Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Denail Shane Green was charged with possessing cocaine base with intent to sell. The information also alleged a prison prior for a 1990 robbery conviction and two prior strike offenses, including the robbery and a lewd act involving a minor. Green was acquitted of the possession charge but convicted of a lesser offense. He admitted to the prior convictions and was sentenced to 26 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prison prior.The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Green as potentially serving an invalid enhancement under Senate Bill 483, which retroactively invalidated certain prison prior enhancements. Green sought resentencing under the new law. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied his request, reasoning that his prison prior enhancement remained valid because he served concurrent terms for both the robbery and the lewd act.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the enhancement was not imposed for a sexually violent offense as required by the new law. The information had only alleged the robbery as the basis for the enhancement, not the lewd act. Therefore, the enhancement was invalid under section 1172.75. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a full resentencing, directing the trial court to eliminate the invalid enhancement and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. View "P. v. Green" on Justia Law

Payam Mahram used Instacart to purchase groceries from a grocery store and later sued the store, alleging it had cheated him on price. The grocery store, not a party to the Instacart contract, moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement between Mahram and Instacart. The trial court denied the motion, and the grocery store appealed.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case and denied the grocery store's motion to compel arbitration without providing a written explanation. The grocery store then appealed this decision to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that while Mahram did agree to arbitration with Instacart by signing up for its service, the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. The court determined that the trial court, rather than an arbitrator, was the proper authority to decide the threshold questions of arbitrability because the contract did not clearly indicate that Mahram had agreed to arbitrate with anyone other than Instacart. Additionally, the court found that the grocery store was not a third-party beneficiary of the Instacart-Mahram arbitration contract, as the contract's motivating purpose was not to benefit the grocery store. Consequently, the grocery store could not compel arbitration based on the Instacart agreement. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the respondent. View "Mahram v. The Kroger Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the enforceability of a noncompetition provision in an operating agreement following the partial sale of a business interest. Robert and Stephen Samuelian co-founded Life Generations Healthcare, LLC, and later sold a portion of their interest in the company. The new operating agreement included a noncompetition clause that the Samuelians later challenged in arbitration. The arbitrator found the provision invalid per se under California Business and Professions Code section 16600, which generally voids contracts restraining lawful professions, trades, or businesses.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the arbitrator's decision de novo and confirmed the award, agreeing that the noncompetition provision was invalid per se. The court also found that the Samuelians did not owe fiduciary duties to the company as minority members in a manager-managed LLC. The company and individual defendants appealed, arguing that the arbitrator applied the wrong legal standard and that the reasonableness standard should apply instead.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the arbitrator had indeed applied the wrong standard. The court held that noncompetition agreements arising from the partial sale of a business interest should be evaluated under the reasonableness standard, not the per se standard. The court reasoned that partial sales differ significantly from the sale of an entire business interest, as the seller remains an owner and may still have some control over the company. Therefore, such noncompetition provisions must be scrutinized for their procompetitive benefits.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitration award and directed the trial court to enter an order denying the Samuelians' petition to confirm the award and granting the company's motion to vacate the entire award, including the portion awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Two police officers on routine patrol stopped a car for a traffic violation. Officer Booth approached the driver, Luis Ramirez, while Officer Driscoll approached the passenger side. Booth ordered Ramirez out of the car after noticing a bulge at Ramirez’s waistband, suspecting he might be armed. As Ramirez exited the car, Driscoll saw a handgun behind the driver’s seat. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the stop.The Superior Court of Orange County granted Ramirez’s motion to suppress, reasoning that there was no change in circumstances regarding the officers’ safety between the beginning of the stop and the point at which Ramirez was removed from his car. The court dismissed the case because the prosecution could not proceed without the excluded evidence. The Orange County District Attorney appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that under the Fourth Amendment, once a vehicle is lawfully detained for a traffic violation, an officer may order the driver to exit the vehicle without any additional justification. The court determined that Officer Booth’s actions were permissible and that there were no Fourth Amendment violations. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal order and remanded the matter with directions to deny Ramirez’s motion to suppress evidence. View "P. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

A group called Riversiders Against Increased Taxes (RAIT) filed a petition to stop the City of Riverside from placing Measure C on the November 2, 2021, ballot. RAIT argued that Measure C, which involved transferring excess fees from the city-operated electric utility to the general fund, violated Proposition 218 because it was a general tax that should not be voted on in a special election. The City contended that the election was a general election as it was a regularly scheduled event, despite being labeled a "special municipal election" in city documents. The trial court granted RAIT's request for declaratory relief, finding the election was special, but did not cancel the election or enjoin certification of the results. Both parties appealed.The City argued on appeal that the trial court wrongly declared the election as special and that RAIT should not be considered the prevailing party. RAIT cross-appealed, claiming the trial court should have removed Measure C from the ballot and enjoined the certification of the election results. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's declaratory judgment, holding that the November 2021 election was a general election under state law, despite the city's charter labeling it as special. The court found that the election was regularly scheduled and consolidated with a general election, thus complying with Proposition 218. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the rest of RAIT's petition, noting that RAIT had multiple opportunities to object to continuances but failed to do so, making their appeal moot. The City was deemed the prevailing party and entitled to costs on appeal. View "Riversiders Against Increased Taxes v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

In 2017, Riverside Mining Limited (Riverside Mining) leased 73 acres of its property to Quality Aggregates (Quality) for mining. By 2020, disputes arose, leading Quality to sue Riverside Mining in 2021 for breach of contract, trespass, and quiet title. In 2022, Riverside Mining filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Quality for alleged lease breaches. The parties agreed that Quality would deposit monthly rent payments with the court during the litigation. Quality later made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Riverside Mining did not accept. Riverside Mining then dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice.The Superior Court of Riverside County dismissed the unlawful detainer action and later addressed two motions: Quality's motion for attorney fees under section 998 and Riverside Mining's motion to disburse the deposited rent payments. The court denied Quality's motion for attorney fees and granted Riverside Mining's motion for disbursement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that Quality was not entitled to attorney fees under section 998 because Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), precludes awarding attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed. The court also affirmed the disbursement of the deposited funds to Riverside Mining, as Quality had no right to a setoff for attorney fees. The court's main holding was that section 998 does not independently authorize attorney fees without an underlying statutory or contractual right, and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), prevents such an award in cases of voluntary dismissal. View "Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Syre appealed an order denying her motion to disqualify California Indian Legal Services (CILS) from representing defendant Mark Douglas. Syre had initially contacted CILS seeking representation for a quiet title lawsuit against Douglas but was declined due to her non-residency in Inyo County. She later filed the lawsuit with other counsel. Douglas, who is homeless and the son of the late property owner Charlotte Willett, successfully obtained representation from CILS. Syre argued that CILS had a conflict of interest due to her prior contact with them.The Superior Court of Inyo County denied Syre's motion to disqualify CILS, finding no conflict of interest. The court noted that Syre had only spoken to a non-attorney intake advocate at CILS and that no confidential information was shared with any attorney at CILS. The intake advocate had merely gathered preliminary information to determine Syre's eligibility for CILS's services, which she did not meet. The court also found that CILS had adequate screening measures in place to protect any confidential information.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Syre was a prospective client but did not communicate any confidential information to an attorney at CILS. The court emphasized that the information shared was preliminary and necessary to determine eligibility for CILS's services. Additionally, the court noted that public interest law offices like CILS are treated differently from private law firms regarding disqualification rules. The court concluded that there was no substantial relationship between Syre and any attorney at CILS and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. View "Syre v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The case involves the Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network (appellant) challenging actions taken by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission (CPC) in March 2018 to implement parts of the Westside Mobility Plan. This plan aims to address congestion and mobility issues in the western part of Los Angeles. The appellant argued that the CPC’s actions did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and sought to invalidate them.The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the case and rejected most of the appellant’s contentions, denying the petition. The court found that the CPC was a decision-making body authorized to certify the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA. The court also found that the EIR was legally adequate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the CPC was authorized to certify the EIR as it was a decision-making body for the project. The court also found that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA under Guidelines section 15301, which covers minor alterations to existing public structures. The court concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate that the Streetscape Plan fell within any exceptions to the categorical exemptions. Additionally, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts was adequate and that the City had ensured that mitigation measures would be implemented.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, and the City of Los Angeles was awarded costs on appeal. View "Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Kurt Brady Obermueller was convicted of stalking Kathy B., a former girlfriend from junior high school, after a 30-year hiatus in contact. In 2018, Obermueller began sending Kathy B. sexually charged and threatening emails, texts, and online communications. Despite a restraining order issued in 2019, he continued his harassment by sending messages to Kathy B.'s father and sister, who forwarded them to her. These messages included disturbing references to weapons and violence, causing Kathy B. significant distress and fear for her safety.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially handled the case, where Obermueller was charged with stalking and disobeying a court order. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to five years in custody. Obermueller appealed, arguing that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted stalking, based on his claim that he only contacted Kathy B.'s family members and not her directly.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the method of conveying threats is irrelevant under the stalking statute, which requires only that the defendant made a credible threat with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear. The court found that Obermueller's actions constituted completed stalking, not attempted stalking, as he was recklessly aware that his messages would be perceived as threatening. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on attempted stalking, as there was no substantial evidence to support the lesser offense. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "People v. Obermueller" on Justia Law

Bijan Boutiques, LLC (Bijan) appealed a summary judgment in favor of Rosamari Isong. Bijan sought to void the property distribution in the marital dissolution judgment between Isong and her former husband, Richard Milam Akubiro, under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). Bijan argued that the judgment was fraudulent as it awarded Isong the couple’s only U.S. property, making it difficult to enforce a judgment Bijan had against Akubiro without incurring significant expenses to pursue foreign assets.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Bijan’s complaint was barred by Family Code section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which protects property received in a marital dissolution from being liable for a spouse’s debt unless the debt was assigned to the receiving spouse. The court found that the marital dissolution judgment was not a product of a negotiated settlement but was adjudicated by the court, thus not subject to the UVTA.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that Family Code section 916 precludes Bijan from enforcing its judgment against the property awarded to Isong. The court distinguished this case from Mejia v. Reed, which allowed UVTA claims against marital settlement agreements, noting that the dissolution judgment here was court-adjudicated, not a private agreement. The court also rejected Bijan’s arguments that the judgment was obtained by fraud and that the Chino property should not have been subject to division, affirming that the property was presumed to be community property under Family Code section 2581.The appellate court concluded that Bijan could not satisfy its judgment against Akubiro by executing on the property awarded to Isong and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Isong. View "Bijan Boutiques v. Isong" on Justia Law