Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging, among other things, fraud and unfair business practices in the origination of plaintiffs' residential mortgage loans, and negligence in the subsequent servicing of the loans. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint failed to allege fraud for which defendants are responsible and in concluding that defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiffs in the review of their applications for a loan modification. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action for fraud against defendants where the complaint alleged that the loan documents concealed the terms of plaintiffs' loans and plaintiffs have alleged facts establishing defendants' liability for the alleged fraud. Accordingly, the court reversed as to plaintiffs' first, second, and sixth causes of action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

The Bloxhams and the Saldingers disputed the location of their common property lines. At trial, the determinative issue was the location of the western boundary of the Shoquel Augmentation Rancho, a line roughly seven miles long. The deed descriptions of the parties’ parcels at issue called to that western boundary line of the Rancho. The exterior boundaries of the Rancho were surveyed by U.S. Deputy Surveyor Wallace in 1858, and the plat of the Rancho specified that it encompassed over 32,702 acres. The corners, or termini, of the Rancho line are SA-2 (at the southerly end) and SA-3 (at the northerly end). The parties’ surveyors reached different conclusions about the location of the Rancho line and the parties’ common boundaries. Following trial, which included a judicial view of the property, the court quieted title in favor of the Bloxhams. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting an argument by the Saldingers that the survey done by their surveyor was sufficient as a matter of law because it “sufficiently” utilized the original 1858 survey, while the survey done by the Bloxhams’ surveyor was insufficient as a matter of law because it did not. View "Bloxham v. Saldinger" on Justia Law

In 2007 Rufini purchased his Sonoma residence with a $600,000 loan. Rufini and his fiancée lived in the home until they separated. In June 2009, CitiMortgage approved Rufini for a loan modification and told him he would receive a permanent modification after making timely trial payments of $2787.93 in July, August and September. Rufini timely made the payments at the modified rate through December. In January, 2010, CitiMortgage informed him that his permanent loan modification agreement would be ready in three days. Three months later, with still no written agreement, he rented out his house to offset expenses In August Rufini learned that Citibank was denying his loan modification, because the home was not owner-occupied. He attempted to make timely mortgage payments at the modified level, but CitiMortgage returned his checks. Rufini received a notice of default in September 2010, followed by a notice of trustee’s sale scheduled for January 2011. He contacted CitiMortgage and obtained its agreement to delay the foreclosure. CitiMortgage assigned Semien to Rufini’s account, but Rufini was unable to contact him on the phone for three and a half weeks. On April 11 Rufini was informed his modification was “in final state of completion.” On May 4, his house was sold at auction. The trial court dismissed Rufini’s complaint alleging “breach of contract—promissory estoppel,” breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair business practices, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court reversed and remanded the claims of negligent representation and under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law. View "Rufini v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

Nearly 15 years after the Orange County Assessor established the base year value used to assess real property taxes against plaintiff William Jefferson & Co., Inc.'s property, the company appealed to defendant Assessment Appeals Board claiming the Assessor made a clerical error in valuing the property. The Appeals Board conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the appeal on the ground plaintiff had waited too long to challenge the Assessor's base year value determination. The Appeals Board found plaintiff based its appeal not on a clerical error but on the Assessor's error in judging the property's value, and therefore plaintiff failed to comply with Revenue and Taxation Code sections 51.5, subdivision (b), and 80, subdivision (a)(3), which required plaintiff to appeal within four years of the Assessor's base year value determination. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to compel the Appeals Board to grant its appeal and direct the Assessor to change the property's base year value. However, plaintiff failed to address the Appeals Board's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to grant plaintiff's appeal, instead relying on the Assessor's allegedly erroneous property valuation. The trial court granted the Appeals Board summary judgment because plaintiff challenged the merits of the Assessor's valuation and therefore had to bring this action against the County of Orange and not the Appeals Board. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Wm. Jefferson & Co. v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Olive Lane Industrial Park owned real property that was taken by eminent domain. Within four years after the eminent domain order, Olive Lane acquired another parcel of property. About five years after the eminent domain order, for purposes of calculating property taxes on its new property, Olive Lane filed a request with the San Diego County tax assessor to transfer the condemned property's base year value to the replacement property, as permitted by California Constitution, article XIIIA. The County denied Olive Lane's request as untimely. After evaluating the constitutional and statutory provisions as a whole, the Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend to deprive a taxpayer who loses property through eminent domain of the right to obtain prospective application of the base year value transfer in the event the replacement property is acquired within the four-year statutory period but the claim is filed after the four-year period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Olive Lake Industrial Park v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joanne Peake purchased a home from Marviel and Deanna Underwood. About two years later, Peake brought an action against the Underwoods and the Underwoods' real estate agent, Paul Ferrell. Peake sought to recover damages for defendants' alleged failure to disclose defective subfloors in the home. After the case had been pending for more than one year, Ferrell moved to dismiss and for monetary sanctions against Peake and her counsel Norman Shaw under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, arguing Peake's claims were factually and legally frivolous because the undisputed evidence showed Ferrell had fulfilled his statutory and common law disclosure duties, and Peake had actual notice of facts disclosing prior problems with the subfloors. Peake declined to dismiss the action during the statutory safe harbor period, and instead amended her complaint to add claims similar to claims she had previously dismissed. The trial court found Ferrell met his burden to show Peake's claims were "without legal or evidentiary support" and Peake's continued maintenance of the lawsuit demonstrated "objective bad faith" warranting sanctions. As sanctions, the court dismissed Peake's claims against Ferrell and ordered Peake and her attorney to pay Ferrell for his attorney fees incurred in defending the action. On appeal, Peake and Shaw challenged the sanction order. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the section 128.7 sanctions. View "Peake v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In April 2008, a particularly cold month in a dry year, young salmon were found fatally stranded along banks of the Russian River system, which drains Sonoma and Mendocino Counties. The deaths were caused by abrupt declines in water level that occurred when water was drained from the streams and sprayed on vineyards and orchards to prevent frost damage. After hearings and preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR), the State Water Resources Control Board adopted a regulation that is likely to require reduction in diversion of water for frost protection under certain circumstances. The regulation does not limit water use, but delegates regulatory authority to local governing bodies composed of the diverting growers. The regulation declares that any water use inconsistent with the programs, once they are approved by the Board, is unreasonable and prohibited. The trial court invalidated the Board’s action. The appeals court reversed. While authority to require a permit for water use by riparian users and early appropriators is beyond the authority of the Board, it has the power to prevent unreasonable use of water. In regulating unreasonable use of water, the Board can weigh public purposes, notably the protection of wildlife habitat, against the commercial use of water by riparian users and early appropriators. The court noted that its ruling was on a facial challenge and did not address the validity of any particular substantive regulation. The Board did not unlawfully delegate its authority and properly certified the EIR. View "Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

The eighth addendum to a 1997 environmental impact report for San Jose’s International Airport Master Plan concerns the environmental impacts of recent amendments to the Airport Master Plan, which include changes to the size and location of future air cargo facilities, replacement of air cargo facilities with 44 acres of general aviation facilities, and modification of two taxiways to provide better access for corporate jets. The trial court rejected a challenge under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000, which claimed that the amendments constituted a new project and that the changes are substantial and require major revisions to the EIR with respect to noise, greenhouse gas emissions, toxic air contaminants, and the burrowing owl habitat. The appeals court affirmed, finding substantial evidence showing that the master Plan amendments addressed in the eighth addendum will not result in any new significant impacts on noise, air quality, and the burrowing owl habitat that are substantially different from those described in the 1997 EIR and the 2003 supplemental EIR. The city did not violate sCEQA Guidelines by failing to analyze greenhouse gas emissions in the eighth addendum. View "Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Wellesly owned real property subject to a first deed and a junior mechanic's lien. The holder of the mechanic's lien subsequently filed suit to foreclose its lien, arguing that the lien was not eliminated by a foreclosure. The court held that, under well-established California law, the senior beneficiary's lien and title ordinarily do not merge when a deed in lieu of a foreclosure is given if there are junior lienholders of record; the foreclosure after acceptance of the deed was therefore valid and eliminated all junior liens, including plaintiff's mechanic's lien; and the third party now owns the property free of all such junior encumbrances. Accordingly, the court reversed the superior court's foreclosure order on the mechanic's lien. View "Decon Group v. Prudential Mort." on Justia Law