Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, the Poksays built their Novato home, including a 150-foot long driveway within the 30-foot wide easement running to the site, which was hidden from the street. The easement was over property then owned by the Schaefers and was for access and utility purposes only. The Poksays hired a landscaper, who dug holes, added plants and trees along both sides of the driveway, and installed a drip irrigation system with a line under the driveway. Water fixtures were installed along the driveway for fire safety. The Poksays added lighting, regularly tended to the landscaping, and paid maintenance, water, and other costs. Respondents purchased the property from the Poksays in 2000. The landscaping was mature. Appellants purchased the Schaefer property in 2004. In 2010, without notice, appellant cut the irrigation and electrical lines on both sides of the driveway, including those irrigating respondents’ own property and sent a letter demanding removal of all landscaping and supporting systems from the easement. Respondents filed suit. The court granted respondents an irrevocable parol license. The court of appeal agreed that it would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given the substantial investment of time and money and years of acquiescence. View "Richardson v. Franc" on Justia Law

Wilsons purchased and restored the Soda Rock Winery’s century-old building, which backs to the Belle Terre vineyard, with an “avenue” between. Its front entrance is on Highway 128; to enter the winery from the back, users must use Soda Rock Lane, then the avenue. When the Wilsons bought the property they did not know whether they had any right to use the avenue, buts used it for deliveries and heavy equipment. Belle Terre used the avenue for vineyard equipment. Dick, president of Belle Terre, testified he did not complain because he was trying to be neighborly. The avenue was always considered part of Belle Terre, never used by anyone else. When the Wilsons sought permits to complete the renovation, Belle Terre raised concerns. Conditions in the 2004 permit limited access: “Should the applicant choose … access from Soda Rock Lane, an application for modification … shall be required.” Nonetheless, the Wilsons used the avenue. In 2008, Dick complained that a cement truck was generating dust on the avenue, damaging crops. He told the Wilsons to stop trespassing. He later filed suit. The trial court permanently enjoined further trespass, awarded $1 for past trespass, and awarded attorney fees of $117,000. The court of appeal affirmed as to the boundary dispute, future trespass, and nominal damages, but reversed the award of attorney fees. View "Belle Terre Ranch, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Real party in interest and respondent 7-Eleven, Inc. applied to the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control for a license to sell beer and wine at its store located within defendant and respondent City of Lake Forest. Based on the number of other businesses that held liquor licenses in the area, the Department would not act on the application without first receiving a determination from the City that "public convenience or necessity would be served by . . . issuance [of the license to 7-Eleven]." After investigating 7-Eleven’s application, the City determined issuing the license would serve public convenience or necessity, and the City forwarded its conclusion to the Department. Plaintiffs-appellants Adam Nick, Sherry Nick, and Adam Nick & Associates, Inc. (collectively, Nick) filed suit to obtain a writ of administrative mandamus compelling the City to set aside its public convenience or necessity decision. The trial court denied Nick’s writ petition and entered judgment in favor of the City and 7-Eleven. On appeal, Nick argued that the Court of Appeal should overturn the City’s public convenience or necessity determination for four reasons. Finding each of Nick’s reasons lacked merit, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Nick v. City of Lake Forest" on Justia Law

The Carmelita aggregate mine and processing plants, proposed for 1,500 acres at the base of the Sierra Nevada foothills near Sanger and Reedley, includes a reclamation plan for creating a usable postmining site. Fresno County prepared and certified an environmental impact report (EIR). The State Mining and Geology Board (SMGB) remanded. The county approved a revised reclamation plan. On second appeal, the SMGB affirmed. While the first SMGB appeal was pending, objectors sued, alleging abuse of discretion under the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code, 21000 (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the matter was not ripe when the trial court ruled because SMGB had granted the first appeal and that the county approved the EIR while the reclamation plan was invalid. The court also rejected CEQA challenges that: the project description was inadequate; conclusions regarding water issues lacked substantial evidence; the county should have required acquisition of agricultural conservation easements to mitigate loss of farmland; the EIR’s discussion of potential air quality, hydrology and noise impacts were inadequate; the final EIR contained new information and erroneous conclusions; and no substantial evidence supported required findings for a conditional use permit.View "Friends of the Kings River v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-2. The Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State of California later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. Given these findings, the court declined to decide any of the other challenges raised in the petitions. SANDAG appealed, arguing the EIR complied with CEQA in both respects. Cleveland National Forest Foundation and Sierra Club (collectively, Cleveland) cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to analyze a reasonable range of project alternatives, failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's air quality impacts, and understating the transportation plan's impacts on agricultural lands. The State separately cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's impacts from particulate matter pollution. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects. The Court modified the judgment to incorporate its decision on the cross-appeals and affirmed.View "Cleveland Nat. Forest v. San Diego Assn. of Gov." on Justia Law

The Sacramento Kings have played at the Sleep Train Arena since 1988. In January 2013, the team’s then owners entered into a tentative agreement to sell the Sacramento Kings to a group of investors in Seattle, Washington. Seeking to keep the team in Sacramento, the City of Sacramento partnered with Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a new entertainment and sports center in downtown Sacramento at the site of a shopping mall with declining occupancy rates. In May 2013, the Board of Governors for the National Basketball Association (NBA) rejected an application to sell the team and move it to Seattle, and approved the sale of the team to Sacramento Basketball Holdings. The NBA’s board of governors also reserved the right to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another city if a new arena in Sacramento did not open by 2017. To meet the NBA’s deadline, the City and Sacramento Basketball Holdings developed a schedule that targeted October 2016 as the opening date for the downtown arena. To facilitate timely completion of the project, the Legislature added section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code, which modified (only for construction of the downtown arena in Sacramento) several deadlines for review of the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (sec. 21050 et seq.). Other than deadlines for review, section 21168.6.6 did not substantively modify CEQA as it applied to the downtown arena project. Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other individuals sued to challenge section 21168.6.6’s constitutionality as well as the project’s compliance with CEQA requirements. Saltonstall moved for a preliminary injunction on grounds of imminent harm to the public caused by the demolition of the shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena. The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. She appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing: (1) section 21168.6.6 represents an unconstitutional intrusion of the legislative branch on the core function of the courts; and (2) the preliminary injunction should have been granted because section 21168.6.6 “harms [the public] and the environment,” but not the respondents. The Court of Appeal rejected Saltonstall’s constitutional challenge on the merits because section 21168.6.6 did not materially impair a core function of the courts. Moreover, CEQA review did not implicate any constitutionally granted right.View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Walton Emmick's application to the County for a coastal development permit (CDP) to make improvements to his property. After Emmick died, the SDS Family Trust succeeded to the property. The County subsequently approved the CDP, which was conditioned upon SDS's offer to dedicate a lateral easement for public access along the shorefront portion of the property (CDP-1). SDS did not appeal. Nine months later, SDS applied for another CDP (CDP-2) and the application was approved. The Sierra Club, the Surfrider Foundation, and two coastal commissioners appealed the County's approval of the CDP-2 to the Commission. The Commission determined that the easement condition contained in CDP-1 is permanent and binding on the landowner, and removal of the easement condition would violate the policy favoring public access to coastal resources. The Commission conditioned its permit on the implementation of the easement condition contained in CDP-1. The court reversed the judgment denying SDS's petition for a writ of administrative mandate to eliminate a public access condition from the permit where it could be inequitable to apply collateral estoppel to require a party to dedicate a coastal easement as a condition of obtaining a coastal development permit.View "Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

San Francisco prevailed in a writ proceeding under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) brought by the Coalition for Adequate Review and Alliance for Comprehensive Planning. After securing judgment, the city filed a memorandum of costs totaling $64,144, largely for costs incurred in preparing a supplemental record of the proceedings. The trial court denied all costs, relying on the fact that the Coalition had elected to prepare the record itself, as allowed by CEQA’s record preparation statute and expressing concern that sizeable cost awards would have a chilling effect on lawsuits challenging important public projects. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded, stating that neither rationale is a legally permissible basis for denying record preparation costs to the city. View "Coal. for Adequate Review v. City & Cnty of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In 2001 Millview County Water District began diverting water from the Russian River under the authority of a pre-1914 appropriative water right assigned to Millview by plaintiffs Hill and Gomes. Following a citizen complaint, the State Water Resources Control Board issued a cease and desist order substantially restricting Millview’s diversion of water under the right, finding it had been largely forfeited by a period of diminished use from 1967 through 1987. Millview argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to limit appropriation under a pre-1914 water right and that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding of forfeiture because there was no evidence of a timely adverse claim of use. The trial court accepted Millview’s arguments. The appeals court affirmed. While the Board did have jurisdiction under Water Code section 1831 to issue a an order precluding excessive diversion under a pre-1914 right to appropriate and the Board properly determined the original perfected scope of the claim, it applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the forfeiture of Millview’s claimed water right. Applying the proper legal standard, the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support a finding of forfeiture. View "Millview Cnty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Elaine and Gerald Rominger challenged a mitigated negative declaration approved by defendant Colusa County with respect to a subdivision proposed by real party in interest Adams Group Inc. The trial court denied the Romingers’ petition based on the conclusion that, notwithstanding the county’s approval of a mitigated negative declaration, the county’s "action in approving the subdivision map was not a project for CEQA purposes and [thus] no review beyond the preliminary review stage was required." The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining the proposed subdivision was not a CEQA project, even though the proposal did not include any specific plans for development. On independent review of the Romingers’ other complaints, however, the Court found merit in only one: the Romingers adequately showed there was substantial evidence in the record that the subdivision may have had a significant unmitigated impact on traffic at a particular intersection adjacent to the project site. Accordingly, on that basis only, the Court reversed and remanded for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Rominger v. County of Colusa" on Justia Law