Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, five plaintiffs sued three excess insurers, alleging breach of contract, declaratory relief, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs claimed that the insurers failed to cover litigation costs related to a series of disputes between the plaintiffs and another party, Paine. The insurance policies in question provided $40 million in excess coverage, divided into four layers of $10 million each.The San Francisco County Superior Court sustained the demurrers of two excess insurers, St. Paul and Liberty Mutual, without leave to amend, on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege exhaustion of the underlying insurance policies. The court overruled the demurrer of the first-level excess insurer, Twin City, allowing the claims against Twin City to proceed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege exhaustion of the underlying insurance policies, which is a prerequisite for triggering the excess coverage. The court also found that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief, bad faith, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty were properly dismissed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of curing the defects in their complaint through further amendment. The judgments in favor of St. Paul and Liberty Mutual were affirmed, and the plaintiffs' appeal was denied. View "Fox Paine & Co., LLC v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In January 2008, Ignacio Ruiz, Jr., participated in an attack on rival gang members, resulting in one death. Ruiz, who was 16 at the time, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism, with several gang and firearm enhancements. In August 2010, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder charge, among other consecutive terms. Ruiz was resentenced in 2016, but his sentence remained nearly the same.Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing in March 2023 under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), which allows individuals sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as minors to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The Superior Court of Orange County denied the petition, calculating Ruiz’s incarceration period from his sentencing date in August 2010, and found he had not been incarcerated for 15 years.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Ruiz’s argument that his period of incarceration began in January 2008 when he was taken into custody, not from his sentencing date. The court interpreted the term "incarcerated" in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) to mean the time when Ruiz was first placed in jail, which was January 29, 2008. Since Ruiz had been continuously incarcerated since that date, he had been incarcerated for more than 15 years by the time he filed his petition in March 2023.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of Ruiz’s petition for resentencing, instructing the lower court to consider the petition based on the correct interpretation of the statute. View "People v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

In 2000, the petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional four years for a firearm enhancement. While serving this sentence, he was convicted in 2008 of aggravated assault by a prisoner and received a four-year determinate sentence under the Three Strikes law, to be served consecutively. In 2022, the petitioner was considered for parole under the Elderly Parole Program, which applies to inmates over 50 who have served at least 20 years. The parole board found him suitable for parole, but the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) required him to serve his four-year determinate sentence first.The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Kings County Superior Court, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release and that his determinate sentence should not apply. The superior court denied the petition, ruling that the petitioner was ineligible for parole under the Elderly Parole Program because he had been sentenced under the Three Strikes law.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Three Strikes exclusion under section 3055, subdivision (g), applies to prisoners who were convicted and sentenced under the Three Strikes law, even if they had already commenced serving a prison sentence. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments, stating that his "current sentence" included the term imposed under the Three Strikes law, making him ineligible for early parole release under the Elderly Parole Program. The court also found that the legislative history confirmed this interpretation and that the case of In re Hoze did not apply because it did not address the Three Strikes exclusion. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

Jeffrey G. Grossman and his family sued attorney John Peter Wakeman, Jr. and Wakeman Law Group, Inc. for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that Wakeman negligently prepared estate planning documents for Dr. A. Richard Grossman, which disinherited them in favor of Richard's fourth wife, Elizabeth Grossman. Richard's estate was valued at $18 million, and the plaintiffs argued they were the intended beneficiaries. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $9.5 million in damages.The Ventura County Superior Court denied Wakeman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wakeman appealed, arguing that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, as they were not his clients. He contended that his duty was solely to Richard, who had instructed him to leave everything to Elizabeth.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Wakeman owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that there was no clear, certain, and undisputed evidence of Richard's intent to benefit the plaintiffs. Testimonies from Elizabeth and others supported Wakeman's claim that Richard intended to leave his estate to Elizabeth. The court held that imposing a duty on Wakeman to the plaintiffs would place an intolerable burden on the legal profession.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Wakeman and his law group. The appeal from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was dismissed as moot. View "Grossman v. Wakeman" on Justia Law

A minor child, Rene V., was removed from the custody of his legal guardian, Dora V., by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Dora was appointed as Rene's legal guardian by the juvenile court. After Rene's removal, the juvenile court ordered family reunification services for Dora, including visitation. However, Rene refused to participate in overnight visits and eventually refused all visitation with Dora.The juvenile court sustained the DCFS's petition and ordered family reunification services for Dora. At an 18-month review hearing, the court terminated Dora's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing. Dora filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the juvenile court erred by allowing Rene to refuse visits and that no substantial evidence supported the finding that she received reasonable reunification services. The court issued an order to show cause but denied Dora's request to stay the section 366.26 hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that legal guardians appointed by the juvenile court are not entitled to a presumption of reunification services, unlike those appointed under the Probate Code. The court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional reunification services to Dora. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme for dependency guardianships does not mandate reunification services and that the juvenile court's decision was in Rene's best interests. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Dora V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

Four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla's Fremont plant. Despite the requests, Tesla did not provide the requested records, citing a stay in the Vaughn case due to an ongoing appeal. The plaintiffs then filed a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against Tesla for failing to comply with the Labor Code.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion, which argued that the PAGA claims arose from protected petitioning activity related to the Vaughn case. The court found that the plaintiffs' requests for personnel records were independent of the Vaughn litigation and were merely an exercise of their statutory rights under the Labor Code.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Tesla's refusal to provide the requested records did not constitute protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs' PAGA claims did not rely on any "written or oral statement or writing" by Tesla. The court also found that Tesla's conduct did not meet the criteria for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute's "catchall" provision, as it did not contribute to any public issue or debate. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Taylor v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing employment discrimination dispute between a well-known columnist, T.J. Simers, and his former employer, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC. Simers was demoted in 2013 and subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging constructive termination and age and disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The litigation spanned nine years and included three jury trials. The first trial resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding significant economic and noneconomic damages. However, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the constructive termination claim and ordered a new trial on noneconomic damages. Both parties appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, necessitating a second trial.In the second trial, the jury awarded Simers $15.4 million in noneconomic damages, but the trial court granted a new trial due to misconduct by Simers's counsel during closing arguments and the excessive nature of the damages awarded. The third trial focused solely on the amount of noneconomic damages, resulting in a $1.25 million award, which matched a pre-trial settlement offer made by the defendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded Simers $3,264,906 in attorney fees and $210,882.55 in costs, but excluded fees and costs incurred after the defendant's settlement offer. The defendant appealed, arguing that fees for the second trial and the unsuccessful appeal should not be awarded due to counsel's misconduct and the unrelated nature of the work. The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking recovery of appellate fees despite the trial court's ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in awarding fees for the second trial and the appeal, noting that the trial court had considered the misconduct and the overall reasonableness of the fees. The court also upheld the exclusion of post-offer fees and costs, in line with statutory requirements under section 998. View "Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC" on Justia Law

Flor de Maria Mejia was involved in a hit-and-run accident where she struck a bicyclist, William McGill, with her van and fled the scene. The collision caused significant damage to her vehicle and injuries to herself. Shortly after the incident, a parking control officer observed Mejia driving the damaged van and later identified her as the driver. Mejia and her boyfriend subsequently burned the van. Mejia sought medical attention, claiming her boyfriend had assaulted her, but refused a rape examination. Evidence from the burned van and Mejia's social media messages linked her to the crime.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Mejia of fleeing the scene of an injury accident, resulting in a three-year prison sentence. The jury found her guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 20001, subd. (b)(2), and imposed a restitution obligation of $7,500. Mejia's defense included multiple inconsistent statements to the police and an attempt to shift blame to her boyfriend, Carter, who also testified at trial.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Mejia challenged the identification process, the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments, and the sentencing enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. The court found the identification process was not unduly suggestive, and any assumed Griffin error (prosecutor's comment on Mejia's failure to testify) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also addressed the prosecutor's improper comment during rebuttal, concluding that the trial court's immediate and forceful admonition to the jury mitigated any potential prejudice.The court upheld the jury's finding of the sentencing enhancement, stating substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Mejia's failure to render aid exacerbated McGill's injuries. The court affirmed the trial court's restitution order, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "People v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Sutter’s Place, Inc., which operates Bay 101 Casino, challenged the City of San Jose's annual cardroom regulation fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax imposed without voter approval and violated due process. The fee was equally divided between Bay 101 and Casino M8trix, the only two cardrooms in the city. The plaintiff contended that the fee included costs outside the constitutional exception for regulatory charges and that the equal allocation was unfair.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found the fee valid, covering reasonable regulatory costs and fairly allocated between the cardrooms. The court determined the fee was for regulatory functions, the amount was necessary to cover costs, and the equal allocation was reasonable given the equal number of tables and benefits to both cardrooms. The court also excluded certain expert testimony from the plaintiff and denied a separate due process trial.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It upheld the trial court's finding that the equal allocation of the fee was reasonable but reversed the judgment on other grounds. The appellate court found the trial court erred by not specifically determining whether all costs included in the fee fell within the constitutional exception for regulatory charges. The case was remanded for the trial court to identify and exclude any non-permissible costs from the fee and to conduct further proceedings on the due process claim if necessary. The appellate court also reversed the award of costs to the city and directed the trial court to reassess costs after applying the correct legal standards. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law