Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ryan Anderson pled guilty to multiple charges, including second-degree robbery, grand theft, retail theft, and second-degree burglary. These charges stemmed from a scheme where he stole "Scratchers" lottery tickets from various retailers and redeemed the winning tickets for prize money. The trial court ordered Anderson to pay $179,231.65 in restitution to the California State Lottery, which included the value of the stolen tickets, the prize money he collected, and commissions paid to retailers.The trial court's restitution order was based on a detailed chart presented by the prosecution, which outlined the value of the stolen tickets, the amounts reimbursed to retailers by the Lottery, and the prize money Anderson collected. Anderson did not dispute the Lottery's entitlement to recoup the prize money and retailer commissions but argued that the prize money should have been deducted from the retail value of the stolen tickets. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the stolen tickets represented lost sales revenue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. Anderson's appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende, identifying no specific issues for appeal. The appellate court conducted an independent review and invited supplemental briefs on whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the restitution award. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the restitution order was appropriate and that the Lottery did not receive a windfall. The court found that the Lottery's reimbursement to retailers shifted the loss from the retailers to the Lottery, and Anderson was responsible for the full amount of the stolen tickets' retail value, the prize money he collected, and the retailer commissions. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Maxwell Tillinghast, a 13-year-old student, collapsed from sudden cardiac arrest while jogging during a physical education class at Palms Middle School. Although the school had a defibrillator in the main office, the teachers were unaware of its presence. Despite being trained to use a defibrillator, the teachers could not utilize it, leading to Tillinghast's death. His father sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and several employees, alleging negligence for failing to inform the teachers about the defibrillator.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard the case, where the jury focused on whether Tillinghast's latent heart defect would have been fatal even if the teachers had known about the defibrillator. The jury found the school district negligent and awarded Tillinghast's father $15 million in damages. The jury exonerated the school principal, Dr. Derek Moriuchi, from negligence.The LAUSD appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a specific jury instruction (CACI No. 423) related to public entity liability for failure to perform a mandatory duty. The appellate court found that the school district had forfeited its objections to this instruction by not raising the issue during the trial. Additionally, the court noted that the school district had conceded mistakes were made regarding the defibrillator's availability and training.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the school district's failure to inform the teachers about the defibrillator constituted negligence. The court awarded costs to the respondent, Tillinghast's father. View "Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles College Faculty Guild, AFT Local 1521, sought to reverse the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of three grievances against the Los Angeles Community College District. The grievances involved safety-related construction projects at Los Angeles City College, the termination of a faculty member at Pierce College, and the miscalculation of retirement benefits for a faculty member at Los Angeles Trade-Technical College.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County partially granted the motion to compel arbitration for the grievance related to backpay for the retirement benefits issue but denied the motion for the other grievances. The court found that the grievances were beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement and were preempted by the Education Code and other statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the grievances related to construction projects and employment termination were not arbitrable because they were preempted by the Education Code and the Construction Bonds Act. The court also found that the grievance related to retirement benefits was partially arbitrable only concerning the backpay issue, as the Public Employees’ Retirement Law governed the reporting of service credits to CalPERS, and the arbitrator could not order injunctive relief beyond the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.The appellate court concluded that the Guild failed to demonstrate that the grievances were within the scope of representation as enumerated by the Educational Employment Relations Act and affirmed the trial court’s mixed ruling. View "L.A. College Faculty Guild v. L.A. Community College District" on Justia Law

In this case, the mother (K.G.) and father (J.G.) were involved in a custody dispute following their divorce. The mother was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, which triggered a rebuttable presumption under Family Code section 3044 that awarding custody to the father would be detrimental to the child's best interest. Despite this, the parents initially agreed to joint legal custody.The Superior Court of El Dorado County initially found that the father had committed domestic violence but awarded joint legal custody based on the parents' agreement. Later, the mother requested a modification to award her sole custody. A second judge reviewed the case and denied the mother's request, stating that the presumption had been rebutted, although no specific findings were made to support this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the lower court had erred by not making the required findings to rebut the presumption under section 3044. The appellate court noted that the lower court failed to address the statutory factors and did not provide reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. The appellate court emphasized that the presumption is mandatory and must be properly applied, with specific findings made to determine if it has been rebutted.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing to reassess custody in light of the current circumstances and the presumption set forth in section 3044. The court directed the family court to enter a new custody order after applying the presumption and making the necessary findings. The mother was awarded her costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of J.G." on Justia Law

Alberto Lopez-Barraza was convicted of robbery and murder related to the 2011 killing of Jose Manuel de Jesus but was acquitted of conspiracy to commit robbery. He appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on factual findings that conflicted with the jury's determination that he was not guilty of conspiracy.Initially, Lopez-Barraza and his co-defendants were charged with murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery, with additional allegations related to firearm use. Lopez-Barraza was found guilty of murder and robbery, but not conspiracy. His murder and robbery convictions were affirmed on appeal, but the special circumstance finding was reversed due to instructional error. On remand, the special circumstance was not retried, and Lopez-Barraza was resentenced to 25 years to life plus one year. In 2019, he filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which was denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the resentencing petition based on findings that Lopez-Barraza participated in planning and preparing for the robbery, which conflicted with the jury's acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The appellate court held that the trial court's reliance on these findings was improper and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing. The trial court was instructed not to rely on any evidence that contradicted the jury's verdict acquitting Lopez-Barraza of conspiracy. The order denying the petition was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "P. v. Lopez-Barraza" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants, Kimesha Williams and Candace Townsel, were convicted by a jury of felony murder, robbery, and elder abuse. The victim, an 84-year-old woman, was attacked in a casino restroom, resulting in her death. The jury found that the murder occurred during the robbery and that the victim, who was over 70 years old, suffered elder abuse that caused her death. The trial court sentenced both defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole.The defendants appealed on several grounds. They argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that force or fear was used in stealing the victim’s property. Townsel also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that she aided and abetted the robbery and that she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in the elder abuse jury instruction and that the suspended parole revocation fine should be stricken.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that force was used in the robbery, that Townsel aided and abetted the robbery, and that Townsel acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court also concluded that any error in the elder abuse jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s other findings demonstrated that the defendants caused the victim’s injuries and death. Finally, the court agreed that the parole revocation fines should be stricken because the defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.The court affirmed the judgments with directions to strike the parole revocation fines and issue amended abstracts of judgment. View "P. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Lori Anne Whipple was charged with first-degree murder and arson of property, with an additional allegation that the murder occurred during a robbery or attempted robbery. In November 2019, she was convicted on both charges, and the jury found that she was a major participant in the robbery or attempted robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Whipple was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. She did not raise any issues regarding jury instructions in her direct appeal, which focused on the improper exclusion of evidence and sentencing. Her conviction was affirmed.Whipple later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the jury was not properly instructed on the felony murder theory as required by People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The trial court found her ineligible for relief and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court noted that Whipple's conviction occurred after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule and added section 1172.6. The court held that Whipple's failure to raise the instructional error in her direct appeal rendered the jury's findings conclusively valid. The court emphasized that findings made after Banks and Clark are generally conclusive and preclude a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. Since Whipple's conviction was final and she did not demonstrate a significant change in the law or other basis for an exception, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of her petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Whipple" on Justia Law

Javier Hernandez, a farm laborer employed by Ceja Reyes, Inc., was injured in a vanpool accident while commuting home from work. Hernandez did not have a driver's license or own a car, and he used a vanpool arranged by another employee, paying $10 per day for the service. The vanpool was not provided by Ceja Reyes, and the driver at the time of the accident did not have a valid California driver's license. Hernandez sustained catastrophic injuries, including a right leg amputation, and filed a workers' compensation claim.A workers' compensation judge initially heard the case and concluded that Hernandez's claim was not barred by the going and coming rule, applying the special risk and dual purpose exceptions. Zenith Insurance Company, Ceja Reyes's workers' compensation insurer, denied the claim and filed a petition for reconsideration. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied the petition and adopted the judge's report, leading Zenith to file a petition for writ of review with the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and determined that the Board's application of the special risk and dual purpose exceptions was erroneous. The court found that the special risk exception did not apply because the injury did not occur just outside the employer's premises and there was no relationship between the risk and the location of the premises or conditions over which the employer had control. Additionally, the dual purpose exception was deemed inapplicable as the commute did not provide an incidental benefit to the employer beyond the normal need for the employee's presence at work. Consequently, the court annulled the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Zenith Insurance Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Thomas R. McDonald filed a petition contesting amendments to the Declaration of Trust of Judith E. Stratos 2000 Trust, which named William Goebner as successor trustee. McDonald alleged the amendments, which removed him and his sister as beneficiaries, were due to undue influence, fraud, and financial elder abuse. He sought various remedies under the Probate Code. Two days before a scheduled hearing, Goebner filed a demurrer to dismiss McDonald’s claims, which the trial court overruled as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, requiring demurrers to be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint.The trial court overruled Goebner’s demurrer as untimely, leading Goebner to petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order. He argued that the Probate Code, specifically section 1043, which allows an interested person to make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing, should govern the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, not the Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Goebner, holding that section 1043 of the Probate Code governs the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, allowing it to be filed at or before the hearing. The court concluded that Goebner’s demurrer, filed two days before the hearing, was timely. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer as untimely and to consider the demurrer on its merits. Goebner was entitled to recover his costs in the writ proceeding. View "Goebner v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A mother (B.D.) sought extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order that terminated her family reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. The case involved her two children, S.R. and O.R., who were removed from her custody due to allegations of serious physical harm and failure to protect. The mother argued that the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau did not provide reasonable reunification services and that the juvenile court erred in concluding she failed to make substantive progress in her court-ordered treatment plan.The juvenile court found that the mother had not made substantive progress in her treatment plan and terminated reunification services. The court noted that despite the mother's participation in various services, she continued to struggle with parenting skills and judgment, and the children remained at risk. The court also found that the Bureau had provided reasonable services tailored to the mother's special needs, including referrals to parenting classes, counseling, and individual therapy.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the juvenile court's finding that the Bureau had provided reasonable services. However, it found that the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother had not made substantive progress was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court noted that the mother had completed multiple parenting courses, engaged in therapy, and regularly visited her children without resorting to physical discipline.Despite this, the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court's error was harmless. Given the imminent 12-month review hearing and the heightened standards for continuing reunification services, the court found it unlikely that the mother would be able to demonstrate a substantial probability of the children's return to her custody within the extended period. Therefore, the petition for extraordinary relief was denied. View "B.D. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law