Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David Pratt obtained court orders requiring his ex-wife, Cynthia Vedder, to pay child support and expenses. Vedder was the beneficiary of a trust established by her grandparents. Pratt filed a petition to compel Robert Ferguson, the trustee of the Borgert Vedder and Nellie A. Vedder Revocable Trust, to satisfy the orders from Vedder's share of the trust estate. The trial court denied the petition based on a clause in the trust that prohibited the Trustee from making certain distributions if they would become subject to Vedder's creditors' claims (the shutdown clause). After review, the Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding the shutdown clause, Probate Code section 15305 gave the trial court discretion to order a trustee to make distributions of income and principal to satisfy the final child support orders. Pratt's petition also sought the imposition of a judgment lien on Vedder's interest in the trust estate to satisfy a community property judgment that he held against her. The trial court relied on the shutdown clause to deny the petition for a lien. Because Pratt was entitled to a judgment lien on the trust to satisfy the community property judgment, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Probate Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the trial court's order too. View "Pratt v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Trust I, established by Maryon and Robert, became irrevocable when Maryon died in 1994. Robert died in 2013. Months later, Maryon’s son, Funsten, filed a “safe harbor” application, requesting a declaration that he would not violate a “no-contest” clause in Trust I by filing a petition to establish that he is its sole successor trustee, notwithstanding that Robert designated an additional co-successor trustee after Maryon died. The probate court denied the application. The executors of Robert's probate estate sought a determination that Funsten violated no-contest clauses in Trust I and in Robert’s will by filing creditor’s claims against Robert’s probate estate to recover damages for the allegedly improper removal of trust assets. The trial court found that Funsten’s conduct constituted a contest of Robert’s will, but did not constitute a contest under Trust I. The court of appeal held that Funsten was not entitled to a ruling on the merits of his safe harbor application because that statutory procedure has not been available since former Probate Code section 21320 was repealed in 2010. The probate court correctly found that Funsten did not violate the Trust I no-contest clause by filing creditor’s claims against Robert’s probate estate, but erred by finding a contest of Robert’s will. Funsten is not a beneficiary of Robert’s will and could not have violated the no-contest clause in that instrument as a matter of law. View "Funsten v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Greco, Jr. was the trustee of his parents’ trust and the administrator of their estates. He used money from the trust and estates to fund litigation against his sister and others, purportedly to recover money they owed to the trust and estates. After he allegedly spent considerably more money on litigation than he could have possibly recovered, his sister, plaintiff Cara Lyn Greco, brought two lawsuits against him, one at the trial court and one at the probate court, to recover the money he spent, plus penalties. She claimed the prior litigation was a personal vendetta. Clyde Jr. responded to each lawsuit by filing separate special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In each case, the special motion to strike was denied. On appeal, Clyde Jr. contended he met his burden on the first prong of section 425.16 by establishing that Cara Lyn’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity, funding litigation. He further argued that Cara Lyn could not meet her burden on the second prong of section 425.16 to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of each claim because all her claims are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found the gravamen of most of Cara Lyn’s claims was the alleged wrongful taking from the trust and estates and that was not a protected activity under section 425.16. The courts properly denied Clyde Jr.’s special motion to strike as to these claims. The one exception was Cara Lyn’s claim for constructive fraud based on Clyde Jr.’s alleged misrepresentations about the underlying litigation. While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigation are protected activity, Clyde Jr. did not show it was covered by the litigation privilege. The Court remanded this matter back to the probate court for a determination of whether Cara Lyn met her evidentiary burden under the second prong of section 425.16 analysis. View "Greco v. Greco" on Justia Law

Borel's trust states that, upon Borel’s death, a parcel of the trust’s real property is to be distributed to the East Bay Regional Park District for the purposes of establishing an agricultural park. Part of the property is also subject to an option agreement between Borel and Corrie. After Borel’s death, Corrie sought an order instructing the trustee to convey a portion of the property to him pursuant to the option agreement. The District opposed that petition, and filed a competing petition under Probate Code section 17200, seeking an order authorizing the trustee to distribute the property to the District and to receive an $800,000 loan on behalf of the trust. The probate court granted the District’s petition. The District subsequently petitioned the probate court (section 1310(b)) to authorize the immediate distribution of the land and acceptance of the loan while appeal was pending. The order granting that motion was also appealed. While those appeals were pending, the probate court held a trial and found Corrie’s option unenforceable. A third appeal followed. The court of appeal dismissed in part, noting that under section 1310(b), the actions taken by the trustee are valid, regardless of the outcome on appeal. The court affirmed that the option agreement is void and unenforceable. View "East Bay Reg'l Park Dist. v. Griffin" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was a dispute over the ownership of certain real property between appellant Scott Walters, as the administrator of his father Randy Walters' estate and Randy's former girlfriend, respondent Valerie Boosinger. A 2003 deed named Randy and Boosinger as owners in joint tenancy of the Property. Upon Randy's death in 2013, Boosinger claimed sole ownership of the Property as the surviving joint tenant. Scott brought a quiet title claim premised on the theory that the grant deed was void ab initio. The Court of Appeal rejected Scott's claim on appeal that such a claim could be brought "at any time." Instead, the Court concluded that the claim was subject to a statute of limitation and that Scott failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that his quiet title cause of action was time barred. Scott also contended that he properly stated a claim for quiet title premised on the alternative theory that Randy and Boosinger severed their joint tenancy in the Property prior to Randy's death. As to this contention, the Court of Appeal concluded that Scott failed to sufficiently allege facts demonstrating such severance and that he did not demonstrate that he could amend his complaint to properly allege a severance of the joint tenancy. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Scott did not properly state a quiet title claim pursuant to this alternative theory either. View "Walters v. Boosinger" on Justia Law

William's wife died in 1996; he died in 2011. Upon the wife's death, their trust established the decedent’s irrevocable trust, and the survivor’s amendable, revocable trust. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, both trusts would terminate; 30 percent of the survivor’s trust would be distributed to William’s children, with the rest set aside in a grandchildren’s trust. The document contained a no contest provision. In 1997, William executed the first amendment to the survivor’s trust After William’s death, a grandson filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition to determine the validity of a 2008 amendment, alleging that William lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence when he executed the amendment. The court dismissed, based the fact that another grandchild disclaimed his interest, thereby restoring the petitioner’s interest in the trust estate. The court of appeal reversed. Acceptance of the disclaimer was contrary to public policies of effectuating a testator’s intent and dissuading elder abuse, and was premised on the erroneous view that the disclaimer effectuated a settlement of the lawsuit. A settlement assumes the consent of the parties; it is not a side deal between the court and a nonlitigant. The petitioner had an interest in challenging the validity of the 2008 amendment, and the prosecution of his petition was necessary to protect that interest. View "Gregge v. Hugill" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor obtained a judgment against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment creditor filed a petition under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL), Code Civ. Proc., 680.010 et seq., to invalidate the third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant appealed. The court concluded that the underlying order invalidating the third party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly denied the third party claimant's belated motion to vacate that order. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Torjesen, v. Mansdorf" on Justia Law

John F. LeBouef, an attorney, appeals a probate judgment invalidating a will and living trust purportedly executed by John Patton. Patton's will and trust named LeBouef as the principal beneficiary to a $5 million estate. The trial court factually found that LeBouef caused the loss of the original trust instrument, which made it impossible for the trial court to determine the true terms of the trust. The trial court declared the will and trust invalid and removed Lebouef as trustee. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court's factual findings are disturbing, fatal to LeBouef's contentions, and suggest criminal culpability. The court also affirmed the trial court's postjudgment order approving LeBouef's trust accounting but denied his request for trustee fees, attorney fees, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and property management services where the trial court ruled that an award for fees, costs, services, and out-of-pocket expenses would be inequitable and reward LeBouef for his misconduct. View "Butler v. LeBouef" on Justia Law

In this case the competent spouse, Lynn Bower unquestionably paid for the support and maintenance of her conservatee husband David. In fact she devoted about 72 percent of the couple’s $200,000 marital estate income to making the $12,000 a month payments to a home specializing in Alzheimer’s care for David. What she didn’t do was comply with the letter of an order of the probate court to pay lump sum large professional fee claims directly to David’s conservator and several other creditors. Instead she either paid those claims directly herself, or those claims were paid indirectly from escrows based on liens asserted by the relevant professionals. Based on the literal noncompliance with the terms of the order, the probate judge ordered the community estate of the Bowers divided, with the conservator receiving David’s share. Because the probate court erroneously proceeded on the premise that article 3 of part 6, division 4 of the Probate Code, section 3089, was triggered by noncompliance with orders to pay professional fees directly to the conservator in a lump sum, rather than refusal to comply with an order to support the conservatee spouse, the Court of Appeal reversed an order dividing the estate and remanded the matter to the trial level for application of the proper standard to the facts of this case. View "Conservatorship of Bower" on Justia Law

Coblentz, a law firm partner, died in 2010. Coblentz served for many years as a trustee for the McClatchy Trust before resigning in 2009. In 2012, one of the Trust’s beneficiaries filed a Petition for Relief from Breach of Trust under Probate Code 17200(a), seeking damages for alleged asset mismanagement. The petition included an allegation that “Petitioner is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Respondents named herein as Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore names these Respondents by such fictitious names." An amended petition, attempting to add the Firm as a named defendant, alleged that after reading an SEC filing dated 2004, plaintiff became aware that Coblentz‘s actions as trustee had been undertaken in his capacity as a partner in the Firm, making the Firm vicariously liable. The Firm argued the beneficiary was not entitled to use the Doe defendant procedure because he had known the Firm‘s identity and the facts allegedly giving rise to its liability when the original petition was filed and that the claims were time-barred. The trial court quashed service, reasoning that plaintiff knew all the relevant facts before filing the original petition. The court of appeal affirmed. View "McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP" on Justia Law