Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brandon Horton was convicted of stalking and making criminal threats against Seiko H. He was acquitted of making criminal threats against Seiko’s father, John H. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order prohibiting Horton from contacting both Seiko and John, and an order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons. Horton appealed, challenging the inclusion of John in the protective order and the prohibition on possessing deadly or dangerous weapons.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found Horton guilty of making criminal threats against Seiko and stalking her, with the jury finding true several aggravating factors. Horton was acquitted of making criminal threats against John. The trial court sentenced Horton to five years and eight months in state prison, with credit for time served, and issued the protective orders in question.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in including John in the protective order, as there was sufficient evidence that Horton committed or attempted to commit harm against John. However, the court found that the trial court erred in extending the weapons prohibition beyond firearms to any deadly or dangerous weapon. The appellate court modified the judgment to strike the order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons, while affirming the judgment as modified. The trial court was directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections. View "P. v. Horton" on Justia Law

Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) filed a lawsuit against Federal Insurance Company (Federal) alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, and seeking rescission of a settlement agreement. Truck claimed that Federal fraudulently misrepresented and concealed the voluntary nature of its decision to pay defense costs for Moldex-Metric, Inc. (Moldex) under an umbrella policy. Truck argued that it would not have agreed to pay $4.9 million in settlement had it known Federal contributed to Moldex’s defense voluntarily “at its own expense.”The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially ruled in favor of Federal, granting summary judgment on the basis that Federal had no duty to defend Moldex under its umbrella policy. Truck appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Truck’s assertion that it reserved the right to recoup defense fees and indemnity costs after the settlement agreement. Truck then filed the current fraud action, alleging that Federal concealed its voluntary business decision to defend Moldex.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Truck contended that the trial court failed to address its claim for fraudulent concealment and only considered the misrepresentation theory. The appellate court agreed with Truck, finding that the trial court did not consider the fraudulent concealment claim despite Truck’s objection. The appellate court determined that Truck did not unreasonably neglect to protect itself against the alleged fraudulent concealment by Federal, rendering it extrinsic and not barred by the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on Truck’s fraudulent concealment cause of action and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial to consider Truck’s fraudulent concealment claim and any other derivative causes of action. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and Truck was awarded costs on appeal. View "Truck Ins. Exchange v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Hinojos, who was convicted of three counts under the gang conspiracy statute, Penal Code section 182.5, related to an attack on a prison inmate by individuals associated with the Mexican Mafia. The underlying offenses were assault by a life prisoner, conspiracy to commit murder, and attempted murder. Hinojos appealed, raising several issues, including the application of section 654 to stay two of his convictions, the gang enhancement, the application of the Three Strikes law, the sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Hinojos and sentenced him to 50 years to life plus additional terms for the gang enhancement. The court imposed sentences on all three counts, which Hinojos argued should be stayed under section 654. He also contended that the gang enhancement should not apply, the Three Strikes law was improperly applied to one count, and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Additionally, he challenged the jury instructions on the pattern of criminal gang activity and the natural and probable consequences doctrine.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that two of Hinojos's three convictions must be stayed under section 654 but rejected the rest of his challenges. The court held that the gang enhancement punishes aspects of criminal conduct beyond those in the gang conspiracy statute, and therefore section 654 does not bar its imposition. The court also found that allegations of Three Strikes sentencing as to some counts are sufficient to allege sentencing as to all eligible counts. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and any error in not setting aside the indictment was harmless. The court concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the pattern of criminal gang activity and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury did not convict Hinojos of multiple conspiracies but rather a single conspiracy charged in three ways. The convictions were affirmed, and the case was remanded for the trial court to stay execution of the sentence on two of the three counts. View "P. v. Hinojos" on Justia Law

A mother was shot and killed by a deputy sheriff while her young children watched. The mother, who had been acting erratically and wielding a knife, advanced towards the deputies despite repeated requests to drop the weapon. The lead deputy fired his service pistol after a backup deputy's taser failed to stop her. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the deputies and Nevada County, claiming the use of force was unreasonable.The trial court ruled that the lead deputy acted reasonably and granted summary judgment in his favor, but allowed the claims against the backup deputy to proceed, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude his actions were unreasonable. The backup deputy and the County petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have granted their summary judgment motion as well.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court emphasized the need to assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering the split-second decisions officers must make. The court concluded that the backup deputy acted reasonably as a matter of law, noting that the mother advanced towards the deputies with a deadly weapon and that the backup deputy's use of a taser was a reasonable response under the circumstances.The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its partial denial of the summary judgment motion and to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety, thus ruling in favor of the backup deputy and the County. View "County of Nevada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Andrew Christian Temple was found not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of second-degree murder. The jury determined that Temple used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on considering his mental disorders in determining imperfect self-defense, erred in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and wrongly denied his motion for a trial continuance to locate a witness.The Superior Court of Riverside initially handled the case, where Temple was convicted. Temple's defense requested jury instructions on imperfect self-defense and consideration of mental disorders, which the court provided. However, Temple contended these instructions were insufficient as they did not explicitly allow the jury to consider his mental disorders in assessing imperfect self-defense. Additionally, Temple's request for a trial continuance to locate a witness was denied by the trial court, which found no good cause for the delay.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple's mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no guarantee the witness could be located within a reasonable time. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Temple" on Justia Law

Stephen Hofer, a licensed attorney and founder of Aerlex Law Group, hired Vicky Boladian as a part-time contract attorney in 2008. In 2013, they formed Aerlex Tax Services, LLC (tax LLC) to provide tax-related services. Hofer held a 55% equity interest, and Boladian held 45%. Their relationship deteriorated in 2017-2018, leading to litigation. In 2020, they settled by executing three agreements, each containing arbitration clauses. In 2023, they dissolved the tax LLC and transferred its assets to Aerlex Tax Services, LLP (tax LLP). Boladian later withdrew, forming her own firm and taking clients and assets.The plaintiffs, including Hofer and the tax LLP, filed a lawsuit against Boladian and her new firm, alleging 13 causes of action and seeking various damages and relief. They did not mention arbitration in their complaint. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, both of which were denied. They also engaged in extensive discovery and demanded a jury trial. Boladian and her firm filed a cross-complaint, and three days later, the plaintiffs moved to compel arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiffs had waived their right to arbitration by substantially litigating the case in court for over six months. The court applied the waiver standard from St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California, which was later overruled by the California Supreme Court in Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo under the new standard set by Quach. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had waived their right to compel arbitration by engaging in extensive litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hofer v. Boladian" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services) for alleged childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.The trial court overruled Family Services' demurrer, which argued that Plaintiffs' claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal (Family Services) was "litigated to finality" under section 340.1, subdivision (q), where a previous suit against an agent (Dowell) for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts supporting liability based on conduct other than that of Dowell. View "Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In December 2019, Andrew Christian Temple, Vanessa Marquez, David Deschepper, and others were part of the homeless community in Temecula, California. On December 21, 2019, Temple fatally stabbed Deschepper in a Motel 6 parking lot after an altercation. Temple claimed self-defense, stating that Deschepper had attacked him first. However, evidence showed that Temple used excessive force, including pursuing and repeatedly stabbing Deschepper even after he fell to the ground.The Superior Court of Riverside convicted Temple of second-degree murder, finding that he used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred in jury instructions regarding imperfect self-defense and mental disorders, in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and in denying a trial continuance to locate a material witness.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple’s mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no indication the witness could be located within a reasonable time.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Temple’s conviction and sentence. View "People v. Temple" on Justia Law

Mone Yvette Sanders filed a class and representative action against her former employer, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., alleging wage and hour claims under the Labor Code and a cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The trial court granted Edward Jones's motions to compel arbitration of Sanders's individual claims and stayed the representative PAGA cause of action. Sanders initiated arbitration, but Edward Jones failed to pay $54,000 in fees within 30 days as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Sanders then moved to vacate the order compelling arbitration and proceed in court.The trial court denied Sanders's motion, finding section 1281.98 preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Sanders filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted by the FAA, as it furthers the goal of expeditious arbitration. The court also rejected Edward Jones's contention that the arbitration agreement required the arbitrator to decide whether Edward Jones was in default. The court found that section 1281.98 vests the employee with the unilateral right to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court upon the drafting party's failure to timely pay fees. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Sanders's motion to vacate the order compelling arbitration and granted the petition for writ of mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of Sanders's request for monetary sanctions. View "Sanders v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Beal Hickman pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 21 years in prison for the 2014 killing of Chadwick Brice. Hickman later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law under Senate Bill No. 1437, which altered the law of imputed malice, should apply to his case. He claimed that he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the new legal standards.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Hickman's petition, relying on the precedent set by People v. Reyes, which held that defendants who were convicted by plea after Senate Bill No. 1437 took effect are ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The court concluded that since Hickman entered his plea after the effective date of the legislation, he could not demonstrate that he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder due to the changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the reasoning in Reyes and other similar cases, such as People v. Lezama and People v. Gallegos, which held that defendants who were convicted by plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 are categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected Hickman's arguments that the law was unsettled after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437 and concluded that he had already received the benefits of the legislative changes. Therefore, the order denying Hickman's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Hickman" on Justia Law