Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Nancy Wood, an indigent homeless woman, was residing in Mile Square Park in Fountain Valley, near the hospital where she received treatment for cancer and heart disease. The City of Fountain Valley, which had no homeless shelter at the time, sought to prohibit her from living in the park, citing violations of city ordinances. Wood argued necessity as a defense, claiming her health conditions required her to stay near the hospital.The City initially filed a criminal complaint against Wood, where she was represented by appointed counsel. While the criminal case was pending, the City also filed a civil lawsuit for nuisance against her. In the civil case, Wood, representing herself, again argued necessity. The trial court conducted the proceedings remotely due to COVID-19 restrictions. Despite Wood's claims that she had not received the City's trial exhibits, the court proceeded, ultimately finding her culpable for public nuisance and issuing an injunction prohibiting her from residing in the park. Shortly after the civil judgment, Wood was acquitted in the criminal case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not staying the civil case pending the outcome of the criminal case. The appellate court noted that the simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings placed an unfair burden on Wood, especially given her indigent status and lack of legal representation in the civil case. The court also found that the trial court failed to consider all relevant evidence, including Wood's necessity defense, in issuing the injunction. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to reconsider the propriety of the injunction, taking into account Wood's acquittal in the criminal case and all relevant equitable factors. View "People v. Wood" on Justia Law

Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

The case involves Mario Rodriguez, who was prosecuted for several felonies in late 2016. Twice, the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial, leading to his commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals. His first commitment lasted 119 days, and his second began on May 16, 2019. After being treated, Rodriguez was certified as restored to competency on January 9, 2020. However, his new trial counsel requested a continuance for the restoration hearing, which was delayed multiple times due to various reasons, including the COVID-19 pandemic.The trial court denied Rodriguez's motion to dismiss the charges, which argued that his commitment exceeded the two-year limit under Penal Code section 1370(c)(1). Rodriguez then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which initially ruled that the two-year limit had not been exceeded. The California Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the period between the filing of the certificate of restoration and the court’s ruling on it is included in the two-year limit. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal to determine if the two-year limit was exceeded and, if so, the appropriate remedy.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the two-year limit under section 1370(c)(1) may be tolled for delays attributable to the defense. The court found that delays requested by Rodriguez’s counsel, including those for continuances and writ litigation, should be attributed to him. Excluding these delays, Rodriguez’s total commitment period was calculated to be 664 days, leaving 66 days remaining on the two-year limit. Consequently, the court concluded that the two-year limit had not been exceeded and denied Rodriguez’s petition for writ of prohibition or other equitable relief. View "Rodriguez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

James Morell, a retired research attorney for the Orange County Superior Court, was entitled to a pension under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL). The dispute arose over whether the $3,500 Optional Benefit Program (OBP) payments he received should be included in the calculation of his pension. The OBP allowed attorneys to allocate the $3,500 to various benefits or receive it as taxable cash. Morell allocated portions to a healthcare reimbursement account and cash. The Orange County Employees’ Retirement System (OCERS) excluded these payments from his pension calculation, leading to prolonged litigation.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially ruled in favor of Morell, ordering OCERS to reconsider its decision without relying on Resolution 90-1551, which OCERS argued required the exclusion of OBP payments. The court found that the resolution had been invalidated and that Morell could not waive his argument that OCERS’ calculation contravened CERL through a settlement agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Resolution 90-1551, which adopted the provisions of the now-repealed Government Code section 31460.1, remained valid due to a savings clause in Senate Bill 193. This clause preserved actions taken by counties under section 31460.1 before its repeal. The court found that Morell had elected to participate in the OBP and that the payments reflected amounts exceeding his salary.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with directions to deny Morell’s petition. The court held that Resolution 90-1551 was still valid and that OCERS correctly excluded the OBP payments from Morell’s pension calculation. View "Morell v. Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Santiago Gonzalo Canales, who was convicted for lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children. Canales sexually abused his stepdaughter and niece for over a decade, both of whom were under the age of 14 during the abuse. He was charged with four counts, including lewd acts on his niece and continuous sexual abuse of his niece and stepdaughter. The trial lasted eight days, and the jury convicted Canales on all counts, sentencing him to 60 years to life in prison.Canales appealed his convictions, challenging two different jury instructions. He argued that the first instruction did not identify the correct mental states for the offense of continuous sexual abuse. The court upheld the instruction, stating that it was in line with the presumption of mandatory culpability. Canales's second challenge was to another instruction, which the court assumed was given in error, but held that the error was harmless. Canales also forfeited a third challenge. However, on his fourth point, the court agreed with both parties that Canales must be resentenced.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, during an encounter with police officers, reached into his car, pulled out a gun, took a shooting stance, aimed the gun at an officer, and pulled the trigger. The gun was unloaded. The defendant was charged with resisting officers by the use of force or violence under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a). The defendant argued that he could not be convicted of this charge because his gun was unloaded and, therefore, he could not have committed an assault, which he claimed was a necessary element of the charge.The trial court disagreed, finding that the defendant's actions constituted violent conduct that impeded the officers' efforts to perform their duties. The court found that the defendant's actions fell within the scope of section 69, subdivision (a), even though his gun was unloaded. The court convicted the defendant and sentenced him to seven years and four months in prison.On appeal, the defendant argued that assault is a necessarily included lesser offense of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a), and since his gun was unloaded, he could not have been convicted of assaulting the officers and, therefore, could not have been convicted of the greater offense of resisting an officer by the use of force or violence. The appellate court rejected this argument, finding that the language of section 69, subdivision (a) does not require the defendant to have actual physical contact with the officer. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing due to an error in the trial court's sentencing decision. View "People v. Morgan" on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, D.R., who appealed jurisdiction and disposition orders related to her six children, all of whom were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. D.R. argued that the dependency petitions were deficient, some of the sustained jurisdictional allegations lacked substantial evidence, and her constitutional rights were violated by depriving her of her right to present additional evidence at the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing for two of the children, and by what she characterized as a violation of her due process right to a speedy contested jurisdictional hearing.The children's fathers were not parties in this appeal. The children were born to three different fathers, referred to as father M., father V., and father H. The mother had been married to father H., but they separated after an incident of domestic violence. Father H. had a history of alcohol abuse and criminal offenses, mostly related to driving under the influence. The mother had sole legal and physical custody of the two children she had with father H., G.H. and B.H.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that some of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings lacked the support of substantial evidence, requiring reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for four of the children. The court otherwise affirmed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

In 2018, Josue Ramos pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting attempted murder, carjacking, and criminal street gang activity. In 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing of his attempted murder conviction, arguing that he was charged under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which had since been changed. He claimed that he accepted a plea offer instead of going to trial, where he could have been convicted of attempted murder, and that he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder due to changes in the law.The trial court denied Ramos's petition at the prima facie stage, concluding that he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief because he admitted to aiding and abetting the attempted murder with specific intent to kill. Ramos appealed, arguing that the factual admissions in his guilty plea did not conclusively establish he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Ramos had not made a prima facie case for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. The court concluded that Ramos's admission that he aided and abetted the attempted murder with specific intent to kill conclusively established all of the elements for attempted murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory of liability. Therefore, the court held that Ramos was statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief on his attempted murder conviction. View "People v. Ramos" on Justia Law