Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and was placed on felony probation for three years with specified conditions. He requested a transfer of his case from Riverside County to San Bernardino County, where he resided. The San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended additional drug and alcohol-related probation conditions. At the transfer hearing, the San Bernardino court added these recommended conditions.The Riverside County District Attorney initially charged the defendant with infliction of corporal injury, threatening a witness, and vandalism. The defendant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to the first charge. He also pled guilty in a separate case to misdemeanor driving with a suspended license due to a prior DUI conviction. The court sentenced him to 180 days in county jail with a suspended four-year prison sentence and placed him on probation for three years. In the misdemeanor case, the court denied probation and sentenced him to 69 days in county jail, resulting in a terminal disposition. The Riverside County Superior Court later granted the transfer of his case to San Bernardino County without modifying his probation conditions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the defendant’s probation conditions without a change in circumstances. The court found that the transfer of the defendant’s probation to San Bernardino County did not constitute the requisite change in circumstances to justify the additional conditions. Consequently, the court struck the added drug and alcohol-related conditions and affirmed the order as modified. View "P. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with her alleged father, R.R. In 2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services became involved when the mother failed to secure necessary mental health services for G.R. The mother did not have contact information for R.R. The juvenile court initially found R.R. to be G.R.'s alleged father, later amending the order to reflect this accurately. R.R. was incarcerated for domestic violence and had an extensive criminal history. The court denied services to R.R. and ordered no visits until he contacted the Department.In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her mother's custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In November 2020, R.R. expressed a desire to have a relationship with G.R., but did not follow through with setting up visits. In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition, which the juvenile court denied. By June 2023, G.R. had spoken with R.R. by phone but was not ready for in-person visits. In September 2023, the juvenile court appointed G.R.'s caregiver as her legal guardian, ordered monitored visits for R.R., and terminated its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court dismissed R.R.'s appeal of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visits, stating that as an alleged father, R.R. could not show he was aggrieved by the order. The court emphasized that an alleged father has no rights to custody, reunification services, or visits unless he establishes paternity and achieves presumed father status. R.R. did not establish paternity, and thus had no standing to appeal the visitation order. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law

The case involves a failed business venture between longtime friends, resulting in a $20 million judgment against Stanley N. Cohen for negligent misrepresentation. Cohen, a professor at Stanford University, and his colleague discovered a genetic mutation related to Huntington’s disease and formed a company, Nuredis, with Moshe and Chris Alafi, who invested $20 million. The FDA later rejected Nuredis’s request to conduct human clinical trials for the drug HD106 due to its toxicity. The Alafis sued Cohen and his colleague for negligent misrepresentation and other related causes, alleging they failed to disclose the drug’s history of being withdrawn from the market due to toxicity.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligent misrepresentation claim against Cohen, awarding $20 million in damages. The court did not reach the other causes of action. Cohen appealed, arguing that the claim failed as a matter of law and that the trial court committed prejudicial error by not issuing a statement of decision upon his request.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that the trial court’s failure to issue the requested statement of decision was prejudicial error, as it prevented effective appellate review of the trial court’s factual and legal findings. Consequently, the appellate court did not address Cohen’s arguments on the merits and reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue the statement of decision. View "Alafi v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In April 1996, James Alvin Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, including committing the murder during a robbery and having a prior murder conviction. The jury sentenced him to death. Thompson's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied the petition, citing the special circumstances findings as rendering him ineligible for relief.The California Supreme Court had previously affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence. Thompson also filed a habeas corpus petition, which was transferred to the Riverside County Superior Court and subsequently denied. Thompson appealed the denial, but the appeal was stayed due to funding issues for appellate habeas counsel. In January 2022, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a capital defendant is entitled to seek resentencing relief under section 1172.6, but must do so through a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1509, in compliance with Proposition 66. The court vacated the trial court's order denying Thompson's resentencing petition and remanded the case with directions to allow Thompson to file a limited petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his murder conviction under section 1172.6. The court emphasized that the trial court must follow the procedures outlined in section 1172.6, including appointing counsel if requested and holding a hearing to determine if Thompson has made a prima facie case for relief. View "P. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Khyle Armando Briscoe, at age 21, participated in a robbery during which his accomplice, Shaun P., was fatally shot by the victim, Ben P. Briscoe was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with a special circumstance finding under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (d), which led to a life without parole sentence. This special circumstance applies to non-killer participants in felonies who act with reckless indifference to human life.The trial court sentenced Briscoe to life without parole, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Briscoe later sought a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. The trial court denied his motion, and Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051 was intended to provide youth offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated growth and rehabilitation. However, the statute excludes youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. Briscoe argued that this exclusion violated equal protection, particularly because section 190.2, subdivision (d) employs the same standard of liability as section 189, subdivision (e)(3), which does not exclude youth offenders from parole consideration.The Court of Appeal agreed with Briscoe, finding that the exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) from parole consideration under section 3051 violated equal protection. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a parole hearing and related proceedings. View "P. v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. Shahriyar argued that the writ should be quashed because it was sought more than ten years after the entry of judgment, violating Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020, and was subject to the renewal requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. He contended that judgments for attorney fees under the Family Code are not exempt from these requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ of execution. The court found that the judgment for attorney fees, entered under the Family Code, was enforceable until satisfied in full and did not require renewal under Family Code section 291, subdivision (b). Shahriyar appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment for attorney fees is entered under the Family Code, it is enforceable until paid in full, and failure to renew the judgment does not affect its enforceability. The court found that the plain language of Family Code section 291, its legislative history, and common sense supported this interpretation. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that Family Code section 291's reference to money judgments includes those for attorney fees, exempting them from the ten-year limitation and renewal requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc. and its owners, Rommel and Ruell Medina, had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in the gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding of Rene's material involvement but ruled that the monetary penalty exceeded statutory limits. The court ordered the Commission to set aside the penalty and reconsider it in light of the court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition.The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed under California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) in a manner consistent with its opinion. The judgment, as modified, was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about property collateral and a quitclaim deed for a residence. Disputes arose over the interpretation of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce it by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement but not in the manner the Govind Parties desired.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially heard the case, where Prashant and Mita sued Govind and his affiliates, claiming a 50% interest in their business ventures. Govind counter-sued for mismanagement. A bench trial began but was paused for settlement discussions, resulting in the contested agreement. When disputes over the settlement terms emerged, both parties filed motions to enforce the agreement. The trial court ruled largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, enforcing the settlement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision, holding that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from seeking to vacate the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The appellate court noted that the Govind Parties' positions were totally inconsistent and that they had been successful in asserting the enforceability of the agreement in their initial motion. The court affirmed the trial court's orders, including the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed two class action complaints against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. in Orange County Superior Court, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). They claimed that Experian failed to include a required statement in the "Summary of Rights" portion of their consumer reports, which informs consumers of additional rights under state law. Plaintiffs sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Experian removed the cases to federal court, where Plaintiffs argued they lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they did not suffer concrete harm. The federal court agreed and remanded the cases back to state court.In state court, Experian moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing under Wisconsin law and that their FCRA claim did not fall within the "zone of interests" the FCRA is designed to protect. Plaintiffs contended that California law should apply and that they had standing under California law. The trial court granted Experian's motion, relying on the precedent set by Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc., which held that a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury to have standing in California state courts. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court found Limon persuasive and concluded that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete or particularized injury. The court held that an informational injury without adverse effects is insufficient to confer standing under California law. Therefore, the judgment in favor of Experian was affirmed. View "Muha v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Two defendants, Martin Field and John Asher, were found to be sexually violent predators (SVPs) by separate juries and committed indefinitely to a state hospital. They were compelled to testify against themselves during their commitment trials. Both argued on appeal that they were similarly situated to individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGIs), who are not required to testify against themselves at their commitment trials. They claimed this disparity violated equal protection principles.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, previously found merit in Field's equal protection argument and remanded the case to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County for an evidentiary hearing. The same conclusion was reached for Asher's case by Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the People had not met their burden to justify the disparate treatment of SVPs and NGIs. Consequently, the court concluded that equal protection principles were violated and ordered new commitment trials for both Field and Asher.The People appealed the new trial orders, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the disparate treatment of SVPs was not justified. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's orders. The appellate court held that the People had not demonstrated that the testimony of SVPs was more necessary than that of NGIs to justify the disparate treatment under the strict scrutiny standard. The court emphasized that there were sufficient records and other means to evaluate SVPs without compelling their testimony, and thus, the equal protection violation was not justified. View "P. v. Field" on Justia Law