Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Munoz replaced the carpeting in his upstairs condominium unit with hardwood flooring because of his wife’s allergies The Homeowners Association (HOA) obtained a preliminary injunction requiring Munoz to remedy the unauthorized modification of the flooring to reduce the transmission of noise to the unit below. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the superior court improperly balanced the prospective harm to each party and erroneously concluded that plaintiff would prevail at trial. View "Ryland Mews Homeowners Ass'n v. Munoz" on Justia Law

Wade, an apartment tenant living alone, was evicted after the City of Los Angeles determined his unit, a converted recreation room, was an illegal rental. Wade asserted he has an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility. Under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, a tenant who has lived in a rental unit for three or more years is entitled to relocation assistance of $9,650, unless the tenant is a “qualified tenant,” entitled to an enhanced payment of $18,300. A “qualified tenant” includes a tenant who is handicapped as defined in Section 50072 of the California Health and Safety Code: a family in which the head of the household is suffering from an orthopedic disability impairing personal mobility or a physical disability affecting his ability to obtain employment or a single person with such a physical disability, where the family or person requires special care or facilities in the home. The trial court held a single person with an orthopedic disability was entitled to the enhanced payment. The court of appeal vacated. Under section 50072, only a head of household with an orthopedic disability is deemed to be handicapped. Because Wade was a single person, not a head of household, he was not a “qualified tenant” for purposes of the enhanced payment. View "City of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home subject to a deed of trust. After they defaulted on their loan, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, OneWest, purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the sale was void due to irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings: the predicate notice of default was executed and recorded by an entity claiming to be the trustee of OneWest several weeks before OneWest signed and recorded documents formally designating that entity as such. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed. There was no statutory defect in the manner or timing of the trustee substitution, but even if so, the entity was otherwise authorized to act for OneWest in filing the notice of default because it was alleged that the entity was at all times acting as the agent of OneWest. Alternatively, any alleged defect or omission was not substantial within the meaning of the law of foreclosure, making the subsequent sale at most voidable, and not void. Because the sale was, at worst, only voidable, the borrowers in default were required to allege tender and prejudice, which they did not do. View "Ram v. OneWest Bank" on Justia Law

The prior owners were unable to pay the property taxes on the shopping center beginning in 2010. When petitioner purchased the property, taxes assessed for fiscal years 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 were delinquent, totaling $568,627.94. Petitioner requested that the tax collector cancel penalties. Revenue and Taxation Code section 4985.2(a) provides that a penalty resulting from failure to make a timely property tax payment may be canceled if the failure “is due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control ... notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care in the absence of willful neglect, provided the principal payment for the proper amount of the tax due is made.” The tax collector determined only $2,670.10 of the $142,521.68 in penalties should be waived, because the statement for the second installment of taxes due in the 2012-2013 fiscal year had been mailed to the previous owners’ address. The trial court dismissed the owner’s suit, concluding that writ of mandate was not the appropriate remedy and payment of the tax was a prerequisite to cancellation of penalties and the taxes had not been paid. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Ashlan Park Center, LLC v. Crow" on Justia Law

In 1989, the Poksays built their Novato home, including a 150-foot long driveway within the 30-foot wide easement running to the site, which was hidden from the street. The easement was over property then owned by the Schaefers and was for access and utility purposes only. The Poksays hired a landscaper, who dug holes, added plants and trees along both sides of the driveway, and installed a drip irrigation system with a line under the driveway. Water fixtures were installed along the driveway for fire safety. The Poksays added lighting, regularly tended to the landscaping, and paid maintenance, water, and other costs. Respondents purchased the property from the Poksays in 2000. The landscaping was mature. Appellants purchased the Schaefer property in 2004. In 2010, without notice, appellant cut the irrigation and electrical lines on both sides of the driveway, including those irrigating respondents’ own property and sent a letter demanding removal of all landscaping and supporting systems from the easement. Respondents filed suit. The court granted respondents an irrevocable parol license. The court of appeal agreed that it would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given the substantial investment of time and money and years of acquiescence. View "Richardson v. Franc" on Justia Law

Wilsons purchased and restored the Soda Rock Winery’s century-old building, which backs to the Belle Terre vineyard, with an “avenue” between. Its front entrance is on Highway 128; to enter the winery from the back, users must use Soda Rock Lane, then the avenue. When the Wilsons bought the property they did not know whether they had any right to use the avenue, buts used it for deliveries and heavy equipment. Belle Terre used the avenue for vineyard equipment. Dick, president of Belle Terre, testified he did not complain because he was trying to be neighborly. The avenue was always considered part of Belle Terre, never used by anyone else. When the Wilsons sought permits to complete the renovation, Belle Terre raised concerns. Conditions in the 2004 permit limited access: “Should the applicant choose … access from Soda Rock Lane, an application for modification … shall be required.” Nonetheless, the Wilsons used the avenue. In 2008, Dick complained that a cement truck was generating dust on the avenue, damaging crops. He told the Wilsons to stop trespassing. He later filed suit. The trial court permanently enjoined further trespass, awarded $1 for past trespass, and awarded attorney fees of $117,000. The court of appeal affirmed as to the boundary dispute, future trespass, and nominal damages, but reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Belle Terre Ranch, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A shopping center owner challenged provisions in its commercial lease with Ross, conditioning Ross’s obligation to open a store and pay rent on Mervyn’s operating a store in the shopping center on the lease’s commencement date and allowing Ross terminate the lease if Mervyn’s ceased operations and was not replaced by an acceptable retailer within 12 months. Mervyn’s filed for bankruptcy and closed its store. Ross took possession of the space, never opened for business, never paid rent, and terminated the lease after the 12-month cure period. The trial court found the provisions unenforceable. The jury awarded $672,100 for unpaid rent and $3.1 million in other damages. The court of appeal held that there was no procedural unconscionability. The parties were sophisticated and experienced concerning commercial leases. The rent abatement and termination provisions must be examined separately because they involve separate consequences triggered by different conditions. The determination that rent abatement constituted an unreasonable penalty was supported by findings that Ross did not anticipate it would suffer any damages from Mervyn’s not being open on the lease’s commencement date and the rent forfeited was $39,500 per month. There is no reasonable relationship between $0 of anticipated harm and forfeiture of $39,500 in rent per month. View "Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law

Based on Hardy’s 2006 refinance of his Modesto residence, Hardy, acting pro se, sued ABHL for fraud, breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of California’s unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). Hardy claimed that he was not given a copy of the loan application, that an agent inflated his assets and income on that application without his knowledge, and that he would not have consented to a negative amortization clause, had he been aware of it. In an earlier federal action, the district court declined to dismiss Hardy’s claim based on RESPA and his claims for fraud and violations of the UCL, dismissed his claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and ordered Hardy to file a second amended complaint. Hardy did not timely file and the court dismissed. In the state case, ABHL successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the prior federal action was not terminated by a judgment on the merits and the issues were not actually litigated. View "Hardy v. America's Best Home Loans" on Justia Law