Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant People for Proper Planning (PFPP) appealed the denial of its petition for peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed against defendants-respondents City of Palm Springs and Palm Springs City Council (collectively referred to as City). In its petition, PFPP challenged the City’s adoption of Resolution No. 23415, which approved an Amendment to the City’s General Plan removing the minimum density requirements for each residential development. The trial court denied PFPP’s challenge, contending that the Amendment: (1) was not exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it was not a minor land use alteration; (2) was inconsistent with the General Plan such that it now makes the General Plan internally inconsistent; and (3) violated statutory requirements that the City accommodate its fair share of regional housing needs for all income levels, including low and very low income levels. The Court of Appeal determined the Amendment was not exempted from CEQA requirements, and thus, reversed the judgment. In light of this determination, the Court did not address the other issues raised by PFPP. View "People for Proper Planning v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

This appeal was one of six related cases arising out of a proposed project to pump fresh groundwater from an underground aquifer in the Mojave Desert (the Project). The aquifer was located below real property owned by Cadiz, Inc. In this case, the Center for Biological Diversity, San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, and Sierra Club, San Gorgonio Chapter (collectively, CBD), and the National Parks Conservation Association (National Parks) filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court, challenging the approval of the Project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The named respondents were the Santa Margarita Water District (as the lead agency for the Project); the Board of Directors of the Santa Margarita Water District; the County of San Bernardino, a responsible agency for the Project (the County); and the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Bernardino. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, appellants contended: (1) Santa Margarita was improperly designated as the lead agency for the Project, and that this error so tainted the environmental review process that such designation requires preparation of a new environmental impact report (EIR); (2) the EIR's project description was inaccurate and misleading because the Project was described as a means of conserving water, but would not save from evaporation an amount of water equal to the amount being pumped from the aquifer over the life of the Project; (3) the EIR was misleading because it did not provide an accurate duration for pumping by the Project; and (4) the Project would pump more water from the aquifer than was contemplated by and discussed in the EIR. Having reviewed the EIR and related documents, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in denying the application for a writ of mandate. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

This appeal was one of six related cases arising out of a proposed project to pump fresh groundwater from an underground aquifer in the Mojave Desert (the Project). The aquifer was located below real property owned by Cadiz, Inc. Delaware Tetra Technologies, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court, challenging a resolution by the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors authorizing the execution of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) among the County, Cadiz, the Santa Margarita Water District, and the Fenner Valley Mutual Water Company. Delaware Tetra argued that the County improperly approved the Memorandum without having performed the necessary environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition for a writ of mandate, and Delaware Tetra appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded environmental review was not required before the County approved the Memorandum. Furthermore, the Court concluded the MOU did not violate either the County's relevant groundwater management ordinance or common law. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "Delaware Tetra Tech. Inc. v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, filed an inverse condemnation action against the City, seeking damages and injunctive relief based upon impairment of the views from their backyards by coastal redwood trees the City planted in Roxbury Park. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the judgment entered after a demurrer to their inverse condemnation complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiffs do not allege any physical intrusion, occupation, or invasion of their property or any physical damage to their property. The trees of which plaintiffs complain were not located on plaintiffs‘ properties and the first amended complaint does not allege that the trees or debris from the trees physically intrudes upon plaintiffs‘ properties. Because plaintiffs allege only impairment of their views and a speculative risk of fire danger, neither of which constitutes a taking or damaging of their property, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Boxer v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

The County filed suit against defendants seeking to enjoin the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary in an unincorporated area of Kern County. Defendants appealed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction. The court interpreted the phrase “entirely repeal the ordinance,” pursuant to Elections Code section 9144, to mean that a board of supervisors must (1) revoke the protested ordinance in all its parts and (2) not take additional action that has the practical effect of implementing the essential feature of the protested ordinance. Applying this interpretation, the court concluded that the board of supervisors did more than entirely repeal the protested ordinance banning dispensaries when it revoked that ordinance and took the additional action of repealing the 2009 ordinance, which authorized dispensaries. The practical effect of repealing the 2009 ordinance was to prohibit dispensaries, which was essentially the same as the ban of dispensaries protested by voters. Therefore, the court concluded that the County violated section 9145 by repealing the 2009 ordinance and, as a result, the court regarded the 2009 ordinance as remaining in full force and effect. Accordingly, defendants' dispensary, which is located in a commercial zone, remains an authorized use and the County cannot establish a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim that defendants were operating an unauthorized dispensary. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc." on Justia Law

A school district is entitled to levy fees on new residential construction. Government Code section 66020 applies to partial refunds of fees paid, such as the refund sought by appellant. At issue in this appeal is whether Civil Code section 3287, which provides for interest when damages are awarded, applies specifically to interest on a refund for a development fee paid to the District. The court concluded that section 3287 does not apply because section 66020, subdivision (e) more specifically sets forth the interest available on the development fee refund. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that section 3287 did not apply in this case and properly sustained the school district's demurrer and dismissed the lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Merkoh Assoc., LLC v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-petitioner San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) appealed a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that challenged a decision by defendant and respondent City of San Diego (City) approving a real property lease with defendant and real-party-in-interest BH Partnership (BH). Since 1953, BH and its predecessors have leased from City certain real property in Mission Bay Park on which it operated the Bahia Resort Hotel. In late 2012, the city council approved a 40-year lease agreement that would extend BH's tenancy of that property. However, because that approval did not include a statement of the property's fair market value, approval of the lease agreement was placed on the city council's agenda for its February 26, 2013, meeting for reconsideration. BH hired appraiser Bruce Goodwin to establish the property's fair market value. SDOG contended City erred by approving the lease because the evidence was insufficient to support its finding the appraisal of the property was performed by an independent appraiser. Because there was substantial evidence to support the city council's finding Goodwin was an independent fee appraiser within the meaning of San Diego Municipal Code section 22.0901, the Court of Appeal concluded SDOG did not carry its burden to show the city council abused its discretion by approving the lease between City and BH. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Lamar filed suit challenging the City's denial of 45 applications to convert existing offsite signs - billboards with commercial messages in locations other than at a property owner's business - to digital signs. Lamar alleged that the sign ban violates the free speech clause of the California Constitution and the trial court agreed, granting a writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that the sign ban was a content-based regulation that could not withstand strict scrutiny analysis. After addressing preliminary issues, this court concluded on the merits that the city's offsite sign ban is not content-based, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny under high court or California Supreme Court precedent. Consistent with the many authorities finding no constitutional infirmity under the First Amendment in the distinction between offsite and onsite signs, the court reached a like conclusion under the free speech clause of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order denying plaintiff‟s petition for a writ of mandate. View "Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households for disposal of household hazardous waste, by enactment of an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee.” Crawley challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus, arguing that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution, requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, rejecting Crawley’s assertion that the fee is not incidental to property ownership and concluding that the fee falls within an exemption to the constitutional requirements. View "Crawley v. Alameda Cnty, Waste Mgmt. Auth." on Justia Law