Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
by
Appellant is the only child of the late J.B. Appellant opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Appellant any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Appellant appealed. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the phrase “has received notice” is also inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. The Legislature could have drafted subdivision (c) to apply to those will proponents who receive notice of some post-hearing event, such as issuance of a probate order or letters of administration. It did not. The court explained that limiting the application of section 8226, subdivision (c) to those who receive notice under section 8110 will not, as Appellant argues, hinder the prompt administration of estates. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

by
When Frank died, Leslie, his daughter, was appointed as executor and personal representative of the estate, Independent Administration of Estates Act (Prob. Code, 10400). In his will, Frank confirmed his surviving spouse’s (Caroline’s) interest in their community and quasi-community property, and bequeathed all of his separate property, plus his one-half interest in their community and quasi-community property, to his three children, explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not their mother. Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the probate action a complaint for partition by sale of real property, claiming that Caroline improperly withdrew proceeds from a reverse mortgage and other allegedly fraudulent conduct. Caroline argued Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity.The probate court granted the motions to strike with leave to amend to give Leslie the opportunity to retain counsel. The court determined that Leslie’s complaint “primarily consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The court of appeal affirmed. Leslie’s complaint is a claim against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona; her conduct in filing briefs and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of law. View "Estate of Sanchez" on Justia Law

by
Defendant owned real property located at 3546 Multiview Drive in Los Angeles, California (the property). That year, he executed two deeds of trust against the property. Defendant obtained a HELOC from National City Bank, memorialized in an Equity Reserve Agreement and secured by a deed of trust against the property (collectively, the HELOC agreement). Piedmont Capital, L.L.C. (Piedmont)—a debt buyer—purchased the HELOC debt. Piedmont sued Defendant. Following a demurrer to the original complaint sustained with leave to amend, Piedmont filed the operative first amended complaint for (1) breach of contract, (2) money lent, (3) money had and received, and (4) declaratory relief. Although Piedmont alleged that the full amount of the HELOC debt Defendant owed totaled $186,587.26, Piedmont conceded that it was “not seeking to collect on any [amounts] that were already barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time [the] action was filed.”   The Second Appellate District reversed. At issue is whether the borrower’s duty to make a monthly payment under such a HELOC agreement indivisible from the borrower’s duty to pay the full amount such that the statute of limitations to recover the full amount begins to run upon the first missed monthly payment. The court held that the duties are divisible. The court explained that the HELOC agreement in this case—by setting a fixed maturity date for the full amount and leaving it to the discretion of the lender whether to accelerate that date—necessarily contemplates that a breach as to a monthly payment does not constitute a breach as to the full amount. View "Piedmont Capital Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish" on Justia Law

by
In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

by
In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

by
A trial court disapproved certain disbursements made by the trustee of a special needs trust, and it surcharged the trustee. The trustee appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the wrong standard for determining whether the disbursements were for the trust beneficiary’s special needs and disallowing expenditures as offsets for the surcharges. Because the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong definition of "special needs," the Court of Appeal remanded for the court to exercise its discretion under the proper standard. "In reaching this conclusion, however, we do not mean to be understood as holding that the trust instrument placed no limits on the types of distributions the trustee could make." View "McGee v. State Dept. of Health Care Services" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
The Settlor of a trust, who is both the trustor and trustee, sought to amend his trust. The trust document provides that to amend the trust, he must send the document by certified mail to the trustee. The Settlor failed to follow this procedure. Thus, the Second Appellate District held that the purported amendment did not conform to the terms of the trust, rendering the amendment invalid. As a result, the trust became revocable upon the Settlor's death. After his death, the Settlor's son found an amendment in a stamped envelope addressed to the Settlor's attorney.The Second Appellate District determined that the trust itself sets forth the terms under which modification is effective. Here, because the Settlor failed to follow the terms of the trust, the amendment was not valid. View "Diaz v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
In 2015, a conservatorship of the estate of Thomas Tedesco, a wealthy nonagenarian (Thomas), was created, and Thomas requested the appointment of respondent David Wilson, an independent professional fiduciary, as conservator of the estate. Thomas’s second wife, Gloria Tedesco (Gloria) was present at the hearing and stipulated on the record, through counsel, to Wilson’s appointment. Approximately six years later, on March 23, 2021, Gloria petitioned the probate court to vacate the order creating the conservatorship, along with all subsequent orders “emanating” from the conservatorship. The court denied the petition, and she appealed. Through a "myriad of disjointed arguments," Gloria challenged the probate court’s order striking her petition to vacate all the orders in this conservatorship, including the establishment of the conservatorship and appointment of Wilson as the conservator. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Conservatorship of Tedesco" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Kinney, an adjudicated vexatious litigant and disbarred former attorney, obtained leave to pursue an appeal from the final judgment in this probate proceeding. Leave was granted not because Kinney made the necessary threshold showing of merit and absence of intent to harass or delay under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, but because the vexatious litigant statute has no application to a party who files an appeal in a proceeding he did not initiate.Kinney appealed the Final Distribution and Allowance of Fees Order, apparently claiming that the probate court erred in approving the Special Administrator’s decision not to pay him his $1,000 statutory fee, cancellation of an agreement with a prior administrator of the estate to manage and perform various services relating to a house owned by the estate, and approval of a distribution of $329,684.82 out of the sales proceeds of that house to satisfy indebtedness pursuant to certain judgment liens against that property.The court of appeal affirmed, describing Kinney’s arguments as “incoherent” and a “hodgepodge.” On all but one of the issues presented, Kinney either has no standing to appeal or is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion; on the remaining claim of error, the probate court acted within its discretion. View "Estate of Kempton" on Justia Law

by
This case involves disputes over the disposition of assets. The assets at issue include monies and real and personal property assets held in trust pursuant to the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (“Original Trust Instrument”) as amended and restated in the 2013 Amendment and Restatement of the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Amended/Restated Trust” or “Trust”). Appellant was the deceased’s nephew, as well as his attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney (POA), executor under a pour-over, will, and successor Trustee under the Amended/Restated Trust. Appellant appealed from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court sitting in probate (the “probate court”), in connection with an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 brought by Respondents each of whom were beneficiaries under the Amended/Restated Trust.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the probate court’s disposition of the Subject Property in the subject order. The court explained that even had evidence existed to demonstrate that the deceased wanted Appellant to have the subject funds, the lack of any written document authorizing Appellant to deposit the monies into the joint account would be fatal to Appellant’s appeal concerning the subject funds. The court concluded Appellant’s deposit of the subject funds violated section 4264, subdivision (f) by effectuating a change in the designation of beneficiaries who would have otherwise shared in the entitlement to the subject funds. View "Pool-O'Connor v. Guadarrama" on Justia Law