Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Oak Shores is a 660-unit single-family residential common interest development, governed by the Oak Shores Community Association (Association). Only 125 to 150, of the homes are occupied by full-time residents. Approximately 66 absentee homeowners rent their homes to short-term vacation renters. Absentee owners sued, challenging: a rule stating the minimum rental period is seven days; an annual fee of $325 imposed on owners who rent their homes; a rule limiting the number of automobiles, boats and other watercraft that 3 renters are allowed to bring into Oak Shores; a mandatory garbage collection fee; boat and watercraft fees; building permit fees; and property transfer fees. The trial court upheld the rules and fee and awarded the association statutory attorney fees and costs. Except for clarifying the award of fees, the court of appeal affirmed. Homeowners associations may adopt reasonable rules and impose fees on its members relating to short term rentals of condominium units. View "Watts v. Oak Shores Cmty. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Boyces signed a $1.155 million promissory note payable to Pacific Mortgage, secured by a deed of trust on their Santa Barbara house. Pacific Mortgage endorsed the note to Option One, which endorsed the note in blank and put it in a mortgage investment pool, of which Wells Fargo was trustee. Pacific Mortgage assigned the deed of trust to Option One. The trust deed was later assigned to Wells Fargo. Boyces stopped making payments and filed an emergency bankruptcy petition to stay foreclosure. Wells Fargo moved for relief from the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court inspected the note and allonges; found a valid "chain of control and title of the note,” rejecting a claim that the assignment was invalid; and granted relief from the stay. The district court affirmed. Wells Fargo purchased the property at the trustee's sale and filed suit to evict the Boyces. The court rejected claims that the mortgage was invalid and that Wells Fargo did not perfect title and granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, which sold the property. The Boyces filed claims for wrongful foreclosure, violation of the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200), and quiet title. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, citing res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Boyce v. T.D. Serv. Co." on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

This action started with one of several neighboring property owners establishing an easement for the purpose of access to their properties over land owned by appellant Alfred Robert Pereira, Jr. The neighbors first filed suit in 2007, following Pereira’s purchase of his property in 2006 and subsequent blocking of the piece of the property over which they claimed they had a prescriptive easement by virtue of their use and the use of their predecessors in interest for access to their properties. Respondents the Pulidos were named defendants in the suit by the neighbors, but no allegations of wrongdoing on the Pulidos’ part were included in the complaint. The Pulidos filed a cross-complaint against Pereira, alleging their right to an easement across Pereira’s property on several theories, including an easement by prescription. This appeal involved only the Pulidos’ cross-complaint. The trial court found the Pulidos had satisfied their burden of proving the continuous, open, and notorious use of Quartz Hill Drive for the five-year prescriptive period and granted a permanent injunction against Pereira “from interfering with the PULIDOS use and enjoyment of the easement across PEREIRA’s realty as described and adjudged herein.” Pereira argued there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Pulidos and their predecessors used the road openly, notoriously, and continuously for a period of five years. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding the evidence was sufficient. The Court affirmed the judgment. View "Pulido v. Pereira" on Justia Law

The 22-acre Shuler ranch in Soma is below 1000 acres owned by Sunshine Agriculture. After agricultural operations expanded up the hillside, it collapsed onto the Shuler property. The Shulers sued, alleging: "Defendants . . . were responsible for the removal of historic watercourses and stable ground cover and also for unreasonable grading, irrigation, planting and maintenance of the hillside slope. . . . acted negligently in failing to take steps to prevent the land from collapsing. . . . [T]he harm was foreseeable because of the steepness of the slope and nature of its soil." The Shuler's engineering expert found that the slope was unsuitable for development and that the alteration of the water courses and the introduction of irrigation for 1000 trees were the most significant factors responsible for the foreseeable slope failure. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party: Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), a division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which prepared engineering drawings and calculations in support of the erosion control plan approved by the Ventura County Resource Conservation District. The trial court found that NRCS was a necessary, indispensable party and a federal agency not amenable to suit in state court. The Shulers filed a federal action, naming the same defendants, with the government as an additional defendant. The California Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of the state suit. View "Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Loma San Marcos, LLC, Questhaven Pacific View, LLC, and La Paz Sunset, Inc. (collectively "Loma San Marcos") purchased a 15-acre property subject to a security and lien agreement with the City of San Marcos. The agreement was entered into by the property's former owner to securitize fees due pursuant to a conditional use permit that allowed the owners to convert the property from a recycling facility to a movie studio. Under the agreement the property owner was obligated to pay the City impact mitigation fees by dates certain. After purchasing the property and negotiating an amendment to the agreement extending the payment deadlines, Loma San Marcos failed to pay the fees. As a result and based on other terms of the agreement, the City brought a judicial foreclosure action. After trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the City. Loma San Marcos appealed, arguing the fees were not due because: (1) the City had not yet issued permits; (2) the renegotiated agreement was unenforceable because it was not supported by valid consideration; and (3) even if otherwise otherwise enforceable, the fees set in the agreement were illegal under the California Mitigation Fee Act and the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and concluded Loma San Marcos, represented by sophisticated real estate investors, entered a binding agreement with the City to pay the fees at issue or face foreclosure of the property. View "City of San Marcos v. Loma San Marcos" on Justia Law

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

Sanowicz and Bacal are licensed real estate salespersons. Sanowicz alleges that he and Bacal agreed to share commissions earned by either of them on certain sales of real property, but that Bacal breached that agreement. The two did share some commissions. The trial court dismissed, based on Business and Professions Code section 10137,4 which provides that it is unlawful for a real estate agent to accept compensation from any person other than the real estate broker under whom he or she is licensed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that licensed real estate agents may agree to share commissions earned under certain circumstances. In stating that an agent may pay commission to another licensee, the Legislature did not limit the payee to a licensed broker; instead it required that any such payment be made “through the broker” thus permitting payments to be made to licensed real estate professionals, whether agents or brokers. View "Sanowicz v. Bacal" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on an attorney fee provision in a lease agreement which allows the prevailing party in any action arising out of the homeowner's tenancy, the agreement, or the provisions of the Mobilehome Residency Law, to recover reasonable expenses including attorney fees and costs. Wright Family, LLC dba Roadrunner Club was a manufactured home park consisting of home sites, a golf course, common areas and a large "greenbelt" common area lawn. Don Hemphill purchased a home at the park and leased the space under a written lease agreement with Roadrunner Club. While on the lawn area near his home, Hemphill stepped into a sunken and uncovered drainage hole causing him to fall and suffer serious injuries. Hemphill sued Roadrunner Club alleging negligence and premises liability on the property in which Hemphill was a tenant under the lease agreement. Following trial, Hemphill moved for an award of attorney fees under his lease agreement with Roadrunner Club, which allowed the prevailing party to recover fees if the action arose out of, among other things, the homeowner's tenancy. The trial court denied the motion. Hemphill appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a tenant's fall while walking across a common area lawn arose out of the homeowner's tenancy and entitled him to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in the action. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order denying a fee award and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Hemphill v. Wright Family, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties did not dispute the facts of the various transactions in this case, only the legal conclusions to be drawn from them. At the center, this case concerned the County of Orange’s property tax reassessment of a retail shopping center located in the City of Westminster. The Assessment Appeals Board and the trial court both concluded reassessment was proper because there was a change of ownership of the subject property when it was purchased by the long-term lessee and a third party investor. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was no change of ownership for property tax purposes and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Dyanlyn Two v. County of Orange" on Justia Law