Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of felony vehicle burglary, being a felon in possession of tear gas, and misdemeanor receiving stolen property. During jury selection, the defendant, who was in jail, did not appear in court. The bailiff reported that the defendant refused transport, leading the court to find his absence voluntary and proceed with jury selection. The defendant missed another day but was present for the rest of the trial. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in county jail, with part of the sentence suspended for mandatory supervision.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco handled the initial trial. The defendant argued that his constitutional right to be present was violated due to insufficient evidence of voluntary absence and the denial of a continuance. The court found substantial evidence of voluntary absence based on the bailiff's testimony and denied the continuance. The defendant was convicted on most counts, and the court later modified his sentence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent, including the bailiff's report and jail procedures. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, considering the potential manipulation by the defendant and the inconvenience to jurors and court resources. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions but accepted the Attorney General's concession that the defendant was entitled to four additional days of presentence custody credits. View "People v. Hersom" on Justia Law

In 1998, Khyle Armando Briscoe, then 21, participated in a robbery with Shaun P. During the robbery, Briscoe and Shaun P. both had guns. A struggle ensued, resulting in Ben P., the robbery victim, fatally shooting Shaun P. Briscoe was charged with first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with firearm-use enhancements and a special circumstance of murder during a robbery and burglary. A jury convicted Briscoe on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole.Briscoe filed a motion in 2022 for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. He argued that this exclusion violated equal protection under the California and U.S. Constitutions. The trial court denied his motion, adhering to the majority view that section 3051 did not violate equal protection. Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder was previously upheld in People v. Hardin. However, Briscoe raised a narrower challenge, arguing that excluding youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. The court agreed, finding no rational basis for treating these equally culpable offenders differently.The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for a Franklin proceeding and a section 3051 parole hearing, holding that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary violated equal protection. View "People v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

A woman named Lisa was under a conservatorship due to being gravely disabled from a mental disorder. Her father, Scott, was appointed as her conservator and placed her in a skilled nursing facility. Scott signed two optional arbitration agreements with the facility on Lisa's behalf. After Lisa died, her parents sued the facility's owners and operators, alleging various claims including wrongful death. The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on the agreements Scott signed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition to compel arbitration. The court found no evidence that Scott had the authority to bind Lisa to the arbitration agreements for the successor claims. Additionally, the court found that neither Scott nor Lisa's mother, Marilyn, signed the agreements in their individual capacities, thus the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the conservatorship order did not give Scott the authority to sign the arbitration agreements on Lisa's behalf. The court reasoned that the conservatorship order did not explicitly or implicitly authorize Scott to waive Lisa's right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration because Scott did not sign the agreements in his individual capacity, and Marilyn did not sign them at all. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, denying the petition to compel arbitration. View "Enmark v. KC Community Care" on Justia Law

The petitioner sought resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6 of the Penal Code. He had entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019, after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which eliminated certain theories of murder liability. The petitioner argued that his plea should be reconsidered because he could have faced attempted murder liability under a now-invalid theory had he gone to trial.The Tulare County Superior Court initially charged the petitioner with murder and attempted murder, along with firearm and gang allegations. In 2019, as part of a plea deal, the petitioner pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter, and the remaining charges were dismissed. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. In 2022, the petitioner filed for resentencing under section 1172.6, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that he was ineligible because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 because he entered his plea after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, which had already eliminated the imputed malice theories of murder liability. The court noted that section 1172.6 is intended to provide relief for specific convictions obtained under now-invalid theories of liability, not for dismissed charges. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the petitioner could not show he could not presently be convicted of murder due to changes in the law, as required by section 1172.6. View "People v. Gallegos" on Justia Law

A former employee, Campbell, filed a putative class action lawsuit against her employer, Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC, alleging wage and hour violations. Campbell claimed that employees were not paid proper overtime, were required to work through meal and rest breaks without compensation, were not paid minimum wage, and were not paid in a timely manner. Sunshine initially proceeded with litigation and agreed to participate in mediation. However, Sunshine later claimed to have discovered an arbitration agreement signed by Campbell, which included a class action waiver.The Superior Court of Orange County found that Sunshine had waived its right to compel arbitration. Despite allegedly discovering the arbitration agreement in November 2022, Sunshine continued to engage in mediation discussions and did not inform Campbell or the court of its intent to compel arbitration until March 2023. Sunshine's delay and conduct were deemed inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, leading the court to conclude that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found clear and convincing evidence that Sunshine had waived its right to arbitration. The court noted that Sunshine's actions, including agreeing to mediation on a class-wide basis and delaying the motion to compel arbitration, were inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The court emphasized that Sunshine's conduct demonstrated an intentional abandonment of the right to arbitrate, thus affirming the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health" on Justia Law

A mother sought child support from the father for their adult son, who has autism and receives government aid. The mother argued that the father, who earns a substantial income, should contribute to their son's support. The father contended that the son's receipt of government aid under the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSP) relieved him of any financial responsibility under Family Code section 3910, which mandates parental support for adult children who are incapacitated and without sufficient means.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the father, interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to mean that the receipt of government aid barred the mother from seeking child support from the father. The court also limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the mother, reasoning that the case presented a narrow legal issue that did not justify extensive litigation costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 only prevents government entities from seeking reimbursement from relatives for the cost of aid provided to recipients. It does not bar a parent from seeking child support from the other parent under Family Code section 3910. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind these statutes was to prevent the public from bearing the financial burden of supporting individuals who have relatives capable of providing support.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of child support and to reconsider the attorney’s fees award in light of its ruling. The court clarified that the family court must now address whether the son is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means, and if so, determine the appropriate support amount. View "Marriage of Cady & Gamick" on Justia Law

In March 2010, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder and actively participating in a criminal street gang, resulting in a 22-year prison sentence. Approximately 12 years later, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court admitted statements the defendant made during a parole risk assessment interview and testimony from a parole hearing, ultimately denying the petition.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where the defendant's petition for resentencing was reviewed. The trial court admitted the parole hearing transcript and the defendant’s statements from the comprehensive risk assessment, despite objections from the defense counsel on grounds of hearsay and constitutional violations. The court found that the defendant’s statements demonstrated an intent to kill and denied the petition for resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The defendant argued that his statements and testimony from the parole proceedings should be subject to use immunity and were involuntary. The appellate court held that statements made in preparation for, and during, a parole hearing are not subject to use immunity under the reasoning of People v. Coleman and related authorities. The court also found that the statements were not involuntary, as the defendant was advised of his rights and chose to participate. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the statements and testimony, affirming the order denying the petition for resentencing. View "People v. Zavala" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

A.H., a student at Tamalpais High School, was sexually abused by his tennis coach, Normandie Burgos. A.H. sued the Tamalpais Union High School District (the District) for negligent supervision, arguing that the District's employees failed to properly investigate a prior complaint against Burgos and did not adequately supervise him, which enabled the abuse. A jury found the District negligent and awarded A.H. $10 million in damages.The District appealed, claiming the trial court improperly instructed the jury and allowed inadmissible evidence regarding Burgos's conduct with other students. The District argued that the jury instructions failed to clarify that the District could not be held vicariously liable for Burgos's actions and that the District could only be liable for the conduct of its supervisory employees. The District also contended that evidence of Burgos's misconduct with other students and his 2019 criminal conviction was irrelevant and prejudicial.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found no instructional error, noting that the jury was properly instructed on the District's liability for negligent supervision and that the instructions adequately covered the relevant legal principles. The court also held that the evidence of Burgos's prior misconduct and the 2005 complaint were relevant to show what the District should have known about Burgos's propensity for abuse. Additionally, the court ruled that evidence of Burgos's 2019 criminal conviction was relevant to the issue of damages, as it demonstrated the ongoing psychological impact on A.H.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the $10 million damages award to A.H. View "A.H. v. Tamalpais Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition (Coalition) and the State Air Resources Board (Board) over the adoption of the Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation (Regulation). The Coalition, which promotes the use of natural gas as an alternative fuel, argues that the Regulation's focus on electric vehicles (ZEV) harms those who have invested in low-NOx natural gas technologies. The Coalition contends that the Board failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in promulgating the Regulation.The Superior Court of Fresno County rejected the Coalition's claims and denied their petition. The court found that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had no further obligation to consider low-NOx vehicles as a mitigation measure. The court also concluded that the Board's failure to respond to certain public comments was harmless. Additionally, the court ruled that the Board had conducted a proper economic analysis under the APA and had correctly rejected the low-NOx vehicle credit in its analysis. The court did, however, allow the administrative record to be augmented with a document referenced in several comments during the regulatory proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Board's rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the Board had considered a reasonable range of alternatives and was not obligated to discuss the low-NOx vehicle credit as a mitigation measure. The court further concluded that the Board's failure to respond to comments was harmless and that the Board had complied with the APA in its economic analysis. The court also found that any error in augmenting the administrative record was harmless. View "California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition v. State Air Resources Board" on Justia Law