Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that she "pooled" her $150,000 with $100,000 provided by River Forest and Elevation "in partnership for the purchase" of a residential property at a foreclosure auction for the purchase price of $250,000. The trustee's deed that was executed and recorded omitted plaintiff's name, which had been included in the unrecorded, original trustee's deed; River Forest subsequently quitclaimed the property to Elevation; and without plaintiff's knowledge, Elevation then sold the property to Coronado. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the property. The court held that the alteration of the deed to omit plaintiff's name was not material because the original version of the deed showed she had no interest in the property. Consequently, Coronado, as purchaser, has title to the property.View "Lin v. Coronado" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a declaratory relief action where the Railroad sought a determination of the rent due from the Pipeline for the continued use of its easements from 2004 to 2014. The Railroad obtained a declaration that the rent due was in excess of $14 million per year. The trial court entered judgment reflecting the total back rent due, plus interest, up to the date of entry of judgment. The Pipeline appealed. The court addressed the law relating to railroad rights-of-way in an effort to resolve the legal issues that apply to property interests in the land and, by extension, the Railroad's right to grant and lease subsurface easements to the Pipeline. The court reversed and remanded the trial court's finding as to the "total fee value" for purposes of its ATF calculation; directed the trial court to determine the total fee value of those parcels of land in which the Railroad had sufficient interest to entitle it to collect rent on the Pipeline's easements between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2013; concluded that the trial court committed no error with respect to its determinations regarding issue preclusion, use of the ATF method, - calculations of the rental rate, the enhancement factor, and the use factor -, and the dates of abandonment of certain easements by the Pipeline; and reversed and remanded that part of the judgment awarding prejudgment interest under Civil Code 3287(a) in order for the trial court to determine whether the Pipeline was liable for the payment of rent on the reserved easements, the abandoned easements, or Line Section 101, which rent it unilaterally withheld.View "Union Pacific Railroad v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on a water retention basin that was dug in 2004 as part of an expansion project for ski resort Northstar Village. The resort was owned by CNL Income Northstar LLC and operated by Trimont Land Company. Downhill from the retention basin are 180 condominium units owned by Aspen Grove Condominium Association. Water from the retention basin began to overflow and seep onto Aspen Grove’s property starting in December 2004 despite remediation efforts. After several years of attempts to solve the water problems with the retention basin, CNL communicated to Aspen Grove in 2008 that it would not perform any further remedial modification or remove the retention basin. Aspen Grove responded by suing various entities involved in the Northstar Village expansion project, including CNL. The first phase of the bifurcated trial resulted in the trial court’s granting a permanent injunction that required CNL to remove the retention basin. The Court of Appeal addressed only the first phase of the bifurcated trial, in which CNL challenged the mandatory injunction, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of damage to the trees on Aspen Grove’s property; (2) the trial court should have excluded evidence gathered after the discovery cutoff date; (3) Aspen Grove was not entitled to a mandatory injunction because it has an adequate remedy at law in the form of monetary damages and the option of building a trench on its own property to divert the water overflowing from the retention basin; and (4) the mandatory injunction was overbroad in requiring removal of the retention basin. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded CNL did not preserve its evidentiary arguments because CNL did not include them as issues for appeal when designating a partial reporter’s transcript. The trial court did not err in concluding Aspen Grove had no adequate remedy at law because only removal of the retention basin would alleviate the continuing damage to Aspen Grove’s property. "To hold otherwise would grant a private property owner the right to condemn his or her neighbor’s property by limiting the legal remedy for continuing trespass to monetary compensation. The trial court’s injunctive relief, rather than being overbroad, rests on credible evidence that removal of the retention basin would prevent irreparable harm to Aspen Grove’s property. As a result, we affirm."View "Aspen Grove Condo. Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar" on Justia Law

When he was five years old, plaintiff Michael Lawrence fell from a window in his family's second story hotel room at the La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club and suffered serious head and brain injuries. Michael's parents, Nan Lawrence and Jeff Lawrence, filed a first amended complaint against La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. and La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club Partners, L.P. seeking damages sounding in negligence: "Negligence," "Dangerous Condition of Property," and "Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress." Michael, through his mother as guardian ad litem, later filed a separate complaint alleging the same causes of action. After the court consolidated the cases, defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment on the two complaints. The court granted both motions and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs contended on appeal that the court erred in ruling: (1) defendants had no duty and breached no duty to install a fall prevention device on the window from which Michael fell; and (2) the accident was not caused by defendants' failure to install a fall prevention device on the window. The Court of Appeal reversed. On the record presented, the Court concluded defendants failed to carry their burden on summary judgment to establish they owed no duty to take measures to prevent the type of accident that occurred in this case. Based on the facts in record, a trier of fact could have reasonably found that defendants breached their duty to take measures to prevent an accident like Michael's. Because a trier of fact could have reasonably found defendants were negligent in failing to take reasonable measures that would have prevented Michael's accident, it could have also reasonably found that defendants' negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident.View "Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club" on Justia Law

Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appealed a jury verdict that found defendants, consisting of his homeowner association's management company (Optimum Professional Property Management and Debra Kovach), the patrol service it employed (BLB Enterprises, Inc., dba Patrol One, and Bill Bancroft), and a towing company (PD Transport, dba Southside Towing, and John Vach), did not wrongfully tow and convert his Jeep vehicle, nor convert the personal property it contained. CAAJ Leasing Trust (CAAJ), which Aulisio created as sole grantor, trustee, and trust beneficiary, owned legal title to the Jeep and also appeals. CAAJ appeals the trial court's ruling at the outset of trial that CAAJ "can't participate in the proceedings" with Aulisio appearing in propria persona as the trust's sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The trial court relied on precedent that an executor or personal representative may not appear in propria persona in court proceedings outside the probate context on behalf of a decedent's estate because representing another person or entity's interest in a lawsuit constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. But if a sole trustee is also the trust's sole settlor and beneficiary, the rationale of these cases ceases to apply: no interests are at stake except those of one person. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that a sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. The judgment as to CAAJ was reversed, and the case remanded so Aulisio may appear in propria persona to assert his interest as the sole beneficial owner of the Jeep as a trust asset. The Court affirmed the judgment against Aulisio in his individual capacity concerning his personal property in the Jeep.View "Aulisio v. Bancroft" on Justia Law

RNT appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on its claim for breach of insurance contract against RNT, arguing that the trial court erroneously determined that the claim failed in light of the terms of RNT's policy. The court concluded that summary judgment on RNT's claim for breach of insurance contract was properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts; condition 10(b) of the policy, which terminates an insurer's liability when the loan is paid off or the related mortgage is released; and exclusion 3(a) of the policy, which precludes coverage for defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by RNT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "RNT Holdings v. United Gen. Title Ins." on Justia Law

The Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action to collect a loan secured by two parcels of real estate which had been made to a husband and wife. After the husband died, the loan went into default. The Bank and wife agreed to a private sale of one of the parcels that was her separate property and Bank filed the foreclosure action on the remaining parcel to obtain a deficiency judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion for summary adjudication of its judicial foreclosure cause of action and determined that the Bank was entitled to obtain a deficiency judgment against the representatives of the husband's estate (appellants). The court concluded that, because the Bank failed to show the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 726 for creditors seeking deficiency judgments by disposing of the property at issue outside of judicial foreclosure and without appellants' consent or waiver, the Bank has waived any right to a deficiency against them. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court.View "First CA Bank v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 2007, Robert (Bob) Perry quitclaimed a house to defendant Charlotte (Jeanne) Teegarden, who was his friend and one of his caregivers. Teegarden prepared the quitclaim deed. In her deposition, Teegarden admitted that the only consideration that she gave for the quitclaim consisted of one dollar and her friendship. At trial, however, she testified that, pursuant to an oral agreement with Perry, she also gave $100,000 (for improvements to the house), her $45,000 equity in a different house, and her services. Plaintiff Merilou Jenkins is Perry’s stepdaughter and, since Perry’s death, the trustee and beneficiary of his trust. Jenkins contended that the quitclaim was invalid under Probate Code former section 21350, which, at the time, provided that a "donative transfer" was invalid under specified circumstances, including when the recipient drafted the instrument that effected the transfer. Jenkins also contended that the quitclaim deed was ineffective because it was executed by Perry in his individual capacity instead of as trustee and because it had an erroneous legal description. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not a donative transfer because Teegarden gave good consideration for it. It then reformed the quitclaim deed so as to fix the mistakes in it regarding the grantor’s capacity and the legal description. Jenkins appealed. The Court of APpeal held that, though Probate Code former section 21350 et seq. has been repealed and replaced by Probate Code section 21380 et seq., the former section 21350 et seq. still governed an instrument executed before January 1, 2011. The issue concerning a "donative transfer" for purposes of Probate Code former section 21350 was a question of first impression. The Court held that a transfer is a donative transfer if it is for inadequate consideration; the mere fact that the recipient gave good consideration, sufficient to support a contract, does not prevent the transfer from being donative. Finally, the Court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the quitclaim was a donative transfer under this definition as a matter of law. Hence, the quitclaim was invalid.View "Jenkins v. Teegarden" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Walton Emmick's application to the County for a coastal development permit (CDP) to make improvements to his property. After Emmick died, the SDS Family Trust succeeded to the property. The County subsequently approved the CDP, which was conditioned upon SDS's offer to dedicate a lateral easement for public access along the shorefront portion of the property (CDP-1). SDS did not appeal. Nine months later, SDS applied for another CDP (CDP-2) and the application was approved. The Sierra Club, the Surfrider Foundation, and two coastal commissioners appealed the County's approval of the CDP-2 to the Commission. The Commission determined that the easement condition contained in CDP-1 is permanent and binding on the landowner, and removal of the easement condition would violate the policy favoring public access to coastal resources. The Commission conditioned its permit on the implementation of the easement condition contained in CDP-1. The court reversed the judgment denying SDS's petition for a writ of administrative mandate to eliminate a public access condition from the permit where it could be inequitable to apply collateral estoppel to require a party to dedicate a coastal easement as a condition of obtaining a coastal development permit.View "Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant entered into a settlement agreement to sell her property to Blueberry and then refused to consummate the sale. The trial court entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the agreement and ordered defendant to complete the sale. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's post-judgment order appointing the clerk of the court as an elisor to execute the escrow agreement on behalf of defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court's order was proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(4), which empowers the court to compel obedience to its judgments.View "Blueberry Properties v. Chow" on Justia Law