Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lieselotte Herzog (the Decedent) died intestate on October 17, 2013. In April 2014, the probate court issued letters of administration appointing Winnfred Herzog (Nephew) as the administrator of the estate. Kemp & Associates, Inc. (Kemp), a firm specializing in locating heirs, held a power of attorney for Maurene Schraff Nadj (Half Sister). In July 2016, Kemp petitioned the probate court for a determination that Half Sister was the Decedent’s sole heir. The probate court denied Kemp’s petition with prejudice for insufficient evidence. Kemp appealed, arguing the probate court erred: (1) by bifurcating the issue of whether Half Sister was the Decedent’s heir; (2) by concluding Kemp did not meet its burden of proof; and (3) by ruling Kemp’s evidence was inadmissible. In addition, Kemp contended Nephew lacked standing to oppose Kemp’s petition. Finding no reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Herzog" on Justia Law

The parents established the trust in 1974 when all of the siblings were minors. Howard predeceased Alice, leaving her as the sole settlor and trustee. In 2003, Alice amended the trust to name all six children, as successor co-trustees, with the power to act by majority vote. Alice died in 2015; the trust became irrevocable. Five siblings, (Appellants) agreed to maintain the assets in trust, hoping they would increase in value for the next generation. The sixth sibling asked for distribution of her share of the trust in cash. The trial court interpreted the trust to require liquidation and distribution of the trust assets upon the death of the last surviving parent, based primarily on a provision requiring distribution to any beneficiary when that beneficiary turned 30 years old. All of the siblings were at least 30 years old. The court of appeal agreed that the trust's unambiguous language requires distribution and termination of the trust, but the trial court erred when it ordered the liquidation of the trust assets to accomplish that purpose, rather than deferring to the discretion of the trustees to distribute the trust. The orders removing the parties as trustees and requiring the trust to pay all attorney fees and costs flowed from that error. View "Trolan v. Trolan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a "Trust Transfer Deed," signed by husband, granting certain real property to his wife, did not met Family Code section 852(a)'s express declaration requirement. The court held that without an express statement specifying what interest in the property was granted to wife, the reference to a "Trust Transfer" left the document's purpose ambiguous and thus rendered the purported transmutation invalid under section 852(a). The court held that the deed was fairly susceptible of at least two interpretations―the one wife proffered, whereby husband granted all of his interest in the property to her, thereby transmuting the residence into her separate property, and the one husband proffered, whereby he granted only an interest in trust to wife for the couple's estate planning purposes. View "Begian v. Sarajian" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment ordering Lu Tuan Nguyen to return funds to the Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Joseph Ribal. On remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees incurred in enforcing the underlying judgment to Linda Rogers, the conservator, of $43,507.50. Nguyen argued on appeal of that order that he satisfied the underlying judgment, and after reviewing the record, the Court of Appeal agreed. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080 (a), required such motions to be made before the judgment is satisfied, the Court agreed with Nguyen that the motion was untimely. Therefore, the order granting Rogers $43,507.50 in attorney fees was reversed. View "Conservatorship of Ribal" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs in this dispute over the management and the distribution of monetary assets of a family trust. The court held that the trial court properly applied the substantial benefit theory, an offshoot of the common fund doctrine, in making its award of fees from trust assets. In this case, substantial evidence supported the finding that the litigation substantially benefited all beneficiaries and that litigation preserved trust assets when the accounts were frozen. The court explained that the litigation preserved a common fund for the benefit of the non-participating beneficiaries. View "Smith v. Szeyller" on Justia Law

Stockird's handwritten will transferred “all my property and everything I may be entitled to inherit” to her life partner, Aguirre, and an aunt-by-marriage, Ambrose. The will did not include alternative provisions for disposition if either gift lapsed. Ambrose died before Stockird. After Stockird died, Aguirre sought a declaration that he is entitled to Stockird’s entire estate as the sole surviving residuary beneficiary under Probate Code 21111(b). Stockird’s halfbrother, Ramsden, argued the lapsed gift to Ambrose must pass to Stockird’s estate under section 21111(a)(3) and that as Stockird’s only surviving heir, he is entitled to Ambrose’s share under the laws of intestacy. The probate court agreed with Ramsden. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court misinterpreted section 21111(b). The definition of “transferee” as kindred in section 21110(c) applies to section 21110, but the more general definition of “transferee,” as a “beneficiary, donee, or other recipient of an interest transferred by an instrument,” applies in section 21111(b). Given the clear intent of the Legislature to abolish the “no residue of a residue” rule and avoid intestacy, the 35 percent lapsed gift does not go to Stockird’s estate under section 21111(a)(3), but, subject to determination of Ambrose's descendants' reformation petition, must pass to Aguirre under section 21111(b). View "Estate of Stockird" on Justia Law

Amanda Meleski was injured when Albert Hotlen ran a red light and collided with her vehicle. Unfortunately, Hotlen was deceased at the time of the lawsuit, and he had no estate from which she could recover. However, Hotlen had purchased a $100,000 insurance policy from Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) covering the accident. Meleski brought her action pursuant to Probate Code sections 550 through 555, which allowed her to serve her complaint on Allstate and recover damages from the Allstate policy, but limited her recovery of damages to the policy limits. Meleski attempted to settle the matter before going to trial by making an offer pursuant to section 998 for $99,999. The offer was not accepted, and at trial a jury awarded her $180,613.86. Because the offer was rejected and Meleski was awarded judgment in excess of her offer to compromise, she expected to recover her costs of suit, the postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, and other litigation costs. Meleski argued on appeal that she should have been able to recover costs in excess of the policy limits from Allstate, since it was Allstate that had refused to accept a reasonable settlement offer prior to trial. The trial court disagreed, and Meleski filed this appeal, arguing Allstate was a party within the meaning of section 998 for purposes of recovering costs, and that such costs were recoverable from the insurer despite the limitation on the recovery of “damages” found in Probate Code sections 550 through 555. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed judgment: "Even though the decedent’s estate is the named defendant in actions under Probate Code sections 550 through 555, this is a legal fiction. The insurance company accepts service of process, hires and pays for counsel to defend the action, makes all decisions regarding settlement of the litigation, is responsible for paying the judgment in favor of the plaintiff if such judgment is rendered, and makes the decision whether or not to appeal an adverse judgment. There is no actual person or entity other than the insurance company to do any of this. This is a reality we will not ignore. Moreover, we find it manifestly unfair that section 998 could be employed by Allstate to recover costs from the plaintiff (which costs it would have no obligation to pay to the estate), but Allstate would have no corresponding responsibility to pay costs merely because it is not a named party." View "Meleski v. Estate of Hotlen" on Justia Law

Walter owned and operated Control Master Products, a wire and cable business. After Walter’s death, Plaintiffs filed a petition to determine their status as beneficiaries under Walter's trust and to challenge Youngman’s right to inherit. Youngman, Walter’s long-time friend and tax attorney, had drafted Walter’s trust. The petition sought to have a condition, which made certain gifts contingent on being employed by Control at the time of the death of Walter and his spouse (Verla), stricken on various grounds, including impossibility. Walter had sold the company’s assets and its employees had been terminated. The probate court concluded the dispute was not ripe because Verla’s death had not occurred. On remand, the probate court found that Youngman and his family were “disqualified from any gift under the trust,” that Ostrosky’s gift lapsed because she had retired before the sale, and Schwan’s and Johnson’s gifts “remain valid and enforceable, but only after Verla[’s] death.” The court of appeal reversed and remanded for findings as to whether Ostrosky’s work for Custom satisfied the trust’s employment condition and modified the trial court decision so that the gifts to Schwan and Johnson remain valid and enforceable, only after Verla’s death, and only if they survive Verla. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Schwan v. Permann" on Justia Law

Acting under Probate Code section 16440(b), the trial court denied a petition brought by Orange Catholic Foundation and Kevin Vann, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Orange (collectively, the Church) to remove Rosie Mary Arvizu from her position as trustee of the Josephine Kennedy Trust (Trust) and for damages. The Trust gave a life estate in Kennedy’s house (the Residence) to Paul Senez, her very dear family friend of over 60 years, provided that he pay for certain expenses related to the Residence. The Trust further provided that upon Senez’s death, the Residence was to be sold and the proceeds were to be given to the Church for the benefit of the needy elderly and abused children. The Church alleged that Arvizu (Kennedy’s niece and the successor trustee) breached her duties as trustee by: (1) improperly using Trust funds to pay expenses that should have been borne by Senez (who was elderly, destitute, suffering from dementia, and unable to cover the expenses himself); (2) failing to evict Senez when he could not pay those expenses; and (3) not promptly renting out or selling the Residence after Senez’s death (a delay which occurred in part due to Arvizu’s cancer treatment and other health issues, and which fortuitously benefited the Church because the Residence appreciated by $136,000 during the period of Arvizu’s inaction). Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of theft from an elder or dependent adult in 2010 (the criminal action). After the victim died before the end of the criminal action, plaintiff, the conservator and the co-administrator, filed two actions against defendant under Probate Code section 850, seeking civil damages (the probate action) and another action that resulted in a restitution award (restitution judgment).The Court of Appeal held that, pursuant to the terms of a stipulation concerning the amount of restitution in the criminal action, defendant's prejudgment restitution payments should have been credited against principal rather than interest. The court held, however, that even after adjusting the remaining principal on the restitution judgment to account for prejudgment payments, defendant still owed a substantial sum. Therefore, the court remanded for recalculation of the amount remaining due on the restitution judgment. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. The court affirmed the judgment in the probate action. View "Kerley v. Weber" on Justia Law