Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 4.75-acre Laurel Way site is in a hillside canyon, is steeply sloped, and contains a private, dead end street that is only partially paved. Redwood City divided its proposed development into a first phase, involving paving the roadway, installing utilities and sewer connections, landscaping, and drainage infrastructure, and a second phase, involving the construction of residences on the lots. The second phase is not to commence until the first phase is complete and approved. In 2006, the developer sought a planned development permit (PDP). The city held several workshops and public meetings then circulated a draft environmental impact report (EIR). In 2010, the planning commission certified a final EIR, adopting findings for mitigation measures, including a mitigation monitoring program. In 2013, the commission approved the PDP for the infrastructure improvements with 63 conditions. The approved project contemplates up to 16 new houses; there are two existing houses. The appeals court reinstated the PDP approval. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to evaluate the legal status of the 18 lots under the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code 66410). The PDP does not cover the development of individual lots, so issues regarding the legal status of the individual lots under the SMA are not ripe for judicial review. View "Save Laurel Way v. City of Redwood City" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate regarding their efforts to place a referendum on the ballot concerning a resolution passed by the City of San Bruno, approving the sale of real property, the former U.S. Navy facility, to a hotel developer. There has been previous redevelopment of the site and the hotel property is only one-and-one-half acres. The trial court held that the subject resolution constituted an administrative act and was therefore not subject to referendum. The court of appeal affirmed. The city is not acquiring land for any municipal purpose, and is not appropriating any of its own funds in connection with the real estate transaction; it sold land to a private developer for a profit and is not providing any subsidy to the developer. The property will not house any municipal buildings or be used to serve any municipal function. The sale simply implements prior legislative acts, amendments to the city’s Specific Plan to permit the development of the property. View "San Bruno Committee for Economic Justice v. City of San Bruno" on Justia Law

South San Francisco approved a conditional-use permit allowing an office building to be converted to a medical clinic for use by Planned Parenthood Mar Monte. The city determined that its consideration of the permit was categorically exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000 (CEQA). Respect Life challenged the determination. The trial court and court of appeal upheld the determination, rejecting arguments that the permit’s consideration is not exempt from CEQA because the unusual circumstances exception to CEQA’s categorical exemptions applies. By pointing only to evidence that the permit will lead to protests, Respect Life failed to establish that the city prejudicially abused its discretion by making an implied determination that there are no unusual circumstances justifying further CEQA review. View "Respect Life South San Francisco v. City of South San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Attards own an undeveloped 5-acre parcel in unincorporated Contra Costa County (Fish Ranch Road) on the north side of Highway 24, near the east portal of the Caldecott Tunnel, approximately one mile west of Orinda. The property is designated open space in the county’s general plan, its zoning allows the construction of one single family home. They also own two parcels constituting the 3-acre Old Tunnel Road property near the tunnel's east portal, on the opposite side of Highway 24. The chief barrier to the development of the properties was sewage treatment. In 2005, the Attards contracted with the state Department of Transportation, agreeing to reconstruct the tunnel’s sewage disposal system and pay for upkeep, in return for the right to connect the properties. The tunnel then had a single restroom, served by a septic system. Although they failed to obtain the necessary regulatory approvals, the county issued a permit for construction of an 8400-square-foot home. Before the county discovered its error and notified the Attards, they made substantial progress toward installing a foundation. The county revoked the permits. The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of their petition for mandamus, rejecting claims of vested rights and equitable estoppel; that the Attards were exempt from local regulatory authority because of sovereign immunity; and that they were denied due process by the evident bias of one Board member. View "Attard v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

In 2010, Omni, the landowner and developer, sought approval for construction of a shopping center on 11 acres of property zoned commercial, to consist of 10 retail buildings. Monterey County approved the project. An association of community members challenged the approval under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000 (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition as to the claimed CEQA violations but ordered an interlocutory remand to allow the county to clarify whether the project was consistent with the county’s general plan requirement that the project have a long-term, sustainable water supply. On remand, the Board of Supervisors clarified that the project “has a long-term sustainable water supply, both in quality and quantity to serve the development in accordance with the 2010 Monterey County General Plan Policies. The court entered judgment in favor of the county and Omni. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims that the county violated the association’s right to procedural due process on interlocutory remand and violated CEQA because the water supply analysis was inadequate, the analysis of the project’s consistency with the general plan was inadequate, the environmental impact report’s traffic analysis was inadequate, and environmental review of Omni’s project was improperly segmented. View "Highway 68 Coalition v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Litigation under the Public Records Act (PRA) (Gov. Code, sec. 6250 et seq.) is one of the rare instances where a losing party may still be deemed a prevailing party entitled to an attorney fee award. Ponani Sukumar appeals an order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City of San Diego (City). Sukumar owns a home in San Diego (the Property). In about 1992, Sukumar's neighbors began complaining to the City about Sukumar's use of the Property. These complaints mostly involved parking issues and noise. In 2006 the City ordered Sukumar to take "immediate action to correct" municipal code violations occurring on the Property that constituted "a public nuisance." However, the City decided to not pursue the matter absent additional neighbor complaints. In 2015, Sukumar's attorney delivered a request to the City for "production of documents and information" under the PRA. The request sought 54 separate categories of documents, all relating to any neighbor's complaints about Sukumar. Twenty-four days after the request, the City wrote to Sukumar's attorney, stating that some potentially responsive documents were exempt from disclosure, and responsive, nonexempt records would be made available for Sukumar's review. Sukumar's attorney remained unconvinced that the City had produced all documents responsive to its request, and sought a writ of mandate or used other mechanisms to compel the documents' production. Though every time the City offered to certify it produced "everything," it would release additional documents. The trial court ultimately denied Sukumar's writ petition, finding that by 2016, the City had "in some fashion" produced all responsive documents. After stating Sukumar's writ petition was "moot" because all responsive documents had now been produced, the court stated, "Now, you might argue that you're the prevailing party, because the City didn't comply until after the lawsuit was filed. That's another issue." Asserting the litigation "motivated productions of a substantial amount of responsive public documents, even after the City represented to this [c]ourt there was nothing left to produce," Sukumar sought $93,695 in fees (plus $5,390 incurred in preparing the fee motion). Sukumar appealed the order denying his motion for prevailing party attorney fees against the City. The Court of Appeal reversed because the undisputed evidence established the City produced, among other things, five photographs of Sukumar's property and 146 pages of e-mails directly as a result of court-ordered depositions in this litigation. The Court remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees to which Sukumar is entitled. View "Sukumar v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Before appellants purchased Martins Beach, the public was permitted to access the coast by driving down Martins Beach Road and parking along the coast, usually upon payment of a fee. Because it is sheltered by high cliffs, Martins Beach lacks lateral land access. In 2008, appellants purchased Martins Beach and adjacent land including Martins Beach Road. A year or two later, appellants closed the only public access to the coast at that site. Surfrider, a non-profit organization dedicated to the preservation of access for recreation, brought suit. The trial court held the California Coastal Act (Pub. Res. Code, 30000–30900) applied and the appellants were required to apply for a coastal development permit (CDP) before closing public access. The court issued an injunction that requires appellants to allow public coastal access at the same level that existed when appellants bought the Martins Beach property. The court of appeal affirmed. Appellants‘ conduct is “development” requiring a CDP under section 30106 of the Coastal Act. Appellants‘ constitutional challenge to the Coastal Act‘s permitting requirement under the state and federal takings clauses is not ripe, The injunction is not a per se taking. The court affirmed an award of attorney fees to Surfrider. View "Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The Park and Malibu Bay petitioned the trial court to have Measure R, an initiative designed to limit large developments and chain establishments, declared invalid. The trial court granted the petition and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal held that Measure R exceeds the initiative power because it invalidly annuls or delays executive or administrative conduct. The court also held that Measure R's conditional use permit (CUP) is illegal because it conditions the CUP on the character of the permittee or applicant rather than on the use of the land. The court declined to sever the invalid portions of Measure R and affirmed the judgment. View "The Park at Cross Creek v. City of Malibu" on Justia Law

Grist Creek owns property in Mendocino County on which it has aggregate and asphalt processing operations. The County Air Quality Management District approved a permit to construct a “Crumb Rubber Heating and Blending Unit” for the production of rubberized asphalt, on the property. The District Hearing Board’s four members who considered an appeal split evenly on their vote; the Board stated no further action would be taken, leaving the permit in place. Oponents filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate, claiming that Grist Creek should have conducted an environmental review and that the District and Hearing Board violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code, 21000) and District regulations by failing to require one. The trial court dismissed the action against the Board with leave to amend, finding the tie vote was not a decision, so there was nothing to review. The court of appeals reversed. The Board’s tie vote, in this context, resulted in the denial of the administrative appeal, subject to judicial review. View "Grist Creek Aggregates, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The vacant Morgan Hill parcel was designated, in the general plan, as “Industrial” until the city amended the plan to change its designation to “Commercial.” Its zoning was “ML-Light Industrial” before the amendment. Later, the city council changed the parcel’s zoning to “CG-General Commercial,” which would permit a hotel. The Coalition submitted a referendum petition challenging the rezoning to prevent the development of a hotel. The city adopted a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum, but later “discontinue[d] processing,” believing that the referendum would enact zoning inconsistent with its general plan. The city recognized that it could, alternatively, change the parcel’s zoning to “Highway Commercial” and be consistent with the plan’s designation. Months later, the city called for a special election to submit the referendum to the voters but also authorized the filing of an action to have it removed from the ballot. The court ordered the referendum removed from the ballot and the rezoning certified as effective. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a referendum petition challenging an ordinance that attempts to make the zoning for a parcel consistent with the parcel’s general plan designation is not invalid if the legislative body remains free to select another consistent zoning should the referendum result in the rejection of the legislative body’s first choice of consistent zoning. View "City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey" on Justia Law