Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaza de Panama Committee (the Committee) appealed the denial of its motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Committee filed the motion after it successfully appealed a judgment granting a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO), in which SOHO challenged the approval by the City of San Diego (City) of a site development permit for a revitalization project in Balboa Park (the project). This appeal presented two related issues for the Court of Appeal’s review: whether the Committee, as a project proponent, could obtain a section 1021.5 attorney fees award and, if so, whether the court could impose such an award against SOHO. After review, the Court concluded a project proponent may obtain a section 1021.5 attorney fees award if the project proponent satisfies the award's requirements. Furthermore, the Court concluded while SOHO did not dispute the Committee satisfied the award's requirements, SOHO was not the type of party against whom the court may impose such an award because SOHO did nothing to compromise public rights. The Court, therefore, affirmed the order. View "Save Our Heritage Org. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Until 2000, Sonoma County grape growers could plant or replant a vineyard “as a matter of right” without governmental approval. A 2000 ordinance, governing “grading, drainage improvement, and vineyard and orchard site development within the unincorporated area of the county” requires growers, other than hobbyists, to obtain an erosion-control permit from the Agricultural Commissioner before establishing or replanting a vineyard. An applicant must submit plans demonstrating compliance with certain directives and must accept certain ongoing agricultural practices. The Commissioner issued the Ohlsons a permit to establish a vineyard on land they own that was being used for grazing, finding that issuing the permit was a ministerial act, exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000 (CEQA). The trial court agreed. The court of appeal affirmed. Although the ordinance may allow the Commissioner to exercise discretion when issuing erosion-control permits in some circumstances, the objectors did not show that the Commissioner improperly determined that issuing the Ohlsons’ permit was ministerial. Most of the ordinance’s provisions that potentially confer discretion did not apply to their project, and the objectors failed to show that the few that might apply conferred the ability to mitigate potential environmental impacts to any meaningful degree. View "Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of San Diego (City) obtained a Site Development Permit (SDP) to construct a new lifeguard station on Mission Beach. The SDP stated that failure to utilize the permit within 36 months of its issuance would automatically void the permit. Over the ensuing years, the City worked to secure a permit from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) and to obtain funding for the project. Largely because of the economic downtown, the City struggled to find financing for the project and no construction occurred until 2015. At that time, the City notified nearby residents that its contractor would begin construction in March. The City issued building permits in April and its contractor began initial work on the project, then stopped before the summer moratorium on beach construction. In August 2015, before the end of the moratorium, Citizens for Beach Rights (Citizens) brought a petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory relief seeking to halt construction on the grounds that the SDP issued in 2006 had expired. The trial court agreed with Citizens and issued a permanent injunction, preventing further construction without a new SDP. The City appealed, arguing Citizens' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or the doctrine of laches and, even if the action was not time barred, the SDP remained valid in 2015 under the City's municipal code and policies. The City also argued Citizens improperly sought declaratory relief. After review, the Court of Appeal held Citizens' action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and, even if Citizens' claims had been timely pursued, the SDP remained valid when construction began. View "Citizens for Beach Rights v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This case involved the interpretation, and application of Water Code section 51200 and articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution, as approved by California voters in 1996 as Proposition 218, and the interplay between them. Defendants and cross-complainants Reclamation District No. 17 and Governing Board of Reclamation District 17 (collectively "Reclamation") maintained levees and other reclamation works within the district’s boundaries. Plaintiff and cross-defendant Manteca Unified School District (School) owned real property within Reclamation’s boundaries. School filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing section 51200 exempted it from paying assessments to Reclamation and Proposition 218 did not confer such authority. School also sought recovery of over $299,000 previously collected by Reclamation. Reclamation answered and cross-complained for declaratory relief. The trial court found the assessments levied by Reclamation were invalid under section 51200 but denied recovery of assessment payments made during the pendency of the action and concluded School’s action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Reclamation appealed, arguing section 51200 and Proposition 218 allowed assessments against school district property unless the district could show through clear and convincing evidence that the property received no special benefit. School cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying recovery for assessments paid during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in declining to apply the constitutional mandate of Proposition 218 to the statutory exemption from assessments provided by section 51200. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal. View "Manteca Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reclamation Dist. No. 17" on Justia Law

Santa Cruz County adopted three ordinances that extended minor exceptions to zoning site standards; altered certain height, density, and parking requirements for hotels in commercial districts; and established an administrative process for approving minor exceptions to the sign ordinance. Aptos argued that the county engaged in piecemeal environmental review in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) when it considered the ordinances separately and failed to act in the manner prescribed by CEQA when it approved a negative declaration for the ordinance altering height, density, and parking requirements for hotels in commercial districts, because it failed to consider the environmental impacts that may ensue from future hotel developments. The court of appeal rejected those arguments. Although the county is in the process of modernizing some of its zoning regulations, this modernization process does not constitute a single project under CEQA. The court upheld the negative declaration for the hotel ordinance as adequate. The county should consider the potential environmental impacts resulting from reasonably foreseeable future development resulting from the ordinance. Future hotel developments, however, were wholly speculative at the time the negative declaration was adopted. View "Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Residents Against Specific Plan 380 appealed the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the County of Riverside’s (County) to approve development of a master-planned community put forward as Specific Plan 380 by real party in interest, Hanna Marital Trust. The County commissioned an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) on the project, which determined all potentially significant environmental impacts except noise and air quality impacts would have been reduced below the level of significance after mitigation. The final EIR responded to public comments on a draft EIR requesting further mitigation before the County approved the project. The Riverside County Board of Supervisors requested modifications of the plan before approving it and determined the changes did not require revision and recirculation of the EIR. After the revisions were codified, the Board of Supervisors certified the final EIR and approved the plan. The County then posted a public notice of its determination which included a description of the project containing errors about certain project details. Appellant sought a writ of mandate asserting the County failed to comply with procedural, informational, and substantive provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition in its entirety and entered judgment in favor of the County and the Hanna Marital Trust. On appeal, appellant argued the County: (1) substantially modified the project after approving it; (2) approved the project without concurrently adopting findings, a statement of overriding consideration, and a mitigation plan; (3) failed to recirculate the final EIR after modifying the project; (4) certified the final EIR despite inadequately analyzing the impacts of the development of the mixed use planning area; (5) issued an erroneous and misleading notice of determination after approving the project; and (6) failed to adopt all feasible mitigation alternatives proposed in comments on the draft EIR. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Residents Against Specific Plan 380 v. Co. of Riverside" on Justia Law

The Townhouse Motel in Crescent City first became a subject of code enforcement efforts in 2006. Until 2013, the city repeatedly ordered Reddy to abate dangerous conditions. In 2013, following an inspection, the city issued a Notice and Order to Repair or Abate listing 76 building code violations and other illegal conditions and ordering Reddy to rehabilitate the property within 30 days. A subsequent inspection found that Reddy had not made the required repairs. The city filed suit. The court entered a stipulated judgment requiring Reddy to upgrade the property within six months and to cease renting rooms to the same occupant for more than 30 days. Nearly a year later, the city inspected and found little or no improvement. The inspectors concluded that “conditions on the [property] pose a substantial danger to the life, limb, health, and safety of the occupants of the motel, the residents of the surrounding community, and the public in general.” In October 2014, the city successfully moved for the appointment of a receiver to oversee the property’s rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in overruling Reddy’s objections to the city’s evidentiary submissions and in failing to take live testimony. View "City of Crescent City v. Reddy" on Justia Law

Government Code section 53094(b) authorizes “the governing board of a school district” to “render a city or county zoning ordinance inapplicable to a proposed use of property by the school district,” under certain circumstances. The Santa Clara County Board of Education approved a resolution exempting from local zoning ordinances property to be used by Rocketship Education for a charter school. The San Jose Unified School District argued that county boards of education have no authority to issue section 53094 zoning exemptions and successfully sought a writ of mandate to set aside the resolution. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that section 53094 does not authorize county boards of education to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools. Empowering county boards to issue zoning exemptions for charter schools would not advance the purpose of section 53094—preventing local interference with the state’s sovereign activities. While county boards are authorized to issue charters and oversee charter schools, local school districts are obligated to provide facilities to charter schools. (Educ. Code, 47614(b).) The state has not tasked county boards with acquiring sites for charter schools; to the extent they do so, they are not carrying out a sovereign activity on behalf of the state. View "San Jose Unified School District v. Santa Clara County Office of Education" on Justia Law

In "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court," (1 Cal.5th 151 (Property Reserve I- 2016)), the California Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision and remanded the matter for the appellate court to consider issues not addressed. The Department of Water Resources petitioned the trial court for orders authorizing it to enter onto various properties to conduct precondemnation studies and surveys. Before the trial court convened a hearing on the matter, the landowners requested to conduct discovery. The trial court denied the request, ruling the proceeding was exempt from discovery. The landowners also objected to the Department not naming allegedly indispensable parties. The trial court held the rules governing indispensable parties did not apply to this matter, but it ordered the parties to notify all the persons and entities the landowners claimed were indispensable parties. The landowners both petitioned for writ relief against, and appealed the trial court’s award of an entry order, challenging the constitutionality of the precondemnation entry statutes and attacking the court’s decisions to deny discovery and not order the joinder of indispensable parties. "Property Reserve I" resolved the constitutional issues, but the high court directed the Court of Appeal to address the landowners’ claims against the trial court’s rulings on discovery and indispensable parties. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in holding the proceeding was exempt from discovery, but the Court also found the landowners did not show prejudicial error. The Court also concluded the landowners’ contention regarding indispensable parties was moot, because the trial court gave the landowners all of the relief they sought and which the Court could have provided. View "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law