Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Nick Martino (Decedent) died intestate, his stepson from a previous marriage, Nick Zambito, petitioned to be deemed an heir. Decedent’s biological children, Tracey Martino and Joseph Martino (together, Objectors), objected. After a bench trial, the probate court determined that Decedent was Zambito’s “natural parent” under Probate Code sections 6540 and 6453, which defined the “natural parent” and child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. The Court of Appeal concluded Zambito had standing to claim natural parentage heirship even though he was not the Decedent’s biological child. The Court further concluded that Probate Code section 6454, which provided a pathway for intestate succession by stepchildren and foster children, did not operate to foreclose other available statutory methods for a stepchild to establish a right to intestate succession. In the absence of any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the probate court’s factual findings under this theory, the Court concluded that Objectors failed to demonstrate any reversible error. View "Estate of Martino" on Justia Law

The parents, now deceased, established the Trust. Their daughter is the trustee. There are four other children. The Trust is a 70 percent shareholder of the Company. Each sibling owns an equal share of the remaining 30 percent. A Company shareholder agreement provides that any shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the company can take various actions in their “sole discretion,” including borrowing, lending, and transferring assets. The Trust's balance, after expenses and specific distributions, shall be distributed equally to five sub-trusts benefiting the five siblings. Among the Trust’s liabilities are outstanding loans made by the Company. Two siblings filed a petition to instruct the trustee, to take specified actions, including directing the Company to borrow substantial sums of money to pay estate taxes owed by the Trust. The Company responded to the Petition.The court held that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary, it lacked standing to participate in proceedings on the Petition. The court of appeal remanded, finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Probate Code section 1043(a), authorizes “interested persons” to respond or object at or before a hearing in a trust proceeding. The probate court must make the discretionary determination of whether the Company is an interested person. View "Colvis v. Binswanger" on Justia Law

Boesch and Hudson were unmarried partners. The 1994 Boesch Trust was funded with his 50 percent interest in each of the subject properties. The Hudson Trust was funded with Hudson’s 50 percent interest in each of those properties. Boesch died in 1995. Hudson died in 2019. Mulvihill is the successor trustee of both Trusts. The Museum is the sole residuary beneficiary of the Boesch Trust.Mulvihill filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition, seeking instructions due to “a potential conflict in administering the trust,” alleging the Museum requested that the acquisition indebtedness on the subject properties be paid off and that the Boesch Trust make an in-kind distribution of its interests to the Museum so that the Museum may, as a tax-exempt organization, sell the interests without suffering certain tax consequences. The Hudson Trust beneficiaries, which do not face the same tax consequences, prefer that the trusts sell the properties undivided and distribute the proceeds.The probate court instructed Mulvihill to sell the properties and distribute the proceeds. The court of appeal reversed, noting a trust provision granting the trustee “sole discretion” to distribute the trust property in cash or in kind. Because Mulvihill never purported to exercise that discretion, the court remanded with directions that, barring any conflict of interest matters that may arise, Mulvihill be instructed to exercise his discretion to grant or deny the Museum’s request for an in-kind distribution of the trust’s property interests. View "Stadel Art Museum v. Mulvihill" on Justia Law

Appellant is the only child of the late J.B. Appellant opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Appellant any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Appellant appealed. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the phrase “has received notice” is also inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. The Legislature could have drafted subdivision (c) to apply to those will proponents who receive notice of some post-hearing event, such as issuance of a probate order or letters of administration. It did not. The court explained that limiting the application of section 8226, subdivision (c) to those who receive notice under section 8110 will not, as Appellant argues, hinder the prompt administration of estates. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

When Frank died, Leslie, his daughter, was appointed as executor and personal representative of the estate, Independent Administration of Estates Act (Prob. Code, 10400). In his will, Frank confirmed his surviving spouse’s (Caroline’s) interest in their community and quasi-community property, and bequeathed all of his separate property, plus his one-half interest in their community and quasi-community property, to his three children, explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not their mother. Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the probate action a complaint for partition by sale of real property, claiming that Caroline improperly withdrew proceeds from a reverse mortgage and other allegedly fraudulent conduct. Caroline argued Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity.The probate court granted the motions to strike with leave to amend to give Leslie the opportunity to retain counsel. The court determined that Leslie’s complaint “primarily consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The court of appeal affirmed. Leslie’s complaint is a claim against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona; her conduct in filing briefs and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of law. View "Estate of Sanchez" on Justia Law

Defendant owned real property located at 3546 Multiview Drive in Los Angeles, California (the property). That year, he executed two deeds of trust against the property. Defendant obtained a HELOC from National City Bank, memorialized in an Equity Reserve Agreement and secured by a deed of trust against the property (collectively, the HELOC agreement). Piedmont Capital, L.L.C. (Piedmont)—a debt buyer—purchased the HELOC debt. Piedmont sued Defendant. Following a demurrer to the original complaint sustained with leave to amend, Piedmont filed the operative first amended complaint for (1) breach of contract, (2) money lent, (3) money had and received, and (4) declaratory relief. Although Piedmont alleged that the full amount of the HELOC debt Defendant owed totaled $186,587.26, Piedmont conceded that it was “not seeking to collect on any [amounts] that were already barred by the applicable statute of limitations at the time [the] action was filed.”   The Second Appellate District reversed. At issue is whether the borrower’s duty to make a monthly payment under such a HELOC agreement indivisible from the borrower’s duty to pay the full amount such that the statute of limitations to recover the full amount begins to run upon the first missed monthly payment. The court held that the duties are divisible. The court explained that the HELOC agreement in this case—by setting a fixed maturity date for the full amount and leaving it to the discretion of the lender whether to accelerate that date—necessarily contemplates that a breach as to a monthly payment does not constitute a breach as to the full amount. View "Piedmont Capital Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish" on Justia Law

In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

A trial court disapproved certain disbursements made by the trustee of a special needs trust, and it surcharged the trustee. The trustee appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the wrong standard for determining whether the disbursements were for the trust beneficiary’s special needs and disallowing expenditures as offsets for the surcharges. Because the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong definition of "special needs," the Court of Appeal remanded for the court to exercise its discretion under the proper standard. "In reaching this conclusion, however, we do not mean to be understood as holding that the trust instrument placed no limits on the types of distributions the trustee could make." View "McGee v. State Dept. of Health Care Services" on Justia Law

The Settlor of a trust, who is both the trustor and trustee, sought to amend his trust. The trust document provides that to amend the trust, he must send the document by certified mail to the trustee. The Settlor failed to follow this procedure. Thus, the Second Appellate District held that the purported amendment did not conform to the terms of the trust, rendering the amendment invalid. As a result, the trust became revocable upon the Settlor's death. After his death, the Settlor's son found an amendment in a stamped envelope addressed to the Settlor's attorney.The Second Appellate District determined that the trust itself sets forth the terms under which modification is effective. Here, because the Settlor failed to follow the terms of the trust, the amendment was not valid. View "Diaz v. Zuniga" on Justia Law