse, that the County’s conduct with respect to its property had been reasonable, and that Pinole’s failure to maintain the channel was “entirely unreasonable,” given its actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the drainage channel and the need to keep it clear of debris to prevent flooding. The court awarded damages to the County and ordered Pinole Point to clear and maintain the obstructed channel. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Pinole Point’s argument that it had no legal duty as the downstream owner to maintain the channel, especially since it did not create any diversion or obstruction. View "Contra Costa County v. Pinole Point Props., LLC" on Justia Law

After an LLC defaulted on a loan that had been used to purchase property for a section 1031 exchange, the lender’s successor brought a deficiency action to enforce commercial guaranty agreements executed by defendants Bradley and Yates, the managers of the LLC. They argued the guaranties were shams, and therefore unenforceable, due to their close relationship with the borrower on the subject loan, the LLC. Defendants filed a counterclaim, asserting that attempts to enforce the guaranties constituted an unfair business practice in violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). Under California law, a lender may not pursue a deficiency judgment against a borrower where the sale of property securing a debt produces proceeds insufficient to cover the amount of the debt. Lenders may pursue deficiency judgments against guarantors, but only true guarantors. Where the borrower and the guarantor are the same, the guaranty is considered an unenforceable sham. The jury found in favor of defendants on the sham issue, but the court rejected defendants’ UCL counterclaim. The court of appeal reversed, holding that substantial evidence did not support the finding that the guaranties were shams. View "CADC/RAD Venture v. Bradley" on Justia Law