Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
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This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

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The case involves Donald Carmody (appellant) and the estate of his deceased nephew, Robert Allen Flores. Initially, Donald was informed by an heir-hunting firm, American Research Bureau, Inc. (ARB), that he was an heir to his nephew's estate. However, believing it was a scam, Donald assigned his rights to the estate to his brother, John Carmody. The estate, however, turned out to be valuable. John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 to determine the entitlement to the distribution of the nephew's estate, which resulted in a determination that both John and Donald were the nephew's heirs, with each entitled to a 50% share. However, John died before the court issued the final distribution order.The administrator of the nephew's estate sought a final distribution order that would take into account Donald's assignment of his rights to John. Donald objected, claiming that the previous order determining the entitlement to distribution was final and prohibited the court from recognizing his prior assignment of his interest to John. The trial court rejected this claim, ruling that it properly recognized Donald's assignment of his interest in the estate to John.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that John's rights as an assignee were not raised or litigated in the section 11700 proceeding, which was limited to a determination of heirship. Thus, John did not forfeit or waive his rights as an assignee by failing to assert those rights in the section 11700 proceeding. The court also found that Donald failed to establish evidence of rescission of the assignment. View "In re Estate of Flores" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law

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In this California appellate case, the key issue was whether non-monetary benefits, specifically room and board, constituted "remuneration" within the meaning of Probate Code section 21362, a provision relating to the presumption of fraud or undue influence for donative transfers to caregivers of dependent adults. The case arose when the defendant, Elvira Gutierrez, who provided care services to the decedent in exchange for room and board, was named as the sole beneficiary in the decedent’s testamentary instruments. The plaintiffs, relatives of the decedent, argued that Gutierrez was a "care custodian" under the Probate Code, and that her receipt of the decedent’s estate should be presumed to be the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court initially ruled that Gutierrez was not a care custodian because room and board did not constitute remuneration for her services. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that "remuneration" as used in section 21362 does include room and board. The Court found that such an interpretation was consistent with the term's ordinary usage, the legislative intent to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation, and its interpretation in other legal contexts. The Court therefore concluded that Gutierrez was a care custodian under the statute, and the decedent’s donative gifts to her were subject to the presumption of fraud or undue influence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

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This appeal arises from a dispute over a trust established by a deceased father, James. Brian Spears, the son, filed a petition seeking to be named a creditor of his father's trust and to remove his stepmother, Therese Spears, as trustee. The trial court dismissed Brian's petition on the grounds that he did not file an amended pleading after the court sustained Therese's demurrer to the petition, with leave to amend. Brian appealed this decision, arguing that he did in fact file an amended pleading, reasserting only his claim to be named as a creditor of the trust.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four agreed with Brian. The court found that Brian's subsequent filing, titled "Creditor's Claim," was intended to be his amended pleading. It provided additional detail about the oral agreements underlying his claim, and it was filed under the same case number as his original petition.However, the court also agreed with Therese that the statute of limitations barred recovery on one of the alleged agreements underlying Brian's creditor's claim. The court found that the two-year statute of limitations for an action based on the breach of an oral contract had expired for one of the agreements before James's death.The court reversed the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that although Brian's creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations insofar as it rests on one of the alleged oral agreements, the trial court erred in dismissing Brian's creditor's claim to the extent it rests on the other alleged agreement. View "Spears v. Spears" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

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This case arose out of disputes over the propriety and enforceability of amendments to Thomas Tedesco’s living trust, which was conceived of as part of a family estate plan Tedesco created with his late wife, Wanda. The trust came into being following Wanda Tedesco’s death in 2002, and it was later restated. The primary beneficiaries of the restated trust were the cotrustees. For their part, the cotrustees petitioned the court to validate a 2013 amendment, and thus to establish the invalidity of a purported 2020 amendment to the restated trust. The appeal before the Court of Appeal challenged a discovery sanction for $6,000. Counsel attempted to use the sanctions order as a basis for challenging the merits of the trial court’s nonappealable order quashing appellant Debra Wear's document subpoena, and then to further use the trial court’s analysis underlying that discovery ruling into a basis for reviewing a separate order the Court of Appeal already ruled could not be appealed. The Court concluded all of this seemed to be in furtherance of counsel’s broader quest: to again collaterally attack the validity of a conservatorship over the Tedesco estate, which had been rejected by the probate and appellate courts in earlier proceedings. The Court determined its jurisdiction arose here on the limited issue of sanctions, and found Wear failed to challenge the probate court's pertinent determinations, "let alone demonstrate why the court abused its discretion in making them. We find no error in the court’s ruling." The Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Tedesco v. White" on Justia Law

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After Nick Martino (Decedent) died intestate, his stepson from a previous marriage, Nick Zambito, petitioned to be deemed an heir. Decedent’s biological children, Tracey Martino and Joseph Martino (together, Objectors), objected. After a bench trial, the probate court determined that Decedent was Zambito’s “natural parent” under Probate Code sections 6540 and 6453, which defined the “natural parent” and child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. The Court of Appeal concluded Zambito had standing to claim natural parentage heirship even though he was not the Decedent’s biological child. The Court further concluded that Probate Code section 6454, which provided a pathway for intestate succession by stepchildren and foster children, did not operate to foreclose other available statutory methods for a stepchild to establish a right to intestate succession. In the absence of any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the probate court’s factual findings under this theory, the Court concluded that Objectors failed to demonstrate any reversible error. View "Estate of Martino" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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The parents, now deceased, established the Trust. Their daughter is the trustee. There are four other children. The Trust is a 70 percent shareholder of the Company. Each sibling owns an equal share of the remaining 30 percent. A Company shareholder agreement provides that any shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the company can take various actions in their “sole discretion,” including borrowing, lending, and transferring assets. The Trust's balance, after expenses and specific distributions, shall be distributed equally to five sub-trusts benefiting the five siblings. Among the Trust’s liabilities are outstanding loans made by the Company. Two siblings filed a petition to instruct the trustee, to take specified actions, including directing the Company to borrow substantial sums of money to pay estate taxes owed by the Trust. The Company responded to the Petition.The court held that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary, it lacked standing to participate in proceedings on the Petition. The court of appeal remanded, finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Probate Code section 1043(a), authorizes “interested persons” to respond or object at or before a hearing in a trust proceeding. The probate court must make the discretionary determination of whether the Company is an interested person. View "Colvis v. Binswanger" on Justia Law

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Boesch and Hudson were unmarried partners. The 1994 Boesch Trust was funded with his 50 percent interest in each of the subject properties. The Hudson Trust was funded with Hudson’s 50 percent interest in each of those properties. Boesch died in 1995. Hudson died in 2019. Mulvihill is the successor trustee of both Trusts. The Museum is the sole residuary beneficiary of the Boesch Trust.Mulvihill filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition, seeking instructions due to “a potential conflict in administering the trust,” alleging the Museum requested that the acquisition indebtedness on the subject properties be paid off and that the Boesch Trust make an in-kind distribution of its interests to the Museum so that the Museum may, as a tax-exempt organization, sell the interests without suffering certain tax consequences. The Hudson Trust beneficiaries, which do not face the same tax consequences, prefer that the trusts sell the properties undivided and distribute the proceeds.The probate court instructed Mulvihill to sell the properties and distribute the proceeds. The court of appeal reversed, noting a trust provision granting the trustee “sole discretion” to distribute the trust property in cash or in kind. Because Mulvihill never purported to exercise that discretion, the court remanded with directions that, barring any conflict of interest matters that may arise, Mulvihill be instructed to exercise his discretion to grant or deny the Museum’s request for an in-kind distribution of the trust’s property interests. View "Stadel Art Museum v. Mulvihill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates