Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Regents of the University of California (Regents) approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Parnassus Heights campus. The Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition (the Coalition), a group of local property owners, sued to halt the construction, arguing it would violate local building height and bulk restrictions. The Regents countered that as a state entity, they were immune from local building and zoning regulations when engaging in governmental activities, such as constructing university buildings. The trial court disagreed, ruling that the question of whether the construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity could not be resolved at this stage.The trial court concluded that the Regents' immunity depended on whether the proposed construction was a governmental or proprietary activity, a question of fact that could not be resolved on a demurrer. The court further concluded that the exemption only applies when a project is solely for educational purposes. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. The court held that the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose, which is a governmental activity. Therefore, the project falls within the Regents’ broad public purpose, and the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue. The court concluded that the demurrer should have been sustained and issued the writ of mandate. The court also ordered modifications to the published opinion filed on June 13, 2024, but there was no change in the judgment. View "Regents of the University of Calif. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2016, Richard Anthony Rodriguez pleaded guilty to attempted murder and admitted a prior strike for assault with a deadly weapon with great bodily injury. The incident involved Rodriguez firing a shot at a car containing his ex-girlfriend and another individual, though no one was injured. In 2021, Rodriguez petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6, arguing that he lacked specific intent to kill. His petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing.Rodriguez's petition for resentencing was based on the argument that the trial court failed to act as an independent fact finder, applied the wrong burden of proof, and violated his federal constitutional due process rights. He contended that if the trial court had properly weighed the evidence and held the prosecution to the correct standard of proof, there is a reasonable probability he would be found not guilty of attempted murder because he lacked specific intent to kill.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, disagreed with Rodriguez's arguments. The court noted that Rodriguez's guilty plea admitted every element of attempted murder, making any evidence contradicting his admission irrelevant. The only issue to be determined was whether intent was imputed to him because he aided and abetted an accomplice in a different crime, or whether he was the sole perpetrator whose intent was personal to him. Once it was shown Rodriguez was the undisputed sole perpetrator, the trial court correctly found his intent to kill was personal and denied relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an arbitration award in a real estate transaction. The plaintiffs, Miguel and Lizette Valencia, purchased a home from the defendants, Armando Mendoza, Coastal Holdings, LLC, and Class A Realty, Inc. After discovering undisclosed defects in the home, the Valencias initiated an arbitration proceeding against the defendants. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Valencias, awarding them damages for repairs, loss of use, statutory penalties, and inspection fees, as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees.The defendants appealed the arbitration award to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the court erred in denying their petition to vacate the arbitration award and in confirming the Valencias' petition to confirm the award. The defendants also contended that the arbitrator committed legal error by excluding key evidence from the arbitration hearing. The trial court affirmed the arbitration award, finding that the defendants' petition to vacate the award was untimely and that they failed to show that the arbitrator erred in its rulings excluding evidence.On appeal to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in not considering the evidence they submitted with their late-filed petition to vacate the arbitration award. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of error in the arbitration award. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the award without considering the defendants' untimely evidence. View "Valencia v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

The case involves Kyle Andrew Williams, who was convicted for attempted murder and sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Williams argued that he was ineligible for resentencing as he was prosecuted and convicted as the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The trial court denied his petition, basing its decision partly on transcripts from Williams' preliminary hearing and plea colloquy.On appeal, Williams contended that the court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage by engaging in impermissible factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea. He further argued that neither his plea nor his counsel’s stipulation to a factual basis for the plea rendered him ineligible for resentencing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the record of conviction did not establish Williams' ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court found that the trial court had engaged in premature judicial factfinding based on the preliminary hearing transcript and change of plea colloquy. The court held that neither the information nor Williams' plea established his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. The court also held that the preliminary hearing transcript did not establish Williams' resentencing ineligibility. The court concluded that the preliminary hearing transcript did not conclusively establish that Williams was convicted of attempted murder under a valid theory. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Christopher Lee Cofer, who was sentenced concurrently in five separate cases as part of a negotiated disposition. The trial court did not award presentence custody credits in all the cases for all the days Cofer was in actual custody, citing a previous decision in People v. Jacobs.The trial court proceedings involved five criminal cases that were resolved together. Cofer was charged with various crimes including vehicle burglary, possession of burglar's tools, driving without a license, and grand theft of personal property. He resolved all five cases by plea agreement and was sentenced to a six-year term in one case and concurrent terms in the other cases. Cofer filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the calculation of presentence custody credits.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District disagreed with the trial court's reliance on the Jacobs decision. The appellate court concluded that when a defendant is sentenced concurrently at a single hearing to resolve multiple cases that were not previously the subject of a judgment of conviction or probationary disposition, Penal Code section 2900.5 requires the trial court to apply presentence credits for all periods of actual custody toward all of those concurrent sentences. The judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for the limited purpose of recalculating defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "People v. Cofer" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Brittany B., who appealed from juvenile court orders that found her two children, B.D. and C.D., to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and placed them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court sustained a petition based on allegations that C.D. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates, and that the mother’s substance abuse placed both children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The mother contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously reversed the orders. The mother had tested positive for opiates during her pregnancy and at the time of C.D.'s birth. However, C.D. did not display any symptoms of withdrawal, and the mother was attentive to both children. The DCFS did not seek to detain the children, but it did open a case and seek court supervision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three agreed with the mother's contention and reversed the juvenile court's orders. The court found that while the mother had used prescription drugs during her pregnancy, there was no substantial evidence that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the mother's substance abuse. The court also found that the mother's refusal to voluntarily submit to drug testing did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). View "In re B.D." on Justia Law

The petitioner, Milton Jonas Arias Molina, was charged with special circumstances murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. During the preliminary examination, Molina and his two co-defendants were required to share a single Spanish-language interpreter. Molina sought relief after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on the failure to provide him with his own interpreter throughout the preliminary examination.The charges arose from a homicide that occurred in October 2018. The Santa Cruz County District Attorney charged Molina and his two co-defendants with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and street terrorism. The complaint also alleged two special circumstances—that the murder was committed by means of lying in wait and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang—along with various other firearm and gang sentencing enhancements.The preliminary examination was conducted in 13 sessions over the course of 15 months. During the first day of the preliminary examination, Molina’s counsel objected that the hearing would be conducted with a single interpreter for all three defendants. The prosecutor also voiced her concerns about the lack of interpreters. The magistrate stated that he intended to proceed with the hearing, with the understanding that if any of the defendants needed to speak with counsel, he would interrupt the proceedings to permit that.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District concluded that the failure to provide an individual interpreter for Molina at his preliminary examination reasonably might have affected the outcome. The court issued the writ of mandate instructing the trial court to vacate its order denying Molina’s motion to dismiss and enter a new order granting that motion, without prejudice to the Santa Cruz County District Attorney refiling the charges and conducting a new preliminary examination. View "Molina v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Martin Tait, Jane Tait, and Bry-Mart, LLC (collectively, the Taits) who sued Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth) for breach of a title insurance policy. The Taits alleged that Commonwealth failed to pay the full amount by which their property’s value was diminished due to an undisclosed easement. The Taits had purchased a residential property in Danville for $1.25 million and had plans to subdivide the property into two lots. However, they discovered a separate 1988 maintenance easement that they believed would impact the marketability and value of the property and interfere with its potential development.The trial court granted Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required Commonwealth to compensate the Taits only for the value of their actual use of the property as a vacant residential lot suitable for only one home rather than its highest and best use as a subdividable lot. The court reasoned that the legal standard for title insurance losses did not permit consideration of a property’s highest and best use, only its actual use as vacant residential land.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four disagreed with the trial court's interpretation. The appellate court held that the Taits’ policy entitles them to reimbursement for the diminution in value of their property based on its highest and best use. The court found that the Taits’ evidence of the likelihood of subdivision and the value of a subdividable lot created a triable issue of fact regarding the amount of the Taits’ loss under the policy, thereby precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Tait v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant, Haadi Bolourchi, who was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The defendant was pulled over by Officer Kevin Finerty for vehicle code violations. The officer noticed signs of intoxication and conducted several field sobriety tests, which Bolourchi failed. Bolourchi admitted to smoking cannabis the day before and was arrested. Officer Finerty requested Bolourchi to submit to a blood test, but Bolourchi insisted that a warrant be obtained first. Bolourchi also offered Officer Finerty $1,000 to let him go, which was interpreted as a bribe.In the trial court, Bolourchi was convicted of driving under the influence of a drug and bribing an executive officer. The court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed Bolourchi on three years’ probation, and ordered a jail term of 180 days. Bolourchi appealed, arguing that the court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2130, an instruction that states a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by California’s implied consent statute may show consciousness of guilt.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a motorist's refusal to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained can be used as an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt in a DUI trial. The court found no instructional error in the use of CALCRIM No. 2130 and rejected Bolourchi's argument that he had a constitutional right to demand a warrant before submitting to a blood draw. The court concluded that while the Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant to conduct a blood draw, Bolourchi could still face an adverse inference at his trial on a DUI charge as a cost of refusing a blood test. View "People v. Bolourchi" on Justia Law

In September 2020, CloudKitchens applied to the City of Oakland's Planning Department for a zoning clearance to convert a wood shop into a commercial kitchen. The proposed facility was described as a compartmentalized commercial kitchen for take-out services only, measuring roughly 14,000 square feet. The facility is located in a Housing and Business Mix-1 Commercial Zone (HBX-1 zone), which permits certain industrial activities classified as "Light Manufacturing." The Planning Department issued CloudKitchens a zoning clearance and later a building permit allowing renovations.In April 2021, the San Pablo Avenue Golden Gate Improvement Association, Inc., and Oakland Neighborhoods For Equity (Neighbors) learned of CloudKitchens's plans. They sent a letter to the City Administrator requesting that the City reconsider its approval of CloudKitchens as qualifying for HBX-1 classification. The City's Zoning Manager responded, maintaining that the decision was proper. In July, Neighbors filed a formal complaint requesting the Planning Department initiate a revocation review process. They alleged that CloudKitchens will become a nuisance due to increased traffic, air pollution, and noise, and that the commercialized kitchen is essentially a Fast-Food Restaurant not permitted in an HBX-1 zone. The Planning Department denied the request.Neighbors then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed, holding that chapter 17.152 “does not create a legal basis to challenge a prior zoning determination made by the City.” Neighbors appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that chapter 17.152 does not provide a legal basis to challenge the Planning Department’s interpretations and determinations of the zoning regulations, including use classifications and zoning clearances. The court also noted that the Enforcement Regulations still permit Neighbors to seek a revocation hearing for any nonconforming uses (or nuisances) if they arise. However, the Enforcement Regulations do not allow members of the public to challenge use classifications or zoning determinations outside the procedures prescribed in chapter 17.132. View "San Pablo Ave. Golden Gate Improvement Assn. v. City Council of Oakland" on Justia Law