Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Temecula Valley Educators Association and individual students, teachers, and parents from the Temecula Valley Unified School District (collectively, Plaintiffs) who sued the District and five members of the District’s school board (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of “Resolution No. 2022–23/21” (the Resolution), which prohibits the use of Critical Race Theory (CRT) or similar frameworks in teaching topics related to race. The Resolution lists specific elements and doctrines of CRT that are banned. Plaintiffs argued that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague and sought a preliminary injunction to halt its enforcement.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Resolution was sufficiently clear and that Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also concluded that the balance of harms favored denying the injunction, as enjoining a government action would cause irreparable injury.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the Resolution is unconstitutionally vague because it employs ambiguous language, lacks definitions, is unclear in scope, and contains no enforcement guidelines. The court noted that the Resolution’s language leaves teachers uncertain about what is prohibited, leading to self-censorship and fear of arbitrary enforcement. The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the significant harm Plaintiffs would face without an injunction and by incorrectly concluding that the Resolution did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying the preliminary injunction as to the Resolution and remanded for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court dismissed the appeal related to the Board’s “Policy 5020.01” as moot, given that the relevant portions of the Policy had been rescinded following changes in the law. View "Mae M. v. Komrosky" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jayden Demarko McDaniel, a Black individual, was charged with multiple felonies, including attempted first-degree murder and gang-related offenses. McDaniel alleged that he was disparately charged with gang enhancements due to his race, in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA). He sought discovery of evidence from the prosecution to support his claim, arguing that statistical evidence indicated a racial disparity in the application of gang enhancements in San Mateo County.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied McDaniel's motion for discovery, concluding that he failed to demonstrate "good cause" as required by the RJA. The court found that McDaniel's statistical evidence lacked context and did not provide specific facts about his case or other similar cases involving non-Black defendants. McDaniel then filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was initially denied without prejudice. He subsequently refiled his petition, which was again denied by the superior court.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that McDaniel had met the low threshold for demonstrating good cause for discovery under the RJA. The court held that McDaniel's county-specific statistical evidence, supported by an expert declaration, presented a plausible factual foundation for his claim of racial bias in charging decisions. The court emphasized that the RJA's discovery standard is intended to be broad and flexible, allowing for various types of evidence, including statistical data, to support a claim of racial disparity.The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to reconsider McDaniel's discovery motion, directing the trial court to weigh the potential probative value of the requested information against the burdens of gathering it. View "McDaniel v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Ryan Holman sued the County of Butte, alleging it breached mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6 related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of a child abuse referral against him. Holman claimed the County failed to conduct an in-person investigation or cross-report the abuse allegations, leading to years of abuse and subsequent psychological issues. The County argued its employee exercised discretion in deciding to "evaluate out" the referral without further investigation, thus invoking discretionary immunity.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County's employee was exercising discretion protected by immunity when deciding to close the referral without an in-person investigation or cross-reporting. The court found no mandatory duty was breached, and the County was not liable under Government Code section 815.6.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County had a mandatory duty under section 11166, subdivision (j), to cross-report the child abuse referral to law enforcement and other agencies. The court determined that the duty to cross-report is triggered by the receipt of a mandated child abuse report and does not involve discretionary judgment. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the County breached this mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the referral, thus reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Holman v. County of Butte" on Justia Law

A.L. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court's decision to assume dependency jurisdiction over her one-year-old daughter, Minor, following a single-vehicle drunk driving accident in which Minor suffered a severe brain injury. Mother also contested the court's decision to require monitored visitation. The accident occurred after Mother consumed alcohol at a party and drove at high speeds, resulting in a crash that caused significant injuries to Minor. At the scene, Mother attempted to prevent a bystander from calling for help, fearing her child would be taken away. Both Mother and Minor were transported to medical facilities, where Minor was found to have a brain bleed and required surgery.The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a petition alleging Minor needed dependency protection. The juvenile court found a prima facie basis for the petition and placed Minor in foster care after her hospital stay. CFS recommended that Minor be placed in the sole custody of her father, S.L. (Father), with no reunification services for Mother. The court continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing multiple times, during which Mother complied with her case plan, including parenting classes and substance abuse counseling. Despite her progress, CFS maintained that sole custody should be vested with Father, and the matter should be transferred to family court.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to assume dependency jurisdiction under both section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect] and subdivision (e) [severe physical abuse]. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings, noting the severity of Minor's injuries and Mother's actions at the scene. The court also upheld the monitored visitation requirement, emphasizing the need for continued supervision to ensure Minor's safety. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not err in its rulings. View "In re B.L." on Justia Law

Mone Yvette Sanders filed a class and representative action against her former employer, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code and a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The trial court granted Edward Jones’s motions to compel arbitration of Sanders’s individual Labor Code and PAGA claims and stayed the representative PAGA cause of action pending arbitration. Sanders initiated arbitration, but Edward Jones failed to pay $54,000 in fees within 30 days as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Sanders then moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration and proceed in court.The trial court initially granted Sanders’s motion, finding section 1281.98 was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). However, after Edward Jones submitted new authority, the court reconsidered and denied Sanders’s motion, concluding section 1281.98 was preempted by the FAA. Sanders filed a petition for writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98, which allows an employee to withdraw from arbitration if the employer fails to pay fees within 30 days, is not preempted by the FAA. The court found that section 1281.98 furthers the FAA’s goal of expeditious arbitration and does not undermine the FAA’s objectives. The court also determined that the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether there has been a default under section 1281.98.The Court of Appeal granted Sanders’s petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Sanders’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and allowing her to pursue her claims in court. The trial court was also instructed to consider Sanders’s motion for sanctions under section 1281.99. View "Sanders v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Kelly Rose, a former cashier at Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued her employer under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the “suitable seating” provisions of the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. After a nine-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby, and judgment was entered accordingly. Rose appealed, but the judgment was affirmed. Subsequently, Hobby Lobby sought nearly $125,000 in litigation costs as the prevailing party, which the trial court ordered the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) to pay, despite the LWDA not participating in the litigation.The LWDA appealed the cost order, raising the issue of whether it could be held liable for litigation costs in a PAGA action where it did not participate. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that even if a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action is entitled to recover costs under the general cost recovery rule, those costs are not recoverable against the LWDA if it did not participate in the litigation. The court emphasized that the LWDA was not a party to the lawsuit and did not take any action until after the judgment was entered.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order requiring the LWDA to pay Hobby Lobby's litigation costs. The court held that the LWDA, as the real party in interest in a PAGA action, is not liable for costs if it did not intervene or participate in the litigation. The decision clarified that the LWDA's role in PAGA actions does not automatically make it liable for litigation costs incurred by a prevailing defendant. View "Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores" on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

Petitioners were defrauded by a now-defunct corporation that sold them long-term health care and estate planning services they never received. Unable to obtain compensation directly from the corporation, petitioners secured a federal bankruptcy court judgment against the corporation and applied for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund. The Secretary of State, who administers the Fund, denied their applications, leading petitioners to file a verified petition in the superior court for an order directing payment from the Fund. The superior court granted the petition, and the Secretary appealed.The superior court found that the bankruptcy court judgment was a qualifying judgment for compensation under the Fund. The court noted that the complaint contained allegations of fraud and requested a judgment finding the elements of fraud under California law were satisfied. The superior court also found that the administrative record contained ample evidence supporting the bankruptcy court’s default judgment against the corporation for fraud.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court’s final judgment, which expressly adjudged petitioners as victims of intentional misrepresentation, met the Fund’s requirement for a judgment based on fraud. The court affirmed the superior court’s judgment regarding petitioners' entitlement to payment from the Fund. However, it reversed and remanded the case for the superior court to specify the amount the Secretary shall pay each petitioner, as the original order did not account for the statutory limit of $50,000 per claimant and the need to consider spouses as a single claimant. View "Alves v. Weber" on Justia Law

Brandon Horton was convicted of stalking and making criminal threats against Seiko H. He was acquitted of making criminal threats against Seiko’s father, John H. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order prohibiting Horton from contacting both Seiko and John, and an order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons. Horton appealed, challenging the inclusion of John in the protective order and the prohibition on possessing deadly or dangerous weapons.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found Horton guilty of making criminal threats against Seiko and stalking her, with the jury finding true several aggravating factors. Horton was acquitted of making criminal threats against John. The trial court sentenced Horton to five years and eight months in state prison, with credit for time served, and issued the protective orders in question.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in including John in the protective order, as there was sufficient evidence that Horton committed or attempted to commit harm against John. However, the court found that the trial court erred in extending the weapons prohibition beyond firearms to any deadly or dangerous weapon. The appellate court modified the judgment to strike the order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections. View "P. v. Horton" on Justia Law

Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) filed a lawsuit against Federal Insurance Company (Federal) alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, and seeking rescission of a settlement agreement. Truck claimed that Federal fraudulently misrepresented and concealed the voluntary nature of its decision to pay defense costs for Moldex-Metric, Inc. (Moldex) under an umbrella policy. Truck argued that it would not have agreed to pay $4.9 million in settlement had it known Federal contributed to Moldex’s defense voluntarily “at its own expense.”The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially ruled in favor of Federal, granting summary judgment on the basis that Federal had no duty to defend Moldex under its umbrella policy. Truck appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Truck’s assertion that it reserved the right to recoup defense fees and indemnity costs after the settlement agreement. Truck then filed the current fraud action, alleging that Federal concealed its voluntary business decision to defend Moldex.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Truck contended that the trial court failed to address its claim for fraudulent concealment and only considered the misrepresentation theory. The appellate court agreed with Truck, finding that the trial court did not consider the fraudulent concealment claim despite Truck’s objection. The appellate court determined that Truck did not unreasonably neglect to protect itself against the alleged fraudulent concealment by Federal, rendering it extrinsic and not barred by the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on Truck’s fraudulent concealment cause of action and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial to consider Truck’s fraudulent concealment claim and any other derivative causes of action. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and Truck was awarded costs on appeal. View "Truck Ins. Exchange v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law