Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Association (Casa Blanca) and its dispute with the County of Santa Barbara (County) and the California Coastal Commission (Commission). Over 30 years ago, the County approved the development of a 12-lot oceanfront subdivision in Carpinteria, managed by Casa Blanca. One of the conditions for approval was the construction of a public beach access walkway. The County accepted the offer to dedicate the walkway in 2011. In 2017, the County and Commission alleged that Casa Blanca had missed the deadline to construct the walkway. Casa Blanca submitted construction plans but was told it needed a coastal development permit from the Commission. The Commission deemed the application incomplete, leading to a series of unsuccessful attempts to complete the application.The trial court found that Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action and denied Casa Blanca's. The court found that the offer to dedicate had been timely accepted by the County. As for the second cause of action seeking a determination regarding the deadline for Casa Blanca to construct the walkway, the court found it had no jurisdiction because Casa Blanca had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Commission demurred on grounds Casa Blanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment in favor of the County and Commission.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that Casa Blanca's action was not ripe because it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court also disagreed with Casa Blanca's argument that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to its claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. The court concluded that a party may not evade the exhaustion requirement by filing an action for declaratory or injunctive relief. View "Casa Blanca Beach Estates Owners’ Assn v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves Xingfei Luo, who twice sought a restraining order against Professor Eugene Volokh under the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Luo wanted to prevent Volokh from identifying her in his writings. After the trial court dismissed the first petition, Luo moved to "strike" exhibits she filed in support of that failed petition. The trial court denied that motion and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude her from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. Luo appealed these orders. The second case involves Luo’s second petition for a restraining order where the trial court granted Volokh’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion and dismissed Luo’s second petition. Luo also appealed from a subsequent order granting Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in her second petition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Luo's first petition for a restraining order, concluding that the alleged harmful conduct was "likely protected free speech." The court also found that the alleged facts did not comprise acts of violence, threats of violence, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed the petitioner and caused substantial emotional distress. Luo did not appeal from the order discharging that petition. However, Luo filed an "ex parte application for an order to strike and withdraw improperly filed exhibits." The trial court denied Luo’s ex parte motion to “strike” her exhibits because Luo had not completed the proper forms for submitting an ex parte motion. Luo filed a new motion and Volokh again opposed it, and also filed a separate motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. The trial court denied Luo’s motion to strike her exhibits and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the order granting Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Luo’s second petition. The court dismissed Luo’s appeals as to the trial court’s ruling on her motion to strike exhibits in her first petition and the court’s granting of Volokh’s motions in both cases to use her actual name. The court concluded that these rulings are based on nonappealable orders. View "Luo v. Volokh" on Justia Law

The case involves Lusardi Construction Company (Lusardi), a prime contractor, and its subcontractor, Pro Works Contracting Inc. (Pro Works). Pro Works violated certain Labor Code provisions by failing to hire apprentices for a construction project. The Department of Industrial Relations and the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) cited Pro Works for these violations and ordered Lusardi to pay penalties. Lusardi's administrative appeal was unsuccessful, and it subsequently filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the superior court denied. Lusardi argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that it knew of Pro Works's violations and that the joint and several liability provision applied.The Superior Court of San Diego County affirmed the DLSE's decision, concluding that Lusardi had knowledge of Pro Works's violations and was liable for the penalties. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the findings relating to the amount of the penalty assessment. The court rejected Lusardi's claim of due process violations, stating that Lusardi was put on notice of the potential for being held jointly and severally liable for Pro Works’s apprentice hiring violations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the superior court did not err in interpreting the statute, which provides two inclusive and alternative ways for imposing liability on a prime contractor for penalties resulting from the subcontractor’s violations. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the penalty imposed. The court concluded that Lusardi was not denied due process when it refused to enforce its subpoena or ask for a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance. View "Lusardi Construction Co. v. Dept. of Industrial Rel." on Justia Law

In 2020 and 2021, two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Doe WHBE 3 and Jane Doe LSA 35, filed separate lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Raiser, LLC, alleging they were sexually assaulted by their Uber drivers in Hawaii and Texas, respectively. These cases, along with hundreds of others, were coordinated before a single judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. Uber moved to stay the cases on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that the cases should be heard in the jurisdictions where the alleged incidents occurred. The trial court granted Uber's motions, staying the cases and providing for tolling of the statute of limitations.The trial court's decision was based on a comprehensive 21-page order that considered whether the alternate forums (Hawaii and Texas) were suitable for trial, the private interests of the litigants, and the public interest in retaining the action for trial in California. The court concluded that the alternate forums were suitable, and that the public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of transfer. The court also found that the cases should be viewed as individual sexual assault/misconduct cases in which the plaintiffs claimed Uber was vicariously liable due to its deficient safety practices, rather than as corporate misconduct cases.The plaintiffs appealed both the trial court’s forum non conveniens order and the agreed-upon order applying it to the non-California cases. They argued that the trial court erred in failing to ensure that a suitable alternative forum existed for all the affected cases, failing to require Uber to demonstrate that California was a “seriously inconvenient” forum, and failing to “accord the coordination order proper deference.” The Court of Appeal rejected all of these arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999, Sylvester Williams was convicted of indecent exposure with a prior conviction and sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, plus an additional two years for two prior prison term enhancements. In 2012, Williams filed a petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The trial court denied Williams’ petition after finding that he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. In 2023, Williams sought relief for his newly invalid prior prison term enhancements, arguing that he was entitled to be resentenced to a maximum sentence of six years as a “two-striker” under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The trial court agreed and resentenced Williams to six years, struck the two prior prison term enhancements, and deemed the sentence satisfied.The People appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act when resentencing Williams under section 1172.75 due to invalid prior prison term enhancements. They contended that by doing so, the court bypassed the public safety inquiry required by section 1170.126 of the Three Strikes Reform Act, and that section 1172.75 thereby constitutes an improper amendment of the Three Strikes Reform Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the People. It held that applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act to reduce a defendant’s indeterminate life term to a determinate term when the defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75 due to an invalid prior prison term enhancement unconstitutionally amends the resentencing procedure and requirements set forth in section 1170.126 of the voter-approved Three Strikes Reform Act. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order resentencing Williams to a six-year term and to hold a new resentencing hearing at which Williams’s sentence of 25 years to life is reinstated. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In April 2017, Israel Ackerman engaged in a verbal altercation with Anthony K., left, and later returned to stab Anthony four times. Ackerman was found unconscious in the apartment, and Anthony, bleeding profusely, walked to a fire station. At trial, Ackerman argued self-defense. A jury convicted him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, among other crimes, and found true allegations that Ackerman personally inflicted great bodily injury. His sentence included a three-year term for the enhancement. Ackerman appealed, arguing that the law prohibits trial courts from imposing a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement where the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter.Ackerman's original sentence was appealed, and while it was pending, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended he be resentenced, citing a case that prohibited application of a great bodily injury enhancement to a charge of manslaughter. The trial court disagreed with the recommendation, finding that the case did not apply to attempted manslaughter. The court reasoned that great bodily injury was not necessarily an element of attempted manslaughter, unlike completed manslaughter. The court then resentenced Ackerman to 15 years in custody.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment. Ackerman argued that the law does not authorize the addition of a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement when the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter. The court disagreed, stating that the interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. The court found that the plain language of the statute exempts only the completed crimes of murder and manslaughter, violations of certain sections, and crimes where infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense. The court concluded that actual infliction of great bodily injury is not an element of the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, as it is for all other kinds of manslaughter. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

The case involves the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) and the County of Los Angeles. LACERA, a public employee retirement system, sued the County over the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for its employees. LACERA argued that under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL) and the California Constitution, it had the authority to create employment classifications and set salaries for its employees. The County disagreed, asserting that it had the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for all county employees, including those of LACERA.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sided with the County, following a 2003 decision, Westly v. Board of Administration, which held that the broad authority granted to retirement boards was not broad enough to give them the power to establish employment classifications and set salaries for their employees.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the Westly decision was inconsistent with the language, purpose, and intent of Proposition 162, a 1992 voter initiative that gave governing boards of public employee retirement systems “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” The court concluded that this plenary authority included the power to create employment classifications and set salaries for employees of the retirement system. The court also found that section 31522.1 of the CERL imposed a ministerial duty on a county board of supervisors to include in the county’s employment classifications and salary ordinance the classifications and salaries adopted by the board of a county public employee retirement system for employees of that system. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court. View "L.A. County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Ryan Owen Frayo, a former employee of A&A Organic Farms Corporation (A&A), who was terminated for refusing to take a COVID-19 test. Frayo sued A&A and its owners, Andrew D. Martin and Aimee M. Raphael-Martin, alleging they violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). Frayo claimed that his termination was a result of his refusal to provide a COVID-19 test result, which he argued was equivalent to refusing to sign an authorization for the release of his medical information under the CMIA. He also claimed that A&A used his description of his symptoms, which he considered as medical information, to terminate his employment.The trial court sustained A&A’s demurrer to Frayo’s first amended complaint, finding that Frayo failed to state a claim under the CMIA. The court concluded that Frayo failed to state a claim under section 56.20(b) of the CMIA because the statute prohibits employer discrimination based on an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization to release his medical information, not refusal to take a COVID-19 test. The court also sustained the demurrer to Frayo’s second cause of action under section 56.20(c) because Frayo failed to allege A&A had possession of his medical information, as defined by the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Frayo did not state a cognizable CMIA claim under either section 56.20(b) or (c). The court found that Frayo's refusal to take and provide the results of a COVID-19 test was not equivalent to an "employee’s refusal to sign an authorization" under the CMIA. Furthermore, the court concluded that Frayo failed to allege that A&A was in possession of his medical information as defined under the CMIA. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Frayo v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 2018, Ivan Morales was found guilty of robbery and attempted premeditated murder, among other offenses. The jury found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury during the robbery and attempted murder. The crimes occurred in 2016 when Morales and his friend Sergey Gutsu robbed an armored truck and shot an employee, Glenn, multiple times with an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle. Glenn survived the attack. Later that day, the police arrested Gutsu and Morales.The trial court found Morales guilty of the charges, and the judgment was affirmed in 2020. In 2022, Morales filed a petition to vacate the attempted murder conviction and for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The trial court denied the petition, finding that Morales failed to make a prima facie claim for relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the jury's verdicts established all the factual findings necessary to support an attempted murder conviction under current law. The court noted that the jury found that the shooting of Glenn was an attempted premeditated murder and that Morales was the shooter. Therefore, the court held that Morales was not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Morales" on Justia Law

This case involves TRC Operating Co., Inc. and TRC Cypress Group, LLC (collectively TRC) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), oil producers operating adjacent well fields in Kern County, California. Both companies pump from a shared underground oil reservoir and engage in a process known as “cyclic steaming” to make oil extraction more efficient. In 1999, a “surface expression” formed near a Chevron well, which occurs when the steaming process causes a lateral fracture from the wellbore, allowing oil and other effluent to escape to the surface. Despite Chevron’s attempts at remediation, in 2011, an eruption occurred in the area of the well, causing a sinkhole to form, which killed a Chevron employee. The state oil and gas regulator issued various orders preventing steaming in the area, which lasted four years. TRC sued Chevron, claiming Chevron’s negligent maintenance and operation of its property led to dangerous conditions which made it unsafe to perform cyclic steaming operations. These conditions led to the regulator's shut-down orders, and to TRC’s harm and damages. Chevron countersued, claiming TRC’s failure to adequately maintain its own wells was the cause of the surface expression, the eruptions, and damages suffered by Chevron. The jury found in favor of TRC, awarding approximately $120 million in damages against Chevron. Nothing was awarded to Chevron. Chevron filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial court denied the JNOV, but granted a new trial based on misconduct by a juror. TRC appealed the granting of this motion. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a new trial, finding that the juror was not ineligible and no prejudice resulted from the juror’s failure to disclose his prior criminal conviction or the previous civil lawsuit. Chevron also filed a protective cross-appeal, in the event the Court of Appeal found against it on TRC’s appeal. Chevron appealed the denial of its JNOV, arguing that the regulator's orders to stop steaming were the superseding cause of any harm suffered by TRC and precludes it from bearing any liability. The Court of Appeal concluded sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the verdict, demonstrating TRC did not stop any of its steaming operations solely because of the regulator's orders, which were therefore not a superseding cause. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment against Chevron. View "TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law