Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Attorney William Salzwedel appealed a $96,077.14 judgment surcharging him for excessive attorney's/trustee's fees, medical expert fees, and costs incurred while acting as the temporary trustee of the Moore Family Trust. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the finding that the fees were unreasonable, and Salzwedel's trust accounting demonstrates that the fees and expenses were excessive. The court found that Salzwedel was repeatedly warned that he had a conflict of interest acting as trustee and as the attorney for a mentally impaired client in a conservatorship proceeding. He had never served as a trustee or been involved in a conservatorship before but perceived it as a license to zealously fight for Moore no matter what the cost. The court denied Salzwedel's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Friend v. Salzwedel" on Justia Law

Mary is the child of the marriage of Marion and Herbert Sanders. Marion executed a will in California, placing her separate property assets in the Trust and providing that Mary would receive the Trust income during her lifetime. Upon Mary’s death, the remainder of the Trust was to be distributed “for the benefit of the then living issue” of Mary. The will defined ‘’issue" as lawful lineal descendants of all degrees, including legally adopted children. If Mary had “no living issue” surviving, Jody was to become the income beneficiary of the Trust. In 2013, Mary adopted Andrew, the adult son of a close friend, and sought a declaration of Andrew's rights. The probate court concluded that Andrew did not fall within this definition of “issue” because he had been adopted as an adult under Texas adoption statutes. The probate court believed that a Texas parent-child relationship did not encompass the same rights and duties as a California parent-child relationship. The court of appeal reversed. California cannot devalue a parent-child relationship simply because it was created, whether by biology or adoption, in a sister state that imposes different rights and duties. Those policy choices do not alter the status of the relationship. View "Sanders v. Yanez" on Justia Law

Respondent-trustee Bonnie Katzenstein, representing the Feinberg Family Trust (dated October 30, 1984), filed a petition after Rober Feinberg had passed away. Mr. Feinberg was the cosettlor and former cotrustee of the Trust and the named insured in two life insurance policies. In the Petition, the Trustee sought: (1) a determination that the Trust is the beneficiary of, and therefore entitled to the proceeds from, one of the insurance policies; and (2) damages against Chabad of Poway (Chabad) for interfering with the payment of that policy's benefits to the Trust. Chabad responded by filing a document entitled "Claimant's Objection and Counter Claim [sic] to Petition filed by Trustee to Determine Ownership of Life Insurance Policy Proceeds" (Objection and Counterclaim). In an unsigned minute order following summary judgment proceedings initiated by Trustee, the court sua sponte struck Chabad's Objection and Counterclaim on the basis that the Code of Civil Procedure precluded a party from seeking affirmative relief in an answer. Chabad appealed. The Court of Appeal found that the unsigned minute order was not an appealable order under either the Code of Civil Procedure or the Probate Code. As such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Chabad's appeal, and dismissed it. View "Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are trustees under “Coogan Trust Accounts,” which are statutorily required accounts to preserve 15 percent of a minor’s gross earnings for artistic or creative services for the benefit of the minor until the minor turns 18 or is emancipated (Fam. Code, 6750.) They filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others against Bank of America, alleging breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unlawful and unfair business practices. The complaint claimed that the bank made withdrawals from Cogan Trust Accounts, including for monthly service fees, without court approval. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. A bank may not debit a Coogan Trust Account for service fees without court approval (section 6753 (b)). The state law prohibition on a debit by a national bank is not preempted by federal law. View "Phillips v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas W. Sefton, Jr. (Thomas Jr.) appealed a judgment awarding him $565,350, plus interest, from the estate of his grandfather, Joseph W. Sefton, Jr. (Grandfather). Grandfather died in 1966. In Grandfather's will, Grandfather created a testamentary trust for the benefit of his son, Thomas W. Sefton (Father), during Father's life. Upon Father's death, the Trust terminated and its assets were to be distributed. The probate court, interpreting the Court of Appeal's prior opinion in this matter, determined this sum to be the " 'substantial' share" of Grandfather's estate to which Thomas Jr. was entitled. Thomas Jr. argued the probate court misinterpreted "Sefton I" and therefore improperly limited his award from Grandfather's estate. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the probate court's interpretation of Sefton I, while reasonable, was in error. The " 'substantial' share" determined by the probate court was not the correct measure of Thomas Jr.'s award from Grandfather's estate under the facts of this case. In this opinion, the Court resolved the ambiguity from its earlier opinion and clarified the award to which Thomas Jr. is entitled. View "Sefton v. Sefton" on Justia Law

Amine Britel died intestate in 2011. Appellant Jackie Stennett, the mother of A.S., a child born out of wedlock, petitioned to administer Amine’s estate and for A.S. to be declared Amine’s heir. The court denied Jackie’s petitions. It granted the petition of respondent Mouna Britel (Amine’s adult sister) to administer Amine’s estate, which petition listed respondent Rhita Bhitel (Amine’s mother) as Amine’s surviving parent. The Court of Appeal affirmed the court's order, concluding that Probate Code section 6453(b)(2)’s phrase, “openly held out,” required the alleged father to have made an unconcealed affirmative representation of his paternity in open view. The Court also concluded substantial evidence supported the court’s finding Amine did not openly hold out A.S as his child. Further, the Court concluded section 6453(b)(2) did not violate the state or federal equal protection rights of nonmarital children or of nonmarital children who can prove paternity using DNA tests. View "Estate of Britel" on Justia Law

Paul retained attorney Patton to draft an amendment to his revocable living trust. Paul signed the “Trust Amendment,” which, as drafted by Patton, named his wife, Helen, and his children, Stephen, David, Alan, and Nancy, as beneficiaries. Stephen and David also are the successor trustees. Following Paul’s death, they petitioned the probate court to modify the Trust Amendment, alleging it failed to conform to Paul’s intentions by erroneously granting Helen an interest in brokerage accounts and personal and real property. In that probate court action, Patton admitted the Trust Amendment did not reflect Paul’s intention that his brokerage accounts and personal and real property be divided among his children. Stephen and David settled the probate court action with Helen. The children filed the legal malpractice action, alleging that Patton failed to exercise reasonable care in performing legal services by failing to draft the Trust Amendment in a manner consistent with the decedent’s intentions. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the children could not establish Patton owed them a duty as beneficiaries; they should be permitted to amend their complaint to allege such a duty. View "Paul v. Patton" on Justia Law

Pomianowski was 19 years old when she was in an automobile accident which left her a ventilator-dependent quadriplegic. She required total care in all aspects of daily living. A lawsuit filed against the County of Santa Cruz and Ford Motor Company, resulted in a settlement for $3,175,000.00. The court directed that the funds be deposited in a special needs trust (Probate Code sections 3600-3605). At age 23, Pomianowski died, with $1,294,453.23 left in the trust, which was ordered to reimburse the Department of Health Care Services for medical expenses paid on her behalf before her death. The trustee argued that the assets were exempt from reimbursement rights because the beneficiary was under 55 years of age when the services were provided. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the Department was entitled to reimbursement under both the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396a, and the statutes and regulations implementing Medicaid through California’s Medi-Cal program. The statutes and regulations do not exempt beneficiaries under age 55, nor is there a public policy reason to shield the trust assets from recovery so that $417, 812.43 spent by the public can pass to the beneficiary’s parents along with the rest of the trust assets. View "Herting v. Cal. Dep;t of Health Care Servs." on Justia Law

Daniel Ukkestad, co-trustee of the Larry Gene Mabee Revocable Trust, appealed a probate court order denying his petition to confirm that two parcels of real property are part of the Trust's assets. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the probate court erred in denying the petition, and accordingly reversed the probate court's order and remand with directions that the probate court enter an order granting the petition. View "Ukkestad v. RBS Asset Finance, Inc." on Justia Law

The objector is a beneficiary of the 2005 Brown Revocable Trust, which provided that upon Brown’s death, the objector would receive a house for the care of Brown’s cats. Brown’s conservator, Siegel, filed a probate court petition seeking approval of the sale of that specific property. Siegel contended the sale was necessary for the benefit of the settlor, Brown, who resided in assisted living, because the conservatorship estate lacked funds to maintain Brown’s care during her life. The trustee agreed. The probate court conducted an overbid for the property. Upon receiving a satisfactory bid, the court ordered the property sold. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the objector’s argument that the order granting the petition to sell the property violated Probate Code section 21402 regarding the abatement order for trust assets. The trust requires the trustee to apply trust principal to provide for Brown’s care. If the sale of assets becomes necessary, the trust expressly states that all remainder interests, which include the objector’s rights to the house, are secondary. The court noted the precarious nature of the trust estate and that work needed to repair the house and would cost over $225,572.33, although it is appraised at only $685,000. View "Siegel v. Fife" on Justia Law