Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the death of Skyler A. Womack (Skyler) at Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., a skilled nursing facility. Skyler's parents, Jonie A. Holland (Holland) and Wayne D. Womack (Wayne), filed a lawsuit against Silverscreen, alleging dependent adult abuse and negligence on behalf of Skyler, as well as their own claim for wrongful death. Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of the entire complaint based on an arbitration agreement between Skyler and Silverscreen.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Silverscreen’s motion to compel arbitration for the survivor claims but denied the motion for the wrongful death cause of action. The court reasoned that the parents did not have an enforceable arbitration agreement with Silverscreen. The court's decision was heavily influenced by the case Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc.Silverscreen appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellant argued that, according to Ruiz v. Podolsky, the parents are bound by the arbitration agreement signed by Skyler, and therefore, the parents’ wrongful death claim should be subject to arbitration. The appellate court agreed with Silverscreen, stating that Ruiz governs this matter. Consequently, under Ruiz and Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, the parents’ wrongful death claim must go to arbitration along with Skyler’s survivor claims. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves David Arias, who was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse against a minor. During the trial, the defense challenged the prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike against a prospective Black female juror. The trial court ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination was established, but accepted the prosecutor's reasons for the strike without further discussion. Arias was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.The trial court's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District. The appellate court found that the trial court's denial of the defense's challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strike was improper. The prosecutor's reasons for the strike did not withstand scrutiny. The appellate court concluded that the record lacked sufficient evidence on which the trial court could have reasonably relied to accept the prosecutor's reasons for striking the juror without further probing and explanation. As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. View "P. v. Arias" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Braden Nanez, who was injured in an auto accident while off work and away from his job at a remote fire base camp. His employer, 3 Stonedeggs, Inc., expected employees not to leave the job site and to notify a manager if they did. Nanez did not notify a manager he was leaving camp. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) determined that under the commercial traveler rule, workers’ compensation coverage applied to Nanez's injuries. The Board found that Nanez’s use of his own car while off work to drive approximately 70 miles away from camp purportedly to obtain cellular service was conduct reasonably expected by his employer to be incident to its requirement that Nanez spend time away from home where cellular service was not adequately provided at the camp.The employer, 3 Stonedeggs, Inc., and its insurer, Technology Insurance Company, Inc., administered by Amtrust North America, petitioned for a writ of review, arguing that the Board acted in excess of its authority and that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s findings. They argued that Nanez was injured during a material deviation from his employment; he left the camp without employer approval on a personal activity that, under the unique circumstances of working at this remote fire camp, was not contemplated by the employer.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District denied the petition, finding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. The court concluded that under the circumstances of Nanez’s age, his having his personal vehicle with him, the structure of his shifts, the remoteness of the camp, and his not being prohibited from using his vehicle during his off hours, it was reasonable for the employer to expect that Nanez would leave camp in his car during his off time as incident to being employed away from home. View "3 Stonedeggs, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

In 2015, GPT Maple Avenue Owner, LP (GPT) purchased a property that was subject to a lease to Equinix, LLC (Equinix). At the time of GPT’s acquisition, the remaining term of the lease was 26 years. The Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined that GPT’s acquisition resulted in a “change in ownership” permitting reassessment for property tax purposes because, at the time of the sale, the remaining term of the lease was under 35 years. This was based on the statutes implementing Proposition 13, which state that whether the transfer of a lessor’s interest in taxable real property results in a change in ownership generally depends on the length of the remaining lease term at the time of the transfer.Equinix appealed the Assessor’s 2015 change in ownership determination to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board, which found in favor of the county. Equinix and GPT then presented a refund claim to the county, which the county denied. Equinix and GPT filed a lawsuit, and the trial court ruled in favor of the county, concluding that, under the “express language” of the relevant statutes, the sale of the Property to GPT in March 2015 resulted in a change in ownership because at the time of sale the remaining term of Equinix’s lease was less than 35 years.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found that under the unambiguous language of the relevant statute, the 2015 transaction is a change in ownership permitting reassessment. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the statute is inconsistent with Proposition 13 and another section in the statutory scheme. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the statute is inconsistent with the overarching rules set forth in another section of the law. The court concluded that the Legislature was not required to adhere to the task force’s recommendations and that the statute as enacted did not render the law illogical. View "Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Robert Bassi and Susan Bassi. After their divorce, Susan sent a series of e-mails to Robert, which he claimed were harassing and disturbed his peace. These e-mails were related to Susan's intent to file a federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against Robert and others. In response, Robert filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Susan. Susan then filed an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion, arguing that her e-mails were protected free speech and litigation correspondence. The trial court denied Susan's anti-SLAPP motion, finding that several of the e-mails were not privileged or protected speech, and that Robert had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his DVRO petition.The trial court's decision was based on the conclusion that several of Susan's e-mails were not protected activity as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that even if Susan did meet her burden at the first step, the motion would fail because Robert had met his burden of demonstrating a probability of success on the merits of his DVRO petition. The court noted that it had previously found, in granting the requested temporary personal conduct and stay-away order, that Robert’s petition was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for a permanent DVRO under the applicable Family Code provisions.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found that while some of Susan's e-mails were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute, others were not. The court also found that Robert had made a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable result on his DVRO petition if the facts he alleges are substantiated. Therefore, Robert's claim under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act had at least the requisite minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. View "Bassi v. Bassi" on Justia Law

A mother, Daisy M., appealed the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, D.M., arguing that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to conduct an adequate investigation under state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). The mother claimed that DPSS did not fulfill its duty of initial inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), which requires an investigation into the child's potential Indian heritage.The Superior Court of Riverside County had previously found that DPSS had conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not apply. The court ordered the mother to file a Parental Notification of Indian Status form, which she did, denying any Indian ancestry. The court subsequently terminated the mother's parental rights after she was arrested for battery and driving under the influence, and the child was taken into protective custody.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed with previous rulings that the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2(b) applies only if the child was placed into temporary custody without a warrant. As D.M. was taken into custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant, the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2(b) was not triggered. Therefore, the mother's argument failed. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

The case involves George and Sheila Byers, who filed a lawsuit against their homeowners' insurance provider, USAA General Indemnity Company (USAA), and other defendants. The Byerses alleged that USAA breached their contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in relation to the installation of hardwood flooring at their home. They sought attorneys' fees as damages under the Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) principle, which allows for the recovery of attorney fees when an insurer's tortious conduct compels the insured to hire an attorney to obtain policy benefits.USAA sought to compel the Byerses to produce documents related to their attorney fees, arguing that by seeking Brandt fees, the Byerses had waived their attorney-client privilege regarding these documents. The Byerses objected, arguing that the requests were ambiguous, overbroad, and violated attorney-client privilege. The trial court granted USAA's motion to compel, allowing the Byerses to redact any references they believed reflected attorney work product.The Byerses then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, challenging the trial court's order. They argued that the trial court had forced them to waive their attorney-client privilege and had abused its discretion by ordering the production of all invoices, fee agreements, and payment history.The appellate court denied the Byerses' petition. It found that by seeking Brandt fees, the Byerses had impliedly waived their attorney-client privilege regarding the attorney fees documents. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order allowing the Byerses to redact references they believed reflected attorney work product. The court concluded that USAA had a right to learn about the attorney fees aspect of the Byerses' alleged damages during discovery. View "Byers v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves Amber C., the mother of a two-year-old child, Kieran S., who appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders after the court sustained a petition by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Amber's substance abuse posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Kieran. The Department received a referral in April 2019, stating that the parents used drugs in the child's presence. Amber tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine. Despite her positive test results, Amber denied using methamphetamine and claimed she did not use any drugs while with Kieran. After failing to cooperate with welfare checks and evading the Department, Amber absconded with Kieran.The juvenile court sustained counts under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Amber abused substances, failed to protect Kieran from Victor’s mental and emotional issues, and absconded with Kieran. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Kieran a dependent child of the court, removed him from his parents, ordered Amber to attend a drug treatment program, and ordered reunification services. Amber appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders, arguing that there was no evidence she was under the influence of drugs when Kieran was detained and that there was no evidence of neglect or risk of harm to Kieran in her care.The Supreme Court granted Amber’s petition for review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its prior decision and reconsider Amber’s appeal in light of In re N.R., which held that substance abuse is not prima facie evidence of a parent’s inability to provide regular care to a child of tender years. The Court of Appeal found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding Amber’s drug abuse created a substantial risk of physical harm to Kieran and affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Kieran S." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Andrew Reynosa and his former employer, Advanced Transportation Services, Inc. (ATS). Reynosa had signed an arbitration agreement with ATS during his employment. After leaving the company, he filed a complaint for damages against ATS, which was then moved to arbitration as per the agreement. However, Reynosa later filed a motion to withdraw from arbitration, arguing that ATS had twice failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period, thereby waiving its right to compel him to proceed with arbitration.The Tulare County Superior Court denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the deadline for payment of the arbitration fees, and ATS had paid the fees within the extended deadline. Therefore, the court concluded that ATS had not materially breached the arbitration agreement.Reynosa then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant his motion to withdraw from arbitration. The appellate court granted Reynosa's request for a stay of the arbitration proceedings and issued an order to show cause why writ relief should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the superior court had erroneously denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that ATS had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period. The court held that Reynosa was entitled to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court also ordered the superior court to address Reynosa's requests for sanctions under the relevant code of civil procedure. View "Reynosa v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves a father, H.A., who sought to vacate orders of the juvenile court that terminated his visitation rights and the mother’s reunification services, and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The father argued that the inquiry into the minors’ potential Indian heritage in this dependency case was insufficient and failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The San Joaquin County Human Services Agency had filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minors based on the parents’ substance abuse, domestic violence, and the mother’s untreated mental health issues. Both parents denied having any Native American ancestry.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed with the father's contention. The court found that the inquiry of relatives and family members about the minors’ potential Indian heritage was necessary to meet the requirements of the ICWA. The court noted that the Agency had contact with the maternal and paternal grandmothers and the paternal great-aunt, but did not ask them, or any other relatives, about possible Native American ancestry.The court vacated the juvenile court’s finding that the minors are not Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings to address compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of the ICWA. The court also issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the respondent juvenile court to vacate the ICWA findings and conduct further proceedings to determine whether the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been met. The court emphasized the obligations of the parents’ and minors’ counsel, the juvenile court, and the Agency under the ICWA. View "H.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law