Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jermaine Randy Howard was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man at an unlicensed nightclub in San Jose. Howard claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this defense. Before sentencing, Howard filed a motion alleging the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) by questioning him about his connection to East Palo Alto, which he argued was racially biased. The trial court denied the motion, finding Howard failed to make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, and sentenced him to 19 years to life in prison.Howard appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his RJA motion and that the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing arguments violated the RJA and his due process rights. He also contended that the jury instructions misstated the law regarding murder, imperfect self-defense, and heat of passion, cumulatively prejudicing his defense.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in concluding Howard had not made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination about East Palo Alto. The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Howard's RJA motion. The court rejected Howard's claims of instructional error, finding the jury instructions correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury about the prosecution's burden of proof.The appellate court's main holding was that Howard made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation, warranting a hearing on his motion. The court conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, affirming the conviction and sentence otherwise. If the trial court denies relief on remand, the judgment will be reinstated; if relief is granted, further proceedings will follow. View "People v. Howard" on Justia Law

The defendant pled no contest to making criminal threats and admitted to a prior serious felony. Under a negotiated agreement, the trial court imposed and suspended an eight-year prison sentence, placing him on a two-year term of formal probation. Nearly two years later, the probation department filed a petition alleging the defendant violated probation by failing to contact the department for three consecutive months. The trial court revoked probation and ordered the defendant to serve the previously suspended sentence.The Superior Court of Tehama County initially placed the defendant on probation in February 2021, with a two-year term starting from that date. The court credited him with 228 days for time served in county jail. In January 2023, the probation department filed a petition to revoke probation, which the court granted after the defendant admitted to the violation. The court terminated probation and imposed the suspended eight-year sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation in 2023 because his probation term should have ended in July 2022, considering the 228 days credited for time served. The appellate court rejected this argument, stating that there is no legal basis for reducing a probation term by the time already served in custody. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to terminate probation, given the defendant's repeated failures to report to probation. Additionally, the appellate court found no ineffective assistance of counsel and agreed that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the proper conviction assessment.The appellate court affirmed the judgment with directions to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect a $30 conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373. View "People v. Dauterman" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of oral copulation by duress and sodomy by duress against an employee, Jane Doe. The relationship began consensually but evolved into a coercive and abusive dynamic. The defendant required Doe to perform daily oral and anal sex, threatening her employment and pay if she refused. Doe testified that she initially participated willingly but later felt compelled due to the defendant's escalating control and threats.The Santa Clara County Superior Court sentenced the defendant to 60 years in prison, with consecutive lower terms of three years for each count. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on duress and the reasonable mistake of fact defense. He also contended that the court improperly allowed Doe to testify about his state of mind and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in its instructions on duress, finding that the prosecution's theory of duress was supported by the evidence of the defendant's control and threats. The court also upheld the reasonable mistake of fact instruction, consistent with established precedent requiring the defendant's belief in consent to be reasonable. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing Doe's testimony about the defendant's state of mind, as it was based on her observations and experience. Finally, the court rejected the defendant's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, concluding that the 60-year sentence was not disproportionate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant's conduct.The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Guenther" on Justia Law

In 2018, the defendant was sentenced to 12 years in state prison for multiple offenses, including shooting at an occupied vehicle and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. In 2022, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, struck a prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced the defendant to 11 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating factors not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the reimposition of the upper term.The Superior Court of Butte County initially sentenced the defendant to 12 years, considering his criminal history and the severity of his offenses. The court found that the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. In 2022, the same court struck the prior prison term enhancement but maintained the upper term for the other offenses, resulting in an 11-year sentence.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), the trial court was not required to find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt if the upper term was previously imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term and that the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, as there was no sound legal basis for such an objection. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's resentencing order. View "P. v. Brannon-Thompson" on Justia Law

On November 5, 2021, Davonyae Sellers was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police for a minor traffic violation. During the stop, officers observed a marijuana rolling tray and loose marijuana on the vehicle's floorboard. Despite the driver’s denial of any marijuana in the vehicle, officers found 0.36 grams of loose marijuana and a firearm under the passenger seat. Sellers was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.The magistrate denied Sellers' motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search, reasoning that the loose marijuana constituted contraband under Vehicle Code section 23222, subdivision (b). Sellers renewed the suppression motion under Penal Code section 995, which was also denied by the trial court. Sellers then filed a petition for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition, arguing the search lacked probable cause.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the search was supported by probable cause. It held that the loose marijuana, although lawful in amount, was contraband because it was not in a closed container, violating section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). The court also found that the totality of circumstances, including the suspects' nervousness, false statements, and the presence of a marijuana rolling tray, provided probable cause for the search. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay order was terminated upon finality of the opinion. View "Sellers v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, two defendants were tried for multiple assaultive incidents that occurred in 2017. The first incident involved the defendants accosting a man in Pacific Beach, where one defendant punched the victim and the other stole his bike. The second incident took place in Chula Vista, where the defendants attempted to rob a man carrying a shopping bag. The third incident occurred in the Gaslamp Quarter, where one defendant punched an inebriated man, leading to a brawl during which the other defendant fatally stabbed one man and seriously injured another.The Superior Court of San Diego County found both defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista incidents. One defendant was also found guilty of premeditated murder, attempted murder, and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the Gaslamp Quarter incident. The other defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury for the same incident.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred by giving a modified version of CALCRIM No. 375, which used a preponderance of the evidence standard for the jury’s consideration of evidence of the charged Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes. This instruction effectively lowered the prosecution’s burden of proving those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a structural error is reversible per se.The Court of Appeal reversed both defendants’ convictions for the Pacific Beach and Chula Vista crimes (counts 5–7) and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the remaining convictions related to the Gaslamp Quarter incident, finding no prejudicial error in those respects. View "P. v. Holliday" on Justia Law

Eddie Sorto was sentenced to over 100 years in prison for crimes committed at age 15, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found multiple special-circumstance allegations and enhancements true. After serving 15 years, Sorto petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and thus entitled him to relief under equal protection principles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Sorto’s petition, stating that he was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d) because he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. The court did not address Sorto’s equal protection argument directly but noted that he was eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, which it found sufficient to deny the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to relief under section 1170(d) based on equal protection guarantees. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case People v. Heard was wrongly decided and contrary to California Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d).The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether Sorto meets the other requirements for relief under section 1170(d). View "People v. Sorto" on Justia Law

Carla Montgomery petitioned to receive a share of her deceased father Benjamin C. Williams' trust estate, claiming she was an omitted child under Probate Code section 21622. Carla was born following a brief relationship between her mother, Annie Elliott, and Benjamin in the 1960s. Benjamin, who fathered seven children in total, moved to California shortly after Carla's conception and was unaware of her birth. In 1999, Benjamin executed a trust naming only his two youngest children, Benita Ligia Williams and Benjamin S. Williams, as beneficiaries. Carla learned of Benjamin's death and the trust's existence in 2019 and subsequently petitioned for a share of the estate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a one-day trial where evidence and testimonies were presented. The court found that Benjamin was unaware of Carla's birth when he executed the trust but concluded that Carla failed to prove that her omission was solely due to Benjamin's unawareness of her existence. The court noted that Benjamin had also omitted four other known children from his trust, indicating his intent to provide only for the two named beneficiaries. Consequently, the court denied Carla's petition and entered judgment against her.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the trial court's application of the reasoning from Rallo v. O’Brian, which requires an omitted child to prove that the sole reason for their omission was the testator's unawareness of their birth. The appellate court found that Benjamin's omission of his other known children demonstrated his intent to exclude all preexisting children, known or unknown. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, denying Carla's petition and awarding costs on appeal to Benita. View "Estate of Williams" on Justia Law

In 1998, Denail Shane Green was charged with possessing cocaine base with intent to sell. The information also alleged a prison prior for a 1990 robbery conviction and two prior strike offenses, including the robbery and a lewd act involving a minor. Green was acquitted of the possession charge but convicted of a lesser offense. He admitted to the prior convictions and was sentenced to 26 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prison prior.The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Green as potentially serving an invalid enhancement under Senate Bill 483, which retroactively invalidated certain prison prior enhancements. Green sought resentencing under the new law. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied his request, reasoning that his prison prior enhancement remained valid because he served concurrent terms for both the robbery and the lewd act.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the enhancement was not imposed for a sexually violent offense as required by the new law. The information had only alleged the robbery as the basis for the enhancement, not the lewd act. Therefore, the enhancement was invalid under section 1172.75. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a full resentencing, directing the trial court to eliminate the invalid enhancement and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. View "P. v. Green" on Justia Law

Payam Mahram used Instacart to purchase groceries from a grocery store and later sued the store, alleging it had cheated him on price. The grocery store, not a party to the Instacart contract, moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement between Mahram and Instacart. The trial court denied the motion, and the grocery store appealed.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and denied the grocery store's motion to compel arbitration without providing a written explanation. The grocery store then appealed this decision to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that while Mahram did agree to arbitration with Instacart by signing up for its service, the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. The court determined that the trial court, rather than an arbitrator, was the proper authority to decide the threshold questions of arbitrability because the contract did not clearly indicate that Mahram had agreed to arbitrate with anyone other than Instacart. Additionally, the court found that the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of the Instacart-Mahram arbitration contract, as the contract's motivating purpose was not to benefit the grocery store. Consequently, the grocery store could not compel arbitration based on the Instacart agreement. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondent. View "Mahram v. The Kroger Co." on Justia Law