Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A county public guardian filed a petition in February 2023 to establish a conservatorship over an individual, A.H., under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, alleging grave disability due to mental disorder. The trial court imposed a temporary conservatorship, which was extended as A.H. demanded a trial. However, the trial did not begin within the statutory 10-day period and was repeatedly continued, often due to court and counsel unavailability. While the first petition was still pending and as the initial temporary conservatorship was expiring, the public guardian filed a second petition and obtained a new temporary conservatorship, further extending A.H.’s involuntary confinement. A.H. opposed the continuances and requested dismissal of both petitions, but the court denied these requests. The first petition was eventually dismissed at the public guardian’s request, and trial on the second petition began about ten weeks after the statutory deadline. In January 2024, the court found A.H. gravely disabled and ordered a one-year conservatorship, which was not renewed after expiration.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County presided over the initial proceedings, including the imposition of temporary conservatorships, the granting of continuances, and the eventual trial and conservatorship order. A.H. appealed, arguing that statutory amendments required dismissal for untimely trial, that the court abused its discretion in granting continuances, and that the delays violated his due process rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, held that the statutory amendment to section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), does not mandate dismissal for untimely trial but gives the court discretion. The court found no reversible error in the continuances or denial of dismissal under the statute. However, the appellate court concluded that the cumulative 10-month delay in adjudicating the conservatorship petitions, none of which was attributable to A.H., violated his due process rights. The order of conservatorship was therefore reversed. View "In re Conservatorship of A.H." on Justia Law

A chemical company sought a declaratory judgment to establish its right to insurance coverage for environmental damage resulting from its operation of a DDT plant. The company’s insurers denied coverage based on “qualified pollution exclusions” (QPEs) in their comprehensive general liability policies, which excluded coverage for pollution unless the discharge was “sudden and accidental” or, in some policies, “sudden, unintended and unexpected.” The company argued that “sudden” could reasonably be interpreted to include gradual, unintended pollution events, and sought to introduce extrinsic evidence, including drafting history and industry statements, to support this interpretation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, at the parties’ suggestion, divided the case into phases and, in Phase II-A, addressed the interpretation of the QPEs. The parties stipulated to the use of exemplar QPEs for interpretation. The trial court excluded the company’s proffered extrinsic evidence, reasoning that California appellate courts had uniformly held that “sudden” in this context unambiguously does not mean gradual, and that it was bound by this precedent. The court certified a question of law for appellate review regarding whether prior judicial construction of an insurance policy term precludes consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine ambiguity.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, as a general rule, prior judicial construction of a policy term does not categorically preclude a trial court from considering extrinsic evidence to expose a latent ambiguity. However, in this case, the court found that California appellate decisions have uniformly and specifically rejected the interpretation that “sudden” can mean “gradual” in the context of these pollution exclusions. Therefore, the trial court correctly excluded the extrinsic evidence as irrelevant, and the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

After the sudden death of an Alameda County Supervisor in 2021, the Board of Supervisors appointed David Kyle Brown, the former chief of staff to the late supervisor, to fill the vacancy for District 3. At the time of his appointment, Brown had been living in Contra Costa County but moved to Oakland, within District 3, shortly before his appointment. Plaintiffs, including the Alameda County Taxpayers’ Association and several individuals, challenged Brown’s eligibility to serve, arguing he failed to meet both a one-year prior residency requirement under the Alameda County Administrative Code and a 30-day prior residency requirement under state law. They also contended that Brown did not satisfy the continuous residency requirement during his term, asserting he never became a true resident of the district.The Superior Court of Alameda County first overruled Brown’s demurrer and held a hearing on the merits of the prior residency issue. The court found that neither the county nor state code imposed a prior residency requirement on appointees filling a board vacancy, ruling in Brown’s favor. After Brown’s term ended, the court determined that the continuous residency issue was moot, as Brown was no longer in office, and entered judgment for Brown. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the issues were of public importance and that the trial court erred in its rulings and case management.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the prior residency requirements cited by plaintiffs do not apply to appointments made to fill board vacancies. However, the court found that the continuous residency requirement does apply and that there are unresolved factual questions regarding whether Brown satisfied this requirement during his term. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the continuous residency issue. View "People ex rel. Alameda County Taxpayers' Assn. v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a theft occurred at a licensed marijuana-growing facility in Adelanto, California, the employer, Kavry Management, LLC, required several employees, including Steven McDoniel, to take a polygraph test. McDoniel, who was not advised of his right to refuse the test, took and “failed” two polygraph examinations. He was subsequently terminated from his position, with evidence indicating the termination was due to the polygraph results. McDoniel experienced significant emotional distress and concern for his reputation in the industry following his discharge.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed McDoniel’s claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, defamation, and violations of Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5. The court granted summary adjudication for the employer on the defamation and PAGA claims, and on punitive damages, but allowed the wrongful termination and Labor Code claims to proceed. At trial, the jury found Kavry liable for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and for violating Labor Code sections 432.2 and 1198.5, awarding McDoniel $100,000 in noneconomic damages. The court also imposed a penalty for the personnel records violation and awarded McDoniel attorney fees under section 432.6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that an employer’s violation of Labor Code section 432.2—requiring or demanding an employee to submit to a polygraph test as a condition of continued employment—supports a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court affirmed the jury’s award of noneconomic damages. However, it reversed the attorney fee award, finding that section 432.6 did not apply retroactively to McDoniel’s employment, which ended before the statute’s effective date. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute and found McDoniel forfeited his claim for fees under PAGA. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "McDoniel v. Kavry Management" on Justia Law

A child, X.D., was born in May 2022 and immediately placed for adoption by his biological mother, Jessica, due to her history of physical and verbal abuse by the child’s biological father, Raymon. Jessica had left Raymon after a violent incident during her pregnancy and sought refuge in a domestic violence shelter, cutting off communication with him. Raymon, who had a significant criminal history and ongoing substance abuse issues, was unaware of X.D.’s birth and believed Jessica had miscarried. The prospective adoptive parents, Cliff and Rebecca, cared for X.D. from birth. Jessica identified Raymon as the possible father in adoption documents but did not provide his contact information.After being notified of the adoption proceedings in January 2023, Raymon opposed the adoption, claiming he qualified as a “Kelsey S. father”—a status that would require his consent for adoption if he had demonstrated a full commitment to parental responsibilities. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in Raymon’s favor, ruling that he qualified as a Kelsey S. father based on his financial and emotional support and that Jessica’s actions had prevented him from asserting his parental rights. The court ordered supervised visits for Raymon with X.D. and required that Raymon be introduced as a family friend, not as X.D.’s father.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the exclusion of key evidence—screenshots of Raymon’s threatening text messages—and the sufficiency of evidence supporting Raymon’s status as a Kelsey S. father. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding the text message evidence, which was relevant and sufficiently authenticated. Considering this evidence, the appellate court found insufficient support for Raymon’s claim to Kelsey S. status and determined that it was not in X.D.’s best interest for Raymon to retain parental rights. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s order and directed that the adoption proceed. View "In re Adoption of X.D." on Justia Law

Doug Ridley and Sherry Shen owned a condominium unit in a Santa Clara complex managed by a homeowners’ association (HOA). In April 2018, flooding occurred in the crawlspace beneath their unit, which was a common area under the HOA’s control. Initial investigations suggested the water originated from an undestroyed well, but the HOA delayed meaningful repairs for over 19 months, during which the unit suffered extensive damage, including mold and termite infestation. The HOA repeatedly ignored expert recommendations and shifted its position, ultimately failing to properly investigate or remediate the source of the water and related damage.The homeowners filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court against the HOA and its president, Steve Moritz, alleging breach of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CCRs), negligence, nuisance, and other claims. After a lengthy bench trial, the court found in favor of the homeowners on all claims, awarded damages for restoration, lost rent, and emotional distress, and issued an injunction requiring the HOA to complete specified repairs and compensate the homeowners until the work was finished. The court also found the HOA’s conduct grossly negligent and awarded punitive damages.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s finding that the HOA breached its duties under the CCRs by failing to reasonably investigate and timely repair the common area damage. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings, rejected the HOA’s defenses under the business judgment rule, rule of judicial deference, and the CCRs’ exculpatory clause, and concluded the HOA’s conduct constituted gross negligence. The injunction order was affirmed, and the homeowners were awarded costs on appeal. View "Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

After tripping and falling on a raised portion of sidewalk in front of a residence, the plaintiff sued the owners of the adjacent properties and the City for negligence and premises liability. The claim against one property owner, Goode, was based on the theory that a tree in the parkway in front of her house had roots extending under the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell, potentially causing the damage. The City maintained and inspected the tree and sidewalk, but the plaintiff alleged Goode’s ownership of the tree contributed to the dangerous condition.The Ventura County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goode, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding her liability. The plaintiff did not oppose Goode’s motion for summary judgment, but the City did file an opposition and attempted to file a cross-complaint against Goode. The trial court declined to consider the City’s opposition, ruling that the City lacked standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint, and rejected the cross-complaint on procedural grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether a cross-complaint has been filed. The court further found that the City’s cross-complaint was properly filed and should not have been rejected. However, after reviewing the evidence de novo, the appellate court concluded that Goode could not be held liable as a matter of law because she did not own, control, or maintain the sidewalk or tree in a manner that created the dangerous condition. The judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Goode was affirmed. View "Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old committed a violent home invasion, during which he sexually assaulted his former neighbor at knifepoint. He was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and related enhancements. The original sentence was a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms, ultimately resulting in a total sentence of 44 years to life in prison, with parole eligibility at age 60 after a later modification.After serving more than 15 years, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Tulare County for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that excluding him from resentencing relief violated equal protection principles. The trial court denied the petition, finding that his sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP and that, under People v. Heard, he was not eligible for relief.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered whether the functional equivalency analysis from People v. Contreras, which is rooted in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, should apply to equal protection challenges under section 1170(d). The court declined to import the Eighth Amendment standard, instead applying a rational basis review as articulated in recent California Supreme Court decisions. The court held that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between juveniles sentenced to explicit LWOP and those, like the appellant, sentenced to lengthy terms with parole eligibility within their expected lifetimes. The court concluded that section 1170(d)’s limitation to LWOP sentences does not violate equal protection as applied to a 44-years-to-life sentence. The trial court’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Several utility companies operating in California, including in Ventura County, challenged the property tax rates applied to their state-assessed utility property. They argued that the method used to calculate the debt service component of their property tax rate resulted in a higher rate than that applied to locally assessed, nonutility property (referred to as “common property”). The utilities claimed this disparity violated section 19 of article XIII of the California Constitution, which states that utility property “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”The utilities filed suit in the Ventura County Superior Court against the County of Ventura and the California State Board of Equalization, seeking partial refunds for property taxes paid between 2018 and 2023. The County demurred, relying on recent appellate decisions that had rejected similar claims. The parties stipulated that the decision in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court was binding for purposes of this case, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, entering judgment in favor of the County and the Board.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that article XIII, section 19 does not require that utility property be taxed at the same or a comparable rate as nonutility property. Instead, the provision is an enabling clause that allows utility property to be subject to property taxation, but does not mandate rate equivalence. The court also found that the general uniformity requirement in article XIII, section 1 does not override the Legislature’s authority to implement reasonable distinctions in tax treatment for utility property. The judgment in favor of the County and the Board was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant charged with several sex offenses who asserted his right to a speedy trial. The prosecution sought multiple continuances, arguing that the assigned prosecutor was unavailable due to involvement in another sex offense trial (the Lopez Perez case). However, at the time the continuances were granted, the judge assigned to the Lopez Perez case was still engaged in a different trial and was not available to begin the Lopez Perez trial to conclusion. The defendant objected to the continuances and later moved to dismiss the charges, claiming his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted the prosecution’s requests for continuances under Penal Code section 1050(g)(2), finding that the prosecutor’s involvement in the Lopez Perez case constituted good cause. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the prosecutor was engaged in another trial “in progress” as required by the statute.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the standard articulated in Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, a trial is “in progress” for purposes of section 1050(g)(2) only if the judge is available and ready to try the case to conclusion, the court has committed its resources, and the parties are ready to proceed. The appellate court found that, at the time of the continuances, the Lopez Perez trial was not “in progress” because the assigned judge was not available to try the case to conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the continuances and in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its order denying dismissal and to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Hernandez v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law