Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

San Diegans For Open Government (SDOG), represented by Briggs Law Corporation (BLC), filed a verified answer in response to the City of San Diego's (City) complaint in a validation action regarding the City's plan to levy a special tax to finance the expansion of the San Diego Convention Center. SDOG represented that it was an interested party to the litigation. However, at the time it filed its answer, both SDOG and its counsel knew that SDOG was a suspended corporation and neither SDOG nor its attorney informed the superior court or the City of this fact. After SDOG and another defendant ultimately proved successful in the validation action, SDOG sought its attorney fees. The City discovered after a final judgment was entered in SDOG's favor that SDOG had been suspended when it filed its verified answer and was not revived until well after the time period by which an interested party had to answer the validation action. As such, the City moved to strike SDOG's answer and motion for attorney fees. The superior court denied the City's motion and awarded SDOG attorney fees, but limited those fees because SDOG first appeared when it was suspended and did not inform the court or the City of its status. This case presented an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal: whether under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, should attorney fees be awarded when a suspended corporation files an answer in a validation action and both the corporation and its attorney know it is suspended and it is not revived before the expiration of the deadline to appear in that action? The Court answered this question in the negative, and thus, reversed the order granting SDOG its attorney fees. The Court affirmed the court's order denying the City's motion to strike both the answer and SDOG's motion for attorney fees. View "City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government" on Justia Law

MediMarts, a nonprofit collective, paid the Marijuana Business Tax (MBT) for a year, then began submitting returns showing no money due. The City of San Jose sent notices and found that MediMarts owed $58,788.53 as of August 2012, plus future penalties and interest. MediMarts owed $215,111.17 as of November 2013. The city sued MediMarts and its president, Armstrong, for $767,058.60. Defendants filed a cross-complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, arguing that payment of the MBT would subject them to self-incrimination because it “forces [defendants] to admit to the sale or possession for sale of marijuana.” The tax also violated defendants’ due process rights by failing to provide for notice or a hearing before declaring MediMarts a nuisance and forcing it to cease operations. Armstrong was not afforded a hearing on his personal liability for the taxes. Finally, the cross-complaint alleged that the MBT “unjustly treats collectives and medical marijuana patients differently from other similarly situated individuals and organizations.” Applying the “collective entity rule,” the court determined that neither MediMarts nor Armstrong was entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment to resist the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. Neither assertion of Armstrong’s constitutional rights nor their accommodation would abate MediMarts’s duty to pay the tax. View "City of San Jose v. MediMarts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff petitioned the superior court for a writ directing the then-serving members of the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) to cease publishing his name on the FTB's list of the state's "Top 500" income tax debtors. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer. Because plaintiff did not seek leave to amend his petition, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. The trial court also found the action to be “frivolous and groundless,” and sanctioned petitioner in the amount of $5,000. The court held that the petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where plaintiff previously sought redress in federal court for having his name placed on the List; because that issue is determinative, the court need not and did not reach the issue of whether plaintiff's petition stated a claim for violation of his privacy rights; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning petitioner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Franceschi v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jon Ellis appealed the dismissal of his suit against County of Calaveras, the Assessment Appeals Board for the County of Calaveras (the AAB), the Assessor for the County of Calaveras (the assessor), and the Auditor-Controller for the County of Calaveras (the auditor-controller) to Ellis’s petition and complaint relating to property taxes assessed against his real property. Ellis owned real property in Calaveras County on which he was constructing a large detached garage. In 2009, he was assessed property taxes based on an appraised value of the garage set by the assessor at $140,000 (90 percent of the estimated total cost of construction of $156,800). Ellis sought a reduction of the assessment from the AAB. The AAB reduced the value of the garage to $117,600, based on a finding that construction was only 75 percent complete. In February 2011, Ellis contested that finding by seeking writ relief from the trial court, but the parties reached a settlement before the trial court ruled on the merits. In 2010, Ellis was assessed property taxes based on the partially constructed garage having a “ ‘base year value’ ” in 2010 of $117, 600. In light of this assessment, in December 2011, after he had received a property tax assessment as of the 2011 lien date, Ellis sought a writ to enforce the settlement agreement. When his attempts to enforce the settlement agreement failed, Ellis filed an application with the AAB to reduce the assessment for his 2010 property taxes. He designated the application, which was filed November 29, 2012, as a claim for a tax refund, and he indicated his challenge was premised on the base year value being incorrect and there having been no new construction as of the 2010 lien date. By the time Ellis filed his application, construction of the garage had been deemed complete and a supplemental assessment had been issued. He also received a regular assessment as of the 2012 lien date. In July 2013, the AAB heard Ellis’s appeal of his 2010 tax assessment and determined Ellis’s appeal was not timely filed, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In March 2014, Ellis petitioned the trial court seeking a traditional or administrative writ of mandate, refund of his property taxes, and declaratory relief. The trial court found that Ellis had not exhausted his administrative remedies, he had an adequate remedy at law, and that to the extent the pleading could be construed as a complaint, it was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the trial court’s previous denial of Ellis’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement “amounted to a determination of the merits of the same legal arguments raised [here.]” Therefore, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and subsequently entered a judgment of dismissal. Ellis appealed that judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ellis v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

The County appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of JCC on its property tax refund action based on the welfare exemption in Revenue and Taxation Code section 214, contending that the trial court erred by not deferring to an advisory rule of the SBE. The SBE interpreted section 214 to mean that both the owner and third party operator of a property used for charitable purposes must file claims for welfare exemptions. The court concluded that, while the statutory and regulatory scheme required JCC to file a claim for a welfare exemption as well as a claim for an organizational clearance certificate, it imposed no other conditions. Therefore, the SBE’s interpretation of section 214 was clearly erroneous. The court also concluded that the SBE’s advisory rule regarding who must file a welfare exemption is not binding and should not be given independent legal effect. The court further concluded that the County failed to establish that the trial court should have denied a tax refund because JCC’s claims were tardy and its claim forms were incomplete. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Jewish Community Ctrs. Dev. Corp. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households for disposal of household hazardous waste, by enactment of an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee.” Crawley challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus, arguing that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution, requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, rejecting Crawley’s assertion that the fee is not incidental to property ownership and concluding that the fee falls within an exemption to the constitutional requirements. View "Crawley v. Alameda Cnty, Waste Mgmt. Auth." on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Marlton appealed from the denial of its verified petition for peremptory writ of mandate, seeking to overturn a decision by the County denying Marlton's request for cancellation of tax penalties. The court concluded that, under Revenue and Taxation Code section 4985.2, a tax payer may not be in delinquent status as to any tax period in excess of four years in order to seek relief for penalties accrued. In this case, the trial court properly considered lack of payment and correctly concluded that section 4985.2 requires timely payment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Marlton Recovery Partners, LLC v. County of L.A." on Justia Law