Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

A charter city in California was required by state law to update its housing element—a component of its general plan addressing housing needs—by October 15, 2021. The city submitted a draft housing element to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which found the draft would comply with state law if adopted. However, the city refused to adopt the revised housing element, citing concerns about environmental impacts and the number of affordable housing units required. The city also filed a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Housing Element Law, which was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing.The People of California, represented by the Attorney General and the HCD, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Orange County Superior Court, later transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court, seeking to compel the city to adopt a compliant housing element. The Kennedy Commission, an affordable housing advocacy group, intervened. The trial court granted the State’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the city had a ministerial duty to adopt a compliant housing element, but the court’s order did not include a 120-day compliance deadline or provisional remedies limiting the city’s permitting and zoning authority, as requested by the State. The court also stayed further proceedings due to pending appeals and unresolved cross-petitions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Article 14 of Chapter 3 of Division 1 of Title 7 of the Government Code, which includes the 120-day compliance deadline and provisional remedies, applies to enforcement actions against charter cities. The court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order and issue a new order including the required compliance deadline and provisional remedies, and to lift its stay and expeditiously resolve remaining issues. The court declined to order entry of final judgment while other pleadings remained unresolved. View "Kennedy Commission v. Superior. Ct." on Justia Law

Several general law cities in California challenged the constitutionality of a state law, Senate Bill No. 9 (SB 9), which requires local agencies to ministerially approve two-unit housing projects and urban lot splits in single-family residential zones. The cities argued that SB 9 usurps their authority over local land use and zoning, imposes a uniform approach that disregards local needs and conditions, and is not reasonably related to its stated goal of ensuring access to affordable housing, as it does not mandate affordability for new units.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the cities’ complaint and the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and demurrer. The trial court concluded that, as general law cities, the plaintiffs could not invoke the municipal affairs doctrine under article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, which provides certain protections only to charter cities. The court also found that the cities failed to identify any constitutional provision that SB 9 violated and determined there was no reasonable likelihood that the complaint could be amended to state a viable cause of action. Judgment was entered in favor of the state, and the cities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that general law cities are not protected by the municipal affairs doctrine and must yield to conflicting state law. The court further found that the cities did not identify a constitutional right that SB 9 violated and failed to show that the statute was unconstitutional on its face or as applied. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint, as no viable claim could be stated. View "City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State" on Justia Law

Arron and Arthur Benedetti, along with the Estate of Willie Benedetti, challenged a provision in Marin County’s amended local coastal program (LCP) that allows owners of certain farmland to build additional residential units only if they record a restrictive covenant. This covenant requires the owner of the new units to be actively and directly engaged in agriculture, either through direct involvement in commercial agriculture or by leasing the property to a commercial agricultural producer. The Benedettis, who inherited farmland and sought to build a second residence, argued that this provision was facially unconstitutional, claiming it violated the nexus and proportionality requirements established in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, and infringed upon their substantive due process rights by compelling them to work in a specific occupation.The Marin County Superior Court initially ruled that the Benedettis could not bring a facial takings challenge under Nollan/Dolan and, applying rational basis review, denied their petition and complaint based on their due process theory. The trial court sustained a demurrer to one cause of action and denied relief on the others, leading to the Benedettis’ appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Benedettis could raise a facial Nollan/Dolan claim. However, the court found that the restrictive covenant requirement had a sufficient nexus and rough proportionality to the county’s interest in preserving agricultural land and did not violate substantive due process. The court applied rational basis review and determined the provision was reasonably related to a legitimate legislative goal. The judgment of the Marin County Superior Court was affirmed. View "Benedetti v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The case concerns an agreement between the City of Fairfield and the Solano Irrigation District, initiated at the request of Solano County, to treat raw water for a new mixed-use development in Middle Green Valley, an unincorporated area outside Fairfield’s city limits. Under the agreement, the City would treat water supplied by the District and return it as potable water, while the District would handle distribution, operations, maintenance, and billing. The development, approved by the County, includes residential units and preserves a significant portion of land for agriculture and open space. The City asserted that providing such water treatment services outside its boundaries was consistent with its practices and rights.After the City Council approved the agreement, the Solano County Orderly Growth Committee filed a petition in the Solano County Superior Court, arguing that the agreement violated the City’s 2002 General Plan and California’s Planning and Zoning Law by providing municipal services for development outside the city’s urban limit line. The Superior Court granted the petition, finding the agreement inconsistent with the General Plan and invalidating it.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether state law required the agreement to be consistent with the City’s General Plan and, if so, whether the City’s determination of consistency was reasonable. The appellate court held that California law does not require such agreements to be consistent with a city’s general plan unless specifically mandated by statute, which was not the case here. Even assuming a consistency requirement, the court found the City’s determination that the agreement was consistent with its General Plan to be reasonable. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, thereby upholding the agreement. View "Solano County Orderly Growth Committee v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

A plaintiff sought to build a single-family home on his residential parcel in El Dorado County, California. The county required him to pay a $23,420 traffic impact mitigation (TIM) fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. The plaintiff paid the fee under protest and subsequently filed a lawsuit challenging the fee as an unlawful taking of property under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.The Superior Court of El Dorado County dismissed the plaintiff’s federal takings claim without leave to amend and denied his petition for a writ of mandate. The plaintiff appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, relying on established California law that the Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to legislatively imposed impact fees. The California Supreme Court denied review.The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Nollan/Dolan test applies to both legislative and administrative land-use exactions. The Supreme Court vacated the California Court of Appeal’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.On remand, the California Court of Appeal applied the Nollan/Dolan test to the TIM fee. The court concluded that the fee had an essential nexus to the county’s legitimate interest in reducing traffic congestion from new development. Additionally, the court found that the fee was roughly proportional to the traffic impacts attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development. The court held that the TIM fee did not constitute an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment and affirmed the judgment. View "Sheetz v. County of El Dorado" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

The case involves the County of San Diego's adoption of thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to streamline the evaluation of transportation-related environmental effects for land-use development projects. The County adopted two specific thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating fewer than 110 automobile trips per day. Plaintiffs, two environmental groups, challenged these thresholds, arguing they were not supported by substantial evidence and did not comply with CEQA requirements.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, finding that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and that the small project threshold was justified by substantial evidence, as it aligned with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions that infill development would generally result in insignificant vehicle miles traveled (VMT) impacts. The court found that the County failed to provide evidence showing that development in designated infill areas would typically generate VMT below the County average.Similarly, the court found that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support. The County had adopted OPR's recommendation without providing evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would have a less-than-significant transportation impact in San Diego County.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for writ of mandate, requiring the County to comply with CEQA by providing substantial evidence to support the adopted thresholds. View "Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law