Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pamela Pollock sued her supervisor, Michael Kelso, in 2018 for sexual harassment and racial discrimination, alleging that Kelso asked her for sexual intercourse in 2016 and, after she rejected him, promoted less qualified individuals of other races to positions she sought. The trial court initially ruled that Pollock’s suit was time-barred, a decision which was affirmed by the appellate court. However, in 2021, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the statute of limitations begins when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the adverse promotion decision, that the defense bears the burden on this issue, and that costs or fees on appeal cannot be awarded to a prevailing defendant without determining the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.Following the Supreme Court’s directions, the appellate court remanded the case and ordered costs for Pollock. Pollock then moved for attorney fees in the trial court, which awarded her $493,577.10. Kelso appealed this award. Before the trial date, Kelso and Pollock settled the bulk of their case, with Pollock moving to dismiss her underlying case with prejudice except for the attorney fee award, which Kelso was appealing. The trial court retained jurisdiction regarding the fee award.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court denied Pollock’s motion to dismiss Kelso’s appeal, affirming that Kelso was appealing from a final collateral order. On the merits, the court affirmed the fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Pollock as the prevailing party and in the amount awarded. The court found that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the fee award, including the use of a 1.8 multiplier, was reasonable. View "Pollock v. Kelso" on Justia Law

In 2008, Eddie Arturo Bravo pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including rape and sex offenses involving a minor, in exchange for a 20-year prison sentence. The original judgment included a stayed enhancement for a prior prison term. In 2023, Bravo sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the Legislature eliminated certain sentencing enhancements. The trial court resentenced Bravo, striking the prison prior enhancement and other enhancements, but maintained the 20-year aggregate sentence.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially imposed the agreed-upon 20-year sentence, which included upper terms for specific counts and concurrent middle terms for others. Bravo was paroled in 2022. Following legislative changes, Bravo requested resentencing, arguing for a reduced sentence based on his rehabilitation and lack of public safety risk. The trial court held a hearing, considered the arguments, and ultimately struck the stayed enhancement but maintained the original sentence length.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the fact the enhancement was originally stayed did not preclude resentencing under section 1172.75. The court found no reversible error in the trial court's resentencing decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Bravo received a lesser sentence as required by section 1172.75 because the stayed enhancement was eliminated, even though the aggregate term remained the same. The court also found no error in the trial court's application of section 1385 or section 1170, and it upheld the decision to impose upper terms for certain counts. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Bravo" on Justia Law

In 2012, Jason Robert Hodge pleaded no contest to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 21 years in prison. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed two requests in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County: a motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The trial court denied both requests in a single order on February 6, 2024, stating it declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence.Hodge appealed the trial court's decision. His appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues, and Hodge filed a supplemental brief without addressing the appealability issue. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1, considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Loper.The Court of Appeal concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners, Eberhard and Ursula Schneider (plaintiffs) and Karla S. Lane (defendant), over an easement used by Lane to access her property. The easement was initially destroyed by flooding in 2002, leading to a 2011 judgment that established the easement burdened the entire servient tenement owned by the Schneiders. The court relocated the easement further inland on the Schneiders' property. After another flooding incident in 2018 damaged the relocated easement, the Schneiders filed an action for quiet title and declaratory relief, while Lane filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief.The Superior Court of Alpine County granted Lane summary judgment against the Schneiders' complaint, ruling it was barred by res judicata. At trial on Lane's cross-complaint, the court again relocated the easement further inland but ruled that Lane was responsible for stabilizing the riverbank to prevent further erosion under Civil Code section 845.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to relocate the easement but reversed the ruling that Lane was responsible for stabilizing the riverbank. The appellate court held that section 845 requires the dominant tenement owner to maintain the easement in good repair but does not obligate them to construct new improvements, such as a riverbank stabilization project, separate from the easement to protect it from potential future harm. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the new easement route that imposed the least burden on the servient tenement. View "Schneider v. Lane" on Justia Law

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

A home improvement and solar panel salesperson visited the home of senior citizens Harold and Lucy West, who lived with their adult daughter Deon. The salesperson, Ilai Mitmiger, discussed a solar installation and bathroom renovation, leading to a loan agreement package being completed electronically with Harold’s signature. Harold and Lucy, both in their 90s and suffering from dementia, did not use email, computers, or mobile phones. Deon believed the renovations would be paid for by a government program, as suggested by Mitmiger. The loan documents were sent to Deon’s email, opened on a mobile device, and signed electronically in Harold’s name within seconds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Solar Mosaic LLC’s petition to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the loan agreement. The court found that Mosaic had not proven the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, specifically that Harold was the person who completed the loan documents or that Deon had the authority to bind Harold to an arbitration agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the evidence strongly suggested Harold lacked the technical ability to execute the electronic signatures and demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Harold actually signed the loan documents. The court also found that Mosaic had not proven Deon had the authority to bind Harold to the agreement or that Harold ratified the agreement through a recorded telephone call. The court concluded that the recorded call did not demonstrate Harold’s awareness or understanding of the loan agreement, and thus, there was no ratification. View "West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC" on Justia Law

A non-medical entrepreneur, Randhir Tuli, helped form a medical business with Dr. Andrew Brooks, creating a group of surgery centers. Tuli, who was initially active, later became inactive but continued to take profits. His colleagues, frustrated by his inactivity, sought to buy him out, but Tuli refused. Tuli then sent a threatening letter to potential investors, suggesting criminal liability, without a good faith basis. In response, the company warned Tuli to rectify the situation within 30 days or face ejection without compensation. Tuli did not comply, and the company ejected him, paying him nothing. Tuli then initiated a decade-long litigation against his former colleagues.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County rejected all of Tuli’s claims. Tuli appealed, and the case was reviewed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the business judgment rule protected the company’s decision to eject Tuli. The court found that the company acted rationally to protect its interests and that Tuli’s letter was disruptive and baseless.The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that the business judgment rule applied, as the company’s actions were rational and in the best interest of the business. The court found no conflict of interest, bad faith, or improper investigation by the company. It also ruled that Tuli’s claims for declaratory relief, unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were without merit. The court concluded that Tuli’s ejection and the zero-dollar redemption of his shares were not an illegal forfeiture, as Tuli had already received substantial returns on his investment and had disrupted the business. View "Tuli v. Specialty Surgical Center of Thousand Oaks, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Juan Nuno was prosecuted and later pleaded no contest to attempted murder, admitting to several sentence-related allegations. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. In 2022, Nuno filed a petition to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court found made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing. Nuno then filed a motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records, seeking exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland and through Pitchess procedures. The trial court ordered limited disclosure of personnel information after an in-camera review but later denied Nuno’s petition after the evidentiary hearing.Nuno appealed, requesting the appellate court to review the trial court’s application of Pitchess standards. The Attorney General did not initially object to this request. The appellate court sought supplemental briefing on whether the trial court’s review should include Brady principles and whether Brady obligations apply in section 1172.6 proceedings. Both parties agreed that Nuno’s request encompassed Brady principles.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, decided that a petitioner may obtain disclosure of peace officer personnel information under Brady principles through Pitchess procedures in advance of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Pitchess principles but did not clearly consider Brady principles. Consequently, the appellate court conditionally reversed the trial court’s order denying Nuno’s petition and remanded for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Brady principles. If additional information is found to be discoverable under Brady, the trial court must allow Nuno to demonstrate prejudice and potentially order a new evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Nuno" on Justia Law

Juan Alazar was charged in 2008 with attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The charges included allegations of premeditation and personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. Alazar entered a no contest plea to attempted murder and admitted to personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, in exchange for a 29-year prison sentence and dismissal of other charges. He did not admit a factual basis for his plea but stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript contained such a basis.The trial court advised Alazar of the potential life sentences he faced and accepted his plea. In 2022, Alazar petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of attempted murder under the current law. The trial court denied the petition, finding no prima facie evidence that Alazar was entitled to relief, as he was the sole perpetrator and had admitted to using a firearm.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court engaged in improper judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage. The appellate court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Alazar harbored the intent to kill or that he acted alone. The court noted that a West plea allows a defendant to accept a plea bargain while maintaining innocence, and Alazar did not admit the truth of the facts in the preliminary hearing transcript.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order denying Alazar's petition and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate his attempted murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence him. The court emphasized that the prosecution bears the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Alazar" on Justia Law