Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns challenges to groundwater replenishment charges imposed by a water district in a desert region where groundwater is the main source of potable water. The water district operates three areas of benefit (AOBs) and levies replenishment charges on customers who pump significant groundwater. Domestic customers do not pay these charges directly, but their payments for drinking water are allocated to the replenishment funds through the district’s enterprise fund system. Plaintiffs, including a taxpayer association, alleged that the replenishment charges were unconstitutionally structured, resulting in higher rates for certain AOBs and unfair subsidies for others, benefitting large agricultural businesses.The litigation began with a combined petition and class action in the Superior Court of Riverside County, which was dismissed because the court found the validation statutes applied and the statute of limitations had expired. Subsequent reverse validation actions for later fiscal years were timely filed and consolidated. The Superior Court, in rulings by two judges, found the replenishment charges to be unconstitutional taxes because they did not satisfy the requirements of California Constitution Article XIII C, Section 1, subdivision (e)(2). Specifically, the court found that the district failed to show the allocation of replenishment costs bore a fair or reasonable relationship to the burdens or benefits received by each AOB, and thus the charges were not exempt from being classified as taxes. The court awarded substantial refunds to affected ratepayers and enjoined the district from imposing similar unconstitutional charges in the future.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed both the district’s appeal of the remedies and liability findings and the taxpayer association’s cross-appeal on procedural grounds. The appellate court affirmed in full, holding that the replenishment charges were unconstitutional, the remedies were proper, and that the validation statutes applied to these charges, thus barring untimely claims for earlier years. The appellate court also found no error in the trial court’s grant of refund and injunctive relief. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

A property owner in Los Angeles obtained a density bonus from the city in 2005, allowing him to build one additional housing unit beyond what zoning would otherwise permit, in exchange for agreeing to rent one of the units to low-income households for at least 30 years. This agreement was formalized and recorded against the property in 2006. The owner had previously taken out a mortgage, and the lender recorded its deed of trust against the property in 2005. After the owner defaulted, the lender foreclosed on the property in 2013. Several years later, new owners purchased the property, allegedly unaware of the recorded agreement requiring the low-income rental restriction.Following a notice from the City demanding compliance with the affordable housing agreement, the new owners filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking quiet title and declaratory relief. They argued that the affordable housing agreement, recorded after the original deed of trust, was a junior encumbrance extinguished by the foreclosure. The City countered that the agreement was a condition of a building permit and survived foreclosure. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the agreement was a covenant running with the land and survived foreclosure.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the affordable housing agreement was equivalent to a “condition attached to a permit” under Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E), and thus survived foreclosure. Permit conditions that have not been timely challenged run with the land and remain enforceable against successor owners, even those who acquire the property through foreclosure. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim and were not entitled to amend their complaint. View "Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Following the death of Daniel W. Bodmann, Sr., a dispute arose among his widow, Heather Holden-Bodmann, and his six biological and stepchildren, including Thomas E. Krouse, Jr. (Tom), over the administration of Bodmann Insurance—an estate asset—and the appointment of an executor for Dan’s estate. Dan’s holographic will named all seven children as executors and directed Andrea, one of the children, to maintain the insurance business. After Dan’s death, Andrea relied on Tom to help facilitate the transfer of the business’s clients, but conflict emerged between Tom and Heather regarding access to business records. The court found that Tom’s conduct toward Heather was aggressively disrespectful and contributed to a breakdown in cooperation, resulting in the decline of Bodmann Insurance.In the San Mateo County Superior Court, dueling petitions were filed for appointment as executor and special administrator. After an 11-day bench trial, Judge Buchwald found Tom’s behavior disqualified him from managing the business and denied his appointment as executor, citing his unwarranted aggression toward Heather and its detrimental impact on the estate asset. Interim orders limited Tom’s involvement in the business, allowed Andrea to run it, and later appointed Beth as special administrator and prospective executor after Dan, Jr. withdrew his request to serve.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Tom’s conduct amounted to mismanagement of the estate under Probate Code sections 8402(a)(3) and 8502(a), thus disqualifying him as executor. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that Tom’s aggressive and disruptive treatment of Heather “mismanaged” Bodmann Insurance, justifying his disqualification as executor. The orders denying Tom’s petition and limiting his participation in the business were affirmed. View "In re Estate of Bodmann" on Justia Law

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an experienced bus rider, was injured when she fell while standing on a public bus operated by a transit district. She had stood up and moved toward the rear door in anticipation of her stop, holding a bag in one hand and a phone in the other. Security camera footage showed she was not holding onto a railing at the time the bus made a routine turn, lost her balance, and fell. The driver was not alleged to have made any unusual maneuver, nor did other passengers appear affected. The plaintiff claimed the driver operated the bus negligently and failed to warn her to hold on or sit down.After the incident, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Kern County, asserting causes of action for motor vehicle negligence against both the driver and the transit district (the latter on a vicarious liability theory). The defendants moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the bus’s video recording to argue that the bus’s movement was ordinary and that the plaintiff’s own actions were the proximate cause of her injury. The plaintiff argued that factual disputes remained, that the heightened duty of care for common carriers was not met, and that expert opinion and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur created triable issues for the jury. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no evidence of negligence by the driver and that the plaintiff’s own conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injury.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that, while common carriers owe a heightened duty of care, that duty does not make them insurers of passenger safety for ordinary vehicle movements. The court further held that evidence, including the video, established the driver did not breach the applicable duty, and the plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injury. The court also ruled that neither comparative negligence nor res ipsa loquitur doctrines applied under these facts. Judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit Dist." on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages.Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law