Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nathaniel DiMaggio filed a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and tablet. DiMaggio argued that the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office exceeded the scope of the search warrant and that the trial court erred in finding the sheriff’s office acted in good faith. The Monterey County District Attorney contended that the sheriff’s office properly executed the search warrant and acted in good faith.The Monterey County Superior Court issued a search warrant authorizing the search of DiMaggio’s cellphone and tablet for evidence related to a sexual assault within a specific date range. During the search, the sheriff’s office found images of suspected child pornography, which were outside the specified date range. DiMaggio filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that the sheriff’s office exceeded the scope of the warrant but denied the motion to suppress, applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and agreed with DiMaggio. The court found that the sheriff’s office knowingly exceeded the scope of the search warrant by including items without timestamps, which were not authorized by the warrant. The court held that the good faith exception did not apply because the actions of the sheriff’s office were not objectively reasonable and were part of a standard protocol that disregarded the warrant’s limitations. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to suppress and to enter a new order suppressing any evidence obtained outside the date and time limitations set forth in the search warrant. View "DiMaggio v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with vehicle theft and receiving stolen property. He pled no contest to misdemeanor vehicle theft, and the court placed him on three years of probation, reserving the issue of victim restitution. The prosecutor did not inform the court or the defendant of a $440 restitution claim submitted by the victim before the probation period ended. The court did not order the defendant to pay any specific restitution amount during his probation.The defendant's probation expired without any restitution order being issued. He then filed a petition for dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, asserting he had fulfilled all probation conditions. The probation department supported his petition, confirming he met all terms and no victim restitution was ordered. However, the prosecutor objected, claiming the defendant still owed $440 in restitution. The trial court denied the petition, citing the reserved restitution.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant fulfilled all probation conditions since no specific restitution amount was ordered during his probation. The court emphasized that reserving restitution is not equivalent to ordering payment of a specific amount. The court also noted that the prosecutor's failure to pursue the restitution claim during the probation period meant the defendant was not responsible for any unpaid restitution. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the defendant's petition for dismissal. View "People v. Daffeh" on Justia Law

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Hill maintained that the murders were committed by Michael McCray, whose statements to the police incriminated both himself and Hill. McCray did not testify at trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, but his statements were admitted under the hearsay rule. Decades later, Hill discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a promise not to prosecute McCray for his involvement in the case. Hill filed a habeas corpus petition alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The trial court dismissed Hill’s claims, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that the evidence against Hill was overwhelming and that the failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement did not undermine confidence in the verdict. The court also found that Hill did not plead that false evidence was presented to the jury, as required under Napue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that Hill established a prima facie case for both Brady and Napue violations. The court noted that McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was misleading and that the prosecution’s suppression of the non-prosecution agreement allowed McCray to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, leading to the admission of his statements without cross-examination. The court concluded that the suppressed evidence was material and could have affected the jury’s verdict. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause. View "In re Hill" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new 2014 Kia Optima and soon experienced issues with the vehicle's reverse gear. Despite multiple visits to the dealership, the problem persisted. The plaintiff requested a buyback from Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia), but Kia's investigations, including installing a flight recorder, did not confirm the defect. Kia eventually offered to repurchase the vehicle, but the plaintiff rejected the offer and continued to use the car until filing a lawsuit under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding restitution and a civil penalty for Kia's willful violation of the Act. Kia filed posttrial motions challenging the restitution amount and the civil penalty. The court partially granted Kia's motions, striking the civil penalty for insufficient evidence but denying the motion to reduce the restitution amount.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the restitution award should not include the cost of the optional service contract, certain insurance premiums, and other specific amounts. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial on the civil penalty, finding substantial evidence that Kia may have had a good faith and reasonable belief that the vehicle was not defective.The appellate court directed the trial court to amend the judgment to exclude the non-recoverable amounts from the restitution award and to conduct a new trial on the civil penalty, limited to the period before the lawsuit was filed. The court clarified that a violation of the Act is willful only if it is deliberate, knowing, or not based on a good faith and reasonable belief of compliance. View "Valdovinos v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Joseph Mayor, a worker injured in December 2013 while employed by Ross Valley Sanitation District, was awarded total permanent disability by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) on March 2, 2023. Ross Valley filed a petition for reconsideration with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) on March 23, 2023. The Board did not act on the petition within the 60-day period mandated by former section 5909 of the Labor Code, which stated that a petition for reconsideration is deemed denied if not acted upon within 60 days of filing.The Board issued an order granting Ross Valley’s petition for reconsideration on August 14, 2023, 144 days after the petition was filed. Mayor requested a hearing to enforce the WCJ’s award and subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the Board lost jurisdiction over the matter 60 days after the petition was filed. The Board issued a revised order on February 2, 2024, rescinding the WCJ’s award and returning the matter to the trial level for further proceedings, citing an administrative irregularity that delayed the Board’s receipt of the petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Mayor and the recent decision in Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2023) that the Board’s action after 60 days exceeded its jurisdiction. The court held that former section 5909 was mandatory and that the Board’s failure to act within the 60-day period resulted in the petition being denied by operation of law. Consequently, the court granted Mayor’s petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the Board to rescind its orders granting reconsideration and to reinstate the WCJ’s award of permanent disability. View "Mayor v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting incident that occurred around midnight on October 7, 2020, in San Francisco. The victim, who was intoxicated, was walking home when a white SUV approached him. After a brief interaction, the SUV drove away, but the victim made an obscene gesture, prompting the driver to return and fire two shots, one of which hit the victim's leg. The police later found a nine-millimeter Luger cartridge case at the scene. Six days later, officers located a white Mercedes SUV matching the description, arrested Raymond Tidd, and found a loaded gun and a similar cartridge in the vehicle.In the Superior Court of San Francisco, Tidd was charged with attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. He pled guilty to additional firearm possession charges. At trial, the prosecution presented expert testimony from a firearms toolmark analyst, Jacobus Swanepoel, who claimed that the cartridge case found at the scene matched a test-fired cartridge from Tidd's gun. Despite the defense's objections, the trial court allowed this testimony. The jury convicted Tidd of assault with a firearm and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle but could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting Swanepoel's testimony without sufficient evidence of its reliability. The court noted that Swanepoel's method lacked objective standards and was based on subjective judgment without supporting studies or validation. Consequently, the court held that the admission of this expert testimony was prejudicial and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Tidd" on Justia Law

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order. View "People v. I.B." on Justia Law

In 1997, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced to 15 years to life, plus an additional 10 years. In January 2020, he filed a petition under former section 1170.95, which was summarily denied. In January 2023, he filed a motion for relief under section 745 of the California Racial Justice Act (RJA), claiming racial bias in his conviction and sentence. The trial court denied the motion, citing improper service and failure to state a violation of the RJA.The defendant appealed, arguing that he made a prima facie case for a hearing under section 745 and that the denial violated his equal protection rights. The People contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion and that the denial was not erroneous. The defendant countered that his motion was authorized under section 745, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the defendant's motion was prematurely filed under the RJA’s phased-in retroactivity provisions. Specifically, the court noted that the defendant's case fell within the last phase of eligibility for relief, commencing January 1, 2026. As a result, the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider the motion, rendering its order void. The appellate court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the appeal. View "People v. Vigil" on Justia Law

In a juvenile wardship proceeding, the minor's counsel declared a doubt about the minor's competency to stand trial. Consequently, the juvenile court suspended the proceedings and referred the minor for a competency evaluation. The court's protocol mandated the disclosure of the minor's mental health records to the court-appointed expert for evaluation. The minor objected, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under California Evidence Code section 1014. The court overruled the objection and ordered the disclosure, prompting the minor to file a writ petition challenging this decision.The Contra Costa County Superior Court overruled the minor's objection, stating that Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 permits the compelled disclosure of all available records, including mental health records, for competency evaluations. The court also referenced Evidence Code section 1025, which it interpreted as allowing such disclosures in competency proceedings. The minor's request for a stay to seek appellate review was denied, leading to the filing of the writ petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Evidence Code section 1016 renders the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable in juvenile competency proceedings once the minor's counsel declares a doubt about the minor's competency. The court reasoned that the issue of the minor's mental or emotional condition is tendered by the minor through their counsel, thus falling under the patient-litigant exception to the privilege. The court denied the minor's writ petition and dissolved the partial stay of the juvenile court's order. View "T.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2005, Gerardo Lopez was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances of committing the murder during a robbery and kidnapping. The prosecution's theory included felony murder. In 2022, Lopez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law should apply to his case. The trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, citing the jury's findings that Lopez had the specific intent to kill and was engaged in the kidnapping, which disqualified him from resentencing.The Superior Court of Orange County found that the jury's special circumstance findings, which included Lopez's specific intent to kill, precluded him from relief under section 1172.6. The court noted that the jury instructions required a finding of specific intent to kill for the kidnapping special circumstance, and thus, Lopez was not convicted under any imputed malice theory.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), a participant in a felony who has the intent to kill is liable for murder without needing to assist in the killing itself. The court concluded that the jury's findings that Lopez committed kidnapping with the intent to kill met the requirements of section 189, subdivision (e)(2), making him ineligible for resentencing. The court affirmed the postjudgment order, agreeing that Lopez's petition was correctly denied at the prima facie stage. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law