Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under Pub. Util. Code 1701(a)1, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC ) promulgated Rule 1.1, stating: Any person who . . . transacts business with the Commission . . . agrees . . . never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. After a massive 2010 explosion of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the PUC imposed reforms, including requiring that PG&E improve its recordkeeping and information technology capabilities. PG&E was directed to keep the PUC informed of any reported pipeline leaks and any discovered information regarding the safety of pipeline operations. Following discovery of a pipeline leak, PG&E also discovered that some information it had provided to the PUC concerning the internal pressure at which certain pipelines could be safely operated might not be correct. About seven months after internally verifying the information, PG&E, communicated to the PUC via a written “Errata”‖ to a previous filing. Following extensive hearings, the PUC deemed this filing both a substantive and a procedural violation and imposed civil penalties totaling $14,350,000. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the penalties were not grossly disproportional to the gravity of PG&E‘s tardiness. View "Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's applications to SCE to interconnect solar generating systems to the SCE electricity grid to generate electricity for use on plaintiff's properties and to sell to SCE. At issue is the potential conflict between Public Utilities Code section 1759,2 which limits jurisdiction to review an order of the PUC to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and section 2106, which grants jurisdiction to the superior court to hear actions for damages against a public utility that violates California law. The court concluded that the trial court correctly held that the PUC had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under its Supreme Court’s holding in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court because adjudication of plaintiff’s claims would “‘hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory and regulatory policies’” with respect to interconnection of solar generating facilities under Rule 21, Rule 16 and the California Renewable Energy Small Tariff (CREST) and Net Energy Metering (NEM) programs. To the extent plaintiff has viable damage claims following the PUC’s adjudication of his administrative complaints currently pending before the PUC, those claims will only become ripe for filing in the trial court once the PUC reaches a final decision. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. Southern Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

In 2005, former owners subdivided a Hayward lot into three residential lots. Alameda County approved a tentative map with a condition requiring connection to the District water system at the expense of the subdivider “in accordance with the requirements of said District.” A service assessment was prepared by the District, stating: “THIS IS NOT A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE WATER SERVICES.” An Approved Parcel Map was recorded, providing the District a utility easement in the form of a water main extension. Plaintiff purchased a lot in 2009; it did not yet have water service. The District provided an estimate that required a 15-foot-long easement beyond plaintiff’s lot line for installation and maintenance of the pipeline and blowoff assembly. The District rejected alterations requested by plaintiff because his layout would have made it impossible to reach his meter from the proposed water main at a right angle. Plaintiff sought to compel the District “to provide water service to Plaintiff consistent with the laws and regulations.” The trial court rejected his claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims under the Subdivision Map Act and stating that even if the District has granted waivers for other properties, there is nothing that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to deny plaintiff a waiver. View "Tarbet v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist." on Justia Law

Casitas is a publicly owned water utility in western Ventura County. Its territory includes Ojai. Most of Ojai receives water from Golden State, which charges rates that are more than double those charged by Casitas. After failed attempts to obtain relief from the Public Utilities Commission, residents formed Ojai FLOW, which, supported by Ojai's city council, petitioned Casitas to take over water service in Ojai. Casitas is subject to the Brown Act and the California Public Records Act, Under Proposition 218, Casitas's rates can be reduced by a majority of voters in its service area. Using the Mello-Roos Act (Gov. Code, 53311) to finance the transaction, placing the financial burden on Ojai residents rather than on its existing customers, Casitas formed a community facilities district; passed resolutions; and submitted the matter to voters. A special tax would be levied to pay for bonds. Golden State sought to invalidate Casitas's resolutions. The trial court stayed the case. At the single-issue special election that drew more than half of eligible voters, 87 percent of the electorate approved the measure. The trial court then rejected claims that the Mello-Roos Act cannot be used to finance eminent domain or the acquisition of intangible property rights and cannot be used by one service provider to supplant another. The court of appeal affirmed. The Act applies regardless of whether the seller consents to the sale or is compelled under force of law. Financing the acquisition of intangible property incidental to tangible property is consistent with the Act's purpose. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Casitas Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District under the Santa Clara County Water District Act, to prevent depletion of the acquifers from which Great Oaks extracts water. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, finding that: the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; it is also a charge for water service, and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; pre-suit claims submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D; and the court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The United Water Conservation District manages groundwater resources in central Ventura County. San Buenaventura (City) pumps groundwater from District territory and sells it to residential customers. The District collects a fee from groundwater pumpers, including the City, based on volume. The Water Code authorizes this fee (Wat. Code, 74508, 75522) and requires the District to set different rates for different uses. Groundwater extracted for non-agricultural purposes must be charged at three to five times the rate applicable to water used for agricultural purposes. The California Constitution (article XIIID) governs fees "upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property related service." The City claimed that the fees violate article XIII D because they "exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel[s]" from which the City pumps its water. The trial court found that the pumping charges violated article XIII D and ordered refunds. The court of appeal reversed: pumping fees are not property related taxes subject to the requirements of article XIII C. The charges are valid regulatory fees because they are fair and reasonable, and do not exceed the District's resource management costs. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conserv. Dist." on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

California voters adopted Proposition 13 in 1978 to require, among other constitutionally implemented tax relief measures, that any “special taxes” for cities, counties, and special districts be approved by two-thirds of voters. In 1996, voters adopted Proposition 218 with one of its aims being “to tighten the two-thirds voter approval requirement for „special taxes‟ and assessments imposed by Proposition 13.” To this end, Proposition 218 added article XIII C to require that new taxes imposed by a local government be subject to two-thirds vote by the electorate. Article XIII C was amended by the voters in 2010 when they passed Proposition 26. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Proposition 26 applied to a practice by the City of Redding of making an annual budget transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility to Redding's general fund. Because the Utility was municipally owned, it was not subject to a one percent ad valorem tax imposed on privately owned utilities in California. However, the amount transferred between the Utility's funds and the Redding general fund was designed to be equivalent to the ad valorem tax the Utility would have to pay if privately owned. Redding described the annual transfer as a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). The PILOT was not set by ordinance, but was part of the Redding biennial budget. Plaintiffs in this case (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, Michael Schmitz, Shirlyn Pappas, and Fee Fighter LLC) challenged the PILOT on grounds it constituted a tax for which article XIII C required approval by two-thirds of voters. Redding argued the PILOT was not a tax, and if it was, it was grandfathered-in because it precedesd the adoption of Proposition 26. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the PILOT was a tax under Proposition 26 for which Redding needed to secure two-thirds voter approval unless it proved the amount collected was necessary to cover the reasonable costs to the city to provide electric service. The Court rejected Redding's assertion the PILOT is grandfathered-in by preceding Proposition 26's adoption: "[t]he PILOT does not escape the purview of Proposition 26 because it is a long-standing practice." Because the trial court concluded the PILOT was reasonable as a matter of law, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which Redding would have the opportunity to prove the PILOT did not exceed reasonable costs under article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). View "Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding" on Justia Law

In 2010, a PG&E natural gas pipeline exploded in San Bruno, CA, causing death, great physical injuries, and extensive property damage. Governmental entities investigated the incident and PG&E’s business practices. The Public Utilities Commission retained an independent firm, Overland, to review PG&E’s gas transmission safety-related activities from a financial and regulatory audit prospective. Plaintiffs sued, seeking redress for PG&E’s alleged misappropriation of over $100 million in authorized rates that it should have used for safety-related projects. According to the complaint, PG&E misrepresented and concealed material facts when it used money collected from ratepayers to pay shareholders and provide bonuses to its executives instead of spending the money on infrastructure and safety measures. The complaint alleged that PG&E’s negligent handling of the pipe that exploded in San Bruno was unlawful and arose from PG&E’s corporate culture that valued profits over safety and that PG&E’s actions constituted an unlawful business practice under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. The superior court dismissed without leave to amend, finding the action barred by Public Utility Code section 1759 because it would interfere with the California Public Utilities Commission’s jurisdiction.” The appeals court affirmed.View "Guerrero v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law