Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the California Attorney General for allegedly overvaluing in-kind donations and making misleading statements in their solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations used inflated domestic market prices for donated medicines, which could not be distributed within the U.S., and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios to donors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) by adding language to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General's cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent injunctions without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove their entitlement to such relief. The appellate court vacated the injunctions and remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and prove their entitlement to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's reformation of section 12591.1(b), allowing the Attorney General to issue cease and desist orders for violations unrelated to speech. The appellate court also vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and directed the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the remand. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board v. Bonta" on Justia Law

A bakery, owned by Catharine Miller, refused to sell a predesigned, plain white cake to a same-sex couple, the Rodriguez-Del Rios, for their wedding reception. The bakery's policy prohibited the sale of any preordered cake for same-sex weddings based on Miller's religious beliefs that marriage is between a man and a woman. The couple ultimately obtained a similar cake from another bakery.The Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit against the bakery and Miller, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The Kern County Superior Court ruled in favor of the bakery, concluding there was no intentional discrimination and that Miller's referral of the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The court also found that the bakery's refusal was protected by the First Amendment as both pure speech and expressive conduct.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the bakery's policy was facially discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court concluded that the trial court erred in its determination that the policy was facially neutral and in its application of the intentional discrimination standard. The court also found that Miller's referral to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.Regarding the First Amendment defenses, the appellate court held that the plain white cake was not pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court reasoned that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and did not convey any particularized message about marriage. The court also upheld the UCRA's application under the federal and state Constitutions' free exercise clauses, concluding that the law is neutral and generally applicable and that there are no less restrictive means to achieve the state's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal access to goods and services irrespective of sexual orientation. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, Donald Hill, Jr. handed a gun to Timothy Mitchell, who, along with Danny Jeffreys, opened fire on a group of men, resulting in the death of Tereaun Berry and the injury of his brother Trent. Hill was convicted in 2015 of first-degree murder and attempted murder. On appeal in 2018, his murder conviction was reversed due to a trial court error, but his attempted murder conviction was affirmed. In 2019, Hill entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to attempted premeditated murder of Tereaun Berry, and the original murder count was dismissed.Hill petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in 2022. The district attorney conceded a prima facie case for relief, but the trial court ultimately denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Hill argued that the trial court erred by relying on principles of implied malice and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Hill was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he was not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury instructions and verdicts established that Hill was convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor, a theory still valid under current law. The court also found that Hill's no contest plea to attempted premeditated murder indicated express malice, making him ineligible for relief. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Hill's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Rachel Moniz and Paola Correa filed separate lawsuits against Adecco USA, Inc. under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging violations of the Labor Code. Moniz and Adecco settled their case, but Correa challenged the fairness of the settlement. The trial court approved the revised settlement over Correa's objections and awarded attorney’s fees to Moniz’s counsel. Correa's request for a service award and attorney’s fees for her own work was largely denied. Correa appealed, arguing the trial court's analysis of the revised settlement was flawed and that her request for attorney’s fees and a service award should have been granted.The San Mateo County Superior Court overruled Adecco's demurrer in Moniz's case, while the San Francisco Superior Court sustained Adecco's demurrer in Correa's case. Correa's motion to intervene in Moniz's suit was denied, and her subsequent appeal was also denied. The trial court approved Moniz's settlement with Adecco, awarding Moniz a service award and attorney’s fees, but denied Correa’s requests. Correa's motions for a new trial and to vacate the judgment were denied, leading to her appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., which disapproved of the reasoning in Moniz II regarding Correa’s standing. The Court of Appeal concluded that Correa and her counsel lacked standing to challenge the judgment based on the Supreme Court's decision in Turrieta. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. View "Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged with carrying a loaded firearm after police found a handgun during a search of the car he was driving. Jackson filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias. The superior court denied his motion, stating that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie violation under the Racial Justice Act.The superior court found that the police officers were conducting a saturation patrol in a high-crime area and stopped Jackson for having illegally tinted windows. The officers observed Jackson and his brother, who were wearing clothing associated with gang members, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, the officers found a baseball bat in the car and, after a search, discovered an unregistered loaded firearm. Jackson argued that the stop and search were racially motivated, supported by statistical evidence showing racial disparities in traffic stops and searches by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that Jackson had produced facts that, if true, established a substantial likelihood of a violation of the Racial Justice Act. The court noted the statistical evidence showing racial disparities in SDPD's traffic stops and searches, as well as Jackson's and his brother's repeated stops for the same tinted windows without receiving citations. The court also considered the officers' focus on Jackson's and his brother's appearance and the neighborhood they were in, which suggested implicit bias.The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant an evidentiary hearing to consider Jackson's motion under the Racial Justice Act. The court emphasized the importance of addressing implicit bias in the criminal justice system and ensuring that race does not play a role in seeking or obtaining convictions. View "Jackson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2018, Charles David Wilson was charged with 14 felony counts. In 2022, he pled no contest to one count of kidnapping, admitted to using a firearm, and acknowledged an aggravating factor. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges and enhancements. Wilson received a 12-year prison sentence, consisting of an eight-year term for kidnapping and a four-year term for the firearm enhancement.Wilson later petitioned the trial court for resentencing under former section 1172.1, citing a new directive from the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office aimed at reducing reliance on enhancements and allegations. The directive suggested that prosecutors should generally not file or require defendants to plead to sentence enhancements and allowed for probation as the presumptive offer for certain felonies. However, the trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Wilson’s petition because it had not recalled the sentence within 120 days of the original commitment, and Wilson did not have standing to file such a motion himself.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the directive from the district attorney’s office did not constitute a prosecutorial stipulation or recommendation for resentencing under section 1172.1. The court emphasized that internal directives do not create enforceable duties for prosecutors to recommend resentencing. Consequently, Wilson’s petition was deemed a defendant-initiated request for the court to exercise its own-motion jurisdiction, which the court lacked. The appeal was dismissed due to the lack of jurisdiction to consider Wilson’s petition or any other arguments. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Attorney Barry Tarlow executed a will in 2005, with minor modifications in 2006, leaving his estate to be divided between his siblings, Barbara Tarlow Rapposelli and Gerald Tarlow. Gerald was to receive his share outright, while Barbara's share was to be placed in a trust, with David Henry Simon named as trustee. Barry Tarlow passed away in April 2021, and the will was admitted to probate in July 2021. Barbara and Gerald became executors of the estate, while Simon retained his role as trustee.Barbara and Gerald filed an ex parte petition in January 2022 to replace Simon as trustee and modify the trust terms, which was denied. They later filed a petition for final distribution of the estate in July 2022, stating that Barbara had disclaimed her share, leading to a redistribution of the estate. Simon objected, arguing that Barbara's disclaimer was improper and filed his own petition under section 11700, seeking distribution of Barbara's interest to him as trustee and to rescind Barbara's purchase of the Fidelity Fund's interest in the trust. The trial court sustained Barbara and Gerald's demurrer, ruling Simon lacked standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that Simon, as the named trustee, had standing under section 11700 to file a petition for distribution of the estate. The court found that Simon's claim to the estate assets as trustee made him a person entitled to distribution under the statute. The court reversed the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with sections 11700 et seq. and the opinion. View "In re Estate of Tarlow" on Justia Law