Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Elaine and Gerald Rominger challenged a mitigated negative declaration approved by defendant Colusa County with respect to a subdivision proposed by real party in interest Adams Group Inc. The trial court denied the Romingers’ petition based on the conclusion that, notwithstanding the county’s approval of a mitigated negative declaration, the county’s "action in approving the subdivision map was not a project for CEQA purposes and [thus] no review beyond the preliminary review stage was required." The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining the proposed subdivision was not a CEQA project, even though the proposal did not include any specific plans for development. On independent review of the Romingers’ other complaints, however, the Court found merit in only one: the Romingers adequately showed there was substantial evidence in the record that the subdivision may have had a significant unmitigated impact on traffic at a particular intersection adjacent to the project site. Accordingly, on that basis only, the Court reversed and remanded for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Rominger v. County of Colusa" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Commission appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus directing it to remove three conditions from a coastal development permit amendment issued to respondents Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick. The Commission contended respondents waived any challenge to these conditions by signing and recording documents agreeing to them and then accepting the benefit of the permit by completing their project. The Commission further contended the conditions were valid and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with both contentions and reversed the judgment.View "Lynch v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought a petition for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to their two causes of action for financial elder abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welf. & Inst. Code 15600 et seq. At issue was whether to allege a "taking" of a property right under the Act, it is sufficient to plead that an elder has entered into an unconsummated agreement which, in effect, significantly impairs the value of the elder's property, or whether the Act requires that the agreement have been performed and title have been conveyed. The court concluded that because property rights include, among other things, the right to use and sell property, petitioners' allegations that Petitioner Bounds entered into an executory agreement which significantly impaired the value of the property owned by the Trust adequately pleads a taking - that Bounds has been deprived of a property right by means of an agreement within the meaning of section 15610.30(c). Accordingly, the court granted the petition and issued the writ compelling the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to petitioners' financial elder abuse claims.View "Bounds v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This case concerned the City's approval of a residential infill development project in downtown Fresno to build 28 two-story townhouses. The trial court decided that the City violated certain procedural requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000 et seq., in approving the project, but applied the correct legal standards in determining the two houses at issue were not "historical resources" protected by CEQA. The court concluded that CEQA allows a local lead agency, such as the City, to delegate the authority to approve a mitigated negative declaration and a project to a nonelected decisionmaking body such as the Preservation Commission. In this case, the Fresno Municipal Code did not actually authorize the Preservation Commission to complete the environmental review required by CEQA and approve the mitigated negative declaration. Therefore, the Preservation Commission's approval of the mitigated negative declaration did not comply with CEQA. In regards to historical resources, the court confirmed the statutory analysis in Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno and concluded that the substantial evidence test, rather than the fair argument standard, applies to a lead agency's discretionary determination of whether a building or district is an historical resource for purposes of CEQA. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it applied the substantial evidence test to the City's determination that no historical resources were impacted by the project. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Citizens etc. L Street v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the plaintiffs’ residential mortgage loan and purchased their home at a trustee sale conducted by First American. Plaintiffs sued, alleging, that defendants violated their deed of trust’s incorporation of a pre-foreclosure meeting requirement contained in National Housing Act (NHA) regulations and the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The trial court sustained demurrers and denied a preliminary injunction. The court of appeal reversed, finding that plaintiffs pled viable causes of action for equitable cancellation of the trustee’s deed obtained by Wells Fargo based on their allegation that Wells Fargo did not comply with the NHA requirements incorporated into the deed of trust. Because compliance was a condition precedent to the accrual of Wells Fargo’s contractual authority to foreclose on the property, if, as plaintiffs allege, the sale was conducted without such authority, it is either void or voidable by a court sitting in equity. Whether void or voidable, plaintiffs were not required to allege tender of the delinquent amount owed View "Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) initiated eminent domain proceedings to condemn an easement for electric transmission lines across the property of defendants Arnold and Valerie Schmidt and Luis Naranjo after the parties could not agree on an appropriate valuation for the property. Agreeing with defendants' experts that an open-pit mining operation was the "highest and best use" for the land, the jury valued the property at about $8 million. SDG&E appealed, contending the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict. SDG&E also contends it was entitled to a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion: (1) in limiting the cross-examination of defendants' appraisal expert and (2) allowing the appraiser to testify in violation of Evidence Code section 819. Defendants cross-appealed, asserting the trial court erred in denying their request for litigation expenses under Code of Civil Procedure section 1250.410. The Court of Appeal rejected SDG&E's arguments and affirmed the judgment and order denying JNOV. The Court reversed the order denying defendants' motion for litigation expenses. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco approved the Parkmerced Development Project, which involves the long-term redevelopment of the privately owned, 3,221-unit residential rental complex on152 acres near Lake Merced, which were built as affordable housing. The Project contemplates demolition and, over 20-30 years, construction of a greater number of residential units, some affordable and some market-rate, and the addition of commercial and retail space, parks and open space, and transit facilities, with improved utilities. Objectors claimed that the Land Use Element of the San Francisco General Plan was inadequate for failing to include standards for population density and building intensity (Gov. Code, 6302, subds. (a), (b).) (2); that the project and the various approvals were inconsistent with the “priority policies” and other policies of the General Plan; that an environmental impact report (EIR) and findings underlying the City’s approval of the project were inadequate under standards established by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000); and violation of its due process rights. The trial court rejected the challenges. The court of appeal affirmed. View "San Francisco Tomorrow v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Hoffmans purchased the 170 Wolfe property. After close of escrow, the owner of adjoining property, 162 LLC, claimed a landscape easement and prescriptive easement rights of ingress and egress over 170 Wolfe and sued to quiet title. The Hoffmans cross-claimed that 162 LLC had defrauded them by falsely advising that they had no claims or interest with respect to the 170 property, based upon a conversation that allegedly occurred eight months before close of escrow between Hoffman and one of 162 LLC’s members. The Hoffmans had observed vehicles crossing the 170 property to service the 162 property, but neither raised the issue with the then-owner of 170 Wolfe, nor complained to 162 LLC. 162 LLC successfully moved for summary adjudication of the fraud claims. The parties settled their remaining claims. The court of appeal affirmed. The concealment/suppression of facts claim failed because there was no evidence of a duty on the part of 162 LLC to disclose that it claimed rights or of justifiable reliance on the facts as the Hoffmans understood them without such disclosure. The intentional misrepresentation claim failed for lack of evidence that the Hoffmans justifiably relied on 162 LLC’s alleged implicit representation that it did not claim any easement rights. View "Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from issues arising from plaintiff Maria Mendoza’s purchase of a home with proceeds of a loan secured by a deed of trust, and the subsequent loss of the home in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The trial court sustained the banks' demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, rejecting her attempt to void the trustee's sale based on purported defects in the assignment of her deed of trust, irregularities in the substitution of trustees, and flaws in the securitization of her loan. The homeowner contends that not only should she be allowed to remain in her home, but that she is entitled to outright ownership without paying her debt because the banks have "already benefitted from an American taxpayer bailout of unprecedented proportions." In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the second amended complaint for wrongful foreclosure, declaratory relief, and quiet title, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) plaintiff failed to make a specific factual showing that the foreclosing parties did not have the requisite interest in the property to issue the notice of default, the notice of trustee’s sale, and the trustee’s deed of sale; and (2) in the absence of prejudice, she lacked standing to challenge irregularities in the securitization process. View "Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law