Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2022, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance extending the notice period for landlords pursuing at-fault evictions. The San Francisco Apartment Association and Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute sought a writ of mandate to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance, arguing it was preempted by state law. The trial court partially granted the petition, finding the ordinance preempted only for nonpayment of rent evictions. Both parties appealed.The San Francisco Superior Court initially ruled that the ordinance conflicted with state law only regarding nonpayment of rent, citing a split in authority on notice periods for other fault-based evictions. The court referenced Tri County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View, which invalidated extended notice periods, and Rental Housing Association of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland, which allowed them. The trial court felt bound by Rental Housing and limited its ruling to nonpayment of rent.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law. The court found that the ordinance was procedural, not substantive, as it extended the state-mandated three-day notice period to a minimum of 13 days, conflicting with the Unlawful Detainer Act's timelines. The court determined that state law fully occupies the field of landlord-tenant notification timelines, making the local ordinance invalid.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in part, ruling that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law, and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate preventing the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

The City of Gridley operates an electric utility and approved reduced electric rates for residential users in September 2020. Plaintiffs, residential ratepayers, challenged these rates, alleging they resulted in charges exceeding the reasonable cost of providing electric service, thus constituting a tax without voter approval in violation of article XIII C of the California Constitution. They also claimed the rates violated the state and federal takings clauses under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate and class action complaint, alleging the City set rates higher than necessary and transferred excess revenues to its general fund.The Superior Court of Butte County denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether the rates resulted in excessive charges and whether plaintiffs had a property interest in continued electric service. The court rejected the City’s argument that article XIII C was inapplicable because the City did not impose, extend, or increase a tax when it approved reduced rates. The court also found that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine could apply to plaintiffs' takings claim.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the City was entitled to relief. The court found article XIII C inapplicable because the City did not impose, extend, or increase any tax by reducing its electric rates. The court also found the unconstitutional conditions doctrine inapplicable, as it applies only in the land-use permitting context, not to user fees like the electric rates in question. Consequently, the court directed the trial court to set aside its order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. The City’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the stay of proceedings in the trial court was vacated. View "City of Gridley v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Cheryl Lynch, the owner of a residential property in San Clemente, California, engaged a general contractor for home improvement and repairs. The contractor hired Peter & Associates, Engineers, Geologists, Surveyors, Inc. (the Peter firm) to perform a geotechnical inspection of a footing trench. The Peter firm conducted a visual inspection and used a steel probe but did not perform subsurface exploration or laboratory testing. The footing later collapsed, causing significant damage to Lynch's home.Lynch filed a lawsuit in February 2021 against multiple parties, including the Peter firm, for breach of contract, nuisance, and negligence. The Peter firm moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty of care to Lynch due to the lack of a direct contract. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the motion, heavily relying on the precedent set by Weseloh Family Ltd. Partnership v. K.L. Wessel Construction Co., Inc., which found no duty of care in the absence of privity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the Peter firm failed to meet its burden in the summary judgment motion. The court held that the firm owed a duty of care to Lynch, applying the Biakanja factors, which consider the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm, and other factors. The court also found that the trial court erred in dismissing Lynch's nuisance claim and in sustaining the Peter firm's evidentiary objections without proper basis.The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to deny the Peter firm's motion in its entirety. View "Lynch v. Peter & Associates" on Justia Law

Daniel McCurry and Carie Powell sued Dr. Inder Singh for malpractice, alleging he violated a duty of care by refusing to treat their mother, Carol McCurry, who died while awaiting transfer to another hospital. Carol was brought to Methodist Hospital with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with an aortic dissection and a possible heart attack. Dr. Michael Brandon, the treating emergency physician, consulted Dr. Singh, an on-call interventional cardiologist at Mercy General Hospital. Dr. Singh initially agreed that Carol needed acute catheterization but later decided she was not a candidate for the procedure. Consequently, Dr. Singh did not accept her transfer, and Carol died before she could be transferred to another facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh, ruling that he did not owe a duty of care to Carol because no physician-patient relationship existed between them. The court found that Dr. Singh did not affirmatively treat or directly advise Carol, and thus, no legal duty was established.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a physician's duty of care arises only when a physician-patient relationship is established, which did not occur in this case. Dr. Singh's consultation with Dr. Brandon and his decision not to treat Carol did not create such a relationship. The court also declined to apply the reasoning from an Arizona case cited by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that under California law, the duty of care is contingent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh was affirmed. View "McCurry v. Singh" on Justia Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to this.The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, citing multiple aggravating factors such as the defendant's prior criminal record and unsatisfactory performance on probation. Upon resentencing in 2022, the trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement but reimposed the upper term, resulting in an 11-year sentence. The defendant did not object to the reimposition of the upper term during resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order. View "People v. Brannon-Thompson" on Justia Law

A minor, V., was removed from her mother’s care at birth due to the mother’s drug abuse. V. and her half-brother, N., were initially placed together with a relative, but N. was later moved to his non-offending father’s custody. V. was placed with her aunt, who became her legal guardian in 2019. The aunt sought to adopt V. in 2022, but the mother opposed the termination of her parental rights, citing the parental relationship exception to adoption.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother did not meet the burden to demonstrate the parental relationship exception. However, the court, without input from the parties, applied the sibling relationship exception, concluding that adoption would not be in V.’s best interest due to her bond with N. The court selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for V. Both the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and V. appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court erred by sua sponte applying the sibling relationship exception without any party asserting it and by relieving the mother of her burden to prove an exception to adoption. The appellate court found that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception applied, as V. and N. had limited shared experiences and their relationship would likely continue even if V. were adopted. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s orders and directed it to enter a new order selecting adoption as the permanent plan for V. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Andrea Klein Gregg and the Huntsman-West Foundation (the Foundation) sued Melinda Susan Smith for general negligence, intentional tort, and premises liability after Gregg's personal property, stored at Dennis James Babcock's residence, went missing. Babcock, who lived alone on the premises, had allowed Gregg to store her items there. When their relationship ended, Gregg was initially denied access to retrieve her property. Upon gaining access, she found most of her property missing or damaged.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted Smith's motion for summary judgment, finding she had no duty to protect the personal property as she had no control over the premises or the property. The court also sustained Smith's evidentiary objections, excluding much of the plaintiffs' evidence as hearsay or lacking foundation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Smith had no legal duty to the plaintiffs regarding the personal property. The court found that Smith had no control over the premises or the property and that the plaintiffs failed to present admissible evidence to create a triable issue of fact. The court also held that the claims of agency, mutual interest, joint venture, and ratification were not properly raised in the complaint and could not be considered.The main holding was that Smith owed no duty to the plaintiffs regarding the personal property, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in her favor. The court also affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence and the rejection of new legal theories not raised in the original complaint. View "Huntsman-West Foundation v. Smith" on Justia Law

Reabold California LLC applied to convert a former oil well into a Class II injection well in the Brentwood Oil Field, Contra Costa County. The well, drilled in 1963, had been inactive for over 20 years. The conversion involved minor alterations, such as removing the well plug and installing injection equipment. The project aimed to inject produced water back into the aquifer, eliminating the need for water disposal trips. The Environmental Protection Agency had exempted the aquifer from the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1982, making it eligible for such injection projects.The California Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM) approved the project, invoking a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for minor alterations involving negligible or no expansion of use. Sunflower Alliance challenged this exemption, arguing that converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use. The Contra Costa County Superior Court agreed with Sunflower, ruling that the change in use was not negligible and directing CalGEM to set aside its approval and notice of exemption.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the conversion project fell within the Class 1 exemption because the environmental risks associated with injecting water were negligible. The court emphasized that the project involved only minor physical alterations and that the injected water would be confined within the aquifer, posing no significant environmental harm. The court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower’s petition and ordered CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. California Department of Conservation" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Phalon Amad Hall and Patrick Redman, were convicted of home invasion robbery and kidnapping, with additional gang-related sentencing enhancements. Hall was identified as one of the robbers, while Redman was accused of aiding and abetting by recruiting a robber, providing a firearm, and acting as the getaway driver. The case involved a violent home invasion where the victim, A.T., was beaten, forced to open a safe, and tied up while the robbers looted his house.In the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, both defendants were found guilty of home invasion robbery and kidnapping. The jury also found multiple sentencing enhancements to be true, including gang-related enhancements. Hall received a sentence of 15 years to life for robbery, while Redman was sentenced to 60 years to life. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the kidnapping convictions, ruling that the movement of the victim within his home was not substantial enough to constitute kidnapping. The court also reversed the gang-related sentencing enhancements due to legislative changes that retroactively altered the definition and proof requirements for establishing a criminal street gang. The court affirmed the robbery convictions and other aspects of the judgment but remanded the case for complete resentencing in light of the reversals. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Travis Lanell Montgomery of multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to 61 years to life, which was later reduced to 26 years to life on appeal. In January 2024, Montgomery filed a declaration alleging racial bias under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and requested discovery of evidence to support his claims. The trial court treated this as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied it for failing to state a prima facie case for relief. The court also denied the discovery motion, citing lack of jurisdiction.Montgomery appealed the trial court's denial of his discovery motion, arguing that it was appealable as an order affecting his substantial rights. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, dismissed the appeal, stating that the trial court's order was not appealable. The court explained that a trial court order denying relief that it has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).The Court of Appeal held that the RJA does not authorize a freestanding discovery motion; such a motion must be ancillary to an ongoing action or proceeding. Since Montgomery's petition for writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied, there was no pending proceeding in which the discovery motion could be considered. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the discovery motion for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, but Montgomery retains the option to file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, where he can renew his discovery motion. View "In re Montgomery" on Justia Law