Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The proposed construction includes a 488,000-square-foot arena for the Golden State Warriors basketball team and other events, plus two 11-story office and retail buildings, parking, and 3.2 acres of open space, on 11 acres in San Francisco’s Mission Bay South redevelopment plan area. The site is an underutilized industrial area. Planning for the area began decades ago. A 1998 environmental impact report (EIR) incorporated information from a 1990 EIR. In 2015, the Governor certified the current project as an “environmental leadership development project” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), requiring expedited review. The 2015 EIR was tiered to the 1998 FSEIR. The lead agency found that the project would have significant, unavoidable effects on the environment, adopted a statement of overriding considerations, and authorized implementation of a “mitigation monitoring and reporting program.” The city rejected a challenge by citizens’ groups, approved certification of the EIR, adopted the CEQA findings, and approved the project. The court of appeal affirmed. Although some analysis of potential environmental impacts might have been expanded, the record generally reflects a thorough study of all environmental impacts to be anticipated that were not considered in the 1998 report and identifies mitigation measures to lessen adverse impacts to the extent feasible. View "Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment & Infrastructure" on Justia Law

Brookside filed suit against the City alleging that the City Council's actions in proposing and advocating repeal of a 1990 ordinance - that prohibited the El Monte City Council from passing any form of mobilehome park rent control - violated an express prohibition of such activity in that ordinance. The superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the City. The court rejected Brookside's arguments concerning the scope of the prohibitory language in the 1990 ordinance and arguments that the City Council’s actions violated the California Constitution’s implicit withholding of authority for a local government to propose initiative measures that amend or repeal earlier voter-approved ordinances. View "Brookside Investments v. City of El Monte" on Justia Law

Real-Party-in-Interest Encore McKinley Village, LLC (Encore) proposed to construct the McKinley Village Project (the Project). The City of Sacramento certified the Project’s environmental impact report (EIR) and approved the Project. East Sacramento Partnership for a Livable City (ESPLC), a neighborhood group, appeals from denial of its petition for a writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to set aside the City’s approval of the Project. ESPLC contended the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved the Project because: (1) the Project description is defective; (2) there was illegal piecemealing; (3) the EIR failed to analyze significant health risks; (4) the EIR ignored significant traffic impacts; and (5) the EIR failed to disclose or mitigate methane migration. Further, ESPLC contends the Project was inconsistent with the City’s general plan. After review, the Court of Appeals found merit in only the fourth contention. ESPLC challenged the threshold of significance used in the EIR to determine whether traffic impacts were significant; the City relied on policies in its general plan that permitted congested traffic conditions within the core area of the City, thus finding no significant impact of congested traffic on neighborhood streets. The Court held that compliance with a general plan policy did not conclusively establish there was no significant environmental impact, and the City failed to explain why it found none in this circumstance. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for the City to correct this deficiency in the EIR. View "East Sacramento Partnership v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

The City proposed to finance road improvement projects through a public benefit corporation and pay the debt from revenues held in special funds, and filed an action seeking validation of this finance plan under Government Code section 53511 and Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq. West Park opposed the plan and challenged the trial court's judgment validating the City's proposed plan. The court concluded that the City’s finance plan does not violate the California Constitution’s debt limitation where a reasonable nexus exists between the revenues and the projects that will be financed by those revenues. The court concluded, however, that the City cannot pledge gas tax revenues to make the installment payments. In this case, the City's gas tax revenues will be used to pay non-voter approved bonds. This is an impermissible use of these funds. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the portion of the judgment validating the use of the state gas tax revenues and affirmed as to the remainder of the judgment. View "City of Bakersfield v. West Park Home Owners Ass'n & Friends" on Justia Law

The Outdoor Advertising Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, 5200 et seq., regulates advertising displays adjacent to interstate or primary highways in California. Plaintiffs obtained an outdoor advertising permit from Caltrans and began leasing out a billboard for general commercial advertising. The primary issue on appeal is whether section 5270 precludes application of county or city billboard ordinances with respect to a billboard that was placed in an area that was unincorporated at the time of its placement. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that in light of the entire statutory scheme, section 5270 does not preempt county- or city-enacted limitations on billboards in unincorporated areas that are stricter than the limitations set forth in the Act. The court also concluded that the trial court correctly found the billboard at issue was illegal because it was not lawfully erected in 1987 under the Los Angeles County Code, and therefore is prohibited under the Santa Clarita Municipal Code; plaintiffs failed to raise a disputed issue of fact regarding estoppel or laches; and the award of attorney fees was allowed under the statutes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the City. View "D'Egidio v. City of Santa Clarita" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

In 2013, City of Los Angeles planning officials approved Kalnel’s proposed project to tear down a two-story, three-unit apartment building in the Venice area. After the City decided to halt the project, Kalnel petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate seeking to overturn the City's decision. The trial court denied the petition and Kalnel appealed. The court dismissed the appeal in part as to Kalnel's cause of action based on the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Gov. Code, 65590, because Kalnel did not seek appellate review by way of a writ petition as required by that statute. The court affirmed as to the remaining causes of action because there is substantial evidence that the proposed project violated the visual and scenic elements requirement of the California Coastal Act, Pub. Resources Code, 30000, et seq., and because the Coastal Act takes precedence over statutes awarding density and height increase bonuses for proposed residential developments that include affordable housing units. View "Kalnel Gardens v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Croft appealed the superior court's order denying their petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to return fees it collected when Croft applied for building permits. As an initial matter, the court concluded that Croft's facial challenge is time barred pursuant to Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B)-(C) where Croft raised its challenge more than 90 days after the City enacted the Ordinance and adopted the fee schedule. The court also concluded that Croft’s as-applied challenge improperly places the burden on the City and incorrectly states how the fee must be reasonable. In this case, the reasonableness test applies to the creation of the fee schedule, not its application. Croft mischaracterizes the nature of the reasonableness inquiry and does not present evidence relating to the correct inquiry; even if it had, the claim related to such an inquiry would be facial and time barred. Finally, the court concluded that the City correctly calculated the parks and recreation fee; Croft abandoned its traffic fees claim on appeal; and the City collected the fees at an appropriate time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood" on Justia Law